Georges v Tribastoni
[2011] NSWDC 36
•25 February 2011
District Court
New South Wales
Case Title: Georges v Tribastoni Medium Neutral Citation: [2011] NSWDC 36 Hearing Date(s): 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31 January, 1 and 2 February 2011 Decision Date: 25 February 2011 Jurisdiction: Civil Before: Judge Peter Johnstone
Decision: Judgment for the plaintiff with costs
Catchwords: TORT - conversion and detinue
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995
Cases Cited: Texts Cited: Category: Principal judgment Parties: Symond Georges (Plaintiff)
Fabio Tribastoni (First Defendant)
Meridian Investment Group Pty Ltd t/as National Car Wholesalers (Second Defendant)
Tony Haddad (Third Defendant)Representation - Counsel: Mr D Roberts of counsel, instructed by Georgiou & Co, Solicitors (Plaintiff)
Mr D Eardley of counsel, instructed by Madison Shakespeare, Solicitors (First Defendant)
Mr A T Martin of counsel, instructed by Farah Lawyers (Third Defendant)
The Second Defendant is in liquidation- Solicitors: File number(s): 2009/338322 Publication Restriction:
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In May 2009 the plaintiff completed the purchase of a Ferrari from the second defendant. A few months later he engaged the third defendant to find a buyer and left the Ferrari with him for that purpose. The Ferrari was not returned to the plaintiff, and on 13 August 2009 it was sold to Supercar Classics Pty Ltd trading as Haberfield Classic & Sports Cars. The proceeds of that sale have not been accounted for to the plaintiff.
Following completion of the purchase of the Ferrari, the plaintiff failed to effect a transfer of the registration of the Ferrari into his name, and it remained registered in the name of the second defendant until it was transferred into the name of Haberfield Classic & Sports Cars after the sale to that company. The first defendant was the owner and a director of the second defendant corporation. The first defendant caused the second defendant to prepare various documents that facilitated the sale and transfer of the registration to Haberfield Classic & Sports Cars.
The issues
The plaintiff sues the third defendant in conversion and detinue, alleging that he sold the Ferrari without authority, and has failed to return the Ferrari to the plaintiff. The third defendant opposes the claim, alleging that the Ferrari was not in his possession when it was sold to Haberfield Classic & Sports Cars. He asserts that the plaintiff in fact delivered the Ferrari to another man, Mr Omar Tleis, and that it was Mr Tleis who effected the sale of the Ferrari to Haberfield Classic & Sports Cars. Further, he asserts that it was Mr Tleis who received the proceeds of the sale of the Ferrari, and that it was Mr Tleis who has not accounted to the plaintiff for those proceeds.
The proceedings against the second defendant were not pursued because that company has gone into liquidation.
The plaintiff also sues the first defendant, in conversion, alleging that he prepared the various documents that facilitated the sale and transfer of the registration to Haberfield Classic & Sports Cars without the plaintiff's authority. The first defendant opposes the claim, alleging that the plaintiff expressly authorised him to arrange for the preparation and issue of that documentation.
Background
The plaintiff, Mr Georges, is a young man with an interest in cars, especially luxury and sports cars. On 20 March 2009 he entered into a written Contract of Sale with the first defendant, Mr Fabio Tribastoni, whereby he purchased a yellow Ferrari 360 Spyder 2003 motor vehicle. The purchase price of $218,000 was made up of a trade-in of $60,000, the balance of $158,000 to be paid by monthly instalments by 31 July 2009. It was a term of the agreement that Mr Tribastoni would hold the original registration papers and one spare key until payment in full had been received.
Mr Tribastoni had himself purchased the Ferrari only two days earlier. The Ferrari was located for Mr Tribastoni by an associate, Mr Tony Haddad, the third defendant. At that time Mr Tribastoni was in the process of establishing a car dealership, to be operated through a company structure, namely the second defendant, Meridian Investment Group Pty Ltd trading as National Car Wholesalers. The shareholders of that company were Mr Tribastoni and his wife. At the time of purchasing the Ferrari, the necessary dealer's licence had not been obtained and Mr Tribastoni arranged for registration of the Ferrari to be transferred into the name of a friend who did have a dealer's licence, a Mr Safit Aydin, trading as Homebush Used Cars. That transfer was effected on 18 March 2009. It was only after National Car Wholesalers began trading on 1 May 2009 that registration of the Ferrari was transferred into its name on 20 May 2009.
