GELBER & HALLIDAY
[2020] FCCA 1860
•8 July 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| GELBER & HALLIDAY | [2020] FCCA 1860 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Final arrangements for parenting arrangements for two children aged 12 and 10 – conferral of parental responsibility – children currently live with father – mother recently deceased – children have lived with adult maternal half-sibling – half sibling named as testamentary guardian in mother’s will – father opposes the making of order for shared parental responsibility – what is feasible – best interests |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.4, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61B, 61C, 64B, 65C, 65D, 65DAC, 65DAE, 65K, 67Z Guardian of Infants Act 1940 (SA), s.13 |
| Cases cited: Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) [2012] FamCA 1094 MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461 |
| Applicant: | MR GELBER |
| Respondent: | MS HALLIDAY |
| File Number: | ADC 1718 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Brown |
| Hearing date: | 6 May 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 6 May 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 8 July 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Cocks |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | White Berman Grant Legal |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | N/A |
UPON NOTING THAT:
(A)the Respondent, if she is able, shall continue to provide private medical insurance cover for the children;
(B)the parties shall continue to have the children attend with their psychologists until such visits are no longer recommended with the Applicant to pay any gap for fees for such visits not otherwise covered by the Respondent’s medical insurance or Medicare; and
(C)that the expression ‘major long term issue affecting the children (or either of them)’ includes the children’s education, religion, major medical issues and any change from living in the Adelaide Metropolitan area.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
That all previous Parenting Orders be and are hereby discharged.
That the Applicant have sole parental responsibility for the children, X born in 2007 and Y born in 2009.
That save and except in the event of an emergency whereby the following is impracticable, the Applicant consult the Respondent in the following manner, prior to making any decisions concerning a major long term issue affecting the children (or either of them):
(a)The Applicant notify the Respondent in writing of the issue, and the decision he proposes to make;
(b)The Respondent provide the Applicant with her views, in writing, within 14 days;
(c)The Applicant consider the Respondent’s views, and provide her with notice of the decision he makes, within 7 days of receipt of the Respondent’s views NOTING that if the Respondent does not provide any views, the Applicant is at liberty to proceed with his decision 14 days from the date upon which he provided original notice to the Applicant.
That if an emergency arises such that it is impracticable for the Applicant to consult the Respondent prior to making a decision concerning a major long term issue affecting the children (or either of them), then the Applicant notify the Respondent of the issue and the decision as soon as possible after the decision has been made, and in any event, within 24 hours.
That the said children spend time with and communicate with the Respondent at the following times and dates and under the following conditions, namely:
(a)from after school Fridays to before school Monday mornings (or Tuesdays in the event of a long weekend) in each alternate week during school terms with the first such weekend to occur commencing at the end of the second week in each school term;
(b)for half of the short school holidays at the end of Terms 1, 2 and 3 of each year as agreed by the parties in writing and failing agreement, from the conclusion of school on the last day of term until 5.30pm on the Saturday in the middle of such school holidays.
(c)for the long school holidays at the conclusion of Term 4 (save for the times for Christmas Day as set out in paragraph 5(d) hereof), unless agreed otherwise in writing:
(i)from the conclusion of school on the last day of Term to 5.30pm on the Friday a week later; and
(ii)from 5.30pm on the third Friday of the holidays for a period of two weeks concluding at 5.30pm on the said Friday two weeks later;
(d)unless otherwise agreed in writing, the following arrangements for Christmas Day shall override the above times in paragraph 5(c), namely;
(i)for 2021 and in each alternate year thereafter, the children shall be in the care of the Respondent from 4.00pm 24th December to 4.00pm 25th December (PROVIDED THAT they shall be in the care of the Applicant Father from 4.00pm 25th December to 4.00pm 26th December); and
(ii)for 2020 and in each alternate year thereafter, the children shall be in the care of the Applicant from 4.00pm 24th December to 4.00pm 25th December (PROVIDED THAT they shall be in the care of the Respondent from 4.00pm 25th December to 4.00pm 26th December).
(e)unless otherwise agreed in writing, the following arrangements for Easter shall override the above times in paragraph 5(b), namely for the Easter long weekend in each year as shall be agreed between the parties in writing and in the absence of agreement;
(i)from after school on Holy Thursday to 5.00pm on Easter Saturday in even numbered years; and
(ii)from 5.00pm Easter Saturday to before school on the Tuesday after the Easter long weekend in odd numbered years.
(f)for a period on each of the following days each year:
(i)the children’s birthdays;
(ii)the Respondent’s birthday;
(iii)the children’s late Mother’s birthday; and
(iv)the date on which the children’s late mother passed away;
(v)(if the children are not already in the Respondent’s care) at times to be agreed in writing;
(g)the Respondent shall be at liberty to telephone the children at reasonable times when they are in the care of the Applicant;
(h)the Applicant shall be at liberty to telephone the children at reasonable times when they are in the care of the Respondent;
(i)the children shall be at liberty to telephone the Applicant at any time when they are in the care of the Respondent;
(j)the children shall be at liberty to telephone the Respondent at any time when they are in the care of the Applicant;
(k)handovers which do not occur at the children’s school shall take place as agreed in writing between the Applicant and the Respondent and in default of agreement, at the Applicant’s residence.
That the said children shall otherwise live with the Applicant, including the times for special occasions as specified in paragraph 5 hereof.
That each party shall forthwith inform the other of any significant illness or injury sustained by either child whilst in their care and each party shall forthwith advise the other as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical emergency requiring the child or children to be hospitalised or to require immediate medical treatment while in their respective care and each party shall be at liberty to visit the said child or children during any period of hospitalisation.
That in the event of either party leaving the state of South Australia with either or both of the said children they shall notify the other party of their intention to so travel in writing no less than 14 days prior to the anticipated departure time in the event of interstate travel and they shall provide the other party with reasonable particulars of the proposed itinerary and of details and telephone numbers at which they can be contacted whilst out of South Australia.
That the parties be restrained and an injunction is hereby granted restraining them and each of them from;
(a)denigrating the other in the presence of the children or allowing the children to be present whilst anyone else is doing so;
(b)denigrating the other party to or with any third party in the earshot or the presence of the children;
(c)discussing Court proceedings or children’s matters with the children.
