Garnys v Secretary, Department of Employment, Education,
[1999] FCA 860
•25 JUNE 1999
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Garnys v Secretary, Department of Employment, Education,
Training & Youth Affairs [1999] FCA 860ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – cancellation of Newstart Allowance – whether case management activity agreement breached – whether applicant took “reasonable steps” to comply with terms of the agreement – error by Tribunal in failing to make factual findings on relevant issues – s 45 of the Employment Services Act 1994 considered.
Social Security Act 1991, s 660I
Employment Services Act 1994, s 45(5) and s 45(6)Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs v Ferguson
(1997) 147 ALR 295 considered
JOHN GARNYS v
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION,
TRAINING AND YOUTH AFFAIRS
NG 769 of 1998
HILL J
25 JUNE 1999
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 769 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
JOHN GARNYS
ApplicantAND:
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, TRAINING AND YOUTH AFFAIRS
RespondentJUDGE:
HILL J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JUNE 1999
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.
2.The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for rehearing in accordance with law, with or without the calling of fresh evidence as the Tribunal shall determine.
3.The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 769 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
JOHN GARNYS
ApplicantAND:
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, TRAINING AND YOUTH AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
HILL J
DATE:
25 JUNE 1999
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant, Mr Garnys, appeals to the Court in its original jurisdiction against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) setting aside a decision in his favour of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal and substituting in place of that decision its affirmation of a decision made by an authorised review officer to cancel his newstart allowance pursuant to s 660I of the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”) on the ground that he had failed to comply with the terms of his case management activity agreement.
Mr Garnys was born in October 1942. He attained a diploma in metallurgy from the Perth Institute in or around 1968. He has for some considerable time been unemployed. On 1 May 1996 he signed, as he was required to do, a case management activity agreement. As that document declares on its face the aim of such an agreement is to get a job for a job seeker. Some of the terms of the agreement are specific to the job seeker. Others are contained in printed conditions. Under it, and as the first condition, the job seeker agrees to do everything he or she can to get a job indicating that he or she is willing to undertake suitable paid work. The printed conditions provide relevantly as follows:
“3. I agree to accept a suitable job offer.”
Another provision, it is handwritten in the present agreement, is to the following effect:
“I agree to report to the matching team once a week and apply for all positions where appropriate.”
The case manager whose signature also appears on the agreement undertakes to assist the job seeker and monitor the job seeker’s activities “so that he/she obtains a job as quickly as possible”. The case manager agrees to advise the Commonwealth Employment Service if a job seeker is not taking reasonable steps to comply with the agreement. He or she agrees to provide support and assistance for a period of time after a job has been obtained.
Sometime before 25 May 1996 Mr Garnys was advised by his case manager to attend an interview and information session at Maroubra Commonwealth Employment Service at 9.00 am. Franklins store was conducting a recruitment drive, apparently for a number of positions and was to interview persons desiring a job.
Mr Garnys arrived, it would seem, at 9.30 am. He completed and handed to a Ms Hamill an application form. Ms Hamill was the human resources coordinator for Franklins and the person who apparently organised the interviews that were to be conducted on that day. Ms Hamill’s evidence was that Mr Garnys wanted to hand to her his application form but not stay for the ultimate interview. Mr Garnys told her that he had other commitments and could not stay. According to Ms Hamill’s evidence, which the Tribunal accepted, she explained to him that an interview was necessary and offered him an afternoon interview at 4.00 pm. Ms Hamill then passed the application form on to a Ms Kerry Thomas who was the manager of the Maroubra job centre. When the application form was handed to her, Ms Hamill noted that it was (in her view) “inappropriately completed”. Mr Garnys had under the heading “work history” written “unemployed with CES Maroubra” but nothing else. In the document he gave the name of his case manager as referee. Ms Thomas annotated at some stage Mr Garnys’ record as “client may need counselling re completing forms for genuine employment”.
