FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Garrett, in the matter of application by Garrett [2020] FCA 1704
File number: SAD 143 of 2020 Judgment of: WHITE J Date of judgment: 26 November 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by the subject of a vexatious proceeding order for leave under s 37AT of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to institute a proceeding – application refused. Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 11
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 20(2), 46PO
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AM, 37AO, 37AQ, 37AR, 37AS, 37AT
Federal Court Rules 2011
Cases cited: Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; (2015) 234 FCR 535
Gallo v Attorney‑General [1984] VICSC 412
Garrett, in the matter of Company One [2016] FCA 703
Division: General Division Registry: South Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 41 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant was self-represented ORDERS
SAD 143 of 2020 ANDREW MORTON GARRETT PERSONALLY, AND AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ANDREW GARRETT FAMILY TRUST NO 4 ABN 42 388 204 496 TRADING AS OENOVIVA CAPITAL RESOURCES
Applicant
ORDER MADE BY:
WHITE J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 NOVEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to institute proceedings under s 37AT of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WHITE J:
Introduction
Section 37AO(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act) permits, amongst other things, the Court to make an order which prohibits a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian Courts or Tribunals from instituting proceedings in the Court. An order of this kind is referred to as a “vexatious proceedings order”.
When a vexatious proceedings order is in force, the person who is subject to it must not institute proceedings in the Court without the leave of the Court under s 37AT of the FCA Act (s 37AQ(1)(a)). Further, other persons must not, acting in concert with the person, institute proceedings in the Court without the leave of the Court (s 37AQ(1)(b)).
Section 37AR of the FCA Act permits a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order to apply to the Court for a grant of leave to institute a proceeding.
Section 37AT(4) of the FCA Act provides that the Court may grant leave only if it is satisfied that the proceeding is not a vexatious proceeding. The applicant for leave has the onus of satisfying the Court of that circumstance.
Section 37AS(3) provides that the Court or a judge may dismiss the application seeking leave without an oral hearing (either with or without the consent of the applicant).
A vexatious proceedings order was made in respect of Andrew Morton Garrett on 26 February 2015. That order…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1704
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that Mr Garrett’s proposed proceeding was vexatious because it named 100 respondents, including regulatory authorities, statutory agencies, financial institutions, and members of the legal profession. The Court found that it was unlikely that Mr Garrett had viable causes of action against these respondents, let alone causes of action which would make it appropriate for them to be joined as parties in the one proceeding. The Court also found that the content of Mr Garrett’s proposed Originating Application for Judicial Review was baseless and did not propose a reasonable cause of action. The Court found that the proceeding was vexatious because it sought to review decisions and conduct of 100 respondents over a 17 year period and because it contained baseless claims about the weaponisation of the domestic and international monetary system. The Court concluded that Mr Garrett had not satisfied it that the proceeding was not vexatious and refused the application for leave.
The Court made an order that the application for leave to institute proceedings under section 37AT of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) was refused. The Court did not make any other orders.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to institute proceedings under s 37AT of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Garrett did, in accordance with Order 2, file a document entitled “Exhibit AMG 2549; Further Outline of submissions dated 20th October 2020”. The heading to the document suggests that Mr Garrett may also intend this document to comprise his submissions in support of applications for leave to commence other proceedings. These applications are not before me. I will refer to the content of the document later. Consideration A number of matters indicate that the Court cannot be satisfied that Mr Garrett’s proposed proceeding “is not a vexatious proceeding” for the purposes of s 37AT(4). First, there is the multiplicity of respondents. The proposed proceeding names exactly 100 persons and entities as respondents. The first is the Commissioner of Taxation. The remaining respondents include regulatory authorities (including the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, and the Australian Financial Security Authority), multiple statutory agencies, financial institutions, the Commonwealth and State Attorneys General, the State and Territory Law Societies, 14 judicial officers, 12 retired judicial officers, the High Court of Australia, this Court, the FCC, various State courts, numerous members of the legal profession, and other individuals. It is unlikely in the extreme that Mr Garrett could have viable causes of action against these 100 entities and persons, let alone causes of action which would make it appropriate for them to be joined as parties in the one proceeding – see Pt 9 in the Federal Court Rules 2011. In any event, the involvement of so many seemingly unrelated respondents in the one proceeding would of itself be vexatious. Secondly, the vexatious nature of the proceeding is indicated by the content of Mr Garrett’s proposed Originating Application for Judicial Review. That document commences with the statement:The Applicant applies to the Court to review the decisions and conduct of the Respondents between 2003 and Today’s date and the decisions set out at Annexure 1, 2, 3, 4 &5. Thus, it seems that Mr Garrett wishes to review decisions and conduct of 100 respondents over a 17 year period. Mr Garrett elaborates the proposed claim under the heading “Details of claim”:The Applicant is aggrieved by the Respondents’ decisions and conduct because:1.The Applicant is a Legally Assisted Person within the meaning of the National Legal Assistance Partnership Agreement and has not been provided funding by the Respondents for counsel acting for the Applicant at any time that is sufficient to result in a Fair Trial in the Criminal Jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Australia and/or a Fair Hearing in the Civil Jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Australia.2.At all relevant times the Respondents have made decisions and conducted themselves in manner to cause Weaponisation of the Domestic and International Monetary System in order to maximise Tax Revenues that are ILL GOTTEN by way of redistribution of wealth and Intellectual Property associated with the Applicant and the Citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia.3.The Second to Sixth Respondents have at all materials times interfered with the Rights of the Applicants to carry on an enterprise and monetise financial assets related to the Applicant.4.The Decisions and conduct of the Respondents has been at all relevant times been Criminal Jurisdictional Error in the exercise of discretionary public powers conferred under an enactment within the meaning of the Common Law.