Gherga v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gherga v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 351

MIGRATION – visas – refusal to grant partner visa – decision made in excess of jurisdiction - application of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Reg 1.15A in determining whether there is a genuine ‘married relationship’ – whether applicants denied natural justice because failure of Migration Review Tribunal to respond to enquiry as to whether available witnesses would be needed – breach of procedural fairness amounting to jurisdictional error that would deny protection of s474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether denial of procedural fairness deprived applicants of the possibility of a successful outcome – failure to consider a topic mandated by the Regulations

Statutes

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474, 362

Migration Regulations, 1994 (Cth) Sch 2, par 309; Reg 1.15A(1A), (3), (3)(c), (3)(c)(ii)

Cases

Broussard v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472 Referred to

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 Referred to

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGJB [2003] FCAFC 290 Referred to

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 Applied

Re Phillip Ruddock in his capacity as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;  Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60 Discussed

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 Applied

CORNELIU GHERGA and ELENA-LAURA GHERGA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Q94 of 2003

KIEFEL J
BRISBANE
29 MARCH 2004

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q94 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

CORNELIU GHERGA and ELENA-LAURA GHERGA
APPLICANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MARCH 2004

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The decision of the Migration Review Tribunal of 21 May 2003 be set aside.

2.The matter be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination according to law.

3.The Minister pay the applicants’ costs of the proceedings including any reserved costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q94 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

CORNELIU GHERGA and ELENA-LAURA GHERGA
APPLICANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE:

29 MARCH 2004

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The male applicant, Mr Corneliu Gherga, is an Australian citizen. The primary visa applicant is his wife, a Romanian national.  Her three children are secondary visa applicants.  On 7 August 2001 the Minister’s delegate refused to grant a Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). At issue is the review of that decision conducted by the Migration Review Tribunal.

  2. A key criterion for the grant of the visa in question is that the primary visa applicant is the spouse of an Australian citizen:

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 351
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Gherga v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs involved the applicants, Gherga and others, challenging a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) that rejected their application for a partner visa. The applicants argued that the Tribunal’s decision was made in excess of its jurisdiction, alleging breaches of natural justice and procedural fairness. They contended that the Tribunal failed to alert them that certain matters remained unresolved and declined to hear evidence on a topic mandated by the Regulations. Additionally, they argued that the review was not a genuine and realistic one and that the Tribunal did not apply Regulation 1.15A correctly. The applicants also challenged specific factual findings made by the Tribunal.

The legal issues before the court included whether a breach of procedural fairness amounted to jurisdictional error that would deny the protection of s 474 of the Migration Act, and whether the Tribunal was obligated to call witnesses notified by the applicants. The court considered precedents that established procedural fairness as a critical component of administrative law, notably Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala. The court also examined the requirements under the Migration Act and Regulations concerning the Tribunal’s consideration of evidence and social aspects of the relationship.

The court found that the Tribunal’s conduct did indeed constitute a breach of procedural fairness, affecting the applicants’ ability to present their case adequately. The Tribunal had not sufficiently addressed the necessity of the other witnesses and had failed to consider the social aspects of the relationship as required by the Regulations. This amounted to a jurisdictional error, thus the Tribunal’s decision was set aside. The matter was remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal for redetermination according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the proceedings.

In conclusion, the court's decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness in administrative law, emphasizing the Tribunal's obligation to ensure that applicants are not misled and that all relevant evidence is considered appropriately. The matter was remitted for a fresh determination, ensuring that the applicants' rights to a fair hearing were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Migration Review Tribunal of 21 May 2003 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination according to law.