Mr Garnys waited for some time. According to his evidence he waited until 10.45 am. The Tribunal found that Mr Garnys was impatient and unhappy about waiting to see an interviewer. It was Mr Garnys’ case that this came about because he suffered from a number of medical conditions. One was a longstanding medical condition of dermatitis. Another condition he suffered with at the time was an ear infection with resulting discharge; a third was an ingrown toenail which had been bothering him for some months. Mr Garnys wanted to attend the Oxford Square Medical Centre to see a doctor and presumably obtain medication. Mr Garnys left the Maroubra Employment Office and went to the Oxford Square Medical Centre. By that time it was 12.30 pm. According to his evidence he was unable to obtain an appointment and refused to stay there. He said he attended another centre, the Maroubra Medical Centre, in the afternoon at either 3.30 or 4.30 pm. Evidence before the Tribunal indicated that he did not see a doctor at either of these centres. Nor did he purchase any medication on that day nor collect any prescription for the dermatitis.
According to the Tribunal Mr Garnys gave also as an explanation for his non-attendance at the interview his belief that the written application that he had left with Franklins was adequate. He had applied to Franklins before and thought his name might already be on the data base. He believed that he might be able to proceed to a second interview without attending the first interview. The Tribunal however did not believe Mr Garnys on this last point because it accepted Ms Hamill’s evidence that she had told Mr Garnys that without a first interview he would not be considered for a second and final interview. Mr Garnys explained away the incomplete application form by saying that he believed that if he indicated how long he had been unemployed that it might be prejudicial to his application and thought that it would improve his prospects to name his case manager as a reference.
A delegate of the Secretary, the Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs determined that Mr Garnys’ newstart allowance should be cancelled. The document recording that decision particularised what was said to be Mr Garnys’ “breach”, ie. his non-compliance with the terms of the case management agreement, as being both the failure to proceed with the interview and the filling in of the application form inappropriately. That decision was then reviewed by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal. It formed the view that Mr Garnys had done everything he could to get a job within the limits of his personal circumstances. In so holding the Tribunal took into account particularly that, at the time of the interview, no decisions were to be made and that further interviews were to be held later. It said it would not have reached this conclusion if the decisions were to be made on the day of the recruitment drive as to the selection of successful applicants. The Secretary then appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which set aside the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal.
Relevant legislation
The relevant legislation for present purposes is the Employment Services Act 1994. Section 45 of that Act is in the following relevant terms:
“(1)This section applies to a person who is a participant in the case management system throughout a particular period (the ‘participation period’).
…
(5)The person is not qualified for newstart allowance or youth training allowance in respect of a period unless (in addition to meeting any other requirements set out in the Social Security Act 1991 or Part 8 of the Student and Youth Assistance Act 1973, as the case may be):
(a)when the person is required under section 38 to enter into a Case Management Activity Agreement in relation to the period, the person enters into that agreement; and
(b)while the agreement is in force, the person satisfies the Employment Secretary that the person is taking reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement; and
(c)at all times during the period when the person is a party to the agreement, the person is prepared to enter into another such agreement instead of the existing agreement if required to do so under section 38.”
Subsection (6) then provides:
“(6)For the purposes of paragraph (5)(b), a person is taking reasonable steps to comply with the terms of a Case Management Activity Agreement unless the person has failed to comply with the terms of the agreement and:
(a)the main reason for failing to comply involved a matter that was within the person’s control; or
(b)the circumstances that prevented the person from complying were reasonably foreseeable by the person.”
By force of s 660I of the same legislation a newstart allowance is to be cancelled or suspended where the Secretary of the Department is satisfied that it is being, or has been, paid to a person to whom it was not payable.
The reasons of the Tribunal
After setting out the relevant statutory provisions and summarising the evidence adduced before it the Tribunal went on to consider whether Mr Garnys had complied with the terms of the case management activity agreement he had signed. The only term the Tribunal referred to and therefore one assumes the only one the Tribunal thought relevant was the provision that Mr Garnys agreed to report to the matching team once a week and apply for all positions where appropriate. The Tribunal, however, also said:
“I am mindful of the submissions of the Applicant that while Mr Garnys’ resume contained his employment history, his application form for Franklins was inadequately completed, reflecting as submitted by Ms Lawrence, a disinterest in being employed.”
