Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales
CITATION:
George M Adams - V - Waverley Council [1999] NSWLEC 7
PARTIES
Applicant
George M AdamsRespondent
Waverley Council
NUMBER:
10198 of 1998
CORAM:
Lloyd J
KEY ISSUES:
:- Judgments and orders
Jurisdiction to set aside
LEGISLATION CITED:
Judgments and orders
Jurisdiction to set aside
DATES OF HEARING:
12/04/1998
DATE OF JUDGMENT DELIVERY:
02/05/1999
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:
Defendant
Applicant
Applicant
I J Hemmings
(i/b John Burrell Solicitors)
M E McMahon (s)
JUDGMENT:
1. This is a Notice of Motion by the respondent (“the Council”) in a proceeding which was heard and determined by Assessor R R Hussey (as Commissioners were then called). The proceeding was an appeal by the applicant (Mr G Adams) under s 97 of the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 against the determination of the Council to refuse a development application for subdivision of No 2 Roscoe Street, Bondi into two allotments. The appeal was upheld by the Assessor, who granted development consent for the subdivision subject to a number of conditions which are set forth in Attachment “A” to the Assessor’s judgment and which I attach to this judgment.2. The Council seeks the following orders set out in its Notice of Motion:
“1. That the matter be referred to Assessor Hussey for consideration under the slip rule being the rule in Part 10 Rule 7 of the Land and Environment Court Rules.
2. That leave be granted to adduce further evidence on the practicality of the reciprocal right of way in favour of Lot A DP 439971 if the common manoeuvring area in Plan B in the Court’s Order of 6th May, 1998 does not form part of the right of way.
3. That the Court’s Order dated 6th May, 1998 in respect of the subdivision of Lots 2-4 Roscoe Street, Bondi, be amended by adding the words “for Lots 1 and 2 and Lot A DP 439971” in plan B after the words “common manoeuvring area” on that plan.”
Background
3. The property the subject of the proceeding before the Assessor was No 2 Roscoe Street, being Lot 4 in Deposited Plan 8368 and which was proposed to be subdivided into Lot 1 having a frontage to Roscoe Street and Lot 2 at the rear and having access to Roscoe Street by a right of way partly over Lot 1 and partly over the adjoining property. The property adjoining No 2 Roscoe Street is No 4 Roscoe Street (Lot A in Deposited 439971). On 14 March 1998 the applicant (together with his wife and their company) exchanged contracts for the sale of 4 Roscoe Street with Ms Nina Hopkins-Shirley as purchaser. Settlement of the contract took place on 29 October 1998. A condition in the contract is that it was subject to the vendor granting and the purchaser accepting a transfer granting a right of way, presumably so as to guarantee the purchaser vehicular access to the rear of the property which she had contracted…
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- Case
- [1999] NSWLEC 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal principles governing the setting aside of perfected orders, distinguishing between the statutory power under the Land and Environment Court Rules and the inherent jurisdiction of the court. It was established that the court could re-open proceedings in exceptional circumstances, such as where the order was obtained by fraud or where there had been a unilateral mistake by one of the parties. The evidence indicated that the applicant had made a misrepresentation to the owner of a neighbouring property, Ms Hopkins-Shirley, regarding the scope of the right of way over the "common manoeuvring area."
The court concluded that the orders should be set aside as they were obtained by fraud, either because the misrepresentation occurred before the conclusion of the proceeding or because it prevented the Council from properly presenting its case. Additionally, the inherent jurisdiction of the court could be exercised to re-open the proceedings due to the unconscionable conduct of the applicant and the potential injustice caused to Ms Hopkins-Shirley and the Council.
Accordingly, the court set aside the orders of the Assessor, remitted the matter to the Commissioner for a rehearing on the issue of the reciprocal right of way, and granted leave for the parties to adduce fresh evidence. The matter was to be referred back to the Commissioner for further hearing, and the costs of the Notice of Motion were reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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