GBT v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   GBT -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 19

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

PULLIN JA
LE MIERE AJA

HEARD:   22 OCTOBER 2008

DELIVERED          :   22 JANUARY 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 162 of 2007

BETWEEN:   GBT

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :EATON DCJ

File No  :IND 1416 of 2004

Catchwords:

Appeal - Conviction - Sexual offences against a child - Directions to the jury - Longman warning - Corroboration - Whether direction regarding 'uncharged acts' was correct - Whether directions regarding surrounding circumstances were correct

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(4)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S W O'Sullivan

Respondent:     Mr D Dempster

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Ian R Farquhar & Co

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

AM v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 196

Collard v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 47

Cornelius & Briggs (1988) 34 A Crim R 49

Crisafio v The Queen [2003] WASCA 104; (2003) 27 WAR 169

Doggett v The Queen [2001] HCA 46; (2001) 208 CLR 343

Domican v The Queen [1992] HCA 13; (1992) 173 CLR 555

Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207

Hill v The Queen [2003] WASCA 177

HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16; (2008) 82 ALJR 723

Kelleher v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 534

Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79

R v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508

R v Best [1998] VR 603

R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609

R v Rayner [1998] 9 VR 818

R v Sadler [2008] VSCA 198

R v Taylor [2004] VSCA 98; (2004) 8 VR 213

RPS v The Queen [2000] HCA 3; (2000) 199 CLR 620

WKD v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122

  1. MARTIN CJ:  I agree with Pullin JA.

  2. PULLIN JA:  The appellant was convicted before Judge Eaton and a jury of 28 counts involving sexual offences against a child.  The appellant appeals against his convictions.  The offences occurred over a 10 year period between January 1991 and January 2001 on seven children aged between 6 and 15 years.  One of the complainants was his daughter L and the others were her friends.  

  3. The offending occurred whilst the appellant lived with his ex‑wife.  The appellant's wife was a shift‑worker who worked weekdays from the afternoon until late at night and who would often be absent from the family home from just before or after the children finished school until after the children went to bed at night.  During the time his wife was absent, the appellant's two daughters were under his care.  Friends would come to play or to sleep over.  During these periods the appellant engaged the children in games which…

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Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of GBT v The State of Western Australia, the appellant appealed against his conviction of multiple counts of sexual offences against a child. The trial judge had directed the jury to consider each count separately, without allowing evidence of uncharged acts to prove the counts in the indictment. The appellant argued that the trial judge should have directed the jury to consider whether the uncharged acts could be used as circumstantial evidence to prove the counts in the indictment. The appeal was dismissed.

The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the trial judge's direction regarding 'uncharged acts' was correct and whether the directions regarding surrounding circumstances were correct. The court considered whether the trial judge's direction was an error which advantaged the appellant and whether there was a miscarriage of justice as a result of the error.

The court found that the trial judge's direction regarding 'uncharged acts' was an error which advantaged the appellant. The court noted that the trial judge did not direct the jury that evidence of uncharged acts could be used as circumstantial evidence to prove the counts in the indictment. However, because the error advantaged the appellant, there was no miscarriage of justice. The court also found that the trial judge's directions regarding surrounding circumstances were correct.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