It referred then to Mr Garnys medical condition noting he had neither seen a doctor nor obtained a prescription on 25 May 1996. It continued:
“I find that the events of 25 May 1996 were within Mr Garnys’ control and the consequences of not attending were reasonably forseeable(sic) and known to him.”
The Tribunal accepted that Mr Garnys was worried about his medical problems. It said of them that they were not acute but of a longstanding nature. It continued:
“I make the finding therefore that his efforts at the Franklins interview were not such as to reflect him doing everything possible to get a job as required by his CMAA.”
The Tribunal then took issue with the finding of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal to the effect that second job interviews could take place some six weeks later even when persons had not been initially interviewed. The Tribunal continued:
“In applying section 45(6) of the Employment Services Act, I find that the main reason for non attendance at the Franklins interview was quite within Mr Garnys’ control and everything was entirely forseeable(sic) including the impending breach if he did not attend the interview. His medical conditions were long standing and there was no acute problem. In any case the evidence shows he did not see a doctor or get his prescription medicine on that day.
I find that Mr Garnys was not taking reasonable steps to comply with his CMAA on 25 May 1996 when he left the Franklins interview situation and did not accept a substitute appointment for 4.00 pm.
I looked further to consider his general attitude and compliance with the CMAA, mindful of the evidence of Mr Besser who had been his case manager. Mr Besser’s evidence was that he had had to enter into extensive negotiations regarding wording of the CMAA with Mr Garnys; that Mr Garnys had been hard to contact; that he wanted extensions of time regarding notifications; and that he would often find reasons why he could not do certain jobs. He said Mr Garnys focused on the problems with his hands, and on his qualifications, but rejected all jobs. I am mindful that this can be taken into account and that Mansfield J said in Ferguson (1997) 147 ALR 295 at 308 (supra):
‘As the question which s 45[5](sic)(b) poses is the wider question as to the conduct of the recipient of newstart allowance in relation to the agreement, which does not simply look to the particular failure to comply with the terms of the agreement, it would not follow as a matter of course … That would depend in other respects upon the person’s attitude to performance of the terms of the agreement, attendances on other occasions, attempts to seek work and the range of information …’ ”
After consideration of three Tribunal cases dealing with the different circumstances, the Tribunal concluded by saying that Mr Garnys’ non-attendance at the interview on 25 May 1996 caused him to breach his agreement so that the original decision to “breach” Mr Garnys was the correct decision and the Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision accordingly should be set aside.
Submissions on factual matters
Before me, Mr Garnys was not represented. He suffered the disability that lay persons suffer from when faced with a jurisdiction which is dependent upon demonstrating that an administrative tribunal has made an error of law. The Court’s jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the tribunal is specifically limited to questions of law. The Court has no power to make itself factual findings.
Mr Garnys wanted to persuade me that the Tribunal’s conclusion was factually wrong. He sought to tender a statement from a doctor at the Oxford Square Medical Centre to the effect that indeed he had gone to that centre but a doctor had been unable to see him before the centre closed at 2.30 pm. This document no doubt might have persuaded the Tribunal to find that the reason Mr Garnys left the interview when he did was indeed to attend at the medical centre to see a doctor. The Tribunal might indeed also have been persuaded that he did so needing medical attention. It seems obvious from reading the Tribunal’s reasons that it was not impressed with Mr Garnys. Indeed at one point the Tribunal says that Mr Garnys left his application form with Ms Hamill and Ms Thomas “ostensibly to attend a medical appointment” (emphasis added), suggesting no doubt thereby that this was not the real reason or that he did not seek to attend any appointment there.