In the meantime Mr Georges took delivery of the Ferrari from Mr Tribastoni on 20 March 2009, together with one set of keys, and he began to use the car.
Thereafter Mr Georges paid off the balance of the purchase price by instalments, and completed the purchase upon payment of the final payment on 7 July 2009, when Mr Tribastoni gave Mr Georges the spare set of keys, a keypad and log books. Mr Tribastoni also caused National Car Wholesalers as the registered owner to issue documentation to enable registration of the Ferrari to be transferred to Mr Georges (Exhibit J). That documentation consisted of a Tax Invoice (No 86) and a Notice of Sale. For reasons that were never satisfactorily explained, these documents specified the sale price as $197,000.
Mr Georges, however, did not effect a transfer of the registration of the Ferrari into his name, and chose to leave it registered in the name of National Car Wholesalers. Why Mr Georges failed to transfer the Ferrari into his name was one of the contentious issues in this case. As will emerge, it was the plaintiff's failure to transfer the registration into his name that enabled the Ferrari to be on-sold without his express authorisation. He said he did not transfer the Ferrari into his name because he was unable at that time to afford the stamp duty required, but that he always intended to do so when he had enough money, and prior to selling the Ferrari. He never did pay the stamp duty, principally because of the subsequent events the subject of these proceedings.
Shortly after completing the purchase of the Ferrari, Mr Georges got into financial difficulties, as a result of which he decided to sell the Ferrari quickly. He initially thought to make a profit on the sale. That expectation proved to be something of a pipe dream.
In early October 2009 he engaged the third defendant, Mr Haddad, an "independent car locater", to find a buyer for the Ferrari. In subsequent weeks he left the Ferrari with Mr Haddad on several occasions, together with a set of keys and a keypad, for the purpose of enabling Mr Haddad to show the Ferrari to prospective customers. During October Mr Haddad attempted to find a buyer for the Ferrari. He told Mr Georges about a number of interested prospective purchasers, but nothing eventuated.
Another contentious issue in the case was the basis of the arrangement between Mr Georges and Mr Haddad. It is Mr Georges' case that he only ever authorised Mr Haddad to find a buyer, and gave him an indicative price range, but not to sell the Ferrari without first referring back to him on the price.
Mr Haddad, on the other hand, contended that Mr Georges gave him full authority to sell the Ferrari, at a certain price, initially $195,000, and later, $190,000.
It is Mr Georges' case that the last time he saw his Ferrari was when he delivered it to Mr Haddad on Monday 12 October 2009 at the premises of Sydney Motors, at Bankstown. He remembered the day because he had collected the Ferrari the previous weekend for a photo shoot at a wedding.
Importantly, Mr Georges kept one set of keys and keypad, the log books, and the paperwork proving his ownership of the Ferrari. It was his belief that the Ferrari could not be sold whilst he retained possession of those items.
The next day, Tuesday 13 October 2009, the Ferrari was purchased by another motor dealer, Supercar Classics Pty Ltd trading as Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars. That company has since gone into liquidation, but the proprietor, Mr Nick Papalexandris, gave evidence about the purchase, to which I will come in a moment. It is Mr Georges' case that he knew nothing about this sale, which he says was effected without his knowledge and without his authority.
According to the evidence of Mr Papalexandris, a person by the name of Omar rang him prior to 13 October 2009 and asked whether he wanted to buy a Ferrari. Mr Papalexandris asked Omar to bring the Ferrari for him to have a look at it. Subsequently Omar brought the Ferrari to show Mr Papalexandris, when it was agreed that Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars would purchase the Ferrari for $180,000, to be paid in cash. He told Omar to come back in approximately 3 days while he obtained the cash.
Mr Papalexandris believed that Omar was acting for or on behalf of the second defendant, National Car Wholesalers. It was his understanding that Mr Haddad and Omar both worked for Mr Tribastoni in his business, National Car Wholesalers. Mr Papalexandris believed the seller was National Car Wholesalers and was never told that the car in fact belonged to Mr Georges.
On 13 October 2009 Omar attended at Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars to deliver the car and collect the cash from Mr Papalexandris, who asked for an invoice. Omar made a phone call, following which an invoice was faxed by National Car Wholesalers to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars. But Mr Papalexandris was not happy with the invoice and insisted that it state that the purchase price had been paid in full. He rang Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars and spoke to Mr Tribastoni, and asked for an invoice that showed the purchase price had been paid. Soon after a second invoice was faxed from National Car Wholesalers to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars with the word "Paid" written on it and initialled by Mr Tribastoni (Exhibit O - Document 5).