That all Applications and Responses otherwise be dismissed as finalised.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym is Gelber & Halliday approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADC 1718 of 2016
| MR GELBER |
Applicant
And
| MS HALLIDAY |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
These reasons for judgment are directed towards the resolution of a dispute relating to how parental responsibility is to be exercised in respect of two children. The dispute is to be resolved pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975.
The children concerned are X born in 2007 and Y born in 2009. The parties in dispute are the children’s father, Mr Gelber and their half-sibling, Ms Halliday.[1]
[1] Ms Halliday is identified as Ms Halliday in the court proceedings. She married her husband Mr C in 2018, after the proceedings had been commenced. However, it is her preference to be known by the surname of “Halliday” which is her husband’s name. In deference to her wishes, I will refer to her as Ms Halliday in these reasons for judgment.
The children’s mother is the late Ms B. Ms B died in 2018 from the effects of cancer. She was fifty years of age. At the time of her death, she and Mr Gelber were separated but not divorced and had been living apart since early 2015.
In the context of this parental separation, in May of 2016, Mr Gelber commenced proceedings, in this court, naming the late Ms B as a respondent. At the time, he sought orders to resolve issues arising from the division of property relating to his de facto relationship with Ms B and for parenting orders in respect of X and Y.
Ms B had been previously married. Her first marriage produced three children. They are Ms Halliday, born in 1991; Ms D, born in 1983; and Ms E born in 1997. Accordingly Ms Halliday is the half-sister of X and Y.
It is Ms Halliday’s case that given the death of Ms B and in deference to her dying wishes, it is appropriate that she (Ms Halliday) be conferred with some level of parental responsibility (or guardianship) for X and Y and to ensure that they maintain a sense of connection to their maternal family of origin.
Mr Gelber does not agree that he and Ms Halliday can be conferred with some form of joint parental responsibility for X and Y because of the difficulties they have in discussing issues together and their disparate views and values.
He is open to keeping Ms Halliday informed about major long-term issues pertaining to the two children and canvassing her views about them but believes that in order for parental authority to be exercised efficiently, one person needs to have the final say.
In this context, it is his view that a parent must be regarded as holding some level of superiority, over any other individual in respect to decision making for a child, given the status conferred on parents by the applicable legislation. He does not accept that parental responsibility can be bequeathed by a deceased parent to another person, certainly if it is not in the best interests of the children concerned.
Underpinning Mr Gelber’s position is his contention that he and Ms Halliday simply cannot work together effectively and for him and her to be conferred with some form of shared parental responsibility for X and Y is simply unworkable, and therefore it is axiomatically not in the children’s best interests for the orders sought by Ms Halliday to be made.
These reasons for judgment are directed to resolving this dispute, which has generated a significant level of both controversy and emotional anguish for both parties involved. Sadly, they were unable to agree on how the issue could be resolved consensually.
Background
The father and the late Ms B began to live together in 2006, when Ms Halliday was a teenager. It seems that she (Ms Halliday) and Mr Gelber did not have the easiest of relationships with one another, certainly the late Ms B deposed so in her affidavit material filed in the court. Ms Halliday left home as soon as she was able to do so.
It also seems to be the case that there were issues in respect of Mr Gelber’s relationship with Ms E. Accordingly, at the time of the initial proceedings, complex issues arose regarding parenting arrangements, in the context of an extended blended family. As with many cases, powerful emotions were precipitated and the children’s loyalties were torn.
Essentially, Mr Gelber aspired to an equal time arrangement for the children. It was Ms B’s view that X was somewhat reticent about her father and did not wish to spend overnight time with her father. Mr Gelber attributed this to a combination of the mother and Ms E’s antipathy towards him.
Mr Gelber and the late Ms B were able to resolve their property issues fairly promptly. The issues relating to X and Y were more controversial and emotionally charged. Ultimately, in May of 2017, it was agreed between them, on a final basis, that Y would spend alternate weekends and half of each school holiday with her father but that X should be able to elect if she wished to attend. The order in question also conferred Mr Gelber and the late Ms B with joint parental responsibility for both X and Y.
At the time of Ms B’s death, Ms Halliday and her husband Mr C were living in Ms B’s house, with X and Y. It is Ms Halliday’s position that in this tragic situation, she was cast into the role of parent for both X and Y both while her mother was gravely ill and afterwards. For obvious reasons, it was a difficult and emotionally laden situation for all concerned.
It was Mr Gelber’s position that it was in the best interests of both X and Y to come and live in his household as soon as possible, given his status as the children’s sole surviving parent. However, he conceded that he had had little interaction with X over the past 18 months or so. From his perspective, this was because the late Ms B had done little to encourage X to have a positive relationship with him and was intent on doing all that she could to estrange the child from him.
On the other hand, it was Ms Halliday’s evidence that she had been involved with both her late mother and the children, on a daily basis, from March 2018 onwards, as Ms B’s illness progressed. She asserts that the late Ms B made it clear to her that it was her (Ms B’s) desire that she (Ms Halliday) become the children’s guardian, after her death.
Ms B was testate, at the time of her death. She owned the house in which she, Ms Halliday and the children were living in at the time of her death. In her will, she named Ms Halliday as the children’s testamentary guardian pursuant to the provisions of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1940 (SA). Clearly this legislation long predates the Family Law Act and was passed in a vastly different social context.
I have not been provided with a copy of the late Ms B’s will. However, I have been advised that she left a significant estate, which included her home. The will also appointed a trust, which was established to benefit X and Y. The trustees appointed by the will were friends of the late Ms B, namely Ms F and Ms G.
It is Mr Gelber’s case that he enjoys an effective and cordial relationship with the trustees, who fund X and Y’s school fees to attend H School and provide other moneys, from time to time, to fund other of the children’s activities.
It is Mr Gelber’s further evidence that the trustees do not have an easy relationship with Ms Halliday. For her part, Ms Halliday confirms that she and other members of her family are in some form of litigation with the trustees over alleged mismanagement of the estate. Issues also arose regarding the fact that the late Ms B’s home had to be sold to give effect to the trust arising under her will.
