Ghansham v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

Ghansham v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 633

File number: MLG 1716 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE RILEY
Date of judgment: 20 July 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – temporary partner visa – whether the Tribunal unreasonably failed to inform the applicant that his evidence needed to satisfy the requirements of IMMI 12/116 – whether there was a fraud on the Tribunal.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 s.65, 358(1), 425 and 426A

Migration Regulations 1994 reg 1.23, schedule 2 cl.820.221

Legislative Instrument IMMI 12/116

Cases cited:

Hinton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 146 ALD 184; [2015] FCA 408

Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16; Minister for Home Affairs v CHK16 (2020) 271 CLR 550; (2020) 385 ALR 212; [2020] HCA 46

Minister for Immigration v Gupta [2022] FCAFC 51

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; (2011) 119 ALD 1; (2011) 273 ALR 223; (2011) 85 ALJR 327; [2011] HCA 1

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189; (2007) 96 ALD 510; (2007) 237 ALR 64; (2007) 81 ALJR 1401; [2007] HCA 35

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 183
Dates of hearing: 22 and 23 November 2022 and 31 January and 19 April 2023 
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Angel Aleksov
Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Jonathan Barrington
Counsel for the Second Respondent: No appearance
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

MLG 1716 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

GHANSHAM GHANSHAM

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

judge riley

DATE OF ORDER:

20 July 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application filed on 18 June 2018 and amended on 26 July 2022 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.

Note:   The form of the order is subject to the entry in the court’s records.

Note:This copy of the court’s reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)..

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE RILEY:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa pursuant to s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”).

  2. The issues before the court are:

    (a)whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably in not identifying for the…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 633
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ghansham, an Indian citizen, sought judicial review of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs’ decision to refuse his application for a Partner (Residence) visa. The primary issue was whether the Tribunal's decision to refuse the visa was lawful, rational, and procedurally fair. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted and applied the legislative requirements concerning the evidence of family violence. Additionally, the court had to decide whether there was fraud or misrepresentation that affected the Tribunal's decision-making process.

The court examined the evidence presented to the Tribunal, including the statutory declaration and psychologist's report, and considered whether they met the requirements set out in IMMI 12/116. The court concluded that the statutory declaration did not mention domestic violence, and the psychologist's report did not provide the necessary opinion or identify the alleged perpetrator as required. Therefore, the applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a non-judicially determined claim of family violence. The Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's decision was correct because the applicant failed to demonstrate that he met the requirements for a Partner visa. Regarding the fraud allegation, the court found that the applicant's submissions were unconvincing. The court held that section 358(1) of the Act does not impose a reciprocal duty on the Tribunal to consider material provided under that section. The court relied on the authority of Hinton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which stated that there is no reason to consider that section 358(1) of the Act imposes a power or function on the Tribunal. Therefore, the court dismissed the fraud argument.

The court's final orders were that the application for judicial review be dismissed, and the respondent be awarded costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