Mr Papalexandris took delivery of the Ferrari and gave $180,000 in cash to Omar.
It is not disputed by Mr Tribastoni that he caused Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars to issue the invoice to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars with the word "Paid" written on it. It is his case, however, that he only did so to "book the Ferrari out from the company records" at the request of Mr Haddad and with the express authority of Mr Georges. I will return to this in due course.
Mr Georges' evidence was that he attempted to contact Mr Haddad every day in the week following his delivery of the Ferrari to him on 12 October 2009, but that on each occasion he spoke to him, Mr Haddad gave excuses about the delay in finding a buyer. It seems clear from those conversations and text messages received on his mobile phone from Mr Haddad's phone that Mr Georges remained oblivious of the events on 13 October 2009 pursuant to which the Ferrari was purchased by Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars.
In one conversation Mr Haddad told him:
Haddad: "I've got a buyer. He'll pay $190,000.00 but I've got to pay these guys (meaning Sydney Motors) $2,000.00 for the use of the yard. The buyer has traded his boat in for $20,000.00. I'm waiting for the cheque to clear. He's coming up with the rest of the money by mid week and the end of the week."
Georges: "Ok."
Haddad: "I'm going to need the other keys and the receipt Fabio gave you."
Georges: "Ok, but once you've come up with the whole amount, I'll give them to you at the same time. I won't give you the keys, the books or receipt until you bring the money. You make a time and place when we can do the exchange and complete the deal."
Haddad: "I'll let you know, Wednesday or Thursday."
On Wednesday 14 October Mr Georges received a text message from Mr Haddad to the following effect (Exhibit L):
"The bloke rang tomor after non hell have all the cash." (sic)
On Friday 16 October Mr Georges received a text message from Mr Haddad to the following effect (Exhibit L):
"Bud im in melbouren ill try let oma organise it. Give me a hour." (sic)
The evidence that emerged at trial, in particular the telephone records, was that Mr Haddad was not in Melbourne on 16 October 2009.
Mr Georges said he subsequently had two telephone conversations with Omar and asked for his Ferrari, but was told it was in storage for the weekend and he was unable to get hold of the guy who owned the garage. He did not tell Mr Georges the Ferrari had in fact already been sold.
On Saturday 17 October 2009 Mr Georges sent Mr Haddad a text message to the following effect:
"Tony I want my car back. It's a sunny weekend."
Paragraph 34 of Mr Georges' affidavit of 26 July 2010 was partially struck out, initially, but counsel for the first defendant cross-examined Mr Georges about the paragraph. It records two phone conversations he said he had with Omar on Sunday 19 October 2009:
Georges: "Omar, where is my car?"
Omar: "I'm going to do the deal now. I'm leaving in 10 minutes."
And later the same day:
Omar: "I've sold the car, I've got $168,000.00. I need the original papers and keys."
Georges: "Why about the other $20,000.00? (sic) When do I get my money? The deals not on until I get my money."
Omar: "No, Tony told me just pick up the money and not to give it to you. I can't get on to Tony myself."
Georges: "Why, this is my money. You've sold the car without my authority and you don't want to give me my money back."
The next day, Monday 20 October 2009 Mr Georges went to back to the premises of Sydney Motors, at Bankstown, the car dealership where he had left his Ferrari with Mr Haddad on 12 October 2009, and had a conversation with the principal, Mr Estephan. Mr Georges' Ferrari was not there. About an hour later, however, he received a phone call from Omar, who said: "I'm sick of all this, the other owner is on my back about getting the original forms and you're on my back about getting your money. Meet me at 7pm at my house tonight to get your money. 14 Cardigan Road, Greenacre is my mother's home."
Mr Georges did not agree to go to 14 Cardigan Road, Greenacre that night. Instead, he arranged to meet Omar at the NAB branch at Riverwood the next morning. This was another contentious issue in these proceedings. Mr Georges told the court that he did not arrange to meet Omar at the bank; rather he arranged to meet Omar at the bus stop outside the bank. This evidence was directly contradicted by his sister, Ms Carol Saad, who also gave evidence in the proceedings. Just why Mr Georges prevaricated on this episode is not entirely clear.
At any event, Omar did not turn up to the proposed meeting at the bank on Tuesday 21 October 2009, so Mr Georges and his sister went to Omar's mother's house at 14 Cardigan Road, Greenacre where they were met by Omar and another unidentified man. During the course of that encounter, Mr Georges was told that the house and been robbed the night before and the proceeds from the sale of the Ferrari had been stolen.
