Gerzina v Repatriation Commission - [2003] FMCA 490

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GERZINA v REPATRIATION COMMISSION

[2003] FMCA 490

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – post traumatic stress disorder – Veterans Entitlements Act 1975 – war caused disease – whether diagnostic criteria for post traumatic stress disorder requires finding of “intense horror” or “horror” – meaning of “intense fear, helplessness or horror”.

Veterans Entitlements Act 1975, ss.9(1)(a), 9(1)(b), 13(1)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s.44

Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 160 ALR 17
Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2001) 34 AAR 270
Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 335
Woodward v Repatriation Commission (2003) 200 ALR 332
Hill v Repatriation Commission (2001) FCA 1775
Repatriation Commission v Hill (2002) 69 ALD 581
Richardson v Austin (1911) 12 CLR 463
Harris v Repatriation Commission (2000) 32 AAR 84
Knight v Repatriation Commission (2002) FCA 103

Applicant:

ALDO ANDRE GERZINA

Respondent:

REPATRIATION COMMISSION

File No:

MZ 668 of 2003

Delivered on:

7 November 2003

Delivered at:

Melbourne

Hearing Date:

6 October 2003

Judgment of:

McInnis FM

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr Moore

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Peter J Liefman

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr P. Hanks QC, with Ms J. McDonnell

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The Application dated 1 April 2003 be dismissed.
The Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s costs pursuant to the Federal Court scale up to and including the date of transfer from the Federal Court to the Federal Magistrates Court and thereafter pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules with the costs to be taxed in default of agreement pursuant to Order 62 of the Federal Court Rules.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
MELBOURNE

MZ 668 of 2003

ALDO ANDRE GERZINA

Applicant

and

REPATRIATION COMMISSION

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

By an application filed in the Federal Court and dated 1 April 2003 Aldo Andre Gerzina, the applicant, seeks to appeal from a decision of the Veterans Appeals Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The decision which is the subject of the appeal was made by the AAT on 5 March 2003. This application was transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia by order of the Federal Court made on 19 June 2003.
The appeal relates to a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal following a decision before that tribunal of the Repatriation Commission made on 9 September 1999, affirmed by the Veterans Review Board (VRB) on 5 December 2000.
The notice of appeal in the present application essentially raises a single ground of appeal. The ground of appeal in the notice reads as follows:
“The Tribunal erred in law in finding that the diagnostic criteria for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (ICD_9-CM CODE 309.81) set out in the ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ Fourth Edition required it to find on the evidence before it that the Applicant's response to a traumatic event involved ‘intense horror’, and distinct from ‘horror’ simpliciter, before it could conclude that he was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder”.
The legislative framework giving rise to the proceedings has been appropriately set out in the written submissions of the respondent filed with the court on 30 September 2003. The framework arises from s.13(1) of the Veterans Entitlements Act 1975 (the VE Act) which renders the Commonwealth liable to pay a pension where a veteran is incapacitated by a war-caused disease. A disease is war caused if (inter alia) the disease resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service or arose out of or was attributable to any eligible war service rendered by the veteran (see s.9(1)(a) and (b) of the VE Act).
By way of further legislative background, it is noted that where a person claims to suffer a war-caused disease the decision-maker must first determine whether the person suffers from the claimed disease, and that issue must be decided to the "reasonable satisfaction" of the decision-maker (see Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 160 ALR 17 at 20).
The applicant in the present case had claimed to suffer a number of war-caused diseases, the relevant one for the present application being post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The factual background in this matter involves the applicant serving in Vietnam from 18 February 1969 to 11 February 1970. It is common ground that this service was operational service under the VE Act.
Before the Tribunal the applicant gave evidence of two circumstances which he regarded as traumatic during his service in Vietnam. The first occurred when he was in the vicinity of a helipad (known as Vampire) when wounded soldiers were arriving by helicopter having been evacuated to a hospital. The second incident occurred where a senior NCO (non-commissioner officer) in the vehicle workshop opened damaged tanks and armoured personnel carriers for cleaning in preparation for return to Australia. He thought that on four or five occasions he worked on vehicles in which traces of blood or skin were visible to him.
Before the AAT and before this court is the diagnostic criteria set out in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual on Mental Disorders Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) for PTSD. It is noteworthy that in the DSM-IV, a copy of which was attached to the respondent's submissions for convenience, under the heading ‘Diagnostic Features’ there appears the following paragraph:
“The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate (Criterion A1). The person's response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness or horror (criterion A2)”.
Further under the heading ‘Diagnostic Features’ the DSM-IV provides some examples of incidents involving what might be described as traumatic events for the purpose of the guide. In DSM-IV the following passage appears:
“ … Witnessed events include, but not are not limited to, observing the serious injury or unnatural death of another person due to violent assault, accident, war, or disaster, or unexpectedly witnessing a dead body or body parts.
The precise diagnostic criteria for PTSD is set out as follows:
“A.The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present:
(1)the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others.
(2)the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.”
In the present case it is common ground that the Tribunal had before it evidence from medical practitioners. There were two reports from the applicant's treating psychiatrist Dr Seabridge. In the first report Dr Seabridge expressed the view the applicant did not suffer from PTSD. The second report diagnosed a depressive disorder. Two psychiatrists, Dr Cooper and Dr Timney, gave evidence that occurrences (at the helipad and in the workshop) could satisfy the PTSD diagnostic criterion A(1) in DSM-IV.
Dr Cooper, but not Dr Timney, considered that diagnostic criterion A(2) was also satisfied. Dr Timney's evidence that the applicant's response “was not one that indicated significant emotional distress or terror or helplessness” appeared in the transcript available at the appeal book page 231.

