Gennacker Pty Ltd trading as Homestead Holiday Park v Fontainas

[2019] NSWSC 1376

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Gennacker Pty Ltd trading as Homestead Holiday Park v Fontainas [2019] NSWSC 1376

Hearing dates:

4 October 2019

Date of orders:

11 October 2019

Decision date:

11 October 2019

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Lonergan J

Decision:

(1) This Court declines to exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings pursuant to Rule 12.11(1)(h) of the UCPR.

 

(2) The plaintiff is to file and serve written submissions of not more than 4 pages in length by Friday 18 October 2019 as to the costs order for which it contends given my conclusion in respect of order 1, noting that the defendant seeks a costs order that the “plaintiff pay all of the defendant’s costs in relation to and incidental to the proceedings and the notice of motion”.

 (3) The defendant is to file and serve written submissions in response, not more than 4 pages in length by Friday 25 October 2019.

Catchwords:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – jurisdiction of Supreme Court to hear appeal from decision of single member of NCAT – whether Supreme Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction when no right of appeal pursued at NCAT first – right of internal appeal at NCAT available – Court declines to exercise jurisdiction to hear appeal

Legislation Cited:

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), ss 32, 34, 80, 81, 82, 83
Holiday Parks (Long-term Casual Occupation) Act 2002 (NSW), s 5(1)(c)
Residential (Land Lease) Communities Act 2013 (NSW), ss 12, 109(2)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 12.11(1)(h)

Cases Cited:

Allan & Ors v TriCare (Hastings) Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] NSWSC 416

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Gennacker Pty Ltd trading as Homestead Holiday Park (Plaintiff)
Jacques Fontainas (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
A Morris QC/L A Jurth (Plaintiff)
M McMahon (Defendant)

  Solicitors:
Worcester & Co Solicitors (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2019/219385

Publication restriction:

Nil

Judgment

1. The defendant in these proceedings Mr. Fontainas seeks an order that this Court decline to exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings pursuant to r 12.11(1)(h) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”). The basis, in short, for seeking this order is that the summons that was filed by the plaintiff on 15 July 2019 is in effect an appeal from a decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“NCAT”) comprising one person, Mr. G. J. Sarginson, Senior Member (“SM Sarginson”), dated 28 June 2019.

2. The defendant argued that the proper place for this appeal to be heard and determined is via an appeal panel pursuant to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2013 (NSW) (“CAT Act”) and that the summons filed by the plaintiff is simply an effort to “leap-frog” the proper appeal process.

3. I have reached the view that this is indeed what is being sought by the plaintiff in the act of filing the summons seeking leave to appeal in this Court, before having pursued its right of appeal to an appeal panel under the CAT Act.

4. As stated by Beech-Jones J in Allan & Ors v TriCare (Hastings) Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] NSWSC 416:[1]

“… it must be emphasised that, in the ordinary course, complaints of legal or factual error on the part of NCAT decisions should be agitated by the appeal mechanisms proffered by the CAT Act, including the power conferred by s 41 of the CAT Act to allow an extension of time, prior to invoking this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.”

1. Allan & Ors v TriCare (Hastings) Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] NSWSC 416, at [8].

Background

5. The plaintiff is the owner of a residential park at Chinderah, New South Wales.

6. In 2015 the defendant purchased a dwelling in the park and sought a long term site agreement pursuant to the Residential (Land Lease) Communities Act2013 (NSW) (“RLLC Act”). He had purchased a dwelling from the previous owner who held a long term agreement and his plan was to live in it as his principal place of residence.

7. Pursuant to s 109(2) of the RLLC Act the plaintiff must enter into a new agreement with the defendant unless certain matters, specified in subparagraph (2), apply:

109   Operator to enter new site agreement

(1)  This section applies if a purchaser or prospective home owner under a contract, or proposed contract, for the sale of the home (the sale contract) requests the operator of the community to enter into a new site agreement (the new site agreement) for the residential site with the purchaser or prospective home owner.

Note. This section is not relevant if the purchaser or prospective home owner intends to remove the home from the community.

(2)  The operator must enter into the new site agreement after the request is made, unless:

(a)  the operator declines to enter into the agreement and does so on reasonable grounds (including, for example, the ground that it appears reasonably unlikely that the sale contract will be entered into), or

(b)  without limiting paragraph (a), the operator and the purchaser or prospective home owner do not agree on the terms of the proposed agreement.

…..

(7)  The operator must not unreasonably delay or refuse to enter into a new site agreement referred to in subsection (2).

8. Section 12 of the RLLC Act provides that contracting out of the obligations under this legislation is prohibited.

9. Initially, the plaintiff offered the defendant a short term agreement but this required him under the legislation to have a principal place of residence elsewhere and restricts his occupation of the site to no more than 180 days in any 12-month period. [2]

   2. Holiday Parks (Long-term Casual Occupation) Act 2002 (NSW), s 5(1)(c).

10. The plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant in September 2015 offering to further consider the request if he attended to certain matters, the details of which are not relevant to the matters I need to consider to determine this application.