3. The Minister pay the applicants’ costs of the proceedings including any reserved costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants, Mr and Mrs Gherga, were subject to a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) that their marriage was not genuine. The Tribunal's decision was based on several findings, including the fact that the couple had not lived together continuously since their marriage, and there was insufficient evidence to establish a genuine relationship. The applicants challenged the Tribunal's decision on various grounds, including the Tribunal's failure to consider certain evidence and allegations of procedural unfairness. The applicants argued that they were not alerted to the fact that certain matters remained as live issues, and the Tribunal impliedly declined to hear evidence from them on a topic mandated by the Regulations. They further contended that the review was not a 'proper, genuine and realistic review' and that the Tribunal did not apply Regulation 1.15A in deciding the matter.

The case came before the court on an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The applicants sought to set aside the Tribunal's decision and have the matter remitted for reconsideration. The court considered the arguments advanced by both parties, including the question of whether the Tribunal's conduct amounted to a breach of procedural fairness and whether this amounted to jurisdictional error. The applicants also challenged certain factual findings made by the Tribunal, although these are not necessary to set out in detail for the purposes of this summary.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL J
Issues
1. Did the Tribunal’s decision amount to a breach of procedural fairness, such that it constitutes jurisdictional error?
2. Did the Tribunal fail to consider the evidence as to the social aspects of the relationship as required by Reg 1.15A(3)(c)?
3. Was the review conducted in a manner that was a 'proper, genuine and realistic review'?
4. Did the Tribunal apply Regulation 1.15A in deciding the matter?

Held
1. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision amounted to a breach of procedural fairness, which constitutes jurisdictional error. As a result, the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal of 21 May 2003 was set aside.
2. The court found that the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence as to the social aspects of the relationship as required by Regulation 1.15A(3)(c).
3. The court determined that the review was not conducted in a manner that was a 'proper, genuine and realistic review'.
4. The court held that the Tribunal did not apply Regulation 1.15A in deciding the matter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL J

The Tribunal’s decision is alleged to have been made in excess of jurisdiction. The applicants contend that they were denied natural justice because the Tribunal failed to alert them to the fact that the matters upon which the other available witnesses would speak remained as live issues and because the Tribunal impliedly declined to hear evidence from them on a topic mandated by the Regulations. It is further contended that the review was not a ‘proper, genuine and realistic review’. It is contended that the Tribunal did not apply Regulation 1.15A in deciding the matter. Other aspects of the review dealt with in the written argument challenge particular factual findings. It is not necessary to set them out. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION Contrary to the submissions for the Minister, a breach of procedural fairness has been held to amount to jurisdictional error such as would deny the protection of s 474 of the Migration Act to what is there described as a ‘privative clause decision’: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 494, 508; (2003) 195 ALR 24 at [38], [83]; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82. See also Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGJB [2003] FCAFC 290. In Aala the Tribunal had caused the applicant to mistakenly believe that it had read some material which it had not, and thereby affected the way in which he conducted his case. In Re Phillip Ruddock in his capacity as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60, the Court also considered the question whether an applicant had been misled, although it was there held that what had had that potential in the Tribunal proceedings was negated by the discussion which ensued. The Tribunal Member was evidently sceptical about the particular claim the applicant had made. The Minister here also contends that it ought to have been apparent to Mr Gherga’s solicitor that the Tribunal had not accepted the marriage to be genuine for it continued to ask questions of Mr Gherga relevant to that wider question. The applicants do not rely upon some statutory obligation, on the part of the Tribunal, to call the witnesses notified by a party. Section 362 of the Migration Act requires the Tribunal to have regard to the wishes of an applicant with respect to the calling of witnesses, but it is not required to obtain that evidence. It may be said that the Tribunal had some regard, although cursory, to Mr Gherga’s list. The applicants’ case relies upon the Tribunal’s conduct in not replying to the enquiry whether the other witnesses were necessary, and they rely upon the Tribunal’s failure to consider the evidence as to the social aspects of the relationship as required by Reg 1.15A(3)(c). Whether there is some tension between the particular requirement in subparagraph (ii) to consider the opinions of friends and acquaintances about the nature of the relationship, and the Tribunal’s discretion not to hear a witness is not an issue in these proceedings.