Gazepis v Police

[1998] HCATrans 289

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Adelaide  No A67 of 1997

B e t w e e n -

ARTHUR GAZEPIS

Applicant

and

POLICE

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT ADELAIDE ON THURSDAY, 13 AUGUST 1998, AT 12.05 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MS B.J. POWELL, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR D.J. WARDLE, for the applicant.  (instructed by Douglas Wardle)

MR S.K. McEWEN:   May it please the Court, I appear with MS S.V. DAVID for the respondent.  (instructed by the Crown Solicitor for South Australia)

MS POWELL:   I trust that your Honours have the supplementary outline of argument which was filed with the leave of the Registrar, and I do apologise for the lateness of that outline.  May I please, your Honours, proceed to address you with respect to ground 2 of the application for special leave, and that, of course, involves the question of the right of an accused to be present at all times on his trial.

What the applicant says about that right is, of course, that it is a fundamental right at common law and at international law, and included in the applicant’s booklet ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   How does the second matter?

MS POWELL:    It only matters in so far as is set out in the ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:    You say it informs the first do you?

MS POWELL:    It is in the same form as the first and, of course, as was said by Justice Brennan in Mabo (No 2), that the opening up of international remedies to individuals pursuant to accession to covenants and treaties brings to bear on the common law that powerful influence of international standards.

Your Honours, why we say the right to be present at all times is a fundamental right is, of course, because it is an essential component, a necessary element of a fair trial.  And, of course, we say that the other components of that fundamental right include the right to the benefit of a reasonable doubt, and I might say in passing that we say, or we complain that we were denied that in ground 1 of this application, the right to trial by jury, the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself in the trial.

GLEESON CJ:   I notice that Chief Justice Doyle described this as an important right on the top of page 67.

MS POWELL:    Yes, he did, your Honours, and ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   I only wanted to ask you, what is the difference between an important right and a fundamental right.

MS POWELL:    Well, an important right, we say, in the context of this argument, for example, might be the out of court right to silence.

GUMMOW J:    But, if one has a right or one does not have a right, the question is, what is the content of the right?

MS POWELL:   What is the content of the right?  We say that the content ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   It does not help by saying it is fundamental or semi-fundamental or whatever.  If you have a right, you have a right.  The question is, what are the contents of it?

MS POWELL:   Well, probably, you have a right and that right has to be vindicated.

GUMMOW J:   What do you say about the passage at page 65, line 45?  The genius of the common law is to operate practically with relation to particular circumstances, rather than grand abstractions.  And what do you say about page 65, line 45 and following?

MS POWELL:   What we say his Honour was doing at page 65, from line 45 onwards was, in fact, assessing the effect of the abrogation of the right upon what occurred in the trial.

GLEESON CJ:    What if the magistrate had said, “I will see counsel in my chambers”, and then had taken counsel into his chambers in the absence of the parties, and said, “Stop prompting the witness”.

MS POWELL:   Our submission about that, your Honour, would be this.  Provided that the accused consented, and waived his right to be present at all times, then that would overcome it.

GLEESON CJ:   Then the magistrate would have to say, “I will see counsel in his chambers if the accused consents.”

MS POWELL:   That is right, and we say ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   How else can a judge or a magistrate deal with the situation that arose here?

MS POWELL:   Well what we say should occur is this:  that the judge would say, “I want to raise something, in the absence of the accused.  I understand his fundamental right to be present at all times.  If he does not consent to me so doing, then indeed he will wear the consequences of the effect it will have on his testimony, or the effect it will have on his trial, of having been present when these matters were said”.  Often this occurs where an argument occurs on admissibility of evidence and it is considered that it is appropriate that, if the accused is in the witness box, he should leave the court room.  But he only leaves the court room, in our submission, by waiving his right, by consciously waiving his right.  If he is ordered out of court, or effectively ordered out of court, as indeed Chief Justice Doyle decided he had been in this case, then we say that is a breach of his fundamental right to be present at all times. 

