George v the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited & 1 ORS

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      GEORGE v THE BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY COMPANY LIMITED & 1 ORS [2003]  NSWCA 365

FILE NUMBER(S):
40425/03
40558/02

HEARING DATE(S):               23/09/2003

JUDGMENT DATE: 15/12/2003

PARTIES:
Craig GEORGE  -  Claimant
THE BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY COMPANY LIMITED  -  1st Opponent
CONVATECH PTY LTD (Formerly BELL BANE (NCLE) PTY LTD) - 2nd Opponent

JUDGMENT OF:       Meagher JA McColl JA Foster AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          287/00

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Phegan DCJ

COUNSEL:
Mr M Aldridge SC  -  Claimant
Mr R Margo SC with Mr A Spencer - 1st Opponent
Mr G McGrath       -  2nd Opponent

SOLICITORS:
Bale Boshev Lawyers     -  Claimant
Blake Dawson Waldron  -  1st Opponent
Arnold Lawyers                  -  2nd Opponent

CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - leave to appeal - whether claimant's case sufficiently arguable - where no direct evidence of breach of duty of care - whether evidence sufficient to enable the trial judge to find the burden of proof discharged in the absence of any contradiction - review of Registrar's decision to dismiss appeal as incompetent - whether grant of extension of time based upon extraneous or irrelevant matters.   

LEGISLATION CITED:
Construction Safety Regulations 1950 (NSW)
District Court Act 1973 (NSW)
Factories, Shops and Industries Act 1962 (NSW)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW)
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW)

DECISION:
1.  Grant leave to appeal
2.  Claimant to file his Notice of Appeal within 21 days of these orders
3.  Opponents' motions dated 4 December 2002 dismissed
4.  Opponents to pay the claimant's costs of the motions before Registrar Schell
5.  Costs of the leave application to be costs in the appeal

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT  

OF NEW SOUTH WALES

COURT OF APPEAL

CA         40425/03
               40558/02
DC             287/00

MEAGHER JA
McCOLL JA
FOSTER AJA

MONDAY, 15 DECEMBER, 2003

Craig GEORGE v THE BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY COMPANY LIMITED & 1 ORS

FACTS

The claimant, an employee of the second opponent Convatech Pty Ltd, worked at the Sinter Plant which was owned and occupied by the first opponent BHP. On 11 September 1998 a large piece of timber fell on him during the course of his employment. The claimant brought proceedings alleging negligence and breach of statutory duty against both BHP and Convatech to recover damages. On 20 June 2002 Phegan DCJ dismissed the claim on the basis that the claimant had failed to establish that either of the opponents was negligent.

The claimant’s solicitors filed a Notice of Appeal and an affidavit purporting to state facts showing that the $100,000 limit in s 127(2)(c) of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) did not apply. The opponents moved the Court for orders that the appeal be struck out or dismissed as incompetent. On 3 April 2003 Registrar Schell granted the opponents an extension of time to bring their applications as to incompetence and dismissed the appeal as incompetent.

The claimant sought both leave to appeal against Phegan DCJ’s decision and a review of Registrar Schell’s decision of 3 April…

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Details
Case
[2003] NSWCA 365
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The claimant sought leave to appeal from a District Court decision that dismissed his claim for damages against The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited ("BHP") and Convatech Pty Limited ("Convatech"). The claimant sustained an injury while employed by Convatech at a BHP facility. The claimant's proposed appeal sought orders for judgment against both opponents and remittal of the matter for determination of damages.

The legal issues before the court were whether the claimant's case was sufficiently arguable to warrant leave to appeal, particularly in the absence of direct evidence of a breach of duty of care, and whether the evidence presented was sufficient to enable the trial judge to find the burden of proof discharged. Additionally, the court was required to review the Registrar's decision to dismiss the appeal as incompetent and consider whether the grant of an extension of time for the opponents' motions was based on extraneous or irrelevant matters.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the claimant had raised arguable grounds. The claimant contended that the trial judge erred in finding a failure to discharge the burden of proof, submitting that a Significant Safety Occurrence Report indicated BHP's responsibility for plant cleanliness and the prevention of falling dunnage. The claimant argued that BHP's failure to present evidence of its safety systems entitled the trial judge to infer negligence, citing *Shoeys Pty Limited v Allan* for the proposition that slight evidence may suffice when material facts are peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. Regarding Convatech, the claimant argued that the trial judge failed to consider the principles of non-delegable duty of an employer, referencing *Kondis v State Transport Authority*. The court also reviewed the Registrar's decision, finding that it was influenced by extraneous matters, specifically the opponents' unsuccessful attempts to have the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, which were irrelevant to the competence of the appeal itself.

Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, ordered the claimant to file his Notice of Appeal within 21 days, dismissed the opponents' motions dated 4 December 2002, and ordered the opponents to pay the claimant's costs of the motions before Registrar Schell. The costs of the leave application were to be costs in the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to appeal

2. Claimant to file his Notice of Appeal within 21 days of these orders

3. Opponents' motions dated 4 December 2002 dismissed

4. Opponents to pay the claimant's costs of the motions before Registrar Schell

5. Costs of the leave application to be costs in the appeal

Background

Background to the litigation

The notice of appeal the claimant seeks to file if granted leave to appeal, seeks an order for judgment against each opponent and asks that the matter be remitted to the District Court for the determination of the quantum of damages.Procedural Background On 20 June 2002 Phegan DCJ dismissed the claimant’s claim for damages arising out of an injury he sustained on 10 September 1998 at the Sinter Plant which belonged to BHP Company Pty Limited (“BHP”), the first opponent. At the time of his injury the claimant was employed by Convatech Pty Limited (formerly Belle Banne (Newcastle) Pty Ltd) (“Convatech”), the second opponent. On 2 July 2002, within the twenty-eight days limited by Part 51 r 4 of the Supreme Court Rules for appeal, the claimant’s solicitors filed a Notice of Appeal. They also filed an affidavit pursuant to Part 51 r 8 purporting to state facts showing that the $100,000 limit in s 127(2)(c) of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) did not apply. On 9 December 2002 Convatech moved the Court for orders pursuant to Part 51 r 25 that the appeal be struck out or dismissed as incompetent (the “incompetence application”). The motion also sought an order that the time fixed for making the incompetence application be extended. A like motion was filed on behalf of BHP. The motion filed on behalf of Convatech was supported by an affidavit sworn by its solicitor, Mr Arnold. That affidavit stated, in apparent support of the application for an extension of time to bring the incompetence application, that the claimant’s Part 51 r 8 affidavit had not been served on Convatech until 3 October 2002. On 3 April 2003 Registrar Schell granted an extension of time to bring the incompetence applications. He dismissed the appeal as incompetent on the basis that the claimant’s Part 51 r 8 affidavit was inadequate, and secondly, that in any event the amount in issue did not involve or exceed $100,000. He ordered the claimant to pay the opponents’ costs of the applications. On 15 April 2003 the claimant’s solicitors filed a motion to review Registrar Schell’s decision. On 16 May 2003 the claimant’s solicitors filed a summons seeking both leave to appeal from Phegan DCJ’s decision and an extension of time in which to seek that order. On 2 June 2003 Meagher JA granted leave for the leave application to be brought out of time. He also directed that the motion seeking to review Registrar Schell’s decision be heard with the summons for leave to appeal. The summons for leave to appeal appears to have been a fallback filed to guard against the possibility that the review of Registrar Schell’s decision might fail. However, as I have noted, Mr Aldridge SC primarily pressed the leave application. Out of abundant caution he also submitted that Registrar Schell had erred both in his factual findings and in concluding that the appeal did not involve an amount of $100,000. The opponents do not contend that the application for leave to appeal is incompetent if Registrar Schell’s decision is not set aside. Counsel for BHP, Mr Margo SC, submitted, however, that the claimant’s tardiness in seeking leave to appeal militated against granting the application.Leave to AppealThe facts

