Gardner v National Netball League - [2001] FMCA 50

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TRUDY GARDNER v NATIONAL NETBALL LEAGUE PTY LTD
[2001] FMCA 50

HUMAN RIGHTS – Netball player – pregnancy – health risks to unborn child – injunction to prevent ban on pregnant player participating in netball – Sex Discrimination Act 1984
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interim Injunction – balance of convenience – whether damages sufficient remedy – status quo – s 46PP Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986
EVIDENCE – non expert evidence – hearsay – whether “technicalities” –
s 46 PR Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986

Applicant:

TRUDY GARDNER

Respondent:

NATIONAL NETBALL LEAGUE PTY LTD

File No:

AZ148 of 2001

Delivered on:

18 July 2001

Delivered at:

Melbourne

Hearing Date:

18 July 2001

Judgment of:

McInnis FM

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr P J Day

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Finlaysons (Adelaide)

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr S Price

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Corrs Chambers Westgarth (Sydney)

ORDERS

All times be abridged to enable the application to be determined this day.
Pursuant to section 46PP of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 the respondent is restrained from imposing a ban or any other limitation such as to prevent the applicant from competing in the National Netball League for reasons related to her pregnancy or to impose any disciplinary action to punish the applicant from so playing until the close of the current netball season on 11 August 2001 and pending the determination of her complaint lodged with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission on 2 July 2001 alleging a breach of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
The applicant’s costs of the application be paid by the respondent to be taxed in default of agreement.
I direct that the reasons for this decision be transcribed and upon review should constitute my reasons for judgment.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

AZ 148 of 2001

TRUDY GARDNER

Applicant

And

NATIONAL NETBALL LEAGUE PTY LTD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Extempore