I have great sympathy for Mr Garnys who is faced with the situation that perhaps the Tribunal has not accepted his evidence and wishes thereafter to demonstrate that the Tribunal erred on a factual matter. But the fact that the Tribunal decided the facts in a way which Mr Garnys would see as wrong does not demonstrate that the Tribunal erred in law. Clearly on the material before it the Tribunal was entitled to conclude (it is not totally clear that it did) that Mr Garnys did not go to see any doctor on 25 May 1996. It was for Mr Garnys to produce the evidence to the Tribunal. A tribunal cannot err if it makes a finding of fact on the evidence before it where that evidence is incomplete. It is for an applicant to put all relevant facts before the Tribunal.
Mr Garnys claimed to be at a disadvantage because he had received a copy of the transcript of the Tribunal’s proceedings only the morning of the hearing before me. For this reason I gave him three weeks to prepare written submissions dealing with matters in the transcript which he believed would be relevant to any question of law. I did however point out to him that it would be unlikely that any issue of law would emerge from material in the transcript unless of course it was not open for the Tribunal to make some finding of fact which in fact it made. I shall deal specifically with Mr Garnys’ written submissions later in these reasons.
However, because Mr Garnys was unrepresented, I have carefully considered the reasons of the Tribunal and debated them with the legal representatives of the respondent Secretary in open court. They cause me considerable concern and demonstrate in my view that the Tribunal did err in law but not in the way Mr Garnys suggested in his oral submissions. It is necessary therefore to turn to these matters.
Untrammelled by authority I would have thought that s 45(6) operated as a definitional section for s 45(5)(b). The latter paragraph requires the Secretary to consider whether and be satisfied that the job seeker “is taking reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the case management activity agreement”. No doubt the reference to “reasonable steps” if s 45(5)(b) stood alone would mitigate against an argument that every failure to comply with the terms of the agreement, no matter how strong an explanation for non-compliance, would result in cancellation of an allowance. It would be sufficient if reasonable steps were taken to comply even if there was no ultimate compliance. So, for example, if the relevant non-compliance was non-attendance at an interview the fact that a job seeker had sought to attend the interview but, for example because of a train accident, could not, would not result in there being a breach of the agreement for reasonable steps would have been taken.
However, s 45(6) makes it clear that it will be unnecessary for the job seeker to show that he or she has taken reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement. Rather the job seeker is deemed to have taken reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement unless the provisions of subsection (6) operate. Put another way, the Secretary cannot be satisfied of the matter in s 45(5)(b) unless the balance of s 45(6) is made out. So, if the newstart allowance is to be cancelled or suspended, it will be because the job seeker has failed to comply with the terms of the case management agreement and one of either paragraphs (a) or (b) of s 45(6) is made out.
This interpretation, which appears to follow inexorably from the language of the section does not seem to be the interpretation which was accepted by Mansfield J in Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs v Ferguson (1997) 147 ALR 295. In that case it appears to have been assumed by the Tribunal that where there was a breach of the agreement ipso facto there would be a failure to take reasonable steps to comply with the agreement unless either sub paragraph (a) or (b) of s 45(6) was made out. Mansfield J expressed the view, with which I agree, that this involved a mistaken apprehension of the interaction of subsections (5) and (6) of s 45. Mansfield J then continued by pointing out that s 45(5)(b) had primacy over s 45(6). His Honour said at 304-5:
“The consequence which s 45(5) provides for will only arise, relevantly, if the respondent satisfies the Employment Secretary that he is taking reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement. Section 45(6) then provides the threshold over which the Employment Secretary must pass before any onus lies on the respondent to satisfy the Employment Secretary that he is taking reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement. So long as he has not failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, he is necessarily to be taken as taking reasonable steps to comply with the agreement. If he has failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, he is still to be taken as taking reasonable steps to comply with the agreement if
(a)the main reason for the failure involved a matter that was [not] (sic) within his control, or
(b)the circumstances that prevented his compliance were not reasonably foreseeable by him.
In a practical sense, therefore, if he has not failed to comply with the terms of the agreement or if any failure was something that he could not reasonably have done anything about, then he is safe from otherwise having to satisfy the Employment Secretary under s 45(5)(b) of the ES Act.
