NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: GEORGE v THE BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY COMPANY LIMITED & 1 ORS [2003] NSWCA 365
FILE NUMBER(S):
40425/03
40558/02
HEARING DATE(S): 23/09/2003
JUDGMENT DATE: 15/12/2003
PARTIES:
Craig GEORGE - Claimant
THE BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY COMPANY LIMITED - 1st Opponent
CONVATECH PTY LTD (Formerly BELL BANE (NCLE) PTY LTD) - 2nd Opponent
JUDGMENT OF: Meagher JA McColl JA Foster AJA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 287/00
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Phegan DCJ
COUNSEL:
Mr M Aldridge SC - Claimant
Mr R Margo SC with Mr A Spencer - 1st Opponent
Mr G McGrath - 2nd Opponent
SOLICITORS:
Bale Boshev Lawyers - Claimant
Blake Dawson Waldron - 1st Opponent
Arnold Lawyers - 2nd Opponent
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - leave to appeal - whether claimant's case sufficiently arguable - where no direct evidence of breach of duty of care - whether evidence sufficient to enable the trial judge to find the burden of proof discharged in the absence of any contradiction - review of Registrar's decision to dismiss appeal as incompetent - whether grant of extension of time based upon extraneous or irrelevant matters.
LEGISLATION CITED:
Construction Safety Regulations 1950 (NSW)
District Court Act 1973 (NSW)
Factories, Shops and Industries Act 1962 (NSW)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW)
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW)
DECISION:
1. Grant leave to appeal
2. Claimant to file his Notice of Appeal within 21 days of these orders
3. Opponents' motions dated 4 December 2002 dismissed
4. Opponents to pay the claimant's costs of the motions before Registrar Schell
5. Costs of the leave application to be costs in the appeal
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40425/03
40558/02
DC 287/00MEAGHER JA
McCOLL JA
FOSTER AJAMONDAY, 15 DECEMBER, 2003
Craig GEORGE v THE BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY COMPANY LIMITED & 1 ORS
FACTS
The claimant, an employee of the second opponent Convatech Pty Ltd, worked at the Sinter Plant which was owned and occupied by the first opponent BHP. On 11 September 1998 a large piece of timber fell on him during the course of his employment. The claimant brought proceedings alleging negligence and breach of statutory duty against both BHP and Convatech to recover damages. On 20 June 2002 Phegan DCJ dismissed the claim on the basis that the claimant had failed to establish that either of the opponents was negligent.
The claimant’s solicitors filed a Notice of Appeal and an affidavit purporting to state facts showing that the $100,000 limit in s 127(2)(c) of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) did not apply. The opponents moved the Court for orders that the appeal be struck out or dismissed as incompetent. On 3 April 2003 Registrar Schell granted the opponents an extension of time to bring their applications as to incompetence and dismissed the appeal as incompetent.
The claimant sought both leave to appeal against Phegan DCJ’s decision and a review of Registrar Schell’s decision of 3 April…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWCA 365
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the claimant's case was sufficiently arguable to warrant leave to appeal, particularly in the absence of direct evidence of a breach of duty of care, and whether the evidence presented was sufficient to enable the trial judge to find the burden of proof discharged. Additionally, the court was required to review the Registrar's decision to dismiss the appeal as incompetent and consider whether the grant of an extension of time for the opponents' motions was based on extraneous or irrelevant matters.
The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the claimant had raised arguable grounds. The claimant contended that the trial judge erred in finding a failure to discharge the burden of proof, submitting that a Significant Safety Occurrence Report indicated BHP's responsibility for plant cleanliness and the prevention of falling dunnage. The claimant argued that BHP's failure to present evidence of its safety systems entitled the trial judge to infer negligence, citing *Shoeys Pty Limited v Allan* for the proposition that slight evidence may suffice when material facts are peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. Regarding Convatech, the claimant argued that the trial judge failed to consider the principles of non-delegable duty of an employer, referencing *Kondis v State Transport Authority*. The court also reviewed the Registrar's decision, finding that it was influenced by extraneous matters, specifically the opponents' unsuccessful attempts to have the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, which were irrelevant to the competence of the appeal itself.
Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, ordered the claimant to file his Notice of Appeal within 21 days, dismissed the opponents' motions dated 4 December 2002, and ordered the opponents to pay the claimant's costs of the motions before Registrar Schell. The costs of the leave application were to be costs in the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Grant leave to appeal
2. Claimant to file his Notice of Appeal within 21 days of these orders
3. Opponents' motions dated 4 December 2002 dismissed
4. Opponents to pay the claimant's costs of the motions before Registrar Schell
5. Costs of the leave application to be costs in the appeal
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
His Honour entered judgment for both opponents.Consideration The claimant submitted that leave to appeal should be granted because the trial judge had erred in finding that he had failed to discharge his burden of proving that at least one, if not both, of the opponents had breached their duty of care. The claimant submitted that the Significant Safety Occurrence Report demonstrated that BHP had a responsibility to take reasonable steps to prevent falling dunnage and to keep the Sinter Plant clean. He also submitted that the document supported the inference that BHP had not discharged that duty. BHP did not call any evidence as to what, if any, system it had devised and/or implemented to maintain the Sinter Plant in a safe condition. In such circumstances, the claimant submitted the trial judge was entitled to infer BHP had been negligent even when others may have had access to the area. Mr Aldridge SC relied upon Shoeys Pty Limited v Allan (1991) Australian Torts Reports ¶81-104 as supporting the proposition that there was sufficient evidence to enable the trial judge to find the claimant had discharged the burden of proving BHP had breached its duty of care in a manner which led to his accident. Insofar as Convatech was concerned, the claimant submitted that his Honour failed to consider the principles of non-delegable duty of an employer referring to Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. In Shoeys Pty Limited v Allan, Handley JA (with whom Priestley JA agreed) considered whether the trial judge had been correct in concluding that the defendant supermarket had breached its duty of care to an entrant where the plaintiff gave evidence of the circumstances of slipping on a substance on the floor and falling and the defendant called no evidence as to what, if any, system it maintained to keep the floor of its premises clean. Handley JA first noted (at 68,492) that it was incumbent upon a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence before the defendant could be called upon to explain how an accident occurred or might have occurred consistently with the absence of negligence on its part. He said that the principles to be applied to determine whether the plaintiff had discharged that onus were stated by Dixon CJ in Hampton Court Limited v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367 at 371: “… the case is one where the facts can hardly be within the knowledge of the plaintiff and, at all events so far as concerns the care and control of the premises and the precautions taken, must be peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant … But a plaintiff is not relieved of the necessity of offering some evidence of negligence by the fact that the material circumstances are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant; all that it means is that slight evidence may be enough unless explained away by the defendant and that the evidence should be weighed according to the power of the party to produce it. …” Handley JA concluded that although the evidence the plaintiff had educed was sparse, it supported the inference that the defendant employed a shop walker to keep the floor of its premises clean. In circumstances where the defendant did not call that person as a witness and he was not shown to have been unavailable and no other evidence was called by the defendant, the Court was entitled to infer that his evidence would not have assisted the defendant’s case. His Honour, indeed, said that:“The further inference is available that if he had been called his evidence would have disclosed either that the defendant’s cleaning system itself was negligent or that he had failed that day to carry out that system.”