Gavare v The King - [2025] SASC 51

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)

GAVARE v THE KING
[2025] SASC 51
Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice McDonald
17 April 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER - SENTENCE: PARTICULAR CASES
The applicant brings an application pursuant to s 43(2) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) for permission to have her sentenced quashed and a new sentence imposed.
On 4 November 2011, the applicant was sentenced to a period of life imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 32 years, for the offence of murder.
The applicant contends that subsequent to her sentence, she has cooperated with law enforcement agencies to the extent that warrants permission to apply pursuant to s 43 of the Sentencing Act 2017(SA). The applicant submits that she qualifies under s 43 as a person currently serving a term of imprisonment who has demonstrated cooperation by providing police with information about her offending. She further contends that she has since shown genuine remorse, contrition and evidence of rehabilitation.
The respondent opposes the application, contending that the applicant’s conduct does not amount to cooperation under s 43 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). While accepting that the defendant is serving a period of imprisonment, the respondent submits that the information the applicant provided does not constitute cooperation, considering the nature of the offence, the context of the information, and the timing and circumstances in which it was given.
Held; permission is refused:
1.The applicant’s application for permission to have her sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed is refused.

2. The application is dismissed.
Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 37, 43, 43(3), 43(5); Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) ss 67, 67(1), 67(3); Statutes Amendment (Truth in Sentencing) Act 1994 (SA) s 11; Correctional Services (Parole) Amendment Act 2015 (SA) ss 6, 67(6), 67(7); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) ss 29E, 32A(3)(c); Statues Amendments (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2012 (SA), referred to.
R v Gavare [2011] SASC 142; R v Minter [2011] SASCFC 11, applied.

GAVARE v THE KING
[2025] SASC 51
Criminal: Application
McDONALD J:

On 4 November 2011, Angelika Gavare was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 32 years, for the offence of murder. The sentence was taken to have commenced on 26 February 2009, when Ms Gavare was first taken into custody. It follows that she will become eligible for parole on 26 February 2041.
This is an application made by Ms Gavare pursuant to s 43 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘the Sentencing Act’) for permission to apply to this Court to have her sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed.
Section 43 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA)
Section 43 of the Sentencing Act allows for an offender currently serving a period of imprisonment, to be resentenced in circumstances in which they have cooperated with a law enforcement agency subsequent to the imposition of their sentence.
Section 43(1) creates a threshold test. In order to come within the section, it must be established that:
(a)the person is currently serving a period of imprisonment for an offence or offences (the relevant sentence); and
(b)the person has cooperated with a law enforcement agency.
In the event that the threshold test is met, pursuant to s 43(2) the applicant requires the permission of the Court to “apply to the Court to have the sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed, taking into account the person’s cooperation with the law enforcement agency in accordance with this section”.
Permission may only be granted if “the court is satisfied that the cooperation relates directly to an offence that is, in the opinion of the court, a serious offence that has been committed or may be committed in the future (whether in this or any other jurisdiction)”.[1]
[1] Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 43(3).
Section 43(5) sets out the considerations that the Court must take into account in determining a new sentence in the event that permission is granted. These are:
(a)the nature and extent of the person’s cooperation;
(b)the timeliness of the cooperation;
(c)the truthfulness, completeness and reliability of any information or evidence provided by the person;
(d)the evaluation (if any) by the authorities of the significance and usefulness of the person’s cooperation;
(e)any benefit that the person has gained or is likely to gain by reason of the cooperation;
(f)the degree to which the safety of the person (or some other person) has been put at risk of violent retribution as a result of the person’s cooperation;
(g)whether the cooperation concerns the offence for which the person is being sentenced or some other offence, whether related or unrelated;
(h)whether, as a consequence of the person’s cooperation, the person would be likely to suffer violent retribution while serving any term of imprisonment, or be compelled to serve any such term in particularly severe conditions;
(i)the nature of any steps that would be likely to be necessary to protect the person on release from prison;
(j)the likelihood that the person will commit further offences.
Regard may also be had to “any other factor or principle the court thinks relevant”.
