GARBER and LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
[2018] WASAT 133
•12 DECEMBER 2018
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 2008 (WA)
CITATION: GARBER and LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2018] WASAT 133
MEMBER: JUDGE T SHARP, PRESIDENT (ACTING)
MR M SPILLANE (SENIOR MEMBER)
MS M CONNOR (MEMBER)
HEARD: 14 MARCH 2018, 15 MARCH 2018, 13 JUNE 2018 AND 8 AUGUST 2018
DELIVERED : 12 DECEMBER 2018
FILE NO/S: VR 52 of 2017
BETWEEN: JACK CRAIG GARBER
Applicant
AND
LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Catchwords:
Review - Refusal to issue and file compliance certificate in Supreme Court for admission to legal profession - Fit and proper person - Good fame and character
Legislation:
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 712(3)
Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2009 (WA)
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 8, s 8(1)(h)(iii), s 8(1)(i), s 21(2), s 22, s 26, s 26(2), s 30, s 31(1), s 31(2), s 31(3)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1), s 27(2), s 29(1)
Result:
Decision of Legal Practice Board affirmed
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | In Person |
| Respondent | : | A. Macknay |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | N/A |
| Respondent | : | MDS Legal |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Fair Work Ombudsman v Nerd Group Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FMCA 891
Frugtniet v Board of Examiners [2002] VSC 140
In Re Davis [1947] HCA 53; (1947) 75 CLR 409
Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Bachmann [2011] WASC 309
Mungar v Legal Practice Board of WA [2009] WASC 135
Re Stokes; Ex Parte Stokes [2008] WASC 269
Real Estate and Business Agents Supervisory Board v LJW [2011] WASCA 35
Skerritt v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 28
Zampatti v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASCA 149
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
The Supreme Court (Full Bench) may admit a person as a lawyer if, amongst other things, the Supreme Court (Full Bench) is satisfied that the person is eligible for admission to the legal profession and is a fit and proper person to be admitted. For those purposes, the Supreme Court (Full Bench) may rely on the advice of the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia (Board). That advice may be contained in a compliance certificate.
On 29 June 2016, the applicant, Mr Jack Craig Garber, lodged with the Supreme Court (Full Bench) a formal application under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (LP Act), for his admission to the legal profession.
On 30 June 2016, Mr Garber also lodged a notice of his application for admission with the Board.
Board's decision
The Board's decision as to Mr Garber's eligibility and fitness for admission is dated 23 February 2017. It is the decision under review. The Board considered the application of Mr Garber dated 29 June 2016 to be admitted to the legal profession, however, the Board was not satisfied that Mr Garber was a fit and proper person to be admitted. On that basis, the Board refused to give Mr Garber a compliance certificate.
As required under the LP Act, the Board gave an information notice to the Supreme Court and to Mr Garber about the refusal to give a compliance certificate, advising that the Board is:
•satisfied that Mr Garber is eligible for admission;
•not satisfied that Mr Garber is a fit and proper person to be admitted; and
•satisfied that the application is made in accordance with the admission rules.
Application to the Tribunal
On 21 March 2017 Mr Garber applied to the Tribunal for a review of the Board's decision to refuse to give Mr Garber a compliance certificate.
Legislative scheme
Legal Profession Act
Under s 26(1) of the LP Act, the Supreme Court may admit a person as a lawyer if the Supreme Court is satisfied, amongst other things, that the person 'is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession'. The Supreme Court may rely on the advice of the Board in determining this; s 26(2) of the LP Act.
Section 30 of the LP Act provides that the Board must advise the Supreme Court whether it considers that:
(a)an applicant is eligible for admission;
(b)an applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted; and
(c)the application is in accordance with the admission rules.
If the Board considers that the requirements of the LP Act are satisfied, it must advise the Supreme Court by filing a compliance certificate; s 31(1) of the LP Act. If the Board refuses to issue a compliance certificate, it must give the Supreme Court and the relevant applicant an information notice about the refusal; s 31(2) of the LP Act.
Section 22 of the LP Act requires the Supreme Court or the Board, when considering whether a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted, to consider each of the 'suitability matters' as defined in the LP Act and any other matters considered relevant.