11. The defendant commenced proceedings in NCAT in relation to the dispute over the site agreement.

12. The Tribunal made consent orders on 11 December 2015 that provided for certain things to occur which included that within three working days of the defendant providing to the plaintiff the information described in order 2 of the consent orders, the plaintiff (who was the respondent in the NCAT proceedings) was to provide to the applicant a residential site agreement under the RLLC Act.

13. The fourth order was that the parties have leave to relist the matter before the Tribunal at short notice to determine any disputes that may arise in carrying out those orders.

14. That did not occur despite those optimistic consent orders not ultimately quelling the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant contends that he provided all the documents in line with the timetable but the plaintiff failed to provide the site agreement and so the defendant sought to enforce the consent order by commencing other proceedings (RC 16/54883).

15. At the early 2018 hearing, Member Harris ruled that the defendant (who was the plaintiff in the NCAT proceedings) had not complied with two matters.

16. Pursuant to s 80 of the CAT Act, the defendant made an internal appeal to an Appeal Panel. The defendant says that the Appeal Panel heard the matter on 20 June 2018 and that the appeal was allowed and the previous orders made by Member Harris were set aside.

17. Consent orders were then made, which are in evidence before me, which provided for the matter to be remitted to the Tribunal to decide a number of specific questions.

18. It was these remitted questions that were dealt with in the decision and orders made by SM Sarginson on 28 June 2019. After a hearing, he ordered that the plaintiff give the defendant a site agreement within 14 days.

19. The defendant did not give a site agreement to the plaintiff within 14 days, did not pursue its rights under s 80 of the CAT Act to make an internal appeal to the Appeal Panel, but instead, filed a summons in this Court.

The proceedings commenced in this Court

20. The summons filed on 15 July 2019 in this Court appears to be seeking leave to appeal the decision of SM Sarginson, as well as seeking orders setting aside the consent orders made by the Appeal Panel in mid-2018 as well as the consent orders entered into by the parties back in 2016.

21. None of the previous consent orders were the subject of any complaint when the matter was heard by SM Sarginson. What seems to have occurred is that the plaintiff was first, unhappy with the outcome and second, felt that SM Sarginson had stepped outside the specific questions referred to him and made a general determination of the matter.

22. There is no purpose in me going any further into the grounds of the proposed appeal or their prospects of success.

23. The issue before me is limited to whether I should make the orders sought in the notice of motion, in circumstances where the available avenue of appeal under the CAT Act has deliberately not been taken.

Submissions and Decision

24. Initially, I formed the impression based on the oral submissions made by senior counsel for the plaintiff, that there was some subtlety of argument associated with the nature of the referral to SM Sarginson by the Appeal Panel and therefore some jurisdictional basis to argue that it was in effect not a decision of the Tribunal, but part of an already determined set of Appeal Panel proceedings and in that context there was no properly available intermediary (appeal step) before coming to this Court to appeal SM Sarginson’s decision.

25. However it became evident that the complaint was a different one and that is that rather than of SM Sarginson focusing on answers to the specific questions that were sent to him for resolution, he:

“…ignored those directions from the tribunal and repeatedly says in the published reasons it doesn’t matter whether it was ambiguous or reflected the intention or what the order actually required to be done or not to be done, because I have power to pretend that that consent order never existed, and to deal with the matter ab initio as if this was a whole new application for a site agreement in accordance with s109…”

arguing that rather than speedier and cheaper outcomes than litigation in other courts, this proceeding demonstrates that is not invariably the case “if indeed it is at all”.

26. Senior counsel for the plaintiff submitted that this Court could and should exercise its discretion to bring what has been a very expensive and lengthy matter to a close quickly and efficiently, by making a final determination. He argued that it was unfair to the plaintiff to “have to go” to the expense of yet another appeal panel hearing which may be unsatisfactory and may again remit questions back for determination by a Tribunal.

27. Counsel for the defendant however submitted, correctly, that s 80 of the CAT Act makes it clear that an appeal from a Tribunal should be made under the machinery available under the CAT Act:

80   Making of internal appeals

(1)  An appeal against an internally appealable decision may be made to an Appeal Panel by a party to the proceedings in which the decision is made.

Note. Internal appeals are required to be heard by the Tribunal constituted as an Appeal Panel. See section 27(1).

(2)  Any internal appeal may be made:

(a)  in the case of an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal at first instance - with the leave of the Appeal Panel, and

(b)  in the case of any other kind of decision (including an ancillary decision) of the Tribunal at first instance - as of right on any question of law, or with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other grounds.