Mr Georges and his sister left and drove to the RTA branch at Rockdale, where he unsuccessfully attempted to transfer the registration of the Ferrari into his name. He was told by an RTA officer that the Ferrari was now registered in another business name and the plates had been changed.
It finally dawned on Mr Georges that he had been swindled, and he went to the police.
Mr Georges has not seen the Ferrari since, nor has he received one cent of the $180,000 for which it was sold.
The plaintiff's case
The essence of Mr Georges' case against Mr Haddad is that he put the Ferrari into his possession as bailee, solely to permit him to show it to prospective purchasers. Mr Haddad converted the Ferrari by selling it without the authority of Mr Georges, thus depriving him of his immediate right to possession. Alternatively, Mr Georges demanded the return of the Ferrari, but Mr Haddad wrongfully and unequivocally failed to comply with that demand.
As against Mr Tribastoni, Mr Georges alleges that he acted in a manner repugnant to Mr Georges' ownership of the Ferrari by causing National Car Wholesalers as the registered owner to issue documentation that enabled its disposal to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars, without authority. In so doing, Mr Tribastoni was also guilty of conversion.
The third defendant's case
Mr Haddad's case, in essence, is that the Ferrari was not in his possession when it was sold to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars, and that he had nothing at all to do with that sale. He says that Mr Georges entered into a separate and discrete arrangement with Omar, and that Omar was in possession of the Ferrari. It was Omar who sold the car to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars, and he did so with Mr Georges' authority, for cash. It is Omar who has failed to account to Mr Georges for the proceeds of the sale.
Although Omar was not called as a witness to confirm this version of events, Mr Haddad did call Mr Estephan, the owner of Sydney Motors, as a witness in an attempt to prove that Mr Georges delivered the car into Omar's possession.
According to Mr Haddad, Mr Georges was regularly dropping the Ferrari off at Sydney Motors for him and other car dealers to try and sell. The evidence of Mr Estephan was to the effect that he had seen Mr Georges deliver the Ferrari to both Mr Haddad and Omar on various occasions.
According to Mr Haddad's evidence he received a phone call from Mr Georges one day when Mr Haddad was not in Sydney in which he was told by Mr Georges that he had sold the Ferrari through Omar. Mr Georges went on to ask Mr Haddad to contact Mr Tribastoni because the Ferrari was still registered in his name. The conversation continued as follows:
Haddad: "I am not on good terms with Mr Tribastoni now however I will give him a call, but why the car is still in his name?" (sic)
Georges: "The transfer was going to cost over $7,000 and I couldn't do it."
Haddad: "I prefer if I am present on the sale."
Georges: "I can't wait."
Haddad said that some time after that phone call he rang Mr Tribastoni and had the following conversation:
Haddad: "I was told by Symond that Omar has sold the car and he wants you to book it out to the new buyer.
Tribastoni: "I have to call Symond to confirm."
But Mr Tribastoni never rang Mr Georges to confirm. Nor was it was explained why Mr Georges didn't ring Mr Tribastoni himself, or get Omar to ring him. The evidence established that Omar and Mr Tribastoni were well acquainted with each other, as was Mr Haddad, who was a close associate of Mr Tribastoni and Omar, who was in fact his first cousin.
It is not disputed that Mr Haddad did in fact ring Mr Tribastoni and ask him to book the Ferrari out, that is, to prepare an invoice. Mr Tribastoni's evidence was that the call occurred on or about 10 October 2009, when they said words to the following effect:
Haddad: "I have been speaking with Symond Georges and he told me to call you about the invoice. I've sold Symond Georges' car to Haberfield Classics, can you please produce the invoice."
Tribastoni: "Ok."
Mr Haddad denied saying to Mr Tribastoni that he had sold the Ferrari. It is his case that he only rang Mr Tribastoni as a favour for Mr Georges, and that Omar sold the Ferrari, acting on his own, on direct authority from Mr Georges, not on behalf of Mr Haddad,
The first defendant's case
Mr Tribastoni's case is very simple: he created and sent the invoice to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars at the express request of Mr Georges. In his affidavit of 27 October 2010 Mr Tribastoni said:
"On or about 1 October 2009 Mr Symond Georges attended the company warehouse at 21 Hotham Parade Artarmon NSW and there was a conversation with words to the effect:
Georges: "I can't afford to keep the car I am in financial trouble. I have to sell the car. The car is still in your company name, I don't want to pay stamp duty, I have not transferred the car to my name. Can you please provide an invoice for the car to whoever buys it once the car sells."