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view the claimant should have leave to appeal from Phegan DCJ’s judgment.Review of Registrar Schell’s decision The grant of leave to appeal, as I earlier noted, strictly speaking obviates the need to consider whether the Court ought review Registrar Schell’s decision. It is necessary to consider it, however, to determine the issue of the costs of that motion. Registrar Schell’s decision to grant the opponents an extension of time within which to bring their motions and to dismiss the appeal as incompetent was an exercise of discretion and, as such, should not be disturbed unless it can be demonstrated that he allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to affect him: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505; In Re the Will of Gilbert (Dec’d) (1946) 46 S.R. (NSW) 318 at 323. In my view this is a case where the Registrar’s decision was so influenced. Before the Registrar, BHP and Convatech originally asked that the appeal be dismissed for want of prosecution as well as because it was said to be incompetent. Mr Arnold, Convatech’s solicitor, detailed the chronology of the appeal and asserted in various paragraphs of his affidavit that the claimant had not complied with orders made by the Registrar at call-overs. The claimant’s solicitor, Mr Hart, swore an affidavit in which he sought to explain the delays. By the time the incompetence applications were heard, the portion of the motion asking that the appeal be dismissed for want of prosecution was not pressed on the basis that the opponents’ complaints had been attended to (BHP) or satisfactorily explained (Convatech). In those circumstances, it might be thought that those portions of Mr Arnold’s affidavit dealing with the claimant’s alleged non-compliance with the Registrar’s orders would not have been read or, even if read, would have been irrelevant to the remaining paragraphs of the opponents’ motions. Registrar Schell, however, referred to Mr Arnold’s affidavit outlining the claimant’s alleged non-compliance with the timetables as well as Mr Hart’s affidavit seeking to explain the delays and noted:“While all documents subject to directions thus far have now been filed, the opponents have endured an inordinate waiting period to ascertain the particulars of the appeal they are expected to answer. Because of the earlier non-compliance with directions by the claimant, I consider it appropriate that the opponents have an extension of time … to bring these notices of motion.” Convatech also sought to justify an extension of the time to make its incompetence application on the basis that the claimant’s Part 51 r 8 affidavit had not been served within the time limited by the Rules. The Court was informed that this complaint had been abandoned before Registrar Schell, yet his judgment nevertheless records the opponents’ erroneous complaint that they did not receive a copy of the Part 51 r 8 affidavit until service of the Red Appeal Book in early October 2002. Mr McGrath conceded that Registrar Schell was in error in referring to that complaint. Granting that, it is not clear why Registrar Schell did refer to it as it does not appear to have been one of the reasons he granted the extension of time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour entered judgment for both opponents.Consideration The claimant submitted that leave to appeal should be granted because the trial judge had erred in finding that he had failed to discharge his burden of proving that at least one, if not both, of the opponents had breached their duty of care. The claimant submitted that the Significant Safety Occurrence Report demonstrated that BHP had a responsibility to take reasonable steps to prevent falling dunnage and to keep the Sinter Plant clean. He also submitted that the document supported the inference that BHP had not discharged that duty. BHP did not call any evidence as to what, if any, system it had devised and/or implemented to maintain the Sinter Plant in a safe condition. In such circumstances, the claimant submitted the trial judge was entitled to infer BHP had been negligent even when others may have had access to the area. Mr Aldridge SC relied upon Shoeys Pty Limited v Allan (1991) Australian Torts Reports ¶81-104 as supporting the proposition that there was sufficient evidence to enable the trial judge to find the claimant had discharged the burden of proving BHP had breached its duty of care in a manner which led to his accident. Insofar as Convatech was concerned, the claimant submitted that his Honour failed to consider the principles of non-delegable duty of an employer referring to Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. In Shoeys Pty Limited v Allan, Handley JA (with whom Priestley JA agreed) considered whether the trial judge had been correct in concluding that the defendant supermarket had breached its duty of care to an entrant where the plaintiff gave evidence of the circumstances of slipping on a substance on the floor and falling and the defendant called no evidence as to what, if any, system it maintained to keep the floor of its premises clean. Handley JA first noted (at 68,492) that it was incumbent upon a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence before the defendant could be called upon to explain how an accident occurred or might have occurred consistently with the absence of negligence on its part. He said that the principles to be applied to determine whether the plaintiff had discharged that onus were stated by Dixon CJ in Hampton Court Limited v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367 at 371: “… the case is one where the facts can hardly be within the knowledge of the plaintiff and, at all events so far as concerns the care and control of the premises and the precautions taken, must be peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant … But a plaintiff is not relieved of the necessity of offering some evidence of negligence by the fact that the material circumstances are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant; all that it means is that slight evidence may be enough unless explained away by the defendant and that the evidence should be weighed according to the power of the party to produce it. …” Handley JA concluded that although the evidence the plaintiff had educed was sparse, it supported the inference that the defendant employed a shop walker to keep the floor of its premises clean. In circumstances where the defendant did not call that person as a witness and he was not shown to have been unavailable and no other evidence was called by the defendant, the Court was entitled to infer that his evidence would not have assisted the defendant’s case. His Honour, indeed, said that:“The further inference is available that if he had been called his evidence would have disclosed either that the defendant’s cleaning system itself was negligent or that he had failed that day to carry out that system.”