I am not in a position to resolve these factual issues and it is not necessary for me to do so. However, what is clear, is that the late Ms B did not confer any direct financial responsibility, in the administration of her estate, on Ms Halliday.
Initially, Mr Gelber was loathe to institute proceedings, following Ms B’s death, in respect of arrangements for X and Y’s care. Rather, he wished the two children to remain insulated, if at all possible, from such issues, whilst they grieved for their mother.
It is clear that there was considerable uncertainty about what should happen in the immediate aftermath of Ms B’s death. There was no clear plan between the significant adults in the children’s lives at this time. The status of Ms Halliday to be able to remain living in the late Ms B’s house was unclear and there was some conflict between her and Ms F.
It is neither necessary nor helpful for me to attribute fault for what occurred in this difficult period. At least at one stage, police were called. Allegations have been made of physical assault. I suspect that the powerful emotions precipitated by these difficult and tragic circumstances continue to reverberate for each of the individuals concerned.
Following Ms B’s death, Mr Gelber continued to see Y, in accordance with the prior order. He wished to repair his relationship with X but felt frustrated in this regard. He suspected Ms E may still have been trying to influence her against him.
It was in this extremely difficult and emotionally fraught context that Mr Gelber commenced these proceedings on 19 November 2018. On both an interim and final basis, he sought that the two children live with him and he be conferred with sole parental responsibility for them. Ms Halliday, as she then was, was named as the respondent.
Mr Gelber, in the notice of risk document, which is required to be filed in all proceedings relating to children [see section 67Z], made serious allegations in respect of Ms Halliday’s care of the children. He asserted that she was unable to manage money and had illicit substance abuse issues.
He also alleged that Ms Halliday would expose the children to a distorted sense of what is or should be a normal child/parent relationship. He further alleged that she had and would continue to prevent X and Y from interacting, with an appropriate degree of frequency, with members of their paternal family.
It was also the flavour of his case that Ms Halliday had misappropriated significant sums from her late mother’s estate, prior to the involvement of the trustees, and had some form of personality disorder. Again, I need not definitively resolve these complex issues. However, in my view, they are emblematic of the high level of mistrust and animosity between the parties – emotions, which are unlikely to resolve any time soon.
Ms Halliday formally responded to Mr Gelber’s application on 22 February 2019. She had married Mr C on 30 December 2018. At the time of her response, she continued to live in her late mother’s home. It appears to be the case that the trustees wished to sell the property.
Ms Halliday deposed that, at the time of her mother’s death, there was a bank account which was apparently controlled by Ms Halliday and Ms G, which held approximately $180,000.00 and which had been allocated by the late Ms B as to be used to benefit X and Y. Ms Halliday alleged that Ms G had closed this account without her knowledge.
Pending the preparation of a family report, Ms Halliday sought orders that would see X and Y continuing to live with her and to spend time, with their father, in accordance with the final orders made on 11 May 2017. She did not have a formal position in respect of final arrangements for the care of the children.
At this stage, it was Ms Halliday’s position that she continued to provide the vast majority of care for the children, each of whom was apprehensive about interacting with their father. Both parties agree that there was an extremely unpleasant incident between them, at the late Ms B’s home, in 2018, the day after her death and a further confrontation, involving police attendance, on 12 October 2018.
In her notice of risk, Ms Halliday alleged that the father lacked insight into the children’s emotional needs, following the death of their mother, which had been graphically illustrated by what had happened in 2018 and 12 October, when she alleged he had come to her then home to remove the children from her care, with his current partner. This had led to a potentially violent and volatile confrontation, which police had had to defuse and to which the children were exposed.
Accordingly, from an early stage, the proceedings were infused by an extremely acrimonious atmosphere, characterised by allegations of serious financial malfeasance, on the one hand and emotional insensitivity on the other. As such the case had the potential to be extremely unpleasant, with each party having trenchant criticisms of the other. I am fearful that the current controversy regarding parental responsibility is emblematic of this state of affairs.
A family report was ordered at an early stage of the proceedings (10 December 2018) and released to the parties in early April of 2019. The report was prepared by Ms J, a family consultant with tertiary qualifications in social work.
Orders were also made, by consent, for the children to attend upon a grief counsellor. In this context, Mr Gelber did not formally agitate for a change in the living arrangements for either of the children. He did however seek an order that Ms Halliday undergo a forensic psychiatric examination, given the allegations he had made against her.
I have been told that such a report has been prepared but not paid for. As such, it has not been provided to me. Mr Gelber continues to assert that Ms Halliday suffers from a borderline personality disorder. To Ms J, Ms Halliday indicated that she had been diagnosed with this condition, which had been treated with a dialectical behaviour therapy program. She denies drug abuse.
The Family Report
Mr Gelber confirmed to Ms J that he wished to have exclusive responsibility for making parenting decisions in respect of X and Y. He was critical of a number of aspects of Ms Halliday’s behaviour, including alleging that she had been guilty of traffic offences, involving alcohol; had a volatile personality; and, as a child, he had observed she had no real commitment to either education or honesty. On any view, he has a very negative view of Ms Halliday.
In respect of future arrangements for the care of the children, Ms Halliday reported to Ms J the following:
“…she just wanted them to be happy. Ms Halliday said she had promised her mother that she would care for and raise the girls to be the best people they could be. Ms Halliday said she thought that ideally the girls would live with Mr Gelber and have a great relationship with him and she would see them alternate weekends. In having said this, Ms Halliday said she and Mr C were committed to caring for X and Y if that was what they wanted.”[2]
[2] See Family Report at [68]
In this context, it was Ms Halliday’s position, at the time of interview, that both children were opposed to living primarily with their father. Ms Halliday further said that her focus, in parenting X and Y, was on empowering the children.
Ms J described X and Y as being lovely and engaging young girls. I am sure they each are. In interview, with Ms J, their preference was to remain in the care of their half-sister, with whom they were observed to engage warmly. Ms J observed some problematic aspects of the children’s relationship with their father, particularly so far as X was concerned.