This is an application by Trudy Gardner, the applicant against the National Netball League Pty Ltd, where the applicant seeks an interim injunction pursuant to section 46PP of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 to maintain her rights pending resolution of her complaint lodged with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission on 2 July 2001.
The application was filed on 17 July 2001 and this hearing is being conducted pursuant to division 5 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 by video-link from Melbourne with Mr Day appearing for the applicant in Adelaide and Mr Price for the respondent in Sydney.
The claim for interim relief seeks orders based upon accompanying affidavits which seek first of all an order abridging time for service of the proceedings, and secondly, seeks an order as follows:
“An order in the nature of an interim injunction pursuant to section 46PP of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cwlth) to prevent the respondent from imposing a ban or any other limitation such as to prevent the applicant from competing in the National Netball League for reasons related to her pregnancy or to impose any disciplinary action to punish the applicant from so playing until the close of the current netball season on 11 August 2001 and pending the determination of her complaint lodged with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission on 2 July 2001 alleging a breach of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cwlth).”
The application further seeks costs and such other orders as the court deems fit.
The applicant has indicated through her counsel that there are in fact four matches remaining in the netball season conducted by the respondent. There are matches scheduled for 20 July, 27 July, 6 August and 11 August. To that extent there is therefore a degree of urgency in this matter and hence I have been prepared to deliver this decision soon after the close of submissions.
It is not for this court on an application for interim relief to make a final decision concerning the merits of any claim the applicant may have before the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. Once a claim is lodged before that commission it will ultimately be the responsibility of the commission to assess that claim after due investigation and consideration of all the material before it. It would only be after termination of the complaint before the commission that this court or the Federal Court may have jurisdiction to hear an application by the applicant.
The present application, however, is pursuant to section 46PP of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 which provides:
“(1)At any time after a complaint is lodged with the Commission, the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court may grant an interim injunction to maintain,
(a) the status quo, as it existed immediately before the complaint was lodged or,
(b) the rights of any complainant, respondent or affected person.
(2)The application for the injunction may be made by the Commission, a complainant, a respondent or an affected person.”
It is relevant in referring to that section that I also add subsection (5) which reads:
“The court concerned cannot, as a condition of granting the interim injunction, require a person to give an undertaking as to damages.”
The key words in the section that I have just read are that the court may grant an interim injunction to “maintain the status quo” and I emphasise “as it existed immediately before the complaint was lodged” or, and again I emphasise these words, "the rights of any respondent".
Hence the task for this court is not an easy one because clearly there is a duty to look at the background information, the evidence presented, to determine what the status quo is, whether it should be preserved by the granting of an interim injunction, and to also have regard to the rights of a respondent.
By way of background it's noted that the complaint to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission was lodged on 2 July 2001. Hence the status quo that I should look at is the status quo which had been in place prior to the lodging of that complaint. To that extent I rely upon and refer to the evidence before this court, and in particular the affidavit of the applicant Trudy Gardner. Ms Gardner is a 28-year-old sports person and sales representative. She is 15 weeks pregnant and she has indicated in her affidavit that she has pursued the activity of netball for a number of years. For the purpose of the present application it is suffice to note that she has been an active participant in the national netball competition which is conducted by the respondent.
The applicant has been, in fact still is, the captain of a netball team known as the `Adelaide Ravens’. That team, it is said in the affidavit of the applicant, competes in the National Netball League and that league is administered by the All-Australian Netball Association Ltd which is a national association. The South Australian Netball Association is an affiliate of the national association and through that affiliation is entitled to enter the team in the national league.
It is said by the applicant that she has an agreement with the South Australian Netball Association for the period 16 October 2000 up to and including 31 August 2001. That agreement has been the subject of an exhibit which has been attached to an affidavit of Pamela Smith sworn 17 July 2001 which has been filed and served on behalf of the respondent.
I note in that agreement that there are certain terms and conditions which apply to the applicant. In the recitals to that agreement it is indicated that the National Netball League Pty Ltd administers a national netball competition known as the National Netball League. After that recital the agreement provides in the player obligations, part (b) in the operative parts of the agreement, the following:
“(1) The Player agrees to abide by the rules of the Competition insofar as the Rules are directly related to the Player (as amended from time to time) and acknowledges those rules had been made available to her prior to signing this Agreement.
(2) The Player agrees to strive for peak fitness, skills and performance. Illness or injury which may interfere with this shall be handled directly with the Team's coach. The Player shall, where physically possible, participate in the full training program set out by the Team's coach and be subject to reasonable assessment paid for and nominated by the Member organisation in relation to maintaining first class athletic condition”.
Pregnancy is not an illness. It is not suggested in the present case that the applicant has been unable to comply with paragraph (2) of the player obligations to which I have referred.
In the affidavit of the applicant she suggests in paragraph 8 that she learnt that she was pregnant on 8 May 2001. She consulted a general practitioner on that day. She discussed her plan to continue playing netball during the early stages of her pregnancy and her general practitioner did not advise against continuing to play in the national league. The applicant states that she was referred to an obstetrician, Dr John Svigos, whom she consulted in late May 2001. Dr Svigos advised that there was no medical reason stated that would prevent the applicant from continuing to play netball.
The applicant, in her affidavit, further states that it was on the basis of that advice that she continued playing netball with the team and that the last game she played in the national league was on 1 June 2001. No games were scheduled, and this is common ground, between

2 June and 29 June 2001. There was apparently a break in the season whilst an international netball series was being conducted.
It is said that on or about 17 June 2001 the national association imposed an interim ban so as to prevent pregnant women from playing in the national league. I take it that that interim ban, although the document itself was not produced by either party, was a ban placed upon those women wishing to participate in the national league who were pregnant and it was a ban which operated from the date of its notification.
In any event, although it has not been provided to the court, I assume that it is a rule change which was envisaged by the agreement to which I have referred earlier. That issue is not one which is agitated before me. It is sufficient for the purpose of this application to simply note that on or about 17 June 2001 an interim ban was imposed.
The applicant indicates that she first became aware of that ban from media reports. She was not formally advised of the ban until Wednesday, 27 June, 2001. It was on that day the president of her team gave her a copy of an email which she had received from the national association about the interim ban. She then advised the president of the team on Friday, 29 June 2001, that she was pregnant and sought advice about that interim ban. The advice she received was that because of the ban she should not play the game that evening against another team apparently called `Adelaide Thunderbirds’.
The applicant gave evidence before this court and adopted the affidavit to which I have referred. In her evidence and in her affidavit she indicated that she was distressed and distraught by the imposition of the ban; that she was often teary, and found it very difficult to be able to not travel with and play with her team-mates. She states that if it was not for the interim ban she would not have announced her pregnancy at the time. In the affidavit the applicant further states that this was a planned pregnancy, the timing of which was intended to coincide with the break between the 2001 and 2002 seasons. The Applicant states in her Affidavit:-
“Having regard to the medical advice that I had there was no reason that I could not continue to participate in the national competition until the last game of the season which, excluding finals, was scheduled for 11 August 2001”.
The applicant states that as a consequence of the interim ban she had to announce her pregnancy earlier than she wanted to do and the pregnancy had been reported extensively by the media. As a consequence of the ban the applicant has had to stand down from her position as captain and player with the team. The ban has prevented her from pursuing her sporting career and it is asserted by the applicant, though there is no evidence to corroborate this, that the ban has had a negative impact upon her team. As a consequence of not being able to play in the national league it is claimed by the applicant that she has suffered a loss of income and sponsorship and those losses will continue if the interim ban continues.
It is common ground that the applicant receives payments in terms of her sporting performance. The payments are what can only be described as modest amounts, of something in the order of $140 per game. The applicant gave evidence that in addition to that money she is also eligible to receive payments by way of sponsorships from two sponsors. Money is not available, however, on the evidence of the applicant, until the end of the season. The applicant conceded that she may have a legal entitlement to money from the two sponsors but was reluctant to seek payment of that amount in the circumstances where, as a consequence of the ban, she is unable to discharge her obligations and play in the team for the rest of the season.
In this matter the issues that are before the court are issues which are common to applications for interim injunctive relief. The essential issues which have been addressed ably by both counsel are that the court must look at whether there is an arguable case, consider the balance of convenience, and also take into account whether or not damages might be sufficient as an alternative to granting what is considered to be significant relief. There can be no doubt that the granting of an interim injunction will inevitably affect the rights, either adversely or favourably, of both parties depending on the outcome. The court is very conscious therefore of its duty to both parties to consider properly the material on an interim application even though it is conceded by representatives of both parties that the material before the court is necessarily less than fulsome and certainly less than what might be placed before the court on a contested trial.
On behalf of the applicant it was submitted that the balance of convenience clearly favours his client and that she should be permitted to play and the status quo preserved. In making that submission he relies upon the medical assessment of the applicant's treating obstetrician and relies upon the applicant's affidavit evidence and evidence before this court. It should be noted at the outset that the respondent quite properly conceded that there is an arguable case and to that extent the court is not required as it might in other cases to look in detail at the merits of the claim yet to be decided before the commission arising out of the Sex Discrimination Act.
The respondent, however, submits that this is not simply just about the applicant being able to play or continue playing in a contact sport. It is rather about the applicant being allowed in her pregnant state to participate at elite sporting level in a competition that is organised on a national basis. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the respondent has no desire to ban players from playing but has taken what I interpret to be a responsible view as to the potential risks of injury both to the applicant and to the unborn child. It was said on behalf of the respondent that risks might be associated with direct injury which could in turn affect the unborn child, risks of injury to the applicant which might result in her requiring x-rays or analgesic treatment, any and all of which might lead to quite dire consequences including death, birth defects and brain damage to the unborn child. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the respondent.
By way of an alternative submission it was put to the court by counsel for the respondent that in any event the financial payments involved in this sport to this applicant are not particularly significant and that damages would suffice and on that basis I should not be inclined to grant an interim injunction.
It is appropriate to look at those submissions in the light of the evidence that has been provided to this court on behalf of both parties.
The applicant relied heavily upon the evidence of Dr John Michael Svigos, an obstetrician and gynaecologist, who adopted an affidavit which he had sworn on 17 July 2001. Dr Svigos was also made available at the request of the respondent for the purpose of cross-examination.
There is no doubt, and indeed, no challenge made at all to the qualifications of Dr Svigos. A brief perusal of the affidavit which has been filed and relied upon by the applicant clearly indicates that Dr Svigos is a well-qualified and eminent obstetrician and gynaecologist. In his affidavit it is appropriate to refer to those matters which specifically relate, not just to the applicant, but also to the sport which she seeks to pursue and which she believes on the material before me including advice from Dr Svigos, that she should be allowed to pursue unfettered her netball career at least until the end of the current season.
In his affidavit Dr Svigos says that he commenced his treatment of the applicant in May 2001 following a referral from her treating general practitioner for a standard initial consultation. He states:
“7...At the time of my first examination of the applicant I noted that she was eight weeks into her pregnancy. She is now fifteen weeks into her pregnancy.
8.The applicant's pregnancy is proceeding in accordance with routine expectations. All tests and examinations conducted as part of standard procedure have produced normal and expected results.
9.From my examination and treatment of the applicant I have detected nothing to suggest that she is experiencing anything other than a normal first pregnancy.
10.In the first twenty weeks of pregnancy the uterus may be described as a very muscular organ which provides extensive protection of the foetus from external injury.
11.In my opinion and experience the possibility of external force, short of a significant penetrating injury, damaging the unborn foetus within the first 20 weeks of a normal pregnancy is remote.
12.The normal contact expected through playing netball at an elite level should not be deleterious to the unborn foetus or the applicant.
13.I base my conclusion on both my extensive study and knowledge of the physiology and anatomy of pregnancy, particularly within the first twenty weeks of a pregnancy term, together with my experience of treating several other elite netball players who maintained their involvement in playing at the highest levels within the sport during their pregnancy as well as elite basketball players also playing at the highest levels of their chosen sport during the course of their pregnancy.
14.As the applicant's treating Obstetrician I would not place any restrictions upon her in terms of her engagement in the physical activity, and in particular, the pursuit of her netball career at an elite level.”
The doctor goes on in his affidavit to state:
“15.In my experience it is not unusual for players at an elite level of sport to cease their involvement at an elite level after twenty weeks of their pregnancy. However, this has generally in my experience been attributable to the impact of the developing pregnancy on the mother's speed and endurance level rather than an increased risk of harm to the unborn foetus through contact. Such risks do not develop until approximately 28 weeks into the term of the pregnancy.”