The murder of Vonne Isabelle McGlynn
In order to put the competing submission into context, it is necessary to say something about the offence for which Ms Gavare was sentenced. I do not propose to canvas the circumstances of the offending in any great detail, they are comprehensively set out in the trial Judge’s reasons for verdict,[2] and in her Honour’s sentencing remarks.
[2] R v Gavare [2011] SASC 142 (‘Reasons’).
Suffice for now to say that this offence fell into one of the most serious categories of offences of murder. The deceased, Vonne McGlynn, was a vulnerable 83 year old woman who lived alone, who was deliberately targeted so that Ms Gavare could take her home and property for her own use.
Ms McGlynn’s death was violent, and her body was dismembered in order that she could be disposed of. Whilst some parts of her body were recovered, her hands and head were never located. Understandably, this is a matter that has caused considerable, additional distress for her friends and family.
Ms Gavare first came under police suspicion when she attempted to access Ms McGlynn’s bank account. She was interviewed by police on a number of occasions between 9 December 2008 and 6 January 2009. During the course of those interviews Ms Gavare told complex and inconsistent lies. Throughout the interviews Ms Gavare maintained that she had no involvement in the murder of Ms McGlynn.
At her trial Ms Gavare gave evidence. She continued to lie. She provided a version that implicated her former partner in the murder of Ms McGlynn. She claimed that she had opportunistically taken advantage of Ms McGlynn’s death to gain access to her property.
The trial Judge, Kelly J, rejected that account. In doing so, her Honour described aspects of Ms Gavare’s account as “ludicrous”. As to the nature of the offending, her Honour found:[3]
… the evidence does not point to this being a bungled robbery which had unintended consequences or to an assault without the necessary intent or to an unfortunate accident. It points to a woman who planned to steal from Ms McGlynn and as part of the plan to steal decided to and did kill Ms McGlynn. Having done so she then needed to hide the body and conceal any evidence which might connect her with the crime. She had ample opportunity to do so. Moreover I am satisfied that the accused knew enough about DNA and forensic evidence to carefully attempt to conceal her tracks.
[3] Reasons at [141].
As to the reason or motivation for committing the offence, Kelly J in sentencing the defendant said:[4]
It would be a small comfort perhaps to be able to conclude that your actions were the product of madness. Unfortunately they appear to be nothing more than the actions of a greedy, narcissistic and deceitful woman completely devoid of any moral insight or empathy. This makes you a very dangerous person indeed.
Amendments to s 67 of the Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA)
[4] Sentencing Remarks, 4 November 2021 at 2.
Section 67 of the Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) (‘the Correctional and Services Act’) was introduced on 1 August 1994 by s 11 of the Statutes Amendment (Truth in Sentencing) Act 1994 (SA). The amending Act was a response to community concerns that sentences that had been imposed were being eroded because of remissions that were being granted for the “good behaviour” of prisoners whilst in custody, particularly in cases involving serious crimes. Section 67 provided a new regime for the circumstances in which a prisoner who had been imprisoned for five years or more, could apply for parole. Significantly, the onus shifted onto the prisoner to make an application for parole,[5] and such an application could not be made “more than six months before the expiration of the non-parole period fixed in respect of the prisoner’s sentence”.[6]
[5] Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) s 67(2)(a).
[6] Ibid.
Section 67 was amended by s 6 of the Correctional Services (Parole) Amendment Act 2015 (SA). The amendment took effect on 11 February 2016. This amendment was colloquially known as the ‘no body, no parole’ amendment. The subsections of the amended provision most relevant to this application are s 67(6) and s 67(7). They provide the following:
(6)Without derogating from subsections (3a) and (4), the Board must not order that a prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment for an offence of murder be released on parole unless the Board is satisfied that the prisoner has satisfactorily cooperated in the investigation of the offence (whether the cooperation occurred before or after the prisoner was sentenced to imprisonment).
(7)For the purposes of subsection (6), the Board must take into account any report tendered to the Board from the Commissioner of Police evaluating the prisoner’s cooperation in the investigation of the offence, including—
(a)     the nature and extent of the prisoner’s cooperation; and
(b)     the timeliness of the cooperation; and
(c)     the truthfulness, completeness and reliability of any information or evidence provided by the prisoner; and
(d)     the significance and usefulness of the prisoner’s cooperation.
The effect of these amendments is that, absent satisfaction that a prisoner has “satisfactorily cooperated in the investigation of an offence”, the Parole Board cannot order that a person serving a life sentence, for the offence of murder be granted parole.
It is important to note that the mere fact of cooperation may not be a sufficient basis for the Parole Board to determine that a prisoner should be granted parole. The Parole Board are required to undertake an evaluative assessment of whether the prisoner has “satisfactorily cooperated” having regard to those considerations set out in s 67(7) of the Correctional Services Act.
2016 developments
Following the amendment of s 67 of the Correctional Services Act, it was necessary for SAPOL to undertake the exercise of approaching those prisoners in custody to whom the section may apply. It was in this context that on 7 June 2016, Ms Gavare was sent a letter from SAPOL regarding s 67 of the Correctional Services Act, requesting her cooperation.
The letter relevantly contained the following:
…
On 4 November, 2011 you were sentenced in the Supreme Court of South Australia to life imprisonment for the offence of murder and received a non-parole period of 32 years. Please be aware that, in accordance with Section 67(7) of the Correctional Services Act 1982, when you apply to the Parole Board of South Australia (Board) for release on parole, the Commissioner of Police will tender to the Board a report detailing your level of cooperation with police in the investigation of the murder of Ms Vonne McGlynn.
Please note that Section 67(6) of the Correctional Services Act 1982 provides that:
… the Board must not order that a prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment for an offence of murder be released on parole unless the Board is satisfied that the prisoner has satisfactorily cooperated in the investigation of the offence (whether the cooperation occurred before or after the prisoner was sentenced to imprisonment).
Section 67(7) of the Correctional Services Act 1982 provides that:
For the purposes of subsection (6), the Board must take into account any report tendered to the Board from the Commissioner of Police evaluating the prisoner’s cooperation in the investigation of the offence, including—
(a)     the nature and extent of the prisoner’s cooperation; and
(b)     the timeliness of the cooperation; and
(c)     the truthfulness, completeness and reliability of any information or evidence provided by the prisoner; and
(d)     the significance and usefulness of the prisoner’s cooperation.
As a prisoner serving a life sentence for the offence of murder, South Australia Police now formally request your cooperation in the investigation of the murder of Ms Vonne McGlynn through your immediate disclosure of:
1.    the whereabouts of the remains of Ms Vonne McGlynn not yet recovered by police,
2.    the locations at which the remains of Ms Vonne McGlynn were disposed,
3.    the circumstances of the murder of Ms Vonne McGlynn,
4.    the location of any and all material objects relevant to the murder of Ms Vonne McGlynn namely the items used to perform the dismembering of Ms Vonne McGlynn,
5.    the specific location of where the dismembering of Ms Vonne McGlynn occurred.
…
The letter concluded:
It is emphasised that if you do not satisfactorily cooperate with the police in the investigation of the offence, the Board must not consider your release on parole. Where cooperation is provided to police in the investigation, the Board will have regard to the requirements of Section 67(7) of the Correctional Services Act 1982 when assessing your cooperation and eligibility for release on parole.
…
(Emphasis in original)
There could have been no misapprehension on the part of Ms Gavare that, absent her cooperation with police, she would spend the remainder of her life in custody.
On 29 July 2016, a Major Crime detective, Detective Brevet Sergeant Fitzpatrick, attended at the Adelaide Women’s Prison, removed Ms Gavare from the facility and conveyed her to the Holden Hill Police Station for the purpose of speaking to her regarding her cooperation. In the interview, Ms Gavare stated that she wished to seek legal advice regarding her obligations under s 67 of the Correctional Services Act and the implications that her cooperation would have on her children.
In his report of that meeting, Detective Fitzpatrick noted that Ms Gavare was polite and appeared genuine in her request for an opportunity to seek advice, rather than making attempts to delay the process. Further, throughout the interview Ms Gavare engaged “in a manner far different than her previous, cocky and flirtatious demeanour when arrested and previously interviewed”.[7]
[7] FDN 4, Life Sentence Prisoner Cooperation Report, dated 2 June 2022 at 2.
Despite this, and with the sanction of no parole absent cooperation hanging over her head, Ms Gavare made no effort to contact police for over 18 months.
On 26 March 2018, Detective Fitzpatrick, having received confirmation that Ms Gavare had received legal advice, reattended at the Adelaide Women’s Prison and conveyed Ms Gavare to a police station for the purpose of speaking with her in an attempt to obtain her cooperation.
At the outset of the interview, Ms Gavare expressed concerns about her account becoming publicly available and her children becoming psychologically effected if they became aware of the details of what she had done to Ms McGlynn.
Detective Fitzpatrick provided an undertaking that where lawful authority existed, he would take steps to restrict access to the information. There was no more that he could do.
Having received that undertaking, Ms Gavare provided the following details of her offending:[8]
[8] Ibid at 4.
·She removed tiles from the roof and jumped down into Ms McGlynn’s house from a manhole.
·She had removed the tiles during the daylight hours when Ms McGlynn was not home and had hidden in the bedroom.
·When Ms McGlynn arrived home, Ms Gavare listened to where she was walking in the house.
·In the kitchen Ms Gavare grabbed Ms McGlynn from behind, without Ms McGlynn realising that she was there. Ms Gavare put Ms McGlynn in a head lock. She kept holding Ms McGlynn until she went limp and then laid her on the kitchen floor.
·Ms Gavare placed Ms McGlynn’s body under a bush in the backyard. She broke off branches from trees to place over her body.
·Ms Gavare left and later returned with her car and parked it near to the house.
·Whilst at the house, Ms Gavare went from room to room and packed up items of value. She also collected bank statements to use in the Power of Attorney documents that she intended to create to obtain access to Ms McGlynn’s financial affairs.
·Ms Gavare left the house to collect her children from school.
·Ms Gavare then went to her boyfriend’s house and out to dinner with him and her children to celebrate her birthday. She arrived home after dinner at about 9.00pm.
·Ms Gavare returned to Ms McGlynn’s house whilst it was still dark. She parked her car on the street and gained access to the house by using Ms McGlynn’s keys.
·Ms Gavare took black plastic rubbish bags into the house, placed them over Ms McGlynn’s body and dragged her out to the car.
·She then drove home and reversed into the driveway. Ms Gavare moved Ms McGlynn’s body to a wardrobe that was in a shed.
·Ms Gavare told the police that she thought that no one would notice Ms McGlynn was missing because she was a lonely person.
·After about five days, Ms Gavare used a circular saw to cut up Ms McGlynn’s body. She first cut off her hands, then above the elbows and then at the shoulders. She placed the body parts in plastic bags in manageable sizes and packaged the head and palms separately to avoid any identifying features.
·Initially the bags were buried under the cubby house. On 9 December 2008, Ms Gavare put some of the bags in the bin. Included amongst those bags were the bags containing Ms McGlynn’s head and hands. She said that those bags were still in the bin when the police first searched the house on 10 December 2008. The bins were subsequently collected.
·Ms Gavare used a baby pusher to move the larger body parts to an area along the creek opposite her house. She hid a large bag of Ms McGlynn’s remains under some tree roots in the creek.
·After hosing down the circular saw, Ms Gavare placed it along with the wardrobe on the street for hard rubbish collection. She put the carpet from the shed into shop rubbish bins near to a Cheap as Chips store.
Cooperation report
On 2 June 2022, Detective Fitzpatrick provided a “Life Sentence Prisoner Cooperation Report”[9] for the consideration of the Parole Board. In that report information was provided to assist the Parole Board in determining whether Ms Gavare may become eligible for parole. Detective Fitzpatrick provided an overview of how events had transpired:
The prisoner failed to cooperate for about 10 yrs. In 2018 Gavare provided an apparently full and truthful account of her role in the murder of the victim. The Parole Board should consider the timeliness of this cooperation, and the grief that inflicted on the family for 10 yrs – especially not knowing what happened to all the remains. Failure to assist Police prevented the recovery of all the missing body parts.
The recent cooperation (2018) of Gavare has enabled the family to understand how and why the victim was murdered, and that Gavare has accepted full responsibility. No further cooperation is being sought.
[9] Ibid.

On that basis, pursuant to s 67(6) of the Correctional Services Act, it is now open to the Parole Board to consider whether Ms Gavare has “satisfactorily cooperated in the investigation of the offence”. If so satisfied, it may be that at the expiry of her non-parole period, Ms Gavare will be eligible to apply for parole. This was not open prior to her participation in the 2018 interview.
A preliminary question – Does Ms Gavare’s conduct amount to “cooperation” for the purpose of s 43 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA)?
As previously mentioned, s 43(1)(a) and (b) create a threshold test that must be satisfied before an offender can come within the section. It is uncontentious that Ms Gavare satisfies the first limb in that she is a person who is currently serving a period of imprisonment for an offence.
It is in relation to s 43(1)(b) that the real contest lies.
It was the Director’s primary submission that Ms Gavare’s conduct does not satisfy the test as set out in s 43 in that she is not a person who has “cooperated with a law enforcement agency”. There is no dispute that SAPOL is a law enforcement agency as defined by the Act.[10] It is the Director’s contention however, that Ms Gavare’s conduct does not amount to cooperation in that she has done no more than admit her own involvement in a crime that has been solved and for which she has already been convicted.
[10] Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 8(a).
It was submitted by the Director that the circumstances in which this information came to be provided are relevant to a consideration of whether Ms Gavare has satisfied the test of cooperating with the authorities. The matters relied upon by the Director are:
·It was the police who approached Ms Gavare and asked for her cooperation.
·There was a strong incentive for Ms Gavare to cooperate namely, her release from custody at some time in the future.
·Ms Gavare suffered no disadvantage or prejudice by providing the information. She had already been found guilty and exhausted all avenues of appeal.
·Despite this, and having obtained legal advice, it took over 18 months for Ms Gavare to agree to cooperate.
·Whilst it was accepted that Ms Gavare may, at least in part, be motivated by remorse, she was also motivated by her desire to retain a relationship with her daughters. It was only upon police giving her assurances that they would do all that they could to keep the information confidential, that she finally agreed to confess to the murder, and divulge for the first time what she did with Ms McGlynn’s remains.
It was the Director’s submission that in considering whether Ms Gavare’s conduct fell within s 43 of the Sentencing Act, it is important to have regard to the legislative purpose of that section. This section replaced, in identical terms, what was formerly s 29E of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). That section was introduced on 17 June 2012 by s 27 of the Statutes Amendments (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2012 (SA) which was part of a suite of legislation introduced at that time, targeting serious and organised crime. The Director relied upon the Second Reading Speech from 15 February 2012 during which the purpose of the section was explained:
Co-operation with the authorities
An important weapon against serious and organised crime is getting people with inside or other secret knowledge of the activities and membership of the organisation to co-operate with the authorities and spill the beans. These people can be at their most vulnerable when they have been caught committing crimes, perhaps serious crime, and are facing spending a significant period in prison.
The Government has already announced a policy for dealing with the sentencing of people who plead guilty to their offences and, at that time, undertake to co-operate with authorities and provide information, either by way of testimony or otherwise. This is an important area of law and very significant inducements indeed may need to be provided to encourage these offenders to take the risk of danger to life or limb by so doing.
However, there is one area of the law that should be dealt with in this Bill. For any number of reasons, an offender of this kind may decide that, for example, the risks are not worth it and decide not to co-operate and do their time. But what if, having made that decision, the offender faces the bleak reality of that choice and months or even years later decided that the decision is the wrong one? The law needs that evidence should it be forthcoming and should allow such an offender to change his or her mind and recant. If that is done, it is only right that the effective sentence should be reconsidered in light of that co-operation, however belated, and an incentive offered in the form of a reconsideration of sentence. That is what is proposed here.
The Director contended that is clear from that explanation that the section was designed to capture and effectively mirror the common law regime surrounding “Golding letters” and/or, to a narrower extent, s 37 of the Sentencing Act which allows for a reduction in a sentence for cooperation with law enforcement agencies.[11]
[11] 37—Reduction of sentences for cooperation etc with law enforcement agency
(1)A court may declare a defendant to be a defendant to whom this section applies if the court is satisfied that the defendant has cooperated or undertaken to cooperate with a law enforcement agency and the cooperation—
(a)relates directly to combating serious and organised criminal activity; and
(b)is provided in exceptional circumstances; and
(c)contributes significantly to the public interest.
(2)In determining sentence for an offence or offences to which a defendant has pleaded guilty or in respect of which a defendant has been found guilty, the court may, if the defendant is the subject of a declaration under subsection (1), reduce the sentence that it would otherwise have imposed by such percentage as the court thinks appropriate in the circumstances.
(3)In determining the percentage by which a sentence is to be reduced under this section, the court must have regard to such of the following as may be relevant:
(a)if the defendant has pleaded guilty to the offence or offences—that fact and the circumstances of the plea;
(b)the nature and extent of the defendant's cooperation or undertaking;
(c)the timeliness of the cooperation or undertaking;
(d)the truthfulness, completeness and reliability of any information or evidence provided by the defendant;
(e)the evaluation (if any) by the authorities of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's cooperation or undertaking;
(f)any benefit that the defendant has gained or is likely to gain by reason of the cooperation or undertaking;
(g)the degree to which the safety of the defendant (or some other person) has been put at risk of violent retribution as a result of the defendant's cooperation or undertaking;
(h)whether the cooperation or undertaking concerns an offence for which the defendant is being sentenced or some other offence, whether related or unrelated (and, if related, whether the offence forms part of a criminal enterprise);
(i)whether, as a consequence of the defendant's cooperation or undertaking, the defendant would be likely to suffer violent retribution while serving any term of imprisonment, or be compelled to serve any such term in particularly severe conditions;
(j)the nature of any steps that would be likely to be necessary to protect the defendant on release from prison;
(k)the likelihood that the defendant will commit further offences,
and may have regard to any other factor or principle the court thinks relevant.
(4)In this section—
serious and organised criminal activity includes any activity that may constitute a serious and organised crime offence within the meaning of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935.
I accept the submission made by the Director, that the need to combat serious and organised crime was the driving force and the legislative purpose behind s 29E of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) however that does not detract from the broader application of the section. There is nothing in the wording of the section that limits its scope in the manner advocated for by the Director. Indeed, the Director accepted that it may be that in certain circumstances an offender who was not involved in serious and organised crime, who was motivated to cooperate by s 67 of the Correctional Services Act may fall within s 43 of the Sentencing Act. I provide two examples that the Director conceded may bring an offender within s 67.
Example 1
An offender in the same circumstances as Ms Gavare, who was entirely motivated to cooperate by the incentive of being able to apply for parole. The information provided by this offender involved identifying three co-offenders which resulted in their arrest, prosecution and the imposition of lengthy sentences.
Example 2
An offender in the same circumstances as Ms Gavare, who provided information that resulted in the location of Ms McGlynn’s remains, enabling the family to conduct a funeral.
Whilst the Director accepted that these scenarios may bring the offender within s 43, the Director maintained that Ms Gavare’s circumstances did not.
The Director relied on R v Minter[12] in support of the interpretation advocated for as to what amounts to “cooperation” in sentencing. In Minter, the Court of Criminal Appeal was required to consider whether the sentencing Judge was correct in concluding that the degree of cooperation provided by the appellant was insufficient to amount to special reasons to support a reduction of the non-parole period below the mandatory minimum.[13] On the circumstances of that case, the Court found that the sentencing Judge was correct in finding that the nature and level of cooperation was such that it did not amount to special reasons. In his decision, Sulan J explained the reason arriving at this view. His Honour said:[14]
The appellant has shown no remorse. His arrest was as a result of his having a loose tongue and speaking to an under-cover police officer. His limited cooperation occurred after it must have been clear to him that the police had evidence of his involvement. The cooperation was short-lived. The non-parole period of 23 years was entirely appropriate.
[12] [2011] SASCFC 11.
[13] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 32A(3)(c).
[14] R v Minter [2011] SASCFC 11 at [19].
It follows that although of limited weight and utility to the police, the appellant’s conduct still amounted to “cooperation” with the police. This is of course at odds with the primary position taken by the Director on this application.
I do not accept the Director’s submission that Ms Gavare’s circumstances are such that it cannot be said that she “cooperated” with a law enforcement authority. The term “cooperate” is broad. It means to work with another or others, willingly and agreeably. The words of the section do not limit the breadth or its scope in any way.
It is of note that the word “cooperation” is also used in s 67 of the Correctional Services Act, suggesting that it is the same conduct by an offender that is to be captured by both sections.
For reasons that will become apparent however, those matters raised by the Director in support of their primary submission, are highly relevant to a determination of whether permission to apply to the Court to have the sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed, should be granted.
Permission
Section 43(2) of the Sentencing Act requires that an offender may only apply to the Court to have a sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed with the permission of the Court.
Pursuant to s 43(3) the Court may only grant permission to make an application under s 43 if the cooperation relates directly to an offence, that in the opinion of the Court, is a serious offence that has been committed or may be committed. It is for the Court to determine what amounts to a serious offence. Given that the offence is murder there can be no suggestion that the offence is anything other than serious; there is no dispute that this limb of the test is satisfied.
More contentious is the application of s 43(2). That section implicitly vests a power in the Court to determine the question of permission and, if permission is granted, to determine the application. It is apparent from the wording of s 43(2), that the power to grant permission and determine the application is constrained by a consideration of the person’s cooperation with the law enforcement agency in accordance with the section. That is in accordance with those considerations enumerated in s 43(5).
The question is therefore whether the application is reasonably arguable; that is, whether, based on those considerations set out in s 43(5), there is merit in the application to have Ms Gavare’s sentence quashed, and a new sentence imposed. It is only then that permission will be granted to Ms Gavare to apply to be resentenced, on the basis that there are sufficient prospects of success to warrant judicial intervention.
The policy underpinning the requirement for permission is self-evident, in that it reflects the importance of finality and certainty in the sentencing process. It should only be in circumstances in which, based on the application of the criteria in s 43(5), the prospects of an offender being resentenced are reasonably arguable, that permission should be granted.
It was the Director’s submission that permission to apply to the Court to have the sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed should be refused and that no new sentence should be substituted given the nature and circumstances of the offending, the information provided and the circumstances under which the information was given.
Consideration
Although s 43(5) sets out a number of considerations for evaluating and assessing an offender’s cooperation, there is considerable overlap between them, such that, for current purposes, there is little utility in attempting to separate them out and deal with them individually.
It is accepted by SAPOL that Ms Gavare honestly and comprehensively answered their questions, in that she has provided a complete account of Ms McGlynn’s murder. That must, however, be considered in the context of a strong prosecution case implicating Ms Gavare at trial and the majority of the information that she provided to the police was already known to them. The only additional details of any substance, were the means by which Ms Gavare carried out Ms McGlynn’s murder, and how she disposed of her body parts.
Although Ms Gavare is believed to have provided a full account, the belated timing of the admission has meant that there is no follow up investigation that the police can now embark upon in an attempt to locate Ms McGlynn’s remains.
On the question of the usefulness of the information, Detective Fitzpatrick made the following observation:[15]
Due to the passage of time between 2008 and 2022 with the information being obtained in 2018 no search of any rubbish dumps have been progressed. There are no feasible ways in which further recovery of human remains can be reasonably facilitated, considering the size of the remains and the inability to track rubbish tip location since 2008. The delay in the provision of the information and previous deliberate attempts to evade detection directly affected police ability to recover McGlynn’s outstanding remains which consist of her head, hands, arms, feet and leg sections and are likely fully decomposed and buried. The small cut up size of the remains are indicative of them been spread across a large area.
[15] FDN 4, Life Sentence Cooperation Report at 4.
The delay was significant. The offence was committed on 3 December 2008 and Ms Gavare was arrested on 26 February 2009. Ms Gavare’s belated admission did not take place until March 2018. In the intervening period she continued to protest her innocence throughout the trial and nominated a third party as the offender. Ms Gavare exhausted all avenues of appeal. It was the police who made the approach to Ms Gavare, and even then, it took a further 18 plus months for Ms Gavare to decide to participate in an interview.
By providing the police with her account, Ms Gavare has suffered no detriment. This is not a situation in which she has put herself at risk of violent retribution or payback. Nor is she likely to experience more onerous conditions in custody, such as she would if she required protection from other prisoners.
To the contrary, Ms Gavare has received a considerable benefit. But for her cooperation with police, Ms Gavare was destined to spend the rest of her life in prison, without any hope of parole. In circumstances, in which Ms Gavare has already reaped a substantial benefit arising from her cooperation, it would be necessary for there to be other factors of significant weight, to warrant her receiving any further benefit.
Additional matters raised on behalf of Ms Gavare
In addition to those considerations specifically referred to in s 43(5), in determining the application the Court “may have regard to any other factor or principle the Court thinks relevant”. This provides the Court with a very broad discretion to take into account any additional matters that may be relevant to the unique circumstances and a report from a psychologist, Richard Balfour dated 26 September 2024 of an individual case.
An additional matter relied upon by Mr Vadasz in his submissions on behalf of Ms Gavare was her purported remorse, contrition and rehabilitation. It was Mr Vadasz’s submission that this is a matter that can be weighed in the scales in favour of reducing Ms Gavare’s non-parole period.
Amongst the materials before me is a Parole Board report dated 1 July 2024. In addition to that I have been provided with an academic transcript that sets out the courses and studies that Ms Gavare has undertaken whilst she has been in custody.
In combination, these documents establish that Ms Gavare’s institutional behaviour in more recent times has been exemplary.
That is, however against a backdrop of a diagnosis of an underlying Mixed Personality Disorder with Antisocial and Borderline traits.[16] In June 2010, Dr Craig Raeside, a forensic psychiatrist expressed the view that “Ms Gavare demonstrates a number of psychopathic qualities, with her detachment, lack of emotion, and history of manipulative behaviour”.[17]
[16] FDN 13, Report of Dr Richard Balfour dated 26 September 2024 at 16.
[17] Ibid at 14.
In 2012, Ms Gavare was subject to a pre-treatment assessment by a psychologist from the Department of Correctional Services, Sentence Management Unit. The psychologist who conducted the review reported that Ms Gavare is “an individual who reports a shallow affective experience and appears to display a distinct lack of empathy and callousness in her dealings with others.”[18] It was reported that Ms Gavare engaged in positive impression management and demonstrated a tendency to engage in deceitful and manipulative behaviour.[19] She was assessed to be an “individual able to display a glibness and superficial charm and who has a grandiose sense of self-worth.”[20] The psychologist recommended that staff members should be aware of the difficulties inherent in managing such personality types given her propensity for manipulation.
[18] Ibid at 16.
[19] Ibid at 17.
[20] Ibid at 16.
From the Parole Board report, it would appear that Ms Gavare’s behaviour in custody was very poor up until about 2014, at which time she appears to have turned a corner, commencing work in custody, demonstrating a good work ethic and no longer being involved in any behavioural incidents. This is despite her having received no treatment or psychological interventions since she was incarcerated.

This brief summary of Ms Gavare’s conduct, whilst in custody highlights the limitations on any weight that can be placed on the considerations of a prisoner’s institutional behaviour on an application to be resentenced.
A prisoner serving a term of imprisonment may react and behave in any number of ways in response to their incarceration, and that may change over time. Even more difficult to assess is the motivation driving that behaviour. Ms Gavare’s recent good behaviour may be reflective of remorse or a genuine desire to rehabilitate or it may be manipulative behaviour, aimed at forging the most comfortable path through her time in custody. Such an assessment is all the more complicated in circumstances in which Ms Gavare would have been regarded by the world at large as being of good character prior to embarking on such a horrific crime.
It may be that in some circumstances in which there are other compelling considerations warranting the resentencing of an offender, in accordance with s 43 of the Sentencing Act, an individual’s institutional conduct and remorse may be taken into account, however that is not the situation in which Ms Gavare finds herself.
In all of the circumstances, I place no weight on Ms Gavare’s behaviour in custody.
Conclusion
In taking into account all relevant matters, but in particular the circumstances and timing of Ms Gavare’s admissions and the benefit that she has received in now being eligible to apply for parole, I have arrived at the view that it would be entirely inappropriate to grant Ms Gavare permission to apply to the Court to have her sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed. I go further than that to say that to in any way interfere with Ms Gavare’s sentence on the basis of what has been submitted on her behalf would lead to an understandable sense of community outrage and would have the potential to undermine the overall sentencing process.
The application is not reasonably arguable, and I refuse permission for Ms Gavare to apply to the Court to have her sentence quashed and a new sentence imposed.