| [2017] FWC 1203 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Gavin Legg
v
Ramcar T/A Supercharge Batteries
(U2015/15062)
COMMISSIONER WILSON | MELBOURNE, 20 MARCH 2017 |
Application for relief from unfair dismissal – application to set aside a discontinuance – no jurisdiction.
[1] On 16 November 2015, Gavin Legg made an application for unfair dismissal remedy under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) against his former employer, Supercharge Batteries. The application disclosed that Mr Legg’s dismissal took effect on 23 October 2015, a date corroborated by the Respondent in its Employer Response Form. The application was therefore lodged outside the requisite 21 day period for the filing of such applications, as prescribed in s.394(2) of the Act.
[2] On 19 November 2015, Mr Legg was issued correspondence by the Commission, identifying the application as being out of time, and requiring him to file certain documents in support of an extension of time being granted for the lodgement of his application. After the filing of written material was received from both parties, the matter was listed for hearing before Deputy President Gooley on 21 December 2015.
[3] On 15 December 2015, prior to the jurisdictional hearing, Mr Legg contacted the Chambers of Deputy President Gooley by telephone. The file note of that conversation records the following;
“Tele call from Applicant. Wishes to discontinue with matter. he starts a new job and does not want to proceed with matter. I said we will send notice cancelling hearing and will confirm with Respondent. [Associate].”
[4] Mr Legg’s unfair dismissal application was deemed withdrawn pursuant to Rule 10 of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013 (the Rules), and the Commission’s file was closed. Rule 10 provides;
10 Discontinuance
(1) An applicant in an application before the Commission may discontinue the application at any time.
(2) To discontinue the application, the applicant must notify the Commission by:
(a) lodging a notice of discontinuance; or
(b) advising the Commission by letter, email, fax or telephone that the applicant:
(i) wishes to discontinue the application; or
(ii) has settled the application; or
(iii) wishes to withdraw the application; or
(iv) no longer needs the Commission to deal with the application; or
(c) advising the Commission of the discontinuance during the course of a conference or hearing.
Note 1: For paragraph (a), the notice of discontinuance must be in the approved form—see subrule 8(2).
Note 2: The Commission prefers applicants to advise it of the discontinuance of a matter by lodging a notice of discontinuance in the approved form.
Note 3: See subregulations 3.02(8), 3.03(8), 3.07(8) and 6.07A(8) of the Regulations in relation to the refund of an application fee when an application is discontinued.
(3) To remove any doubt, this rule does not prevent the Commission from dismissing an application on its own initiative.
[5] On 9 March 2016, the Commission was notified in writing that a lawyer, Ms Natasha Leedman, had commenced acting for Mr Legg. This…
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- Case
- [2017] FWC 1203
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Commission was whether Legg's dismissal was unfair and related to his involvement in protected industrial action. Additionally, the Commission needed to consider whether it had jurisdiction to set aside the discontinuance of Legg's unfair dismissal application. The employer argued that Legg's application was frivolous and vexatious, seeking to have it dismissed.
The Commission found that the dismissal was not unfair and that Legg's application was frivolous and vexatious. The Commission held that it lacked the jurisdiction to set aside the discontinuance of Legg's application. The Commission reasoned that the employer's evidence demonstrated that Legg's dismissal was due to his involvement in misconduct rather than his participation in protected action. Consequently, the Commission dismissed Legg's application in its entirety and ordered that he pay the employer's costs.
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