It was not alleged that Mr Clarke was fraudulent. Sadly, Mr Juvekar died prior to the hearing in this case. The applicant alleged that Mr Singareddy and, possibly, Mr Juvekar perpetrated fraud on the applicant and the Tribunal.BACKGROUND In his written submissions filed on 20 October 2022, the Minister set out the background to this matter as follows: 2.The applicant is a male citizen of India. He applied for the visa on 16 June 2014 (which was actually a combined application for the visa and a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 801) visa application). He was sponsored by Ms Gurdeep Kaur, a permanent resident of Australia.3.On 11 March 2016, the Department wrote to the applicant inviting him to comment on information obtained from a site visit and from Centrelink to which the applicant’s representative provided a response on 29 March 2016.4.On 25 May 2016, the delegate of the first respondent refused to grant the visa, finding that there was no evidence that the parties saw the relationship as a long-term one, that they drew emotional support and companionship from each other, or that they had a commitment to a shared life together.5.On 31 May 2016, the applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision with the Tribunal.6.On 24 February 2018, the applicant’s representative wrote to the Tribunal advising that the sponsor was withdrawing her sponsorship as the relationship had broken down and there was an intervention order preventing the applicant from staying at her house.7.The applicant subsequently appointed a new migration agent and provided a psychological report dated 6 March 2018 by Carlo Saba and the intervention order as well as documents going to the genuineness of the relationship.8.On 16 March 2018, the applicant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also took oral evidence from Lovrjot Dhunna, Ravinder Singh, and Gurdial Singh.9.On 12 April 2018, the applicant’s representative provided to the Tribunal a statutory declaration for family violence by the applicant, an extract from the Magistrates’ Court indicating that the family violence application against the applicant was struck out, and a subsequent report from Carlo Saba dated 6 April 2018.10.On 8 May 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on the section 375A certificate, providing a copy of the certificate with the invitation. The letter explained that the member had found the certificate to be invalid and that the documents covered by the certificate were not relevant as sponsorship had been withdrawn.11.On 13 May 2018, the applicant responded to the letter, however his response did not address the certificate but rather made submissions as to his family violence claim and the genuineness of the relationship. The applicant’s representative also provided a response on 17 May 2018.12.On 29 May 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.13.The Tribunal noted that a s 375A certificate was attached to the Departmental file and that it had sent a letter to the applicant informing him of the certificate and that it found it to be invalid. The Tribunal noted that the applicant’s response requested the Tribunal to consider compelling and compassionate circumstances, which it found was not within the scope of the applicant's particular circumstances and therefore did not consider. The Tribunal noted that the applicant provided additional information which did not comment on the certificate and that the applicant’s representative also provided a response. The Tribunal found that the material covered by the certificate was not relevant to the matters at hand, namely whether there had been family violence, and therefore did not provide the material to the applicant to comment.14.The Tribunal noted that the sponsor had withdrawn her sponsorship of the applicant and the applicant accordingly claimed at the hearing that he was a victim of family violence. The Tribunal noted that the applicant was seeking to establish family violence on the basis of a non-judicially determined claim of family violence pursuant to regulation 1.23(9) and was seeking to rely on the evidence set out in regulation 1.24, namely a statutory declaration under regulation 1.25 and evidence of a type and number specified within Legislative Instrument IMMI 12/116.15.The Tribunal noted that a statutory declaration and psychologist’s report was provided on 12 April 2018. The Tribunal found that it had received a statutory declaration from the applicant which stated that the sponsor was the perpetrator of the violence, however the psychologist’s report did not mention domestic violence but rather focused on the applicant's challenges in responding to the breakdown of the relationship. The Tribunal also considered the previous report provided by the psychologist but found that this report discussed the claims of violence by the applicant against the sponsor.16.The Tribunal noted that the evidentiary requirements of IMMI 12/116 required the report from the psychologist to include a stated opinion that the alleged victim was subject to family violence, provide reasons for their opinion, and identify the alleged perpetrator. In the absence of these elements, the Tribunal found the applicant had not provided evidence of the type described in IMMI 12/116. The Tribunal found that the evidence presented did not meet regulation 1.24 and therefore a non-judicially determined claim of family violence had not been made. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet clause 820.223(3) and there was no evidence that he met any of the alternative sub criteria.(citations omitted)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In addition, oral evidence was received from:(a)the applicant;(b)Mr Clarke; and(c)Mr Singareddy.MR SINGAREDDY’S EVIDENCE The applicant subpoenaed Mr Singareddy, who attended court and gave oral and documentary evidence. He was the first witness to give oral evidence. His oral evidence included the following. Mr Singareddy said that he was a registered migration agent. He said that, until 2015, he ran a Registered Training Organisation (“RTO”). He said that, on about 13 May 2018, some of his former students from the RTO brought the applicant to see him to seek his assistance. He said that the applicant showed him the invitation to comment dated 8 May 2018 from the Tribunal. He said that he was not familiar with the family violence exception in partner visa cases and he had never done a matter of that type before. He said that he told the applicant that he should go to a different migration agent. He said that the applicant told him that he had no money to pay an agent. Mr Singareddy said that he agreed to help the applicant for no payment, because his former students had brought the applicant to see him. He denied receiving $1,500 in cash from the applicant or any money at all. Mr Singareddy said that the applicant had some notes in English, Hindi and Punjabi and based on those notes and what the applicant told him, Mr Singareddy typed up the submission sent to the Tribunal on 13 May 2018. Mr Singareddy denied preparing the statutory declaration sent with that submission. He said that the applicant brought a bundle of documents with him. Mr Singareddy said that the applicant understood “most” things in English. Mr Singareddy said that, after the Tribunal handed down its decision, the applicant texted him to ask how much it would cost to go to the Federal Court. I