(3)  The Appeal Panel may:

(a)  decide to deal with the internal appeal by way of a new hearing if it considers that the grounds for the appeal warrant a new hearing, and

(b)  permit such fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received by the Tribunal at first instance, to be given in the new hearing as it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

81   Determination of internal appeals

(1)  In determining an internal appeal, the Appeal Panel may make such orders as it considers appropriate in light of its decision on the appeal, including (but not limited to) orders that provide for any one or more of the following:

(a)  the appeal to be allowed or dismissed,

(b)  the decision under appeal to be confirmed, affirmed or varied,

(c)  the decision under appeal to be quashed or set aside,

(d)  the decision under appeal to be quashed or set aside and for another decision to be substituted for it,

(e)  the whole or any part of the case to be reconsidered by the Tribunal, either with or without further evidence, in accordance with the directions of the Appeal Panel.

(2)  The Appeal Panel may exercise all the functions that are conferred or imposed by this Act or other legislation on the Tribunal at first instance when confirming, affirming or varying, or making a decision in substitution for, the decision under appeal and may exercise such functions on grounds other than those relied upon at first instance.

28. I accept the submission made by counsel for the defendant that ss 81 and 82 of the CAT Act confirm a right of appeal to a panel on any question of law and a right to seek leave to appeal on any other ground. Clearly, pursuant to s 80(3), an appeal panel can deal with an internal appeal by way of a new hearing or admit the tender of fresh evidence if it considers that is appropriate.

29. Additionally, s 83(1) of the CAT Act provides that only appeals against decisions of the Appeal Panel are allowed to be made to the Supreme Court with leave and only on a question of law:

83   Appeals against appealable decisions

(1)  A party to an external or internal appeal may, with the leave of the Supreme Court, appeal on a question of law to the Court against any decision made by the Tribunal in the proceedings.

(2)  A person on whom a civil penalty has been imposed by the Tribunal in proceedings in exercise of its enforcement or general jurisdiction may appeal to the appropriate appeal court for the appeal on a question of law against any decision made by the Tribunal in the proceedings.

(3)  The court hearing the appeal may make such orders as it considers appropriate in light of its decision on the appeal, including (but not limited to) the following:

(a)  an order affirming, varying or setting aside the decision of the Tribunal,

(b)  an order remitting the case to be heard and decided again by the Tribunal (either with or without the hearing of further evidence) in accordance with the directions of the court.

(4)  Without limiting subsection (3), the appropriate appeal court for an appeal against a civil penalty may substitute its own decision for the decision of the Tribunal that is under appeal.

(5)  Subject to any interlocutory order made by the court hearing the appeal, an appeal under this section does not affect the operation of the appealable decision of the Tribunal under appeal or prevent the taking of action to implement the decision.

30. As correctly submitted by the counsel for the defendant, the plaintiff is not appealing the decision of the Appeal Panel made in 2018 (although there is reference to seeking relief including setting aside consent orders that it agreed to after the Appeal Panel’s determination) but is really in truth, seeking to “miss a step” as the plaintiff is unhappy with the decision of SM Sarginson, which was decided entirely in the defendant’s favour.

31. The CAT Act is clear that the structure for disputes of this nature is by hearing before a specialist tribunal, together with appeal rights to a specialist panel.

32. I accept the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff commenced its appeal in the wrong place and that any appeal in relation to the decision of SM Sarginson should be to the Appeal Panel pursuant to s 32 of the CAT Act.

33. Illustrated by a number of decisions of this court, including that of Beech-Jones J in TriCare (referred to at [3] of this judgment), this Court can, pursuant to s 34 of the CAT Act, refuse to conduct a judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal if an internal appeal or an appeal to a court could be or has been lodged against the decision.

34. As noted in s 34(2)(a), s 34 permits but does not require the Supreme Court to refuse to conduct a judicial review of a decision on a ground referred to in subsection (1), and pursuant to s 34(2)(b), this option does not limit any power that the Supreme Court has, apart from this section, to refuse to conduct a judicial review of a decision.

35. I accept the submission of counsel for the defendant that these provisions confer upon this Court a discretion to refuse to entertain judicial review proceedings where there is a provision for internal review available elsewhere.

36. I consider it was responsible and appropriate, for this application to be made as it has been, by way of notice of motion, early in the proceedings.

37. I am persuaded that I should decline to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to s 12.11(1)(h) of the UCPR, as there is an available right of appeal to a specialist panel under the CAT Act, and that should be pursued before restoring to this Court.

Orders

1. This Court declines to exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings pursuant to Rule 12.11(1)(h) of the UCPR.

2. The plaintiff is to file and serve written submissions of not more than 4 pages in length by Friday 18 October 2019 as to the costs order for which it contends given my conclusion in respect of order 1, noting that the defendant seeks a costs order that the “plaintiff pay all of the defendant’s costs in relation to and incidental to the proceedings and the notice of motion”.

3. The defendant is to file and serve written submissions in response, not more than 4 pages in length by Friday 25 October 2019.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 11 October 2019