In this context, Ms J detected no great sense of warmth, in the children’s relationship with their father and this raised concerns, for her, about the quality of the relationship. Ms J also noted concerns about her perception that Ms Halliday would have difficulty in supporting the children’s relationships with extended family, on both the maternal and paternal sides, given her propensity to fall into disputation with such individuals.
Overall, Ms J recommended that the children should continue to live with Ms Halliday and spend time with their father. In addition, given the children’s recent bereavement, she recommended that the children engage in therapy. In the conclusion to her report, Ms J wrote as follows:
“…the report writer was worried about the children not feeling listened to and respected regarding their wishes and the potential for this to further fracture their relationship with Mr Gelber. As noted, the children both presented as being mature and having the capacity to convey their thoughts and feelings well with an understanding of the impact of their decisions. Given the complexity of this situation, as well as the recent loss of their mother, it was considered important that both children be engaged in therapy…
With regard to parental responsibility the report writer considered that this be shared. It was acknowledged that this would be difficult for the parties to negotiate and it would require regular mediation to negotiate issues relevant to the children.”[3]
[3] Ibid at [141] – [142]
The release of the report did not lead to the parties being able to reach a consensual resolution of the case. In these circumstances, it was fixed for final hearing, in respect of all issues, including with whom of the parties the children should live, in early May of 2020.
Notwithstanding the contents of the family report and the obvious on-going disharmony between them, the parties agreed that X and Y would transition into their father’s care over the 2019/2020 end of year school holiday.
Mr Gelber deposes as follows in respect of the reason he attributes for Ms Halliday agreeing to this outcome:
“When the children came back into my care in the 2019/20 holidays, I believe that this was mainly due to issues in Ms Halliday’s own life with her husband, Mr C, and her need to move house, more so than a genuine desire to recognise me as an important person in the lives of the children.”
For her part, Ms Halliday asserts that Mr Gelber is not in tune with the children’s feelings and does not value their opinions and as such she is more in touch with what they need and feel. Accordingly, it is my finding that this apparent agreement was not reflective of any newly found rapprochement between the parties and the conflict and animosity between them remains as intense as ever.
Following the release of the family report, the parties engaged in a process of negotiation. Ultimately, to their credit, they were able to agree on a comprehensive raft of orders in respect of the parenting of the children.
It was agreed that the children would spend time with their half-sister on alternate weeks; for half of each school holiday period; and on a variety of special occasions. They also mutually acknowledged that they would not denigrate the other to the children.
More recently again, the parties have agreed on some other contentious issues, particularly that the children should spend time with Ms Halliday on their birthdays; Ms Halliday’s birthday; the late Ms B’s birthday and the day on which she died.
The issue of parental responsibility could not be resolved. In this regard, Mr Gelber proposes as follows:
“2. That the Applicant have sole parental responsibility for the children, X born in 2007 and Y born in 2009.
3. That save and except in the event of an emergency whereby the following is impracticable, the Applicant consult the Respondent in the following manner, prior to making any decisions concerning a major long term issue affecting the children (or either of them):
a. The Applicant notify the Respondent in writing of the issue, and the decision he proposes to make;
b. The Respondent provide the Applicant with her views, in writing, within 14 days;
c. The Applicant consider the Respondent’s views, and provide her with notice of the decision he makes, within 7 days of receipt of the Respondent’s views NOTING that if the Respondent does not provide any views, the Applicant is at liberty to proceed with his decision 14 days from the date upon which he provided original notice to the Applicant.”
He proposes that these orders be prefaced by a number of notations intended to put the orders in context and aid both their interpretation and application. The notations are as follows:
“A. the Respondent, if she is able, shall continue to provide private medical insurance cover for the children;
B. the parties shall continue to have the children attend with their psychologists until such visits are no longer recommended with the Applicant to pay any gap for fees for such visits not otherwise covered by the Respondent’s medical insurance or Medicare; and
C. that the expression ‘major long term issue affecting the children (or either of them)’ includes the children’s education, religion, major medical issues and any change from living in the Adelaide Metropolitan area.”
It remains Mr Gelber’s position that one person needs to be endowed with major long-term decision making authority for X and Y and it should be him because not only is he their sole surviving parent, the children live with him.
On the other hand, Ms Halliday asserts that the children require an advocate, not only in regards to their interactions with the world in general but also their father. As such, she contends that, if she is not endowed with some form of parental responsibility for X and Y they will not be heard as to their interests and preferences in life.
Ms Halliday also points to her shared gender with the children and the fact that each child is either in the midst or on the cusp of puberty. As such, she asserts that it is inevitable that sensitive medical issues will arise for each child and she is better placed than the father to liaise with doctors and other health professionals about these issues and ease any embarrassment the children may feel about such matters, particularly broaching them with Mr Gelber directly.
The evidence
Mr Gelber was represented throughout the proceedings; Ms Halliday represented herself. Mr Gelber seemed reasonable in his presentation. Ms Halliday was more emotional and appeared fixated on practical issues, the most significant of which being her apparent need to have a Medicare card for the children so that she could take them to a doctor if necessary.
Whilst I appreciate that the witness box is not always the most accurate mechanism through which to assess what are the personality characteristics of any particular person, particularly in a case with a high emotional quotient, such as the present one, it is my finding that Mr Gelber was sensitive and balanced in his evidence and was not unreasonable overall, whereas Ms Halliday had the more difficult and less compromising personality.
Accordingly, it is my finding that Mr Gelber has the greater capacity to compromise and solve problems; whereas Ms Halliday had the more abrasive and confrontational personality. In this context, I accept that Mr Gelber has the more functional relationship with the trustees concerned.
This is important, given that the trust is funding the children’s education. It is not likely to be helpful to X and Y if there is any unnecessary conflict regarding the provision of their education. Mr Gelber is likely to have responsibility for the provision of bills to the trustees for payment and be the person who will liaise with them regarding the funding of other activities – such as school trips, music lessons, and attendance at interstate sporting events.
In this context, it appears clear that sports was an important part of the late Ms B’s life and remains important also for X and Y (and indeed for Ms Halliday). This is a significant aspect of her case, that she will be more supportive of the children’s activities in this regard than Mr Gelber will be.