What we are saying about the breach of that right is that the assessment of what occurred in the context of the trial had no part to play in deciding what the consequences should be from the abrogation of that right.  We say, because it is fundamental, because it is an essential component of the fair trial, then if it is breached, one looks no further; there has been an error of the type referred to in this Court in Wilde and in Glennon.  Indeed, if I might take your Honours to the decision of then Chief Justice Mason, Justices Brennan and Toohey in Glennon’s Case, at page 8 of the decision, and I understand it is in my learned friend’s booklet.  And I think that this is obviously ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Which page?

MS POWELL:   Page 8 of the decision - under the heading “Fundamental error”.  And what their Honours say there is that according to the approach of the majority in Wilde, the proviso has no application -

“where an irregularity has occurred which is such a departure from the essential requirements of the law that it goes to the root of the proceedings”.

And that, of course, is very uncontroversial. 

In such a case, the accused “has not had a proper trial, and ... there has been substantial miscarriage of justice”.  But the majority stressed that there is no mechanical formula or rigid test to be applied to determine whether an irregularity is of this nature; each case will depend on its own circumstances, and ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:    That is right and that is the way the common law looks at these things, is it not?

MS POWELL:   Indeed, but what we say is:

and, in determining the question, it will be appropriate to have regard to the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution and defence cases in order to assess the gravity and significance of the error.

What we say is that that, of course, is correct in terms of where the error is one of either the wrongful admission of evidence, as was the case in Wilde, or, in fact, an error in the direction of the trial judge, as was the case in Glennon, but there, of course, always stands, and the High Court recognises, those cases where the error is such as to vitiate the trial, and we say that occurs in a case where a fundamental right has been denied to the accused.  And the Court went on in Glennon, to say:

In the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the trial judge’s misdirection on the applicant’s right to silence was “so fundamental” that the trial was “hardly a trial at all”.  Although the right to silence is a fundamental right of any accused person, it cannot be said that any misdirection on that subject is a fundamental irregularity of the kind discussed in Wilde.

And what we say, of course, is that a misdirection on the topic of the right to silence, is not an abrogation of the right to silence.  We say that if Glennon’s Case, for example, had involved a compunction on the accused to give evidence in his own trial, then that would be the sort of fundamental right which would vitiate the trial.  But misdirections and wrongful admission of evidence do not make the trial unfair.  They, of course, create errors such that the result will be a quash of any conviction recorded, but they do not make the trial unfair.  However, we say there are some fundamental rights, the right to be present at all times included, which, in fact will, if abrogated, vitiate the trial.

And we say that, indeed, this is an appropriate matter for leave to be granted because the state of the authorities, in fact, goes down two completely different paths, and it is appropriate for the High Court to determine the nature and the scope of this particular right, and I should start by saying that, as your Honour Justice Gummow said, there is no question that it is considered to be an important, and often described as a fundamental right.

The first line of authorities suggest that the right is absolute and can be waived only by express consent of the accused or where he has waived that right by his own behaviour, and that, of course, is the position contended for by the applicant.  It is expressed that way in the covenant that I have referred your Honours to and it is the law in Canada, and this appears from page 2 of the supplementary outline of argument.  It is also the position ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:    What is the text of the charter that founds this in Canada?

MS POWELL:   Yes, it appears, your Honours, behind divider 4 - I am sorry in Canada?  In Canada it appears behind divider 8 in the applicant’s booklet, and I apologise, your Honours.  Your Honours will see that the first page of that is the article from which it ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:    But does it come out of the charter?

MS POWELL:   It comes out of the charter, as I understand it, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   Could I just get one aspect of the facts clear.  There was no evidence taken in the absence of your client.

MS POWELL:   No, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   There was simply a rebuke addressed to counsel.

MS POWELL:   Yes, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   And the magistrate took the view that in the circumstances that rebuke should be administered in the absence of the client.  The Chief Justice said the magistrate was wrong in that view.  Telling a client to go outside while counsel was rebuked was an irregularity.  But the key to his Honour’s reasoning, as I understand it, appears on page 66 from line 15 to line 25.