Tribastoni: "Ok."
Whether Mr Georges knew the Ferrari was in the company name rather than in the name of Mr Tribastoni, with whom he made the Contract of Sale, was not explored.
Mr Tribastoni was challenged about this alleged conversation in cross-examination. He said it occurred about mid morning on a weekday after he saw Mr Georges arrive, and he went out and spoke to him on the footpath, at his car.
He considered that conversation was sufficient authority for him to book the Ferrari out for $180,000, without referring back to Mr Georges for confirmation. He simply relied upon the say so of Mr Haddad and Mr Papalexandris that Mr Georges had sold the Ferrari, for cash, for $180,000. He made one enquiry: he asked Mr Papalexandris, "Why so much cash?" Mr Papalexandris replied, "That's what was organised between Tony and Symond."
Mr Tribastoni was asked in cross-examination, "Did you think to ring Mr Georges?" and he said, "Yes. And I tried to ring him a couple of times and there was no answer. I rang his mobile but he did not answer."
I was not referred to any telephone records to support this evidence.
In written submissions, it was submitted for Mr Tribastoni that the court should find that the invoice of 13 October 2009 was produced on the instruction, and thereby the authority, of Mr Georges. On this basis, Mr Georges' case must fail in conversion because Mr Tribastoni acted in a manner consistent with the wishes of Mr George. Mr Tribastoni did not have the Ferrari in his possession, and the invoice of itself did not cause the title to the Ferrari to be transferred. Preparation of the invoice on instructions from Mr Georges was not an act to deprive the true owner of his immediate right to possession. He did not deny Mr Georges' title to the Ferrari. The only way the Ferrari could have been transferred was the production of the invoice to give effect to the transfer of registration. That was done on instruction.
Credit
It is abundantly clear that the court was not given the whole story about the events surrounding the sale of Mr Georges' Ferrari. Nor was the evidence I did receive particularly reliable. The credibility of all the witnesses was suspect, apart from Ms Saad.
Mr Georges' credibility was damaged by several unsatisfactory aspects of his evidence. He prevaricated about the arrangement to meet Omar at the NAB branch at Riverwood on Tuesday 21 October 2009. He did not agree to meet at the bus stop, but clearly intended to meet at the bank itself, presumably because Omar had told him he would bring the money. But that was a peripheral episode and does not, in my view, prove that Omar had been authorised to sell the Ferrari. Mr Georges demonstrated an ability for dishonesty by not paying the stamp duty on the purchase of his Ferrari, and his evidence about the insurance he effected for the Ferrari was also unsatisfactory. However, in this case, as will be seen, the assessment of credit became a matter of comparable relativity. Overall, in my assessment, Mr Georges gave a consistent and essentially reliable account on the critical matters, and was the most reliable of the witnesses. Without question, his evidence is to be preferred to that of Mr Haddad and Mr Tribastoni.
Mr Tribastoni was shown to have acted dishonestly in a number of respects. There were at least 10 instances in respect of which I granted him a certificate under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 providing him with privilege in respect of self-incriminating evidence. The Tax Invoice (No 86) and Notice of Sale of 7 July 2009 misrepresented the true purchase price paid by Mr Georges for the Ferrari. Mr Tribastoni was willing to keep the Ferrari registered in his company's name, and had no quibbles about assisting in its transfer to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars, avoiding the stamp duty payable in respect of the purchase from him by Mr Georges. And he was less than candid about his relationship with Mr Haddad and Omar before the full extent and duration of his connection to those two men emerged when he was cross- examined by Mr Haddad (see Exhibit 2).
In the result, I approached the veracity of the evidence of Mr Tribastoni sceptically, with caution and suspicion. Thus, where I was unable to resolve conflicts in the evidence by reference to the objective material or by an assessment of the inherent logic or probability of events, I preferred the evidence of Mr Georges to that of Mr Tribastoni.
Mr Haddad's evidence was completely unreliable. As counsel for Mr Tribastoni wrote in his submissions:
"The third defendant is 34 years of age and has never filed a tax return, never paid income tax and does not know how to do so. The witness was evasive in cross-examination in respect to his income. The Third Defendant has his home listed for sale at $1,000,000." [23]
"The witness gave evidence that he went to jail for a matter relating to perjury. The witness also gave evidence that he assisted various organs of government in the prosecution of various persons and that his wife and children received $105,000 from these agencies."