Mr Gelber holds the children’s Medicare cards and has access to the number on it. He indicated that he could provide the number, if necessary. Ms Halliday has agitated that she should be provided with her own Medicare card for the children, as it is her evidence that the two children are covered by her private health insurance cover, which covers extras such as glasses and orthodontics and as such it makes sense that she should be able to coordinate the children’s health care issues.
Mr Gelber concedes that the children are on Ms Halliday’s private health insurance card and he has used the card, on at least one occasion, to pay for physiotherapy for one of the children. He is prepared, in future, to pay any future fees himself or approach the trust for them.
At present both children continue to attend grief counselling regularly, which is paid for through Medicare and a GP mental health plan. X may need to have braces in future. Both children have glasses and are frequent users of physiotherapists and chiropractors because of their sports activities.
It is Ms Halliday’s case that the children cannot remain on her private health insurance policy, if she does not have some form of parental responsibility for them. Mr Gelber does not accept that such an order will be necessary for Ms Halliday to maintain this insurance.
Mr Gelber describes Ms Halliday as being a person who has been unemployed in the long term. It would seem to be his position that, if necessary, he is prepared to make his own arrangements for the children’s health insurance, either personally or through an approach to the trustees.
In my view, the real gravamen of Ms Halliday’s submissions, in respect of health issues, turns on the sex and age of X and Y. They are female children, who are in or closely approaching the age of menarche. As such, there may well be sensitive medical issues arising for each child, which she is more appropriately able to deal with than Mr Gelber because of her sex and sibling relationship with them.
It is her evidence that X is unable to talk about her feminine hygiene requirements with her father and relies on her to supply her with sanitary products. She is embarrassed by the fact that her father does her laundry. In my view the latter issue is not likely to be resolved by the allocation of parental responsibility, given the children will remain living with their father.
I do not discount the sensitivity of these various issues. However, in my view, either the possession of a Medicare card or the endowment of some form of parental responsibility does not preclude Ms Halliday from arranging a medical appointment for either of the children and attending with them, if this is indeed the preference of the children concerned. It also does not prevent her from being a confidant for the children in respect of gynaecological and related issues.
In addition, Ms Halliday deposed that if she was conferred with some form of parental responsibility for the children concerned, she would be able to be a more effective advocate for their interests. In this context, she has deposed that the children have told her that it is their perception their father “does not value” their opinions and regards them as “children who should not have their opinions heard”.[4]
[4] See Ms Halliday’s affidavit filed 30 April 2020 at [5c]
In this context, Ms Halliday has deposed that:
“X and Y both talk to me openly about anything and want to talk to me, now their mother is not there for them to speak to, it is because of this that I think I need to be considered a guardian instead of just ‘their half-sister they spend time with’. I am more than that to these young women.”[5]
[5] Ibid at [2e]
Again, I do not discount the sensitivity of these statements nor, I hope, the vulnerability of the two young children, who are coping with and adjusting to the untimely death of their much loved mother. Ms Halliday is clearly important to them and the three share a mutual love and affection for one another, as well as a shared history.
Ms Halliday is likely to remain significant to X and Y for the indefinite future. The importance of this relationship is recognised in the parties’ agreement, which sees the children spending regular weekend periods and school holidays with their half-sister. In my view, these are not token arrangements.
However, the conferral of some form of parental relationship will not necessarily enhance the relationship between Ms Halliday and the children. She can continue to be the children’s confidant and their advocate, if she so wishes. She will remain an integral part of the children’s lives, regardless of her legal status.
In my assessment, Ms Halliday is not the sort of person who will be backward in coming forward if she perceives that there is some issue which needs to be agitated, so far as the welfare of X and Y is concerned. She did not seem to be to the sort of person who was easily cowed. Indeed her personality and that of Mr Gelber is one of the more influential issues arising in the case.
In this context, Ms Halliday conceded that she and Mr Gelber were chalk and cheese other than each of them was extremely stubborn. She also indicated, in her evidence that she did not trust Mr Gelber. I have no doubt, from hearing evidence from each of the parties that these are feelings reciprocated by Mr Gelber.
As such, it appears improbable to me that the communication deficits between the parties, long standing given their difficult relationship over many years, from the time Ms Halliday was an adolescent and Mr Gelber was in loco parentis, are likely to resolve any time soon. Their shared history is painful for each of them.
In this context, it is Mr Gelber’s view that it is predictable that he and Ms Halliday will inevitably disagree about each and every major long term issue to do with the long term development of X and Y and this will mean that the court will have to adjudicate the issue concerned. This will be potentially expensive; time consuming; and emotionally fraught for the children.
In support of his position, he points to the fact that it is his perception that he and Ms Halliday have different views about the value of education. From his perspective, it is very important – he has an applied physics degree and is happy to assist the children with mathematics, something X struggles with. Y is reported to be a bright student but prone to procrastination – not something atypical in a ten year old.
It is Mr Gelber’s perception that Ms Halliday is less interested in academic issues because she herself struggled at school, in the past, from time to time. Whether this is so or not, is beyond the scope of these proceedings. It is a sensitive issue but, in my view, it is indicative of the gulf between the parties in terms of their values and views about all manner of things.
In this context, I am concerned that each and every major issue arising for X and Y, if the parties are conferred with joint parental responsibility will become a battle of wills, with each struggling for superiority over the other and neither being willing to compromise or find some solution.
Apart from their on-going process of counselling and the unexceptional incidents of orthodontics; optometry; and physiotherapy; the children enjoy good health. Mr Gelber has deposed as follows:
“I am happy to inform Ms Halliday of any injury or illness that the children suffer and consult with her about their medical treatment.
However, if it comes to a major decision about a significant operation that the children need to undertake I, of course, would inform Ms Halliday and take into account Ms Halliday’s views about the outcome but do not consider it appropriate that she has an equal say as me to the final decision making in such matters.”[6]
[6] See Mr Gelber’s affidavit filed 1 May 2020 at [42] – [43]
I accept that Mr Gelber’s assurance to keep Ms Halliday informed is a genuine one and not one marked by cynicism of tokenism. It seems to me that the current mistrust between the parties does require one of them to have the final say otherwise there will never be any decision made.