The AAT findings

In its reasons for decision significantly the AAT provides the following:
“38.On the evidence we are not satisfied that Mr Gerzina found his attendances at the helipad to be "traumatic events". We find that his accounts of those activities to the VRB and Dr Cooper were somewhat exaggerated as to his proximity to and involvement with the wounded. Further, if the experience was traumatic, we would have expected Mr Gerzina to have included it in his claim to have "anxiety/depression" accepted as a war-caused disease, rather than relying simply on his anxiety while driving in South Vietnam. Another factor which makes us doubt the accuracy of Mr Gerzina's account, and the traumatic nature of his activities at the helipad, is the evidence that he went back there to keep WO2 Tyrrell company, on two or three occasions, even though it was not his responsibility to perform the task of emptying the CONEX.
39.As to the second alleged traumatic event, we find that Mr Gerzina was upset by his duties involving the inspection and preparation of battle damaged vehicles for return to Australia, and by the smell of putrefaction and the traces of blood or skin indicating that people had died or been severely wounded in those vehicles. But we are not satisfied that his reaction was such as to satisfy criterion A(ii) of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Mr Gerzina could not have felt any fear as a result of those duties. He gave the impression in his evidence, and we find, that he did feel "horror". But we are not satisfied that it was "intense horror".. If so, that seems to us to be inconsistent with his account to Dr Seabridge, that he went to Saigon to ask the Colonel to transfer him to an operational area because he was frustrated by the routine nature of his work, in the light of the reminders in the vehicles that other soldiers were killed.
40.The evidence does not establish to our satisfaction that Mr Gerzina's reaction to either of the two traumatic events he described involved "intense fear, helplessness, or horror". We prefer Dr Timney's evidence on this issue to that of Dr Cooper. Dr Timney said that the history he obtained was of a reaction to the traumatic events which did not satisfy criterion A(ii). Mr Gerzina told him that he did not perceive the events as particularly traumatic at the time. He told Dr Timney that he felt very frustrated in that he wanted to get out among the action and be part of it and be of more use.
41.We find that during his service Mr Gerzina saw himself as a skilled career serviceman and felt he could be more use than he was being in the workshop. At that time he accepted that the traumatic events he described to us, though unpleasant and upsetting, were part of the experience of service in the Armed Forces. They did not evoke a response which involved "intense fear, helplessness, or horror". We find that diagnostic criterion A(ii) is not satisfied. Thus we accept the opinions of Dr Seabridge and Dr Timney, in preference to that of Dr Cooper, and find that Mr Gerzina does not suffer from PTSD.”
In the submissions made for and on behalf of the applicant the court was invited to consider the finding that the applicant did not suffer from PTSD and to make a finding that that approach by the Tribunal was tainted by error of law.
By way of background authority, the applicant referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2001) 34 AAR 270 which in turn had been referred to by the Tribunal as follows:-
“10.In Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2001) 34 AAR 270 [2001] FCA 1879 the Full Court explained that, although the SoPs must be used in regard to deciding whether or not a disease is war-caused, they are not relevant to the issue of diagnosis of a claimed condition. The Full Court said in Benjamin at para 41:
41The primary judge observed that, on all the evidence before the Tribunal, exposure to a traumatic event was the primary criterion required for the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder. The Tribunal made its diagnosis by reference to SoP 15 of 1994. His Honour correctly held that to be impermissible, as the scheme of the Act contemplates that SoPs be used to determine the standard of proof. SoPs are not relevant to the question of diagnosis. However, the similarity of the definition in SoP 15 of 1994 to the criteria ion DSM-IV led his Honour to the conclusion that the Tribunal’s error was of no practical consequence whatsoever.”
No issue is taken with the Tribunal's adoption of and reliance upon the decision of the Full Court in Benjamin's case.
The real issue before the court on this appeal relates to the way in which the Tribunal interpreted criterion A(2). In particular, it was submitted that the Tribunal erred in law in finding that in order to satisfy the requirements of criterion A(2) the applicant's reaction to the second occurrence had to be one of "intense horror" rather than "horror simpliciter". In doing that it was submitted the Tribunal misapprehended the matters of which it had to be satisfied in reaching its decision (see Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 335 at 341-2).
In interpreting the phrase "intense fear, helplessness or horror" it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the Tribunal could have received expert medical evidence as to the meaning. The Tribunal did not have that evidence in the present case. In the absence of such evidence the Tribunal was obliged to look, it was submitted, to the ordinary meaning of the words in question. In support of that submission the court was referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Woodward v Repatriation Commission (2003) 200 ALR 332. In particular, reference was made to the passage which appears at page 352-3
“113.It seems to us that this is the nub of the problem of how the relevant words in the SoP are to be interpreted. The SoP has been developed by an expert medical panel. It needs to be interpreted against that background. This is particularly so when (as here) the SoP adopts a medical definition which was produced by medical specialists as a diagnostic tool for other medical specialists. That is what the SoP does in its express reference to DSM-IV and ICD-9-CM code. To interpret the SoP as if it were a conveyancing documents is to misunderstand the task. What is necessary is to understand what it was intended to convey by those charged with the responsibility for its production. Where it appears that the language has been used with a specialised meaning in a particular area of speciality then the words are to be understood with that meaning. Of course, the distinction between an ordinary and specialised meaning may be a matter of degree: see Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 398; 141 ALR 59; 43 ALD 193. But in determining whether there is any specialised meaning and what that meaning is the AAT may refer to authoritative medical texts: see McMullen v Commissioner for Superannuation (1985) 61 ALR 189 at 207-9.”
It was noted that in the submissions filed on behalf of the respondent and arguments advanced by way of oral submission by senior counsel for the respondent that reliance was placed by the respondent upon the decision of von Doussa J in Hill v Repatriation Commission (2001) FCA 1775 where His Honour stated the following at paragraph 30:
“30.Counsel for the applicant optimistically contended that the Tribunal misinterpreted the requirement of par (a)(ii) in finding that the adjective ‘intense’ qualified ‘helplessness’. Counsel suggested that the adjective only qualified ‘fear’.