During the course of his evidence the doctor elaborated on those matters to which I have referred and seemed to suggest that after 20 weeks it will be appropriate for the situation to be assessed again and that he would expect in the course of the normal doctor, patient relationship. If he had reservations about the applicant continuing in the sport at that stage, then she would abide by his advice and cease playing. In the same affidavit Dr Svigos states:
“21.My specialty is particularly alert to and focused upon the promulgation of any data that identifies potential risks to either a mother or unborn foetus during the course of pregnancy. There has been no information disseminated from the RANZCOG or the AMA to suggest that there are any risks associated with a pregnant woman's participation in playing netball.”
He goes on to say:
“22.To my knowledge the only risks associated with this activity are those risks that apply to all pregnant females as described herein and which are in my opinion remote and not impacted upon by engaging in this sport.”
Dr Svigos concludes his affidavit by saying:
“23.I have no hesitation in concluding that the applicant is fit to play netball at an elite level and would encourage that pursuit up to a point of approximately 20 weeks into her term of pregnancy.”
The respondent before this court relied upon an affidavit sworn by Pamela Smith on 17 July 2001. Pamela Smith is the national executive director of the All Australia Netball Association Ltd and has held that position since 1990. In her affidavit she refers to the affidavits of the applicant and Dr Svigos to which I have already referred.
After referring to the payments made to the applicant and exhibiting the agreement to which I referred earlier in this judgment Pamela Smith attaches further documents. The first of those documents is attachment B which is a letter dated 21 June 2001 from Murray Smith, senior lecturer in anatomy at the University of New South Wales.
It should be stressed that although I am referring to these documents I do note the objection by counsel for the applicant to reference to parts of the affidavit and the attachments on the grounds that to do so would be to rely upon hearsay material and/or rely upon material which has been used in this case by Ms Smith to advance opinions of an expert nature when she is in fact not an expert.
It is noted that section 46PR of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Legislation which provides that the court should not be bound by technicalities and specifically states:
“46PRIn proceedings under this Division, the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court are not bound by technicalities or legal forms. This section has effect subject to Chapter III of the Constitution”.
To the extent that this is an interim application, and having regard to the section to which I have referred, I am prepared to at least receive, and to some extent rely upon the material, set out in the Smith affidavit. However, it is no mere technicality to seek to assert that a lay witness is able to offer expert opinion. It is also no mere technicality to suggest that reliance can be placed upon hearsay evidence. However, in relation to the latter complaint I am prepared to accept that there are opinions expressed in those attachments of a medical or quasi medical nature which may have relevance in terms of whether I should, on the balance of convenience, allow an interim injunction to be granted.
It is in the context of that consideration of the evidentiary value of the material that I now refer to attachment B. As I indicated, attachment B is a letter dated 21 June 2001 from Mr Murray Smith, senior lecturer in anatomy. The letter reads in part:
“I read with interest the fact that your association proposes to ban pregnant women from playing netball. As a researcher in the field of the origins of birth defects with my colleagues Emeritus Professor Marshall Edwards, Professor Kohei Shioto (Kyoto, Japan), and the late Dr David Walsh, you may be aiming at the wrong period of pregnancy.”
The author goes on to talk about a study which has been undertaken in relation to the effects of hyperthermia, heat stress, on mammalian embryos for over 30 years and compared the results against 40,000 human embryos and early foetuses held at the Congenital Anomaly Research Centre in Kyoto. He said:
“We found that a temperature rise of 2.5º C and above for 30 minutes at precise times in the first 8 weeks of pregnancy can cause brain and neural tube defects, spontaneous abortions and probably deleterious heart defects. Most of these are aborted.”
He includes a review paper which is before this court. In the review paper at page 413, I was taken by counsel to the respondent to the following passage:
“Schafer addressed the possibility of embryonic damage due to marathon running citing data that the rectal temperature can rise above 39.4ºC and could even reach 41.9º C during marathon races in elite athletes. In recent times `fun’ runs of 8 to 14 kms have become very popular and in these events hyperthermia is possible in women who might not be aware that they are in the early stages of pregnancy and are not necessarily elite athletes.”
When I was referred to this material by the representative of the respondent it was said that any suggestion of the applicant being involved in a fun run would not be valid; that this was a participation by the applicant in an elite sport at a national level. It was conceded obviously that this is not comparable to marathon running. The applicant's counsel, however, by way of response, indicated and I accept that I should not have regard to this material as it is irrelevant because it focuses on the first eight weeks of pregnancy. He referred me back to the letter of Mr Murray Smith, and in particular the following paragraph where Mr Smith says:
“I do not advocate women stopping sport because of this only care. But as a mere male I believe that many women are not really aware of pregnancy until about 8 weeks. Fitness is important in the latter months of pregnancy.”
It is not clear to me that that passage is meant to or intended to be an expert opinion. Nevertheless it seems to be common ground that many women are not really aware of pregnancy until about eight weeks and that certainly in the present case seems to be the case on the chronology to which I have just referred.
In addition to attachment `B’ I was referred during the course of submissions to a document which is attachment C. That is a document which is entitled “Guideline One, Participation of the Pregnant Athlete in Contact and Collision Sports”. It was suggested that I should look at the changes that might occur and the problems which might arise from contact sports. It seems to me to be common ground that in the present case netball is regarded as a contact rather than a collision sport and reading the guideline in that context it is significant to note that in the introduction the authors state:
“Female athletes are increasingly seeking to continue participation in sporting activities including contact/collision sports throughout pregnancy. Maternal and foetal responses to exercise may vary with pregestational maternal fitness level, co-existing medical conditions, or pregnancy complications. For these reasons exercise counselling to the pregnant sportswoman must be done on an individual basis. These guidelines are intended to provide recommendations to the pregnant athlete, sporting organisations and medical community on safe participation in contact and collision sports during pregnancy.”
I was taken to page 4 of that document where the authors significantly state under the subheading `Limited Contact Sports’:
“In limited contact sports contact may occur minimally, (either legally or illegally), or there is a small a risk of falls or contact with a projectile, (eg, netball, touch football, racquet sports).If the pregnancy is progressing normally these sports are suitable during the first trimester. Ongoing consultation with the Physician or Obstetrician may make sporting participation in this group of sports possible into the second trimester.” (emphasis added)

In addition to the material which was attached to the affidavit by Pamela Smith there were extracts from newspaper articles. I read those newspaper articles and they would appear to contain references by persons without expertise to those matters and in my view do not outweigh or indeed should not outweigh the other material before this court. To that extent I did not place much, if any, weight on those articles in the newspapers at all.
In dealing with the issue of the balance of convenience, apart from the issue of medical risk which has been put forcefully and strongly by counsel for the respondent, it was also submitted that I should have regard to the right of the respondent to seek to impose the interim ban. It was put to the court that if the respondent's interim ban is not permitted to apply to this applicant then the respondent may be criticised for a lack of due diligence having regard to what it perceives is the risks of allowing pregnant women to continue playing netball at an elite level. It was put that it would also subject the respondent to a potential risk of more claims either by the pregnant mother or unborn infant.
In response to that assertion counsel for the applicant has indicated to this court that in the circumstances if the court were to accede to an application for an interim injunction it is difficult to see how the respondent could be then held liable when all that would have happened is that its interim ban in this particular case has not been applied pending the outcome of a complaint to the Human Rights Commission.
It seems obvious to me from the material to which I have referred including the decision by the respondent to impose the interim ban that there has been very little, if any, consideration given to the implications of the Sex Discrimination Act, and indeed, beyond a general ban very little consideration being given to the guides to which I have referred in the medical evidence which has been provided.
A sensible approach should be adopted on an individual basis by pregnant women to determine whether in truth and in fact it is safe and sound or them to continue participating in elite sport.
It was further submitted to the court that in this case as I have indicated damages would suffice. I reject that submission. In my view this is not a case which is simply about damages. I accept the evidence of the applicant that she has a genuine desire to play with her team for the rest of the season. This is the team she has captained throughout the season. It is a team she planned to play with for the duration of the season and she went to the trouble indeed of planning her pregnancy to accommodate that desire. It was only in the middle of the season that a rule was sought to be imposed by way of an interim ban which would prevent the applicant from fulfilling her plan to conclude this season as captain of her team.
In the circumstances the more difficult issue for this court to determine when considering the balance of convenience are the risks that have been suggested by the respondent in terms of medical consequences, either to the applicant or the unborn child, if the applicant were to continue playing netball to the conclusion of the season. On balance I have decided that in the circumstances I prefer the evidence of the medical practitioner currently treating the applicant, that is, Dr John Michael Svigos. He impressed me as not only a well-qualified witness but a witness who, as treating obstetrician for the applicant, has had the opportunity of examining the applicant, has had the opportunity of considering the nature of the activity the applicant is engaged in at an elite level, and to that extent his opinion, both from an expert point of view and as a treating doctor's point of view is to be preferred over and above the other material to which I have referred and which was annexed to the affidavit of Pamela Smith.
In the circumstances it seems to me that the risks suggested by the respondent are not substantiated by the medical evidence before this court. They are understandable but in my view exaggerated. I am satisfied that the better evidence and opinion is that offered by Dr Svigos.
I conclude that on the balance of convenience it is appropriate that I should grant the interim injunction. I should also add that it is important in a case of this kind to note that subsection (5) of section 46PP does preclude this court from seeking an undertaking as to damages. Hence even if I were minded to consider that this was a matter which could be resolved by damages only, as I have indicated I am not so minded, I would still hesitate, having regard to the restrictions placed upon the court by subsection (5).
I conclude that in this case the applicant is a fit, active sportswoman able to compete at an elite level in the sport of her choosing. Her pregnancy as I have indicated is not an illness and at this stage does not provide a sufficient basis on medical grounds which would justify a restriction on her participation in netball. She should in my view be able to continue to the end of the season having regard to the advice that she has sensibly received from her treating obstetrician, and indeed, the advice she will continue to receive between now and the end of the season.
Accordingly, I propose making the following orders. I order:
(1)All times be abridged to enable the application to be determined this day.
(2)Pursuant to Section 46PP of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 the respondent is restrained from imposing a ban or any other limitation such as to prevent the applicant from competing in the National Netball League for reasons related to her pregnancy or to impose any disciplinary action to punish the applicant from so playing until the close of the current netball season on 11 August 2001 and pending the determination of her complaint lodged with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission on 2 July 2001 alleging a breach of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
(3)The applicant’s costs of the application be paid by the respondent to be taxed in default of agreement.
(4)I direct that the reasons for this decision be transcribed and upon review should constitute my reasons for judgment.

I certify that the preceding fifty eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of McInnis FM

Associate:

Date: 23 July 2001