Religion is not a matter of personal priority to Mr Gelber. He is content for the children to continue to attend a Catholic school and be exposed to the broad ethical themes of Judeo-Christianity. Ms Halliday has not indicated that she has any strong religious affiliations.
It seems likely that the trustees, in future, will play a significant role in determining educational matters in respect of the children because they will be funding them. In this context, Mr Gelber’s better relationship with them is a major factor militating in favour of his position.
I acknowledge the sensitivity of Ms Halliday’s position. I also acknowledge the important fact that the late Ms B appointed her the children’s testamentary guardian and, in such circumstances, it is only natural that Ms Halliday will feel that she has let her mother down or betrayed her dying wishes if she does not continue the struggle to maintain some form of parental authority with Mr Gelber.
It is these potent emotions which inform Ms Halliday’s heartfelt desire, expressed in her oral evidence to me that she “wants to be seen as a parent” for X and Y. In the circumstances, I can understand why she would feel this way. However, in my view, I must approach the case from the perspective of the children’s best interests and what is workable and feasible in regards to relevant decision-making in regards to the children.
In this context, I must consider whether it is necessary for there to be some form of brake on Mr Gelber’s decision making and whether he is being disingenuous in his statements to the court that he will keep Ms Halliday in the loop so far as major issues to do with the children are concerned.
I do not consider that Mr Gelber does need to be subject to some form of oversight in the exercise of the parental capacity conferred upon him by reason of the fact that he is the natural parent of X and Y. Further, I do not doubt his word that he will keep Ms Halliday informed about major issues to do with the children.
After all, Ms Halliday will remain an active presence in each child’s life. Given her personality, Ms Halliday will continue in her role of advocate and confidant for the children. As such, Ms Halliday will inevitably become aware of major issues for the children, as they arise and, as a consequence, will have the ability to put forward her views. Given the difficult emotional topography between the parties, I do not consider it would be helpful for the children to furnish her with some form of veto.
Legal considerations
The Federal Circuit Court is invested with the judicial power of the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to Chapter 3 of The Constitution. In lay and general terms, it exercises judicial power for laws made by the Federal Government of which the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) is one such piece of legislation.
As such, the Federal Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to apply legislation made by any state parliament. If a state law is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth law will prevail.
Part VII of the Act deals with orders relating to children. Before making any particular parenting order, the court must regard the best interests of any child concerned as the paramount consideration [Family Law Act section 60CA]
Pursuant to section 61C(1) each of a child’s parents, of a child under 18, has parental responsibility for the child concerned. Pursuant to section 61B, parental responsibility means all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children.
Clearly, given his status as a biological parent of X and Y, Mr Gelber has and retains these duties and powers in respect of the children, whereas Ms Halliday does not and has never held them formally.
The objects and principles underlying Part VII of the Act emphasise the authority of parents in respect of children. In particular, section 60B(1) of the Act provides the following principles to be applied by the court to ensure that a child’s best interests are met:
“(a)ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
(b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
(c)ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
(d)ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.”
The principles, which underpin these objects, are set out in section 60B(2) and are as follows:
“(a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
(b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
(c)parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
(d)parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and
(e)children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).”
Accordingly, it is parents who have duties in respect of their children rather than other relatives specifically under the Act. However the legislation does recognise the obligation of parents to fulfil their duties and meet their obligations towards their children and by necessary implication individuals other than parents can be authorised to fulfil such duties in the event of parental failure.
The Act also recognises the right of children to maintain relations with relatives who are significant to them and to share the cultural orientation of their relatives. Accordingly, Ms Halliday’s relationship with the children is capable of being recognised under the Act. She has standing to apply for a parenting order in respect of X and Y.
A parenting order is an order which deals with such issues as the persons with whom a child should live; spend time and communicate with; and the persons, who should have responsibility for making decisions, both significant and otherwise, about a child and the degree of consultation necessary to implement such decisions [section 64B(2)].
Pursuant to section 65C of the Act, a child’s parents; the child him or herself; a child’s grandparents; or any other person concerned with the child’s care, welfare or development; may apply for a parenting order. Accordingly, the applicants have legislative authority to seek the orders, which they do.
In addition, as a consequence of the provisions of section 65D, the court is empowered to make whatever parenting order it considers “proper”. Pursuant to section 64B parental responsibility can be allocated to two or more persons. Accordingly aspects of propriety attach to the allocation of parental responsible.
As such, the court must consider what is fit, suitable or right for the particular family concerned. Parental responsibility is a difficult concept to fit into a definitive box or category, as is apparent from the loose end definition provided by section 61C. In my view, the meaning of the concept must be derived from the surrounding provisions of the Act, particularly the overall aims and objectives provided by it in regards to the care and parenting of children.
These emphasise the importance of individuals, involved in the care of children, living up to their responsibilities, in respect of children in their orbit, so that each such child achieves their full potential. In determining how parental responsibility is to be conferred in this case, I must remain focussed on the best means by which X and Y can have a happy remainder of their childhood and do the best they can at school and in all their other endeavours in life, with the aim of ensuring they are well adjusted and productive adults.
Clearly this provision, when considered in the light of the objects and principles underlying Part VII, contained in section 60B, is supportive of the concept of parents (and other relevant individuals) sharing parental responsibility and meeting their joint responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of the relevant children.
As Cronin J has observed in Bartel & Schmucker (No 3)[7] adequacy and propriety of parenting are very subjective and must be affected by the parents’ physical, emotional and financial capacities and circumstances of the family concerned. In this context, Cronin J said as follows:
“An element of the subjective assessment is to try and work out ways that ensure that parents, subject to their capabilities, fulfil all of their duties and responsibilities and that they jointly share those parenting tasks and agree about how their children should be raised so that the children ultimately do benefit from the guidance and role modelling of their parents.”
