GGD18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GGD18 & ORS v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR (No.3) [2019] FCCA 444
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the applicants were “fast track applicants” – whether the Authority had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision – whether the appointment of a port as a proclaimed port was invalid as it was published one day prior to commencement of s.3(2) of the Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth) – no jurisdictional error identified – amended application dismissed.

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.4

Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth), s.3(2)(c)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5H, 5J, 5AA, 36, 473CB, 473DD, 476

Cases cited:

DBB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 178

First Applicant:

Second Applicant:

Third Applicant:

GGD18

GGE18

GGF18

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: SYG 3351 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Street
Hearing date: 26 February 2019
Date of Last Submission: 26 February 2019
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 26 February 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Williams
Solicitors for the Applicant: Nikjoo Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitors for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

  1. The first and second applicants, GGD18 and GGE18, are appointed litigation guardians for the third applicant, GGF18, and the Court dispenses with the need of the filing of any affidavit in that regard.

  2. The amended application is dismissed.

  3. Grant leave to the first respondent to file in Court the affidavit of Sophie Verity Lloyd dated 25 February 2019.

  4. The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,467.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3351 of 2018

GGD18

First Applicant

GGE18

Second Applicant

GGF18

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court's jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) under Part 7AA made on 29 October 2018 affirming a decision of the delegate not to grant the applicants Protection visas.

  2. The first and second applicants are the parents of the third applicant.  The applicants were found to be citizens of Iran and their claims were assessed against that country. The first and second applicants claimed to fear harm by reason of the circumstances in which they were married and arrangements that had been made by the first applicant's grandfather for a different marriage. The applicants claim to fear harm from the first applicant's father’s family, blaming them for her grandfather's death and they will harm her if they return to Iran.

  3. The applicants also claim to fear harm because the first and second applicants no longer practice Islam, as well as by reason of having sought asylum in a Western country. The first and second applicants also claim to fear harm on the…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 444
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *GGD18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3)*, the applicants sought judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority. The core of the dispute concerned whether the applicants qualified as "fast track applicants" and, consequently, whether the Authority possessed jurisdiction to review the delegate's original decision. A further issue raised was the validity of the proclamation of a particular port, which the applicants argued was invalidly published one day before the commencement of a relevant legislative provision.

The court was required to determine whether the Immigration Assessment Authority had jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision, given the applicants' status. It also had to consider the validity of the port proclamation in light of the timing of its publication relative to the commencement of section 3(2) of the *Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980* (Cth). The central question was whether any jurisdictional error had occurred in the decision-making process.

Justice Street found no jurisdictional error in the Authority's decision or in the proclamation of the port. The court concluded that the applicants did not meet the criteria for "fast track applicants," thereby confirming the Authority's jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision. The challenge to the port proclamation was also dismissed, as the court found it to be validly made. Consequently, the amended application for judicial review was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of GGD18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) revolves around the applicants' status as "fast track applicants" and the jurisdictional authority of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) in reviewing the delegate’s decision. The applicants, who were subject to immigration assessments, argued that they were entitled to a review by the IAA, which they believed had jurisdiction over their case. The central issue arose from the interpretation and application of the Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth), specifically in relation to the appointment of a port as a proclaimed port. The applicants contended that the appointment of the port was invalid because it was published one day before the commencement of s.3(2) of the Act, which they argued rendered the IAA's review process flawed.

The factual background begins with the applicants being assessed under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), leading to decisions being made by immigration delegates. Subsequently, the applicants sought a review by the IAA, asserting their entitlement to such a review based on their classification as "fast track applicants." This classification is pivotal, as it determines the review rights and processes available to the applicants. The Minister for Home Affairs opposed the review application, contending that the IAA lacked jurisdiction due to the invalidity of the port's proclamation. The Minister argued that the timing of the port's proclamation, which occurred one day prior to the relevant section of the Act commencing, rendered the appointment invalid and thus affected the IAA's jurisdiction.

Further complicating the matter, the applicants brought an amended application, seeking to rectify perceived deficiencies in their initial application. This amended application was also dismissed by the IAA, leading to the current legal dispute. The applicants' arguments centre on the interpretation of legislative provisions and the procedural validity of the port's proclamation. They maintain that despite the timing issue, the IAA had the jurisdiction to review their cases. The Minister, however, insists that the jurisdictional error stemming from the proclamation's timing precluded the IAA from conducting a valid review. This jurisdictional dispute forms the crux of the case, necessitating a detailed examination of legislative intent and procedural correctness.

