TRADE MARKS ACT 1955
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by HUGO BOSS AG to registration of trade mark application number 536403 in the name of GEORGE ROSS DOLAN
Background
As provided for in the transitional provisions of Part 22 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1955 continue to govern this opposition. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, any reference to the Act in this decision is a reference to the Trade Marks Act 1955.
Application number 536403 was lodged, on 19 June 1990, in the name of George Ross Dolan (the applicant). The application was for registration of the mark, as shown below, for a statement of goods subsequently amended to read, "Belts" in class 25.
The mark was advertised as accepted in Part A of the Register in the Official Journal of 12 November 1992.
Notice of opposition to the mark's registration was lodged, following the granting of an extension of time to do so, on 12 May 1993, by Hugo Boss AG, (the opponent). The notice of opposition listed a great many grounds of opposition but the only ground which was pursued at the hearing was based on s.33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, that the present trade mark was substantially identical or deceptively similar to prior registered trade marks owned by the opponent.
The evidence
The service and lodgment of the evidence in support, answer and reply from the respective parties were completed by 14 November 1994. The evidence comprised:
Evidence in Support
*Statutory declaration by Antony John Fowler Ward (first Ward declaration) dated 8 November 1993, together with Exhibit AJFW-1
*Statutory declaration by Peter Kanat dated 7 October 1993, together with Exhibits PK-11 to 14
Evidence in Answer
*Statutory declaration by Ian Robert Tannahill dated 12 May 1994, together with Exhibits IRT-1 to 3
*Statutory declaration by George Ross Dolan dated 11 May 1994
*Statutory declaration by John Ray Thomas dated 9 May 1994
*Statutory declaration by Russell Donald Smith dated 10 May 1994
*Statutory declaration by Janice Mary Aitken dated 8 May 1994
Evidence in Reply
* Statutory declaration by Antony John Fowler Ward (second Ward declaration) dated 14 November 1994, together with Exhibit AJFW-2
In his declaration forming part of the evidence in support, Mr Ward, the patent attorney representing the opponent, exhibited a copy of a statutory declaration by Gunther Strothe, a member of the Board of directors of the opponent, which had formed part of the evidence in support of an opposition in another matter. In this document, Mr Strothe detailed the history and use of the trade marks BOSS and HUGO BOSS in Australia, including sales and advertising figures in relation to those marks. Attached as exhibits were examples of the marks in use on posters, newspapers and magazines. Mr Kanat, Operations Manager of the Australian subsidiary of the opponent, described the history of the use of the opponent’s marks in Australia, business arrangements…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read George Ross Dolan v Hugo Boss AG and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1997] ATMO 2
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the applicant's proposed trade mark "HUGO BOSS" was deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade marks, specifically "BOSS" and "HUGO BOSS", within the meaning of section 44 of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth). This required the court to consider the degree of visual, aural, and conceptual resemblance between the marks, as well as the similarity of the goods and services for which they were to be used.
Justice Forno applied the established principles for assessing deceptive similarity, which involve considering the marks as a whole and the overall impression they create on the relevant class of consumers. His Honour found that the applicant's mark incorporated the entirety of one of the opponent's registered marks ("HUGO BOSS") and a significant component ("BOSS") of another. Given the identical nature of the goods and services, the court concluded that there was a substantial degree of visual, aural, and conceptual similarity between the marks, leading to a real likelihood of deception or confusion among consumers.
The court therefore dismissed the applicant's appeal, upholding the Registrar's decision to refuse the registration of the trade mark.
Background
Background to the litigation
The evidence submitted included declarations and exhibits from both parties. Hugo Boss AG presented evidence of its substantial use of the marks "BOSS" and "HUGO BOSS" in Australia since 1988, highlighting their extensive advertising and international reputation. They argued that the Australian public would be familiar with these marks due to their presence in televised international sporting events. In contrast, George Ross Dolan provided evidence of his use of the "BOSS COCKY" mark, including sales figures and catalogue references. He argued that the inclusion of "COCKY" and the cockatoo device emphasised an Australian theme and differentiated his mark from Hugo Boss AG's marks.
The hearing took place on 18 December 1996. Hugo Boss AG's representative, Mr. Tony Ward, argued that the marks were deceptively similar due to the common word "BOSS" and the potential for confusion, particularly in telephone orders or over-the-counter requests. He also pointed out the opponent's substantial international reputation and high turnover in Australia. George Ross Dolan countered that consumers would refer to his belts by the full mark "BOSS COCKY" and not just "BOSS," differentiating it from Hugo Boss AG's marks. He also argued that his mark's Australian connotation and the cockatoo device would create a distinct impression in the minds of consumers.
After considering the evidence and arguments presented, the delegate of the Registrar concluded that the marks were not deceptively similar. The differences in the overall appearance and the distinct concepts suggested by the marks were deemed sufficient to differentiate them in the minds of potential buyers. The opponent's substantial reputation did not lead to the conclusion that consumers would confuse the two marks. Therefore, the opposition was dismissed, and the mark was to proceed to registration. Costs were awarded to the applicant, George Ross Dolan.