read the text messages out aloud in open court. They were in English. A person, who the applicant accepted was him, said, “Hi, sir. How much for the Federal fee?” Mr Singareddy responded, “600”. The applicant replied, “Altogether, I’m broke. That’s why asking have to manage everything.” A couple of weeks later, Mr Singareddy said, “Kindly note BHAI. Don’t forget to bring $150 to $200 for these documents preparation.” The applicant replied saying, “Thanks.” About a month later, Mr Singareddy said, “Passport copy send now. Thank you.” The applicant replied, “Okay” and sent a photograph of a passport. The message trail continued. Mr Singareddy said that the $600 was the Federal Court filing fee and the $150 to $200 was his fee for helping the applicant to settle his application to the Federal Court. Mr Singareddy said that he was not a lawyer so could not formally make a court application on the applicant’s behalf. Mr Singareddy said that, about a year later, the applicant again contacted him asking for assistance to arrange for his wife and child in India to come to Australia. Mr Singareddy said that the applicant was still married to this wife when he married the sponsor in the present case. Mr Singareddy produced some documents that he said proved this, but they did not prove that at all.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister noted in his closing written submissions on the fraud ground filed on 14 March 2023 at paragraph 70 that s.358(1) of the Act does not impose a reciprocal duty on the Tribunal to consider material provided under s.358(1) of the Act. The authority cited for that proposition was Hinton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 146 ALD 184; [2015] FCA 408, where McKerracher J said:43.Although s 358 of the Migration Act permits the applicant to provide “a written statement in relation to any matter of fact the applicant wishes the Tribunal to consider”, it is difficult to see, on a plain reading or as a matter of policy, that s 358 creates a corresponding duty on the Tribunal to consider a statement provided by an applicant. That is partly because of the content of s 359, which I will come to ……45.Secondly, if there were to be such a duty, it would have been easy for the legislature to express it in the clear terms of the statutory command which immediately follows s 358 in s 359 of the Migration Act. It provides:359 Tribunal may seek additional information (1) In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review....(emphasis added by McKerracher J) While Hinton only refers to a duty on the Tribunal, there is similarly no reason to consider that s.358(1) of the Act imposes a power or function on the Tribunal. Of course, the Tribunal has the general power, function and duty to consider the matter before it. However, that just takes us back to the warning of the High Court in DUA16 that, to vitiate a Tribunal decision, the fraud must affect a particular statutory duty, function or power, rather than the process of decision making in an abstract sense. The applicant’s response to Hinton is at paragraphs 25 and following of his written submissions in reply on the fraud ground filed on 21 March 2023. The applicant argued that s.358(1) of the Act is a critical provision. However, even if it is, Hinton is binding on this court. Its effect, in combination with DUA16, is that the particular statutory provision identified by the applicant does not provide a sufficient foundation for the fraud argument. It follows that ground 7 must be dismissed. For completeness, I will briefly address some other matters. The applicant’s final summary of his argument on fraud in his closing oral submissions was that the present case was like SZFDE. That was said to be because, in SZFDE, the Tribunal was misled into thinking that the applicant did not wish to attend the hearing and, in the present case, the Tribunal was misled into thinking that the applicant’s best case was as set out in the document provided by Mr Singareddy on 13 May 2018. The Tribunal in its reasons for decision in SZFDE said that:The applicant was put on notice by the Tribunal that it is unable to make a favourable decision on the information before it but the applicant has not provided any further information in support of her claims. Nor has she given the Tribunal an opportunity to explore aspects of her claims with her. A number of relevant questions are therefore left unanswered.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Juvekar was not available to give his side of the story. However, taking into account all of the evidence in the case, I consider that Mr Juvekar was aware of the requirements of IMMI 12/116. He arranged for the applicant to make the statutory declaration dated 3 March 2018 on form 1410. That form is headed, “Statutory declaration for family violence claim”. It said prominently, at the beginning:Before completing this declarationPlease ensure that you have read the explanatory notes that accompany this statutory declaration Question 7 on form 1410 stated:What evidence do you have of the family violence that has taken place?Please describe and attach any relevant evidence.Note: There are minimum evidence requirements as outlined on Fact sheet 38 Family Violence Provisions available from the department’s website >The court was not provided with the explanatory notes to form 1410 or fact sheet 38. However, I daresay that they spell out what is required by IMMI 12/116, or at least give clear directions to where to find it. I find it implausible that, having found form 1410, Mr Juvekar would not have followed the instructions and read the explanatory notes accompanying the form and read fact sheet 38. That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, at the hearing, he sought further time to provide further evidence. He would not have done so if he was not conscious that the existing material was inadequate, or, indeed, as the applicant submitted, if he wished to do the minimum amount of work. At the Tribunal, Mr Juvekar was obviously aware of the value of material from a psychologist, and aware that the existing letter was inadequate. He would not have had that awareness if he was oblivious to IMMI 12/116. It is interesting that Mr Juvekar said to the Tribunal (T32-3), in asking for more time:How long can you give? Because if you can give a little more, he’s always nervous. … I’m sure he will have a breakdown. He’ll not be talking with me for maybe a month or something like that. That’s my problem with my client. He doesn’t see me. When he’s all right, then he comes and sees me and then I have to do everything last minute. That’s why I gave you that bunch today. I mean, sorry. Whatever maximum you can give him on it. …That’s if he promises to go there because he'll agree to an appointment and not go there. This indicates that Mr Juvekar had difficulty getting his client to do what he advised. A corollary of that is that Mr Juvekar may have told the applicant what he had to do to meet the requirements of IMMI 12/116, and the applicant did not understand, or the applicant did not diligently follow the advice he was given or the appropriate documents simply could not be obtained. Further possibilities, available on the evidence, are that Mr Juvekar was incompetent or negligent. Any of these options would not amount to Mr Juvekar being dishonest, or recklessly indifferent to the requirements of IMMI 12/116.GROUNDS 1 TO 6 AND GROUNDS 1 TO 5.5