I do not agree with that submission. In my opinion the Tribunal was correct in holding that the veteran’s emotion whether it be of fear, helplessness or horror had to be ‘intense’.”
The decision of von Doussa J in Hill was the subject of an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The respondent relied further upon the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court on appeal. That decision is reported and the citation is Repatriation Commission v Hill (2002) 69 ALD 581. Reference was made to paragraph 52 of the Full Court's decision as follows:
“52 Since the Commission did not dispute that Mr Hill was suffering from PTSD, the main issue before the Tribunal concerned the connection between Mr Hill's PTSD and his service. Mr Hill's position was that the material before the Tribunal raised a hypothesis that fitted cl 1 (a), (b), or (c) of the PTSD SoP because the material pointed to either his "experiencing a stressor" (as defined in cl 4 of the PTSD SoP) prior to the clinical onset or worsening of PTSD, or to his inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for the condition. Given that the Tribunal's rejection of the clinical worsening and clinical management hypotheses was unchallenged in this Court, the only possibility that fell for consideration by the primary judge was whether Mr Hill experienced a stressor prior to the clinical onset of PTSD. Before this hypothesis could warrant consideration under s 120(1) of the Act, the Tribunal had to be satisfied, amongst other things, that the material pointed to Mr Hill "witnessing" an event that involved "actual or threatened death", and that he responded with feelings involving "intense ... helplessness or horror": see [9]-[10] and [23]-[24] above. The hypothesis put forward by Mr Hill was that he had witnessed the crash of the Sea Venom aircraft on 28 April 1966 and had seen a man's unsuccessful attempt to escape from the cockpit; that he had responded with a feeling of what could be properly described as intense helplessness or horror; and that his response was experienced prior to the clinical onset of his PTSD or the clinical worsening of it. As a mere hypothesis, this fitted one of the templates in the PTSD SoP: cf stage 3 of the Deledio approach set out at [50] above.”
In paragraph 52 of its decision the Full Court in Hill made reference to earlier paragraphs namely paragraphs 9 and 10 which simply recite the incidents and paragraphs 23 to 24 where reference is made to the terminology in that case which arose from a statement of principles (SoP). Nevertheless the SoP definition of "experiencing a stressor" is derived from DSM-IV relating to PTSD including reference to a traumatic event whereby “the person's response to that event involved intense fear, helplessness or horror”.
The phrase under consideration in Hill, albeit relating to an SoP, was identical to the phrase which the Tribunal in the present case had to consider when assessing the evidence as to whether the applicant did indeed suffer from PTSD.
Counsel for the applicant when confronted with the decision of both von Doussa J at first instance and the Full Court on appeal in Hill submitted that at first instance the reference by von Doussa J could be regarded as obiter dicta. It was submitted that the decision by

von Doussa J resulted in a number of findings, none of which related to the matters which caused the court to consider the question of the phrase under review in this application.
The court was referred to the specific findings of von Doussa J at first instance set out in paragraph 26 of the judgment of the court as follows:
“26.In my opinion, the Tribunal fell into error of law in three significant respects. First, I consider that the Tribunal erred at the third stage of the four stage approach in that it engaged upon a fact finding exercise. At the third stage the Tribunal should still be dealing with the hypothesis. Fact finding, insofar as it is necessary, does not arise until the fourth stage. Moreover, in doing so, the Tribunal departed from the requirement of s.120(1) which requires that the Commission (and in turn the Tribunal) shall determine that a disease is war caused unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination. Secondly, I consider the truth of the fact about which the Tribunal was satisfied was not a fact inconsistent with the hypothesis that disproved it beyond the reasonable doubt. Thirdly, the Tribunal failed to consider at all the claim based on psycho-active substance abuse or dependence, the SoP requirements for which are considerably less onerous than those for PTSD. My reasons for these conclusions now follow.”