MS POWELL:   Sixty-six, your Honour?

GLEESON CJ:   Sixty-six of the application book, from lines 15 to 25.

MS POWELL:   Well, I think the process that the Chief Justice was going through at this stage was to, first of all, consider whether there had been a fair trial, and we say the error he fell into there was to consider what the effect of the breach of the right was, within that context, because, we say, breach of fundamental right leads to no fair trial.  In other words, you cannot have - there are no degrees of a fair trial, it is a bit like being pregnant.  You cannot be a little bit unfair or mostly unfair.  It is either fair or it is not fair.

He then went on to consider what would happen if he had to apply the proviso, and without applying it, said that if he did apply the proviso, then, in fact, he would be satisfied that the decision would not have been affected, but concedes that that approach does not vindicate the right, at the bottom of page 66.  At the top of page 67 he thought that it required a different approach, referred to Wilde’s Case and then said at the middle of page 67:

I consider that the Court should make an assessment of the significance of the error that occurred.

And we say that that is what his Honour did, that was the test that he applied.  I will consider “the significance of the error that occurred”.  We submit that that is an error on the first approach.

GLEESON CJ:    He began by characterising it as an irregularity on line 15 of page 66.

MS POWELL:   Yes.

GLEESON CJ:   And then said it was a trivial irregularity that had no practical effect on any aspect of the outcome of the case.  You say this was not a mere irregularity, this was a breach of a fundamental right.

MS POWELL:   Well, in fact, your Honour, if I can take you back to page 64, line 30, his Honour concedes the defendant was entitled to be present in court during his trial and said:

I regard this right as a fundamental right -

although he says he only found O’Donnell v Dawe, which, of course, also describes it as a fundamental right.  What ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   It is because of that that the breach of it was an irregularity.

MS POWELL:   That is right.  But we say that in the same way as if the fundamental right of trial by jury was breached, if one assumed, for example - not in South Australia with its legislative provisions - but where a Commonwealth offence was being charged, if there were only ten jurors empanelled, or if a majority verdict was returned, there might be no effect on the fairness of the trial whatsoever.  But because there has been that breach of the fundamental right in the irregularity of the process, accordingly, the trial is not fair.  And what we say is of concern is the lack of decision on which of the two approaches should be taken with respect to the nature and scope of this right.

GLEESON CJ:   Would you just state in summary form the two approaches.

MS POWELL:   Yes, your Honour.  The first which we contend for is that the right is absolute and can be waived only by express consent.

GUMMOW J:    With what consequence of non-observance of that right?

MS POWELL:   Unfair trial, trial vitiated, your Honour.  The second approach is that ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   And no scope for application of any proviso?

MS POWELL:   No, your Honour.  The type of Wilde and Glennon situation, to the root of the proceedings, not like an error of admission of evidence or a misdirection.  The second approach, which is the approach of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, the Western Australian Full Court and some English authorities - I should say the approach we contend for has been adopted in the line of Victorian cases described in the outline.  There is one Victorian case which does not apply that, but most of the Victorian authorities, and certainly the line of authority is that approach we contend for.  The second being the approach taken by the court below, Western Australia and some English authorities, is that there is a discretion in the trial judge where the accused is absent, even without his or her consent as to whether or not to allow the trial to proceed.

We say the Canadian approach is the correct one.  We say it is appropriate for this Court to determine ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Well, the Canadian approach, I think, comes from the provision in the charter that there is a right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal.

MS POWELL:   And we say that no more than states the common law.

GUMMOW J:   But I do not think there are any cases on the charter saying what you say is your first absolute proposition as to the consequences.  I just do not know.

MS POWELL:   Well there is the authority of Meunier v The Queen which is behind ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Yes, I know, but that is not a charter case.

MS POWELL:   No, your Honour, that is the application of the Code.  And, your Honours, we say that the Code no more than states the common law, and we say that the nature and scope of this right is an important right, and the difference of authority on the consequence of the abrogation of it are something which this Court should determine.  If the Court pleases.