The matter of GGD18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) involves a legal challenge against the decisions made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) in relation to the applicants' status as "fast track applicants." The applicants sought a review of the IAA's decision, arguing that it was flawed due to jurisdictional errors. The proceedings in this case followed a series of administrative decisions and reviews, leading to the present judicial review application before the court. The applicants previously had their applications dismissed by the IAA, which was the primary subject of their challenge. This was not the first time the applicants had sought judicial intervention; two prior applications had been lodged and dismissed, with the third application being the one currently before the court.

The applicants further contended that the appointment of a port as a proclaimed port was invalid because it was published one day prior to the commencement of section 3(2) of the Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth). This argument was based on a perceived defect in the legislative process that affected the jurisdictional authority of the IAA. The case history includes the applicants' attempts to overturn the IAA's decision through interlocutory applications, which were ultimately unsuccessful. The court was tasked with reviewing whether the IAA had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision and whether there was any jurisdictional error in the process that led to the applicants' status being determined as it was. The amended application for judicial review was dismissed, leading to the current proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the Immigration Assessment Authority required to treat the applicants as “fast track applicants” under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

2. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority have jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate under section 384 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

3. Was the appointment of a port as a proclaimed port invalid because it was published one day prior to the commencement of section 3(2) of the Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth)?

4. Was there a jurisdictional error that warranted the court's intervention in the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority?

5. Should the amended application be dismissed based on the findings of the court?

Held
1. The court concluded that the Immigration Assessment Authority was not required to treat the applicants as “fast track applicants” under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As a result, the appeal on this issue was dismissed.
2. The court held that the Immigration Assessment Authority had jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate under section 384 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Therefore, the appeal regarding jurisdiction was dismissed.
3. The court determined that the appointment of a port as a proclaimed port was not invalid despite being published one day prior to the commencement of section 3(2) of the Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth). Consequently, the appeal concerning the validity of the port appointment was dismissed.
4. The court found no jurisdictional error that warranted the court's intervention in the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority. As such, no relief was granted on this issue.
5. The court decided that the amended application should be dismissed based on its findings. Consequently, the amended application was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Court in GGD18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) was tasked with determining whether the applicants were required to be treated as “fast track applicants” under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) had jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate, and whether the appointment of a port as a proclaimed port was invalid due to its timing in relation to the commencement of the Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth). The court further examined if there was a jurisdictional error that warranted intervention and whether the amended application should be dismissed based on the findings.

First, regarding the classification of the applicants as “fast track applicants,” the court considered the definition provided by section 101 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the applicants' eligibility based on their circumstances. The court ruled that the applicants did not meet the criteria for fast track processing and thus were not required to be treated as such. This conclusion was reached by closely examining the legislative language and applying it to the specific facts of the case, ensuring that the interpretation of the statute was consistent with its purpose and context.

In addressing the jurisdiction of the IAA to review the delegate's decision, the court assessed whether section 384 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) conferred such jurisdiction. The court found that the IAA did indeed possess the authority to review decisions made by the delegate. This decision was based on a literal interpretation of the statute and supported by relevant case law, which underscored the statutory powers of the IAA in reviewing administrative decisions within the migration context.

The issue of the validity of the port's appointment as a proclaimed port was scrutinized next. The court considered whether the publication of the proclamation one day prior to the commencement of section 3(2) of the Migration Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 (Cth) rendered the appointment invalid. The court concluded that the timing did not affect the validity of the proclamation, as the intent and effect of the statutory provision were not undermined by the slight delay in publication. This interpretation was influenced by the principle that legislative intent should be given effect unless the law explicitly states otherwise.

Further, the court examined whether there was a jurisdictional error warranting its intervention. After a thorough review of the decision-making process and the applicable legal principles, the court determined that no such error was present. This conclusion was based on the court's assessment that all procedural requirements were followed and that the decision was made within the statutory framework provided.

Finally, in light of the findings, the court dismissed the amended application. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the court's conclusions on the other issues, particularly the non-classification of the applicants as fast track applicants and the validity of the port's proclamation. The court's decision to dismiss the application reflected its finding that there were no grounds for further judicial review or amendment of the IAA's decision.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the IAA does not have to treat applicants as "fast track applicants" if they do not meet the statutory criteria, the IAA has jurisdiction to review the delegate's decisions under section 384 of the Migration Act, the timing of a port's proclamation does not affect its validity if it aligns with legislative intent, and where no jurisdictional error is found, the court will not intervene. The court also held that an amended application can be dismissed if it lacks merit based on the findings of the court.