It does not follow that, if he has failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, and either that failure was within his control or that the circumstances that prevented compliance were reasonably foreseeable by him, then necessarily he will not satisfy the Employment Secretary that he is taking reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement. Section 45(6) of the ES Act is not expressed to be a definition of the circumstances in which there will be the taking of reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement. It could have done so, but it does not. It operates only to prescribe circumstances where a person will be taking such steps.
Consequently, only if a person falls under s 45(6) will the operation of s 45(5)(b) arise and then the quality of the conduct of the respondent, or the person in receipt of Newstart allowance, will need to be considered in relation to it. …”
I should say that with respect to his Honour I do not agree with the last two paragraphs. It seems to me that s 45(6) is expressed to be a definition of the circumstances in which there will be the taking of reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement and s 45(5)(b) does not raise an independent question. I should however say that I do not think it matters in the present case. Whether or not s 45(5)(b) operates independently of s 45(6) and in primacy to it, it is clear enough that it is necessary to consider the terms of s 45(6).
Natural justice requires that where it is suggested that a job seeker has failed to comply with the terms of the agreement that job seeker should be made aware of what precise terms of the agreement it is said have not been complied with. At various stages of the present dispute three matters have been suggested to involve non-compliance with the agreement. The first is said to be Mr Garnys’ failure to attend the interview. The second was the inappropriate completion of the application form. The third might be said to be the failure on Mr Garnys’ part to do everything he could to get a job. The Tribunal appears to have proceeded on the basis that it was the first of these. I should not be seen to be suggesting that more than one breach could not be relied upon. However, here the relevant breach is said by the Tribunal to involve the failure to attend the Franklins interview. That is related back to the agreement by Mr Garnys to apply for all positions “where appropriate”. It would be possible to argue and indeed Mr Garnys does argue that he did in fact apply for the position with Franklins, albeit that he did not attend the interview. Certainly the Tribunal equated non-attendance of the interview with non-application for the position. Given the consequences of action which could lead to a job seeker being destitute there is much to be said for the view that language in an agreement such as this should be strictly construed. But there is another problem in any event. Mr Garnys obligation is not to apply for any position at all. It is to apply for positions “where appropriate”. An initial question arose for decision before the Tribunal could find Mr Garnys in breach. That was whether a person with dermatitis who could not touch food was an appropriate person for a job with a company selling food stuffs. This simply is a matter which was not addressed at all by the Tribunal.
Notwithstanding that the breach relied upon was not the failure to fill out the application form the Tribunal appears to have regarded the failure to fill out the application form as having some relevance. That this is so must follow from the fact that the Tribunal pointed out that it was mindful of the submission that the form was inadequately completed, reflecting “a disinterest” (presumably lack of interest was what was meant) in being employed. That involves the Tribunal taking into account what seems to be a wholly irrelevant factor if it did so in considering the matters arising under s 45(6).
Once the relevant failure to comply with the terms of the agreement have been identified, the next question to be considered is whether the case is one falling within paragraphs (a) or (b) of s 45(6).
Paragraph (a) requires the decision maker to consider the main reason for failing to comply with the agreement and determine whether that main reason involved a matter within the person’s control. Probably the words “if any” have to be read after the words “main reason” to make sense of the paragraph, at least in a case where there was no reason at all given for failing to comply. So it is incumbent upon the decision maker, in this case the Tribunal, to make a finding of fact as to what the main reason was for failing to comply with the agreement. In the present case that means the Tribunal had to identify what the main reason was for Mr Garnys failing to apply for jobs assuming he did in fact fail to apply for jobs which were appropriate. It was Mr Garnys’ case of course that the main reason so to do involved the medical reason. Assuming this to be the reason identified (and the Tribunal’s reasoning does not identify any) it would be necessary to decide whether that was a matter within his control; clearly it would not have been. If on the other hand the reason which the Tribunal identifies is merely that Mr Garnys did not want to wait around, then naturally enough that is a matter that is within his control. What is important here is that there is an obligation upon the Tribunal, it is a statutory obligation, to make findings of material questions of fact and to give reasons. Here the relevant finding of main reason is absent. Rather the Tribunal rolls it all up in a conclusion that the main reason was within his control without ever identifying what it was.