It was submitted, therefore, that the reference in the previously quoted passage from paragraph 30 of von Doussa J's judgment was unnecessary and was not part of the ratio decidendi and accordingly, as obiter, was not binding on this court. This court was entitled to consider the further submissions made by the applicant unfettered by what might appear on the face of it to be a binding authority in support of the submissions of the respondent. Likewise it was submitted that the Full Court did not have to consider and nor was the issue of the way in which von Doussa J dealt with the meaning of the phrase "involved intense fear, helplessness or horrors" agitated before the Full Court.
In my view, von Doussa J in his judgment in Hill, and in particular in paragraph 30, had dealt with an issue that was before the court and properly agitated. Although he rejected what he described as an ‘optimistic’ contention by counsel for the applicant, it does not therefore render that reference mere obiter. It was an essential part of his Honour's reasoning and related to an issue that was clearly argued before the court.
I accept that the Full Court on appeal dealt with other issues on appeal in circumstances where effectively the Repatriation Commission had become the appellant and not surprisingly had raised and agitated those issues arising from paragraph 6 of von Doussa J's judgment to which

I have referred; that is, the assertion that the Tribunal fell into error in relation to three significant matters.
Nevertheless, in my view, the Full Court of the Federal Court at least had the opportunity to consider and reject, if it chose to do so, the manner in which von Doussa J dealt with the issue of the meaning of the expression which is currently under review in this case, namely, the reference which is found in DSM-IV to the concept that the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror.
The Applicant submitted that in the present case the court for the first time is faced with the prospect of dealing directly with this issue agitated in more detail than may have been the case before von Doussa J. In support of the submissions made for and on behalf of the applicant the court was referred to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and taken to the meaning of the key words in the phrase under consideration. It was submitted that in the present case the Tribunal having made the findings of fact referred to in paragraph 39 of its reasons should have found that the applicant did satisfy criterion A(2) of the DSM-IV.
It was submitted that the word "intense" merely provides an adjective to the word "fear". It does not provide a further restriction or adjective to the other words in that phrase. That is, it does not add the word "intense" as a description of horror and nor does it add that word to the description of helplessness when one has regard to the ordinary dictionary meaning of the words in question. It was submitted that the word "intense" qualifies only the word "fear" and not additionally the words "helplessness and/or horror".
In referring to the Oxford Dictionary the court was taken to the definition of ‘fear’, ‘helpless’ and ‘horror’, and, as a starting point, taken to the meaning of the word ‘intense’. It is appropriate to set out relevant parts of the definitions of each word and to then consider further submissions made on behalf of the applicant.
Intense - of a quality or condition: raised to or existing in a very high degree; violent, extreme, excessive; off colour, very deep; feeling ardent ... feeling or susceptible to, intense emotion; often in trivial sense, highly sensitive or impressionable.
Fear - the emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending danger, or by the apprehension of evil. In early use applied to more violent extremes of the emotion.
Helpless - destitute of help, needy, unable to help oneself; shiftless (the current sense), affording no help, unavailing, unprofitable ... that cannot be helped.
Horror - a painful emotion compounded of loathing and fear; a shuttering with terror and repugnance, feeling excited by something shocking or frightful. Also in weaker sense, intense dislike or repugnance.
After referring to the dictionary definitions it was argued that the adjective "intense" in the present context is unnecessary and indeed inappropriate for the word "helpless". "Helpless" it was submitted is an absolute term. Whilst it may be qualified by referring to a particular area of activity, it is not assisted at all and nor is it appropriate to provide the adjective "intense". To do so would be analogous to providing the same adjective of "intense" to matters such as thoughtlessness or to describe someone who is childless as being "intense" which in the circumstances would be inappropriate and not a true indication of the meaning of the word. All of these words, such as helpless, childless, thoughtless are absolute terms not capable of being qualified by an adjective such as "intense".
In the circumstances it was submitted therefore that all the Tribunal had to find on the material before it was that the applicant had suffered what is described as a "horror simpliciter". It did not need to find "intense horror".