[7] Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) [2012] FamCA 1094 at [13]
Accordingly, the ultimate consideration in this case cannot centre on the personal feelings of either Mr Gelber or Ms Halliday. The case must be determined by what is best for X and Y. In my view, this will be influenced by what will work or be effective in the particular circumstances of the case concerned. This is particularly so given the ethos that parental responsibly is a thing to be shared and jointly discharged.
Parental authority arises, at common law, with the incidence of becoming a parent. The Act recognises this conferral can be modified, if it is proper to do so, subject to the overall best interests of the child to do so and can in appropriate cases be conferred on individuals who are not a child’s parents.
In Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) Cronin J said as follows regarding the nature of parental responsibility:
“Whilst parental responsibility is vaguely defined, some insight into what is needed from a parent can be seen in s 65DAC(3) which provides that if both parents have that responsibility, they are taken to be required to consult about parenting issues and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision. It will again be remembered that the focus of the objects and principles in this Act is on joint parenting.” [8]
[8] Ibid at [18]
As Cronin J observes, this concept of parental authority being shared between those on whom it is conferred arises from the directions given in the Act as to how various categories of decision are to be actually made by those holding positions of authority in respect of children. The legislation recognises that there are basically two categories of decision which have to be made in respect of children.
An order which provides for shared parental responsibility requires the parties to it to consult with one another and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about major long-term issues to do with the child or children concerned [section 65DAC].
Major long-term issues is defined in section 4 of the Act and includes issues to do with a child’s education; religious and cultural upbringing; the child’s health; the child’s name; and changes to the child’s living arrangements that would make it significantly more difficult for the child concerned to spend time with a parent.
Pursuant to section 65DAE, parents (or other relevant persons) do not have to consult on matters, which are not concerned with long term issues, when the child is spending time with one or other of them. This is to ensure that the myriad decisions, which have no long term significance concerning a child and which need to be made on a day to day basis, by both of the child’s parents, can be made.
Accordingly, Ms Halliday will be able to make quotidian decisions regarding X and Y, when they are in her care, which will be frequent, given the terms of the agreement between the parties in respect of time spending arrangements.
In this case, I accept that Ms Halliday is a person who is concerned with the care, welfare or development of X and Y. I further accept that Ms Halliday’s concern, in this regard, arises through her status as the children’s oldest adult half sibling; her love for the children; the fact that she provided for their care for a significant period following their mother’s death; and because of the provisions of the late Ms B’s will.
It would seem to be the case that pursuant to her will Ms B appointed Ms Halliday as the testamentary guardian of X and Y. Section 13 of the Guardian of Infants Act 1940 (SA) provides as follows:
(1) The father of an infant may by deed or will appoint any person to be guardian of the infant after his death.
(2) The mother of an infant may by deed or will appoint any person to be guardian of the infant after her death.
(3) Any guardian so appointed shall act jointly with the mother or father, as the case may be, of the infant so long as the mother or father remains alive unless the mother or father objects to his so acting.
(4) If the mother or father so objects, or if the guardian so appointed as aforesaid considers that the mother or father is unfit to have the custody of the infant, the guardian may apply to the court, and the court may either refuse to make any order (in which case the mother or father shall remain sole guardian) or make an order that the guardian so appointed shall act jointly with the mother or father, or that he shall be sole guardian of the infant, and in the latter case may make such order regarding the custody of the infant and the right of access thereto of its mother or father as, having regard to the welfare of the infant, the court may think fit, and may further order that the mother or father shall pay to the guardian towards the maintenance of the infant such weekly or other periodical sum as, having regard to the means of the mother or father, the court may consider reasonable.
The powers conferred on the court by this subsection, in cases where the appointed guardian is to be the sole guardian of an infant to the exclusion of its mother or father, may be exercised at any time and shall include power to vary or discharge any order previously made in virtue of those powers.
(5) Where guardians are appointed by both parents, the guardians so appointed shall after the death of the surviving parent act jointly.
(6) If under the preceding section a guardian has been appointed by the court to act jointly with a surviving parent, he shall continue to act as guardian after the death of the surviving parent; but if the surviving parent has appointed a guardian, the guardian appointed by the court shall act jointly with the guardian appointed by the surviving parent.”
Section 65K of the Family Law Act deals with what occurs when there is a parenting order in existence, which deals with whom a child is to live and that person dies. In this case, at the time of Ms B’s death, there was a parenting order which dealt with whom X and Y were to live, namely their late mother. The consent order of May 2017 did not provide for what was to happen in the event of Ms B’s death. The order was not subsequently changed.
Pursuant to section 65K(2) a surviving parent cannot require the children to live with him or her. Section 65K(3) specifically provides that a surviving parent and any other person may apply for a parenting order subject to the provisions of section 65C, namely any person with a level of concern in issues to do with the welfare of the child concerned.
Section 65K and the related provisions of Part VII, being Federal legislation, supplant the provisions of the Guardianship of Infants Act. Ms B was not able to bequeath any form of parental responsibility, for X and Y, to Ms Halliday, pursuant to the provisions of her will. The issue falls to be adjudicated pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law Act.
Accordingly, Ms Halliday has status to bring her application for conferral of some form of parental responsibility upon her notwithstanding the fact that she is not a parent of either child. Whether this should occur depends on whether, firstly, in all the circumstances of the case it would be proper to do so, in the sense that there is a state of affairs fit or amenable to do so; and secondly, it is an outcome calculated to be in the children’s best interest.
Whether it is proper to confer some form of parental responsibility, on two individuals, must turn on how easily the individuals can share that responsibility and, if necessary compromise their views and reach a position based on consensus, particularly in respect of an issue of major long term importance to the child concerned.
Issues to do with the children’s best interests are to be determined by reference to the criteria listed in section 60CC of the Act. The section creates two classes of considerations which are relevant – primary considerations and a longer list of additional considerations.
Generally speaking, the court should give greater weight to the primary considerations, which closely tie in with the overall objects and principles of the Act set out in section 60B. Protective concerns are to be given priority [section 60CC(2A)].
There are two primary considerations, which are as follows:
“a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and
b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm, from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.”
Other specific criteria, relating to how the court is directed to consider how the best interests of any children concerned may be served, by any order which is made, are set out in section 60CC(3). There are fourteen such criteria, which are categorised as being additional considerations. Depending on the circumstances of the case concerned, one or more of these factors may come to the fore.
In this particular case, sub-paragraphs (b); (f); (g); and (l) of section 60CC(3) are relevant. These subparagraphs deal with the following issues:
·The nature of the child’s relationship with parents and significant other persons, including grandparents;
·The capacity of each party to provide for the children’s emotional and intellectual needs;
·The maturity, sex, lifestyle and background and any other relevant characteristic of the children concerned;
·Whether it would be preferable to make the order which would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings between the parties concerned.
Pursuant to section 60CC(3)(m), the court is empowered to have regard to any other fact or circumstance, which it considers relevant. This ensures that the infinite variety of individual children’s circumstances may be addressed in any order which the court makes.
Conclusions
The orders on which the parties have agreed will see X and Y living predominantly with their surviving parent – their father. The orders will also see the children spending significant periods of time with a relative of great importance to them – their half-sister.
Accordingly, the orders envisage the maintenance of the children’s most significant relationships given the untimely death of their mother. In my view, it is axiomatically the case that these orders are in the best interests of X and Y.
I am satisfied that Mr Gelber is a properly motivated parent, who loves both children and, as such, is directed towards ensuring that X and Y live in a secure home; have a happy childhood; and achieve their full potential to become well rounded and appropriately educated adults.
As such, I am satisfied that any conferral on him of formal parental authority will not miscarry or be abused. I am satisfied that he has sufficient capacity to provide for both the emotional and intellectual needs of both X and Y. In this context, I find that Mr Gelber will meet his obligations concerning the care, welfare and development of X and Y arising from the fact of his parentage of them.
I also accept that Ms Halliday loves X and Y and, because of the death of Ms B, has a special role in the children’s lives, which was recognised by Ms B’s will. However, whilst being sensitive to Ms B’s views, I must approach the issues arising in this case from a consideration of the legal considerations delineated in the Family Law Act.
The ages and sex of X and Y are relevant considerations as is the fact that they have lost the influence of their mother in tragic and premature circumstances. Mothers necessarily bring something to the parenting of adolescent female children, as a consequence of their gender, which fathers cannot.
This, of itself, does not preclude a male parent being closely involved in many sensitive and personal aspects of a daughter’s life and, of course, puberty can be just as difficult and embarrassing for boys as for girls. However, I recognise the continuing importance of the role Ms Halliday is likely to play for X and Y given the sad event of their mother’s death.
As I have already observed, the lack of conferral of some form of parental responsibility on Ms Halliday will not preclude her from being both an advocate and confidant for X and Y. It is to be expected that each child will continue to be able to seek out Ms Halliday for help and guidance, as they have done in the past. I am confident that Ms Halliday will be able to put forward the children’s views, in respect of any particular issue, and argue for or against it, as she sees fit.
In MRR v GR[9] the High Court considered issues to do with the conferral of equal shared parental responsibility pursuant to the provisions of section 61DA and what followed as a consequence of the provisions contained in section 65DAA. Essentially this was concerned with what pre-conditions had to be satisfied for there to be an equal time or substantial or significant time regime for any relevant child.
[9] MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461
I appreciate the situation arising in this case is not analogous. However, I find the terminology and analysis of the High Court useful to apply to the issues arising in the current matter. In the case, the High Court directed that not only should there be a consideration of a child’s best interest but also what was objectively practical to put into effect. This exercise turned on the practical realities facing the family in question. Essentially what was likely to work for it?
In purely theoretical terms, it might be seen to be advantageous, for X and Y, that there be a maternal proxy in respect of the exercise of parental responsibility for them, on the basis that, in the absence of their mother, such a person would be able to address issues from the prospect of this part of the children’s background and inheritance and make sure all relevant decisions are in keeping with it.
However, in a case like the current one, the question must be – will such a regime work? I do not consider that it would. The children will continue to live predominantly with their father, who will be the main influence in their lives, which in my view is fitting given he is the children’s surviving parent.
Mr Gelber and Ms Halliday do not communicate effectively and do not like one another because of their past history. In addition, it is likely that they hold different aspirations and value systems for the two children in question. As Ms J recognised, it is difficult for the parties to negotiate issues without some form of professional intermediary.
More significantly, in my view, the parties’ relationship with one another is competitive in nature, particularly because each perceives he or she can speak from a superior position, over the other, in terms of their knowledge of and level of intimacy with X and Y. These attitudes are self-defeating in respect of any sharing of parental responsibility for the children or in the terms identified by Cronin J of a situation evolving based on consultation about parenting issues and the making of a genuine effort to come to joint decisions.
The sad reality is that the parties are more likely than not to be unable to reach any joint decision about any major long term issue to do with the children’s care, welfare and development and this will mean their return to the court system, with all the adverse consequences entailed with that, particularly cost, delay and uncertainty of arrangements.
Finality is generally preferable in children’s cases. Litigation is expensive in both financial and emotional terms. As such, it is usually desirable that arrangements for the care of children are stable and constant and not subject to the threat of further litigation. These are the objectives underpinning the considerations contained in section 60CC(3)(l).
The orders proposed by Mr Gelber do not exclude Ms Halliday from being an active presence and influence in the children’s lives. As a consequence of the provisions contained in section 65DAE she will be able to make and attend upon routine medical appointments for the children and make other day to day decisions about them, whilst they are in her care.
In addition, she will be able to present their views, as she perceives them, to Mr Gelber, for his consideration. She can argue as to their efficacy. However, I have come to the conclusion that ultimately it will not be workable for she and Mr Gelber to have joint parental responsibility for the two children because they will be unable to make the required decisions expeditiously and efficiently, if at all and this is not an outcome calculated to be in the children’s best interests.
One individual has to have the final say and that person should be Mr Gelber, the children’s surviving parent and the person who provides their predominant home and who interacts more efficiently with their financial trustees. It would not be in the children’s best interests to potentially provide Ms Halliday with a de facto veto in respect of the exercise of this power.
For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-nine (149) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Brown.
Associate:
Date: 8 July 2020
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
Legal Concepts
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Injunction
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