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, thank you, Ms Powell.  Mr McEwen.

MR McEWEN:   Your Honours, the only ground that was addressed by my learned friend is ground 2, so I shall go to that first.  The respondent’s argument, of course, can be put very succinctly in the number of propositions that I have put to begin with, and then go to some of the specific matters raised.  It is firstly that, of course, the defendant does have a right to be present, if he chooses to exercise that right.  Secondly, that that right was infringed here, albeit in what we will say is in a minor way.  But the issue, of course, is what flows from the infringement of what is conceded to be a right.

The respondent says that it does not automatically follow that the trial has been vitiated, rather that it is a matter of assessing the potential effect of the infringement of the right, and/or the significance of the infringement of the rights.  The respondent’s case is that the Full Court in this case did that, did both of those things at the pages that I will go through in a moment, in other words, assessed it both ways, both of the ways that my learned friend has just adverted to.  Firstly, whether there could have been any miscarriage of justice, and secondly, or alternatively, looking at it as an observer, the perceived significance, how significant the irregularity appeared to be.

In our submission, the Full Court looked at both aspects of that and concluded firstly, that it could not have deprived him of a fair trial; and secondly, that the perceived significance of the infringement was insignificant.  And we say that there is no reason to doubt those conclusions.  Could I go to some of the detail of that.  Section 42 on our arguments was the section under which this appeal was brought, and that is set out at the back of the book of authorities lodged on behalf of the respondents, your Honours, and section 42(5) ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:    Which tab number?

MR McEWEN:   The second to last one.  The Magistrates Court Act, second to last tab in the respondent’s book.  That is the book that I think you were using when my learned friend was on her feet.  She just ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, I have it, thank you.  Section 42?

MR McEWEN:   Yes, subsection (5).  This sets out, of course, the powers there of the Supreme Court on this sort of appeal, a magistrates appeal from a summary trial, the decision of a magistrate:

(a)  It may confirm, vary or quash the judgment subject to the appeal -

That has been interpreted quite consistently for a very long time to include a power to effectively apply a proviso.  In other words, there is no exclusive proviso there, but the cases have interpreted that and that is ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:    That is what I was wondering.

MR McEWEN:   Yes, your Honour.  For instance, the Case of Ghys v Crafter, which is the very first case in the same book of authorities there, your Honour ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   This is a familiar form of legislation in cases where courts hear appeals from magistrates, a form of legislation that owes its origin to a time when magistrates were not lawyers.  And the essence of the scheme, or the appellant structure was that you had a hearing before a magistrate, and if you were dissatisfied, you could appeal on all grounds to a lawyer.  And the power to confirm the judgment reflects that it is a full rehearing, so you do not just dismiss the appeal, you actually confirm the judgment, if you think the decision was right.

MR McEWEN:   That is precisely our argument, your Honour, and in doing so, if the Supreme Court, whether it be the single judge or the Full Court, as it eventually was in this matter, is of the view that some irregularity could not have caused any miscarriage of justice, then it is perfectly open and appropriate, indeed, there is a duty on the court, we would argue, to, as your Honour says, assess the matter in the form of a rehearing and reach its own conclusion on it.

GLEESON CJ:   Presumably the rehearing cures any irregularity, does it?

MR McEWEN:   That is certainly the respondent’s argument, your Honour.  And on top of that, if one goes to page 66 of the appeal book, in the judgment of the Full Court, this is a passage that my learned friend was taken to earlier, from line 20:

The infringement upon his right to be present was, under the particular circumstances, sufficiently minor, and its effect (or potential effect) upon the defendant’s ability to exercise his rights was sufficiently minor for me to conclude that the fairness of the trial was not affected.

