General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia v Marshall

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia v Marshall [2002] FCA 1006

BANKRUPTCY – alleged deficiencies of Bankruptcy Notice – issue as to legislative provisions for the calculation of interest on debt – where Notice required payment to a solicitor rather than the creditor

BANKRUPTCY – substituted petitioner – whether substituted petitioner was creditor at time of act of bankruptcy and at other relevant times – whether abuse of process – effect of security

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 43, 44, 49, 52(2)(b), 306
Local Court (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) ss 39(1), 39(2)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(1)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25C

Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33 distinguished
Jiminez v Welcome Homes Real Estate Pty Ltd [2001] FMCA 122 not followed
Boorowa Shire Council v Booth [2001] FMCA 31 not followed
Wright v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2001] FCA 386 referred to
St George Bank Ltd v Baldwin [2001] FCA 161 referred to
Kirk v Ashdown [1999] FCA 1664 referred to
Kleinwort Benson v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 applied
George v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 284 referred to
Trustees of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary v Weir (2000) 98 FCR 447 referred to
Re St Leon;  Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1994) 56 FCR 371 not followed
Shephard v Blueberry Farms of Australia (Corindi) Ltd [2001] FMC 2 approved
Re Martin; Ex parte Government Employees Finance and Industrial Loan Corporation (1969) 13 FLR 353 distinguished
James v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 93 CLR 631 distinguished
McNamara v Langford (1931) 45 CLR 267 applied
Re Seckold (1935) 5 ABC 195 cited
Re Mendonca (1969) 15 FLR 256 cited
Re Wiggins (1979) 30 ALR 443 cited

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AUSTRALIA v GARRY BRENT MARSHALL (AKA GARRY MARSHALL, AKA GARY MARSHALL)
A 7004 OF 2001

GYLES J
SYDNEY (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
13 AUGUST 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A 7004 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT CREDITOR

AND:

GARRY BRENT MARSHALL (AKA GARRY MARSHALL, AKA GARY MARSHALL)
RESPONDENT DEBTOR

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 AUGUST 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Upon the amendment referred to in par [39] of the reasons for judgment being made, the estate of the respondent debtor be sequestrated.

2.A decision on costs is reserved with liberty granted to the parties to file written submissions as to costs within seven days.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A 7004 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT CREDITOR

AND:

GARRY BRENT MARSHALL (AKA GARRY MARSHALL, AKA GARY MARSHALL)
RESPONDENT DEBTOR

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE:

13 AUGUST 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In this matter, the applicant judgment creditor, General Motors…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1006
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia as the creditor and Marshall as the debtor. The dispute centered on the proper application of interest rates on a debt under a bankruptcy notice, specifically whether the interest rates referenced in the notice were correctly prescribed under the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) or whether they should have referenced the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW). The court was required to determine whether a defect in the notice, which incorrectly cited the statutory provision governing the interest rates, rendered the notice invalid. The debtor argued that the defect was fatal to the notice, while the creditor contended that any defect was cured by statutory provisions allowing for the correction of formal defects.

The court considered the arguments from both sides, particularly focusing on the precedent set by Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis and the subsequent decisions in Jiminez v Welcome Homes Real Estate Pty Ltd and Boorowa Shire Council v Booth, which held that a failure to correctly cite the source provision in a bankruptcy notice could render the notice invalid. The creditor, however, argued that the notice in this case did not suffer from a fatal defect because it referenced both relevant statutes, unlike the notice in Australian Steel Co. The court ultimately held that while the notice did contain a defect, it did not render the notice invalid. The court relied on the decision in Kleinwort Benson v Crowl, which established that proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) are not invalidated by a formal defect unless substantial injustice has been caused by the defect and cannot be remedied by an order of the court. Here, the court found that no substantial injustice had been caused.

The court found in favor of the creditor and ordered the sequestration of the debtor's estate, subject to the amendment of the bankruptcy notice as specified in the reasons for judgment. The decision also reserved a ruling on costs, allowing the parties to submit written submissions within seven days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Upon the amendment referred to in par [39] of the reasons for judgment being made, the estate of the respondent debtor be sequestrated.

2. A decision on costs is reserved with liberty granted to the parties to file written submissions as to costs within seven days.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GYLES J
Section 95(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) provided:“95 Interest on debt under judgment or order(1)Where judgment is given or an order is made for the payment of money, interest shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be payable at the prescribed rate from the date when the judgment or order takes effect on so much of the money as is from time to time unpaid.”Rates have been prescribed from time to time since 27 May 1993. There is no suggestion that the rates set forth in the interest calculations in the Notice are not as prescribed. The provision identified in the interest calculation appendix to this Notice, the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(1), is, it is argued by counsel for Marshall, the ‘rate provision’ in this case and not, as should have been identified, the ‘source provision’. It is submitted that the correct source provision is the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) s 39(1). Counsel argued that this defect should be held fatal to the notice pursuant to the decision in Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33 (“Australian Steel Co”). It was submitted that I should follow the decisions to that effect of Driver FM in Jiminez v Welcome Homes Real Estate Pty Ltd [2001] FMCA 122 and Raphael FM in Boorowa Shire Council v Booth [2001] FMCA 31. With respect to this alleged deficiency in the Notice, counsel for GMAC submitted that this case is to be distinguished from Australian Steel Co as the Notice in this case refers to both supporting statutes, whereas in Australian Steel Co there was a complete failure to refer to the source provision, and relied upon decisions of Beaumont J in Wright v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2001] FCA 386, of Madgwick J in St George Bank Ltd v Baldwin [2001] FCA 161, and of the Full Court in Kirk v Ashdown [1999] FCA 1664. It was argued that the Notice contains the essential elements as required and would not reasonably mislead a debtor. It was submitted that the approach the Court should take in respect of alleged deficiencies in bankruptcy notices is that determined by the High Court in Kleinwort Benson v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 and that even if there is a deficiency it is cured by s 306 of the Act, which provides:“306(1)Proceedings under this Act are not invalidated by a formal defect or an irregularity, unless the court before which the objection on that ground is made is of the opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by an order of that court.” This case is a further illustration of the minefield that bankruptcy law has become for judgment creditors since the decision in Australian Steel Co. There is a real question as to what was authoritatively decided by that judgment. The majority declined to follow the reasoning in another, earlier, Full Court decision of Kirk v Ashdown. They did not, and could not have, overruled that decision (or George v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 284) for reasons I endeavoured to express in Australian Steel Co (at [123]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GYLES J