If it is necessary to turn to paragraph (b) then the Tribunal would need to find what if any circumstances prevented the job seeker from complying with the agreement. Having identified those circumstances, the Tribunal then has to find whether they were reasonably foreseeable. Strangely here the Tribunal has not identified any circumstances preventing Mr Garnys from complying although it has said that everything was foreseeable. If the factual findings involved a conclusion that Mr Garnys merely did not want to attend because he was a malingerer then there would be no circumstances which prevented him from complying and the Tribunal should say so. Once this is the case it is unnecessary to consider further whether anything was reasonably foreseeable. If on the other hand some circumstance did prevent him from complying then it is for the Tribunal to consider further whether those particular circumstances which it identifies were reasonably foreseeable.
If Ferguson is right, it may well be that independently the Tribunal is required to consider separately whether Mr Garnys took reasonable steps to comply with the terms of the agreement, without reference to s 45(6). As I have already indicated, I do not think this is the correct interpretation. If it is, then no doubt the Tribunal will be required to make that assessment, make findings of fact and give reasons for them.
Mr Garnys’ written submissions
As already noted Mr Garnys was afforded the opportunity to make further written submissions. This he did. In summary these were:
1.The Tribunal did not determine whether he had failed to comply with the terms of the case management agreement, ie to report to the matching team once a week and to apply for all positions as appropriate.
2.He was not required by his case management agreement to attend interviews.
3.The requirement in the case management agreement to “do everything I can to get a job” is too vague and ambiguous. Associated with that submission is the submission that the agreement should be construed strictly, resolving ambiguity in favour of the unemployed person.
4.The Tribunal erred in taking account of the evidence of the case manager, Mr Besser.
5.Presumably in elaboration of the fourth submission, as the case management agreement had not been signed until 1 May 1996, no matter before that date could be taken into account to determine failure to comply or other relevant matters.
The first three of these submissions, to the extent that I understand them turn, probably on the distinction between failing to attend an interview and the case management provision of failure to apply for all positions as appropriate, or the more general provision, failure to do everything to get a job. Clearly the latter clause, wide as it is, is not unenforceable. The fact that there may in some situations be questions whether particular conduct constitutes failure to do everything to get a job, does not result in the conclusion that such a clause, if relied upon by those asserting breach, is to be treated as if it is not there. I have already suggested that there may be a difficulty in relying merely upon the failure to apply on the present facts, although there may be said to be a constructive failure to do so. There is no particular reason why the Tribunal could not rely upon the more general language, at least if Mr Garnys had notice that that was the case he had to meet.
It is difficult for me to understand the fourth ground except by reference to the fifth ground. The Tribunal is entitled to take into account any evidence of relevance. However, I agree with Mr Garnys that it would be an error for the Tribunal to determine, if it did, that steps taken before the signing of the case management agreement were relevant in deciding whether he had breached that agreement. I do not, however, read the Tribunal as having done that. To the extent that the submission is intended to say that the Tribunal could not take matters into account before that date in looking at his general attitude, I see no reason why they could not if relevancy of those matters was established. I do not think in the present case that the Tribunal’s reasons should be treated as having done so on the critical questions at least.
However, for the reasons I have already given, I am of the view that the Tribunal’s decision is erroneous as a matter of law and should be set aside. The matter should be remitted to the Tribunal with or without the admission of further evidence for decision in accordance with law. In so doing the Tribunal will consider the issues it is required to consider and make findings on relevant facts. The Respondent Minister should pay any costs of Mr Garnys, to the extent that any were incurred.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Hill. Associate:
Dated: 25 June 1999
The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 30 April 1999 Date of Judgment: 25 June 1999
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