In my submission, that is the appropriate approach to be taken on the rehearing.  It was taken, and that conclusion was reached.  It has been argued that the Full Court in some way backed away from that approach or decided it was not appropriate.  But I take issue with that.  In my submission, at the bottom of that same page, page 66, the Chief Justice says:

However, as I have already indicated, I accept that that approach does not appear adequate to vindicate the right involved here, or to deal with an error such as occurred here.  For the reasons that I have explained, an error involving an infringement upon an important right affecting the manner in which the Court proceeds may require a different approach.

GLEESON CJ:   This was an appeal that would, in the ordinary course, have been heard by Justice Millhouse, a single judge, is that right?

MR McEWEN:   That is right, your Honour, yes.

GLEESON CJ:    Is there an appeal from a magistrate to a District Court?

MR McEWEN:   No, your Honour, the appeal process is from the magistrate to the Supreme Court and the Act and the regulations contemplate that in certain circumstances the parties can simply elect to go straight to the Full Court ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   I understand that, but you do not have in South Australia what used to be called in New South Wales Court of Sessions Appeals.

MR McEWEN:   No, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   And for how long have magistrates in South Australia been required to be legally qualified?

MR McEWEN:   Well, indeed, there are still summary trials that are heard before justices, so there is really an overlap in South Australia.  Some trials are heard by justices and some by magistrates.

GLEESON CJ:   What I was coming to is this.  Suppose Justice Millhouse had proceeded to deal with this matter in the usual way, instead of referring it to the Full Court, and had come to the view that there was substance in the argument that is put against you.  Presumably, his obligation would then have been to rehear all the evidence and make up his own mind on the guilt or innocence of the accused.

MR McEWEN:   That is so, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   And if he had done that, that would have cured the irregularity at first instance, would it not?

MR McEWEN:   Well, in our submission, that is what has happened here anyway.  There has been the rehearing that Justice Millhouse would have conducted, conducted instead by the Full Court, and that is the conclusion they have come to.  And I am really now just going to the alternate bases upon which I say they came to it, one being that there could not have been a miscarriage of justice by this irregularity, limiting ourselves presently to this ground ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   But if you appeal against the decision of a magistrate to a single judge of the Supreme Court, and you persuade the single judge that the magistrate did something wrong, it does not follow that there is an acquittal.  It just means that the judge goes on and decides whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.

MR McEWEN:   Absolutely, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   In other words, the matter is dealt with on its, what is sometimes laughingly called, merits.

MR McEWEN:   Absolutely.  And in our submission , there have, again to use the vernacular, been already two bites of the cherry here.  In other words, he has had his full hearing in the Magistrates Court.  He has had his full rehearing before the Full Court, and the full ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   So the consequence of this is that what your opponent would really have to show is that the Full Court went outside the parameters of its appellante section.

MR McEWEN:   Well, indeed, in my submission that is so, and that just cannot be said when one looks at their powers under section 42(5) ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   In looking, as they did, across the whole picture in deciding to come to a particular decision as to whether or not they would interfere with what the magistrate had done.

MR McEWEN:   Presumably, that is what is asserted in effect, and it is asserted in my submission by way of saying that this particular right, amongst all the various rights that are looked at by appeal courts day in and day out, this particular one, the matter goes no further.  It is automatic, the Full Court just cannot take it any further.  Any infringement of this right, as I understand the argument, means that necessarily the trial has been vitiated, even on the rehearing, when the infringement of the right is specifically adverted to.  In our submission, that is simply untenable.

GLEESON CJ:   Is the form of order that was made that appears on page 69 the usual form of order in an unsuccessful appeal?

MR McEWEN:   In my submission, yes, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   It is not the form order that would be made in the District Court of New South Wales on an appeal from a magistrate.  On an unsuccessful appeal, the order would confirm the conviction, or confirm the orders of the magistrate.  In other words, it would be the court itself that would, by confirmation, make the order.

MR McEWEN:   In my submission, although terminologically it could have been done that way, the effect of dismissing the appeal, of course, is to confirm the decision of the magistrate, which is well within power.

GLEESON CJ:   All right.

