GE Capital Australia v Davis

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CITATION: GE Capital Australia v Davis [2001] NSWSC 933
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 4683/01
HEARING DATE(S): 26 September 2001
JUDGMENT DATE:
26 September 2001

PARTIES :


GE Capital Australia (P)
Tana Ruth Davis (D1)
Lessel George Davis (D2)
Veltex Pty Limited (D3)
Zeita Pty Limited (D4)
JUDGMENT OF: Hamilton J
COUNSEL : C R C Newlinds (P)
No appearance (D1-4)
SOLICITORS: Kemp Strang (P)
Hugh & Associates (D1-4)
CATCHWORDS: EQUITY [340] - Equitable remedies - Injunctions - Interlocutory injunctions - Injunctions to preserve property pending determination of rights - Mareva injunctions - Other matters - Nature of evidence required - Defendants selling house, declining to indicate nature of defence to proceedings or reveal their assets and failing to appear - PROCEDURE [81] - Supreme Court procedure - Practice under Supreme Court Rules - Preliminary rules and generally - Overriding purpose.
LEGISLATION CITED: Supreme Court Rules, Pt 1 r 3, Pt 9 r 1
CASES CITED: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380
Patterson v BTR Engineering (Australia) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319
DECISION: Mareva order made until further order with liberty to defendants to apply to discharge.



IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

HAMILTON J

WEDNESDAY, 26 SEPTEMBER 2001

4683/01 G E CAPITAL AUSTRALIA v TANA RUTH DAVIS & ORS

Judgment

This is an application by the plaintiff for what should now be referred to as a Mareva order rather than a Mareva injunction: see Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at 401. The principles on which such relief is generally granted were usefully set out by Gleeson CJ when Chief Justice of this Court in Patterson v BTR Engineering (Australia) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 where his Honour said at 321 – 322:

          “The remedy is discretionary, but it has been held that, in addition to any other considerations that may be relevant in the circumstances of a particular case, as a general rule a plaintiff will need to establish, first, a prima facie cause of action against the defendant, and secondly, a danger that, by reason of the defendant’s absconding, or of assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with in some fashion, the plaintiff, if he succeeds, will not be able to have his judgment satisfied.”

2 As will be apparent from what follows, on the material before me the plaintiff has established a strong prima facie case that it will recover judgment against the first and second defendants (hereinafter referred to as "the defendants") against whom the relief is sought. However, this is a case where the matter is closer to the line in drawing the necessary inference that there is a danger of the dissipation of the defendants’ assets so as to prevent satisfaction of a judgment if obtained. This matter must be looked at carefully because the courts have repeatedly emphasised that the Mareva order ought not be used simply as a…

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Details
Case
[2001] NSWSC 933
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of GE Capital Australia v Davis, the dispute revolved around the application of a Mareva injunction to preserve the defendant's assets during the course of litigation. GE Capital Australia sought to prevent Davis from disposing of her property, given concerns that she might dissipate her assets to avoid satisfying a potential judgment in GE Capital's favour. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issues that the court had to address were the criteria for granting a Mareva injunction and the nature of evidence required to support such an application. GE Capital argued that Davis's actions, including selling her house, refusing to disclose the basis of her defence, and failing to appear in court, justified the injunction. Davis contested the application on the grounds that GE Capital had not provided sufficient evidence to meet the stringent standards required for such an injunction.

The court considered the principles established in previous cases, which emphasised the need for a strong prima facie case and a serious question to be tried, coupled with the risk of dissipation of assets. The court determined that GE Capital had made out a compelling case based on Davis's behaviour and the likelihood of her defeating the proceedings. The court concluded that the overriding purpose of the litigation, to ensure just, quick, and cheap resolution of real issues, would be undermined if Davis were permitted to dissipate her assets. Accordingly, the court granted the injunction, preserving Davis's property pending the outcome of the litigation.

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