The submissions made on behalf of the respondent, not surprisingly, adopted the passages from the judgments of von Doussa J and the Full Court to which I have already referred. It was further submitted that in the present case it is appropriate for the court to look at the context and meaning of the DSM-IV from which the phrase has been taken. Included in that reference are the passages to which I have referred earlier in this judgment which appear in the DSM-IV under the heading ‘Diagnostic Features’.
It was submitted by the respondent that even in legislation drafters omit adjectives for the sake of brevity where the context makes it clear that the adjective governs more than one word which immediately follows it. Reference was made to the High Court decision of Richardson v Austin (1911) 12 CLR 463 where it was submitted the High Court read the phrase "streets, lands, entries or other public passages or places" as if the word "public" were also included before the word "places".
It was submitted by the respondent that in the context of the SoPs the argument raised by the applicant is similar to the argument rejected by the Full Court in Harris v Repatriation Commission (2000) 32 AAR 84 at 51-2. Reliance was placed upon by the decision of Gray J in Knight v Repatriation Commission (2002) FCA 103 at paragraphs 40 to 43 was rejected as a misconstruction to the proposition that the adjective "acute" in the phrase "acute symptoms and signs of pain, tenderness and altered mobility or range of movement" in the SoP for lumbar spondylosis only qualified the noun "pain".
During the course of submissions I inquired as to whether or not medical experts called to give evidence in the application had addressed the issue of whether or not their findings should include findings which adopted the meaning of the phrase from DSM-IV, and in particular, whether the evidence which led to the findings in this matter of the medical witnesses focused at all on the expression "intense fear, helplessness or horror". I was referred to an extract of evidence from one of the experts, Dr Timney, who during the course of evidence-in-chief, which appears at page 231 of the court book gave the following evidence:-
“Could you explain why post-traumatic stress disorder is not appropriate?
... However, his response to both situations was not one that indicated significant emotional distress or terror or helplessness so that, although experienced those situations, he did not go on to develop clinically relevant symptoms of anxiety or distress.”
It is clear from the extract of evidence to which I have just referred that the medical practitioners giving evidence before the Tribunal had not necessarily considered, in reaching their opinions about whether or not the applicant suffered from PTSD, the use or otherwise of the word "intense" as an adjective for the three words, "fear, helplessness, or horror".
In the present case, however, in my view, the court is bound to follow the decision of von Doussa J in Hill v Repatriation Commission. Although the reasoning of his Honour in considering the issue is brief and although the conclusions were not the subject of detailed submission and consideration by the Full Court, I nevertheless find that the conclusion reached by von Doussa J applies to the present case.
In my view, although it may be argued that the adjective "intense" superficially may only appear to qualify "fear", I do not accept that the adjective appearing at the beginning of those three terms is restricted in the manner proposed for the appellant in the present case. I do not accept that the words "helplessness" and "horror" cannot be the subject of the adjective "intense". In my view, having regard to the dictionary definitions it is quite possible for the helplessness and horror to be described by the adjective "intense". Although it may be suggested that helplessness to some extent appears to be an absolute term, it must be viewed in the light of the context of the DSM-IV and the condition of post-traumatic stress disorder which is sought to be diagnostically defined.
I accept the submissions of the respondent that apart from applying the decision of von Doussa J in Hill v Repatriation Commission, it is also helpful in undertaking the meaning of DSM-IV to consider the other passages of DSM-IV which appeared under the heading Diagnostic Features. Although there is, as pointed out by counsel for the applicant, under that heading a reference to witnessing "a dead body or body parts", I am not satisfied that is sufficient to detract from the general serious nature of the condition referred to under the heading ‘Diagnostic Features’ in DSM-IV and to then conclude that a proper reading of the phrase is different to the meaning proposed by the Respondent.
It is in that context, combined with applying the decision of von Doussa J in Hill v Repatriation Commission, that the conclusion

I have reached is that there has not been an error of law sufficient for the purpose of s.44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 which would justify this court upholding the application. Accordingly, it follows that the application dated 1 April 2003 should be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of McInnis FM

Associate:

Date: 7 November 2003