Mr Haddad was "caught out" in a series of untruths during the course of the trial. His evidence about the telephone provided to him by Mr Tribastoni and when he used it or didn't use it was less than candid, and the various text messages he sent were factitious and misleading. For example, he told Mr Georges he was in Melbourne when he wasn't. The fact that Omar was his cousin only emerged in cross-examination, and even then he attempted to minimise the closeness of their relationship. Overall I formed the view that Mr Haddad is thoroughly untrustworthy and his evidence lacked any sense of integrity or veracity.
In my view the evidence of Mr Haddad is not to be believed. Absent any compelling corroborative material, I have declined to accept any of the evidence given by Mr Haddad.
Findings and conclusions
I am comfortably satisfied that Mr Georges last saw his Ferrari when he delivered it into the possession of Mr Haddad on 12 October 2009. I find further that Mr Georges put the Ferrari into the possession of Mr Haddad on that day for the limited purpose of showing it to prospective buyers, and that he did not give Mr Haddad authority to sell the Ferrari without first referring back to Mr Georges on price.
The proposition that Mr Georges delivered the Ferrari to Omar and gave him authority to sell it, for cash, never rose above the status of a suggestion. The proposition was an invention designed to avoid complicity in the scam pursuant to which the Ferrari was swindled away from Mr Georges.
I am comfortably satisfied that to the extent Omar played a role in the sale of the Ferrari, he did so not at the behest of Mr Georges, but on the instructions of Mr Haddad, as his agent or associate (see for example the text message sent on 16 October 2009 in Exhibit L).
I am also comfortably satisfied that Mr Georges demanded the return of his Ferrari by Mr Haddad, who has wrongfully refused to do so.
For these reasons I find that Mr Haddad wrongfully converted Mr Georges' Ferrari and is also liable to him in detinue.
Turning to Mr Tribastoni, I am comfortably satisfied that Mr Georges never authorised Mr Tribastoni to prepare the invoice on 13 October 2009 by which the Ferrari was booked out to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars. I find that the conversation Mr Tribastoni alleges occurred outside his warehouse at 21 Hotham Parade Artarmon on or about 1 October 2009 never occurred. Nor did Mr Tribastoni attempt to ring Mr Georges to check whether he had agreed to the sale of the Ferrari on 13 October 2009, or at any time. I find that Mr Tribastoni booked the car out on the say so of Mr Haddad and Mr Papalexandris, and in so doing he consciously and deliberately acted in a manner repugnant to Mr Georges' ownership of the Ferrari.
By enabling the disposal of the Ferrari to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars without the owner's authority Mr Tribastoni was guilty of conversion.
The plaintiff succeeds against both the first defendant and the third defendant and I enter verdicts in his favour against each of them.
Damages
Mr Georges' case on damages is that the value of the Ferrari as at the date of the conversion was the amount for which it was sold to Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars, namely $180,000.00.
It was submitted for the defendants that the value of the Ferrari was in fact only $165,000.00, being the amount for which Haberfield Classic and Sports Cars on-sold the Ferrari several days later, the lesser amount being attributable to transmission problems.
The only evidence of transmission problems came from Mr Papalexandris. It was never pleaded, nor did anyone else say there were transmission problems. I reject that evidence on the basis that is unreliable and not independently supported by any other evidence.
For these reasons I find that the value of the Ferrari at the relevant date, 13 October 2009, was $180,000.00 and that the plaintiff is entitled to damages in that amount together with interest at the prescribed statutory rates from that date to the date of judgment.
Interest
Interest is awarded on the damages at the statutory rate as follows: 13 October 2009 - 30 June 2010 (260 days @ 9% pa) = $11,539.72 1 July 2010 - 25 February 2011 (240 days @ 8.75% pa = $10,356.16 Total interest $21,895.88
The damages and interest total $201,895.88.
Costs
Costs follow the event and are payable on the ordinary basis, unless some other order is appropriate. There is nothing before me, at this point, to indicate that some other order is appropriate.
There should be an order for costs in favour of the plaintiff against the first defendant and the third defendant.
Disposition
I direct the entry of judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant in the amount of $201,895.88.
I direct the entry of judgment for the plaintiff against the third defendant in the amount of $201,895.88.
The proceedings against the second defendant are dismissed, with no order as to costs.
I order the first defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs, on the ordinary basis.
I order the third defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs, on the ordinary basis.
Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.
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