However, the trial judge then said:Now, whether they do or not is a matter for you to judge. If you were to be satisfied that that event in the case of [N] did in fact occur, you could not thereby conclude that the other acts which are charged in the indictment did also occur. It's not evidence which lends itself to proving the charged acts in the indictment. What proves those acts is the evidence of [N] in relation to those acts. If you accept, though, her truthfulness as to [GBT's] treatment of her on that occasion of the uncharged act, and that he behaved that way for a sexual motive, and you conclude that the allegations were not the product of concoction in concert with other complainants or collaboration or suggestion by the detective, then you may more readily accept [N's] evidence as to similar activity, which are the subject of charges in the indictment.The same applies with respect to any other complainant who has given evidence of other uncharged acts of sexual interference or molestation. But again each count relies essentially upon the truthfulness and accuracy of the complainant concerned, so you must first be satisfied in that regard. If so, you may use the evidence of other uncharged acts, as I have mentioned. Whether you do so or not is ultimately a matter for you to decide. This is not a model direction. However, the highlighted portions in effect, directed the jury that they must decide each count by reference to the evidence of the complainant concerned and that evidence of uncharged acts was not evidence which would go to prove the counts in the indictment. That was an error which advantaged the appellant. It is an error similar to one made by the trial judge in the HML case. Because the error advantaged the appellant there was no miscarriage of justice. See HML [216] ‑ [219] (Hayne J). Counsel for the appellant at trial apparently anticipated that the trial judge would give directions about the fact that an offence committed in relation to one count might be used as circumstantial evidence to prove another count. However, the trial judge never gave any such direction. Although his Honour did say that the 'chasey game is relevant', he did not go on to say that the sexual offence committed immediately after the game of chasey in relation to one offence was circumstantial evidence relevant to another offence. The overall effect of the judge's summing up was to tell the jury that they had to consider each charge separately and to decide whether the appellant was guilty or not guilty in relation to each by reference to the evidence of the particular complainant who was the victim in relation to each such offence. The trial judge directed the jury by saying:We are, of course, dealing with 29 counts involving, I think, seven complaints, which are all being dealt with in the one trial. That carries with it a degree of prejudice, by reason of the fact that all these counts are brought together, and you might think at first blush, 'Well, gosh, all these counts, he must have done something, but that's not the way you should approach it. In fact, that's quite inappropriate reasoning.You see, each of these counts could in theory be tried separately. They could in theory be the subject of separate trials, each one lasting probably a day. We are hearing them all together as a matter of practicality. A number of the witnesses are common to various counts, and of course there are common issues running through the various counts. The criminal law does provide for, in certain circumstances, counts, various counts, to be joined in the one indictment and to be tried together in the one trial and that's what has happened here.It involves, as you might expect, a saving of time and money and having people come back to court on more than one occasion, but there is, and the law recognises a degree of prejudice involved in all of these charges being dealt with together and you must be aware of that. As I say, it would be inappropriate reasoning were you to say, 'There's such a lot of charges and seven complainants, so he must have done something.' You need to look at each charge. Look at the elements of it. Look to the evidence and decide for yourself whether on the evidence which pertains to that particular charge, you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.This is not a job lot. It's not the case that if you find [GBT] guilty or not guilty of any particular charge that you will find him guilty or not guilty as the case may be of some other charge. There's no situation where if you find him guilty of one you will find him guilty of another. It's not the case that if you find him guilty of a charge with respect to a particular complainant that you will necessarily find him guilty of any charge relating to another complainant. The point that I'm making is that each of these 29 counts needs to be looked at separately as though it were the subject of a separate trial.You need to look at the evidence which pertains to it and decide whether or not you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. As I say, I just want to confirm that. If you find in the course of your deliberations that [GBT] has committed a particular offence, don't reason that he has therefore committed other offences or another offence. If you conclude that he is the sort of person who behaves in a particular way, don't assume that he has done so on any particular occasion. Have regard to the evidence that relates to each count.…The state says that it was part of a pattern of conduct adopted by the accused as precursor to his molesting of the children involved. If you find that he did commit a particular offence, you must not conclude from that alone that he is likely to have committed any other offence charged. If you find that he did commit an offence against a particular complaint, you must not conclude from that alone that he's likely to have committed an offence against another complainant in the same way, or in a different way.You must not reason that he is guilty of any particular offence because he's the sort of person who might commit such offences. As I said earlier, a finding of guilt with respect to one count will not automatically lead you to a conclusion of guilt on another. Each must be considered having regard to the evidence given with respect to it. (ts 1525 ‑ 1527, 1559)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established