MR McEWEN:   Just before I leave what I was putting earlier ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   We think we will hear what Ms Powell has to say.  Yes, Ms Powell.

MS POWELL:   Your Honours, of course, it is our submission that the Full Court did not proceed by way of rehearing in this matter.  In fact it ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   But you have to say, really, that they went wrong in exercising their powers under section 42.

MS POWELL:   Well, we say that they did err in the way they approached the exercise of their powers ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   That they were bound to quash.

MS POWELL:   They were bound to quash, we say.

GLEESON CJ:   But they do not have to rehear.  Subsection (4) of section 42 of the Magistrates Courts Act says that on an appeal, the appellant court may rehear any witnesses.

MS POWELL:   Yes, they can make an independent review of the evidence.  They can allow an appeal, or the single judge, can allow an appeal, even if there is evidence to support the magistrate’s finding, and if they reach a different view on the evidence, then they have to give effect to that by substituting the court’s view for that reached by the magistrate.

GLEESON CJ:   Presumably, the way the matter was conducted on behalf of the appellant was that the only point being relied on by the appellant was this point.

MS POWELL:   Well, there was ground 1 as well ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   Putting that to one side.

MS POWELL:   And there was another ground, but it was not argued in that ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   So that it is up to the appellant to choose how he or she presents the appeal.

MS POWELL:   Indeed.

GLEESON CJ:   And that will affect, no doubt, the decision of the appellate court on whether it has a rehearing of evidence or whatever.

MS POWELL:   Whether it treats it as a rehearing or an appeal on a matter of a law.

GLEESON CJ:   So for presently practical purposes, or for presently relevant purposes, what the Full Court did, on reference from Justice Millhouse, was to hear this particular argument and the proposition that the magistrate went wrong in this way.

MS POWELL:   Yes, just treated as if it was an ordinary appeal on an error of law, and that is the way it was argued, and, of course, that is the way the order of the court is ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   And what was the order that you were seeking, if they had upheld you on this point?

MS POWELL:   Retrial.

GLEESON CJ:   Before the magistrate?

MS POWELL:   Before a magistrate.

GLEESON CJ:   Why not before them?

MS POWELL:   Because often in this jurisdiction that is the way that section 42 operates in practice.

GLEESON CJ:   But would it not ‑ ‑ ‑

MS POWELL:   The single judge or the court may choose not to rehear but to remit.

GLEESON CJ:   That may be so, but if the only complaints you had about what the magistrate did, apart from this point, were two other matters on which they were against you, why would they not say, or why would Justice Millhouse not have said, or the Full Court on reference,
“We’ve heard all the complaints that the appellant wants to make about what happened to him in this matter, and we decide that the conviction should be confirmed”?

MS POWELL:   If that is what they have done, it may be that we would be before your Honours not arguing in the way that we do.  But we say that it was treated, as it is often under section 42, as an ordinary appeal, and that once the question of law was determined, had it been determined in the applicant’s favour, then the issue would have arisen as to whether the Full Court was to rehear, or it was to return to a magistrate.  And, of course, the usual order would be to remit it back to the Magistrates Court for this accused to have a proper trial, a fair trial. 

We say that an analysis of what Justice Doyle said from page 66 makes it clear that he deliberately refrained, as he said at line 37, on page 66, he deliberately refrained from expressing the view of whether it was incumbent upon the appellant to demonstrate a miscarriage.  So that he was not applying section 42 in the exercise.  We can see section 42 requires the demonstration of a miscarriage, but his Honour said, “I am not going to do that, because I have to consider whether this is such a fundamental abrogation of a right as to vitiate the trial.”  He determined that against us.  We say that is a matter that this Court should determine, the nature of that right.

GLEESON CJ:   The Court is of the view that special leave to appeal should be refused on two grounds.  First, there is insufficient reason to

doubt the correctness of the decision of the Full Court, and second, having regard to the procedural questions that have been discussed in argument on this application, the case is not an appropriate vehicle for ventilation of the issues of principle suggested to arise.

AT 12.43 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED