Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Independent Broad-based Anti‑Corruption Commission

[2015] HCASL 217

GAYE LUCK

v

PRINCIPAL OFFICER OF INDEPENDENT BROAD-BASED ANTI‑CORRUPTION COMMISSION & ANOR

[2015] HCASL 217
M33/2014

1. On 13 August 2012, the applicant made a request to the Office of Police Integrity ("the OPI"), pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) ("the FOI Act"), for various documents relating to her and complaints she had made regarding members of the Victoria Police. On 10 September 2012, the applicant was advised that the OPI (which has since been succeeded by the second respondent to these proceedings) would not be providing any documents to the applicant. On 28 September 2012, after conducting an internal review, the second respondent affirmed the decision, relying on s 51 of the Police Integrity Act 2008 (Vic) ("the PI Act") as exempting the documents sought by the applicant from release.

2. On 10 October 2013, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ("the Tribunal") (Jenkins J) summarily dismissed the applicant's application for review of the second respondent's decision. Jenkins J stated that the application was misconceived, as all of the documents sought were clearly excluded from the operation of the FOI Act by virtue of s 51 of the PI Act.

3. On 1 April 2014, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Warren CJ and Whelan JA) refused leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of Jenkins J and from Jenkins J's decision not to order that the Tribunal's reasons be supressed.  The Court of Appeal held that the applicant had not shown that the decisions below were attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave.  On the same day, Warren CJ delivered reasons for refusing to recuse herself on the basis of apprehended bias.

4. The applicant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court.  She requires an extension of time to do so.  She has also filed a summons seeking leave to file an amended written case and notice of appeal, an extension of time to file her list of authorities, and leave to extend the length of her written and oral arguments.  The applicant also seeks postponement of the determination of this application pending the determination of other applications she has made to this Court.  We do not consider that the interests of justice require leave or a postponement to be granted.  The applicant's draft notice of appeal does not give rise to any reason to doubt the correctness of the decisions below.

5. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
10 December 2015 P.A. Keane