IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S132 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
JEAN BALHARRY GARCIA
Applicant
and
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BRENNAN CJ
TOOHEY J
GUMMOW J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON THURSDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1997, AT 11.22 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR L.J.W. AITKEN, for the applicant. (instructed by Minter Ellison)
MR B.C. OSLINGTON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.L. WILLIAMS, for the respondent. (instructed by Dibbs Crowther & Osborne)
MR JACKSON: Your Honours, the essence of the decision of the Court of Appeal in this case was that the view which had been expressed by Justice Dixon in Yerky v Jones was no longer applicable because of the Court’s decision in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Amadio. May we say five things about it in support of the application. The first thing is, your Honours, that one does not find such a suggestion in Amadio itself. Three of the majority Justices in Amadio and one of the minority referred to the earlier decision of Justice Cussen in Victoria in Bank of Victoria Ltd v Mueller - I will give your Honours the reference in just a moment - which was to the same effect as, and earlier than that of Sir Owen Dixon, without any suggestion of disapproval, if I can put it that way.
Your Honours, the references in that regard are Amadio 151 CLR 447, and your Honours will see, if I could go to page 463, about point 2 on the page, Justice Mason:
That the principle might justify the setting aside of a guarantee is established by -
and he refers to Bank of Victoria v Mueller. Your Honours will see Justice Deane at page 475 saying, halfway down the page:
Such a guarantee is properly to be viewed in the terms enunciated by Cussen J. in Bank of Victoria Ltd v Mueller:
Your Honours will see the reference at the end of the quotation to the guarantee being treated as voidable as between the husband and wife and your Honours will see the next paragraph of Justice Deane’s own reasons. His Honour’s reasons were agreed in by Justice Wilson, who was the third Judge. That appears at page 468. He does not deal with the specific issue. At page 486 one of the minority, who was Justice Dawson, at the first new paragraph on the page said:
Special considerations apply in cases where a husband procures his wife to become surety for his debt and the cases dealing with these circumstances may be put to one side.
He refers to the Victorian case. If I could just indicate to your Honours - and I will do so very briefly -…
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- Case
- [1997] HCATrans 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the bank had acted unconscionably in procuring Mrs Garcia's agreement to the guarantees. This required the court to determine if the bank had exploited a special disadvantage affecting Mrs Garcia, and whether the bank had actual or constructive knowledge of that disadvantage, such that it would be inequitable for the bank to rely on the guarantees.
The High Court found that the bank had not acted unconscionably. Their Honours applied the principles established in *Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio*, which require a party to demonstrate a special disadvantage, and that the stronger party knew or ought to have known of that disadvantage and taken unfair advantage of it. The court held that while Mrs Garcia may have been in a position of some vulnerability due to her reliance on her husband, this did not amount to a special disadvantage in the legal sense. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the bank had actual or constructive knowledge of any such disadvantage or that it had acted unfairly in its dealings with her. The bank had provided her with independent legal advice, and she had signed the documents voluntarily.
The appeal was dismissed.
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