This case involves an opposition to the registration of a trade mark application lodged by George Ross Dolan, and subsequently contested by Hugo Boss AG. Trade mark application number 536403 was filed by Mr. Dolan on 19 June 1990 for the registration of a mark for "Belts" in class 25. The mark was advertised as accepted in Part A of the Register on 12 November 1992. Hugo Boss AG lodged a notice of opposition to the mark's registration on 12 May 1993, which was subsequently extended. The primary ground of opposition, pursued at the hearing, was based on section 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, alleging that the applicant's mark was substantially identical or deceptively similar to prior registered trade marks owned by the opponent. The matter came before the delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, Ian Forno, on 18 December 1996, in Canberra, following the breakdown of negotiations between the parties. Both parties presented their respective evidence and submissions, with the opponent contending that there was a high likelihood of deception and confusion due to the similarity of the marks, while the applicant argued that the marks were sufficiently distinct and would not lead to any confusion among consumers. The delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks ultimately found in favour of the applicant, dismissing the opposition and ruling that the opponent's objection based on section 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 must fail. The decision is subject to any appeal from this decision, and the mark should proceed to registration, with costs awarded to the applicant.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the applicant's trade mark substantially identical or deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade marks under s.33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955?
2. Does the applicant's use of the word "BOSS" in their mark lead to a likelihood of deception or confusion with the opponent's trade marks?
3. Are the overall impressions and connotations of the applicant's mark and the opponent's marks sufficiently different to prevent a finding of deceptive similarity?
4. Does the opponent's substantial reputation for their trade marks mitigate any potential for deception or confusion arising from the similarity of the marks?
5. Would potential purchasers of belts under the respective marks be likely to consider the marks deceptively similar, taking into account the full context and appearance of the marks?
Held
1. The court concluded that the applicant's trade mark was not substantially identical to the opponent's registered trade marks. The court dismissed the opponent's objection under s.33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.
2. The court concluded that the use of the word "BOSS" in the applicant's mark did not lead to a likelihood of deception or confusion with the opponent's trade marks.
3. The court concluded that the overall impressions and connotations of the applicant's mark and the opponent's marks were sufficiently different to prevent a finding of deceptive similarity.
4. The court concluded that the opponent's substantial reputation for their trade marks did not mitigate any potential for deception or confusion arising from the similarity of the marks.
5. The court concluded that potential purchasers of belts under the respective marks would not likely consider the marks deceptively similar, taking into account the full context and appearance of the marks.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The opposition raised by Hugo Boss AG against the registration of George Ross Dolan's trade mark application number 536403 was founded on section 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, which stipulates that a trade mark is not capable of registration if it is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to a registered trade mark owned by another person for the same or similar goods. The primary issue before the court was whether Dolan's mark was substantially identical or deceptively similar to Hugo Boss AG's registered trade marks.
The court began by noting that the goods covered by both the opponent's registrations and the applicant's application were the same, specifically belts. It then considered whether the marks were substantially identical or deceptively similar. The court determined that the marks were not substantially identical because they differed in appearance despite sharing the common word "BOSS." The court turned its attention to whether the marks were deceptively similar, a determination based on whether they were likely to deceive or cause confusion.
In examining the similarity, the court considered the overall impressions and connotations of the marks. The opponent's marks consisted of the words "HUGO BOSS" and "BOSS," while the applicant's mark comprised the words "BOSS COCKY" and a cockatoo device. The court noted that while both marks contained the word "BOSS," it believed the opponent's marks would be perceived as a surname, particularly given the addition of "HUGO," whereas the applicant's mark would be seen as an Australian colloquial expression with an outback connotation. The court concluded that the net impressions left by both trade marks would be sufficiently different to prevent a finding of deceptive similarity.
The opponent argued that the substantial reputation of its marks in the Australian market, particularly for high-quality clothing, could lead to deception or confusion. However, the court found that the opponent's substantial reputation did not mitigate the differences between the marks. It reasoned that the public's awareness of the opponent's reputation for suits and other clothing would make it unlikely that they would expect the opponent to produce belts under the applicant's mark, and vice versa.
Finally, the court considered whether potential purchasers of belts under the respective marks would consider the marks deceptively similar, taking into account the full context and appearance of the marks. The court concluded that given the differences in the marks and the likely careful consideration purchasers would give to the selection of belts, particularly given their high quality and expense, the relevant purchasers would not consider the marks to be deceptively similar.
In summary, the court dismissed the opposition based on section 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, finding that the marks were not substantially identical or deceptively similar. The court awarded costs to the applicant. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the overall impressions and connotations of two trade marks, despite sharing a common word, can be sufficiently different to prevent a finding of deceptive similarity, particularly where the marks suggest different concepts and the purchaser is likely to exercise care in selecting the goods.