George Antonios Kyprianou v The Queen

[2011] HCASL 191

GEORGE ANTONIOS KYPRIANOU
v
THE QUEEN
[2011] HCASL 191
B55/2011

1. On 11 September 2007, the applicant pleaded guilty, in the Supreme Court of Queensland, to one count of carrying on the business of unlawfully trafficking in the dangerous drug heroin. At his sentencing, the Crown submitted that a 12 year sentence was appropriate, but the applicant submitted that there were a number of mitigating factors which meant that the sentence should be 10 years imprisonment. The mitigating factors included the applicant's remorse, good character and his early plea of guilty. The applicant placed particular emphasis upon the fact that he had returned to Australia from Cyprus knowing that a trafficking charge and a possible substantial custodial sentence awaited him, when he may not be extradited from Cyprus of which country he was a citizen. The sentencing judge (Martin J) sentenced the applicant to 10 years and six months' imprisonment and declared the conviction to be a serious violent offence pursuant to s 161B(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).

2. On 13 June 2008, the Court of Appeal refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal against the sentence.  The applicant had argued that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive because the mitigating factors in the applicant's favour required a sentence of 8 years' imprisonment.  McMurdo P (with whom Fraser JA and Fryberg J agreed) noted, inter alia, that the trafficking had been substantial and commercial and that the applicant had "extensive managerial involvement" in the heroin trafficking network.  The applicant's return to Australia was held to be unremarkable given the applicant's personal and financial ties to this country.  Accordingly, the sentence imposed was held not to be manifestly excessive.     

3. In this Court, the applicant's application for special leave to appeal is directed to the sentencing judge's declaration of the conviction to be a serious violent offence. It appears to be asserted that Part 9A of the Act, in which s 161B(1) appears, is invalid on constitutional and human rights grounds.

4. The applicant requires an extension of time to file his application in this Court.  We would grant that extension, but dismiss the application for special leave to appeal.  The purported constitutional questions raised by the application were not advanced in the courts below and are misconceived.  The application ultimately involves settled principles relating to the sentencing process. It is not in the interests of the proper administration of justice for special leave to appeal to be granted.

5. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

W.M.C. Gummow	S.M. Kiefel
1 December 2011