Section 8 of the LP Act sets out the 'suitability matters' and provides as follows:
(1)Each of the following is a suitability matter in relation to an individual
(a)whether the person is currently of good fame and character;
(b)whether the person is or has been an insolvent under administration;
(c)whether the person has been convicted of an offence in Australia or a foreign country, and if so
(i)the nature of the offence; and
(ii)how long ago the offence was committed; and
(iii)the person's age when the offence was committed;
(d)whether the person has engaged in legal practice in Australia
(i)unlawfully; or
(ii)when not admitted, or not holding a practising certificate, as required under this Act or a previous law of this jurisdiction that corresponds to this Act or under a corresponding law; or
(iii)if holding an Australian practising certificate, in contravention of a condition of the certificate or while the certificate was suspended;
(e)whether the person has practised law in a foreign country
(i)when not permitted under a law of that country to do so; or
(ii)if permitted to do so, in contravention of a condition applicable to the permission;
(f)whether the person is currently subject to an unresolved complaint, investigation, charge or order under any of the following
(i)this Act or a previous Act;
(ii)a corresponding law or corresponding foreign law;
(g)whether the person
(i)is the subject of current disciplinary action, however expressed, in another profession or occupation in Australia or a foreign country; or
(ii)has been the subject of disciplinary action, however expressed, relating to another profession or occupation that involved a finding of guilt;
(h)whether the person's name has been removed from
(i)the local roll, and has not since been restored to or entered on a local roll; or
(ii)an interstate roll, and has not since been restored to or entered on an interstate roll; or
(iii)a foreign roll;
(i)whether the person's right to engage in legal practice has been suspended or cancelled in Australia or a foreign country;
(j)whether the person has contravened, in Australia or a foreign country, a law about trust money or trust accounts;
(k)whether, under this Act, a previous Act, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, a supervisor, manager or receiver, however described, is or has been appointed in relation to any legal practice engaged in by the person;
(l)whether the person is or has been subject to an order under this Act, a previous Act, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, disqualifying the applicant from being employed by, or a partner of, an Australian legal practitioner or from managing a corporation that is an incorporated legal practice;
(m)whether the person is currently unable to carry out the inherent requirements of practice as an Australian legal practitioner.
(2)A matter mentioned in subsection (1) is a suitability matter even if it happened before the commencement of this section.
Section 31(3) of the LP Act provides in the following terms for a review by the State Administrative Tribunal:
An applicant may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of a decision of the Board to refuse to give the applicant a compliance certificate.
State Administrative Tribunal Act
Under s 27(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), a hearing in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction is a hearing de novo. The Tribunal is to consider afresh all of the facts and circumstances and make a decision on the merits of the case; Zampatti v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASCA 149 at [62].
Section 27(2) of the SAT Act provides that the purpose of the review is 'to produce the correct and preferable decision at the time of the decision upon review'.
When dealing with a matter in its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal has the functions and discretions corresponding to those exercisable by the decision-maker; s 29(1) of the SAT Act.
Proceedings in the Tribunal
After a number of directions hearings, the matter was listed for a mediation conference in the Tribunal on 7 April 2017, which did not achieve a resolution of the matter.
On 2 May 2017, orders were made by the Tribunal programming the proceedings to a hearing on 28 and 29 August 2017.
However, the hearing dates of 28 and 29 August 2017 were vacated and the proceedings were relisted for hearing on 19 and 20 December 2017. Consent orders were filed on 24 November 2017 and the hearing dates were again vacated.
On 22 November 2017, Mr Garber's solicitor wrote to the Board's solicitor advising that Mr Garber had been unable to comply with existing orders because he was having difficulty preparing and finalising his statement due to feelings of embarrassment arising from the historical matters.
Following the adjournments, extensions of time for compliance with deadlines, and the vacated hearing dates, at a directions hearing on 7 March 2018 the matter was reprogrammed to a final hearing. The final hearing was heard over the three dates of 14 and 15 March 2018 and 13 June 2018, with final oral submissions on 8 August 2018.
At the final hearing Mr Bryan Stokes, employer of Mr Garber, gave evidence, as did Mr Rodney Hooper SC, barrister and Dr Leonie Coxon, treating psychologist of Mr Garber.
Mr Garber also provided a number of witness statements to the Tribunal in support of his application, attesting to his character and contribution to the community. These witness statements were given by colleagues, employers, legal practitioners, a city councillor, a chartered accountant, the Dean of Law of the University of Western Australia and Members of Parliament, amongst others.
Facts
The facts set out below are those agreed between the parties. They are not controversial and the Tribunal makes the following findings of fact.
Mr Garber
Mr Garber was born in Denver, Colorado in 1953.
In 1981, Mr Garber commenced his legal studies. During his legal studies he clerked with a sole practitioner, Mr Michael London, in minor commercial matters and criminal defences cases (applicant's witness statement, Exhibit 26, para 15).
In 1983, Mr Garber obtained his Juris Doctorate from Western State University in the State of California in the United States of America. Mr Garber was admitted to practise in California in February 1984 at the age of thirty.
Following admission, Mr Garber continued working for Mr London.
In mid-1984 Mr Garber commenced work as General Counsel at Worldco Group Services, which specialised in tax advantaged investments (Exhibit 26, para 19).
Mr Garber found himself unemployed in 1986 'after the firm folded' (Exhibit 26, para 24).
In 1987, Mr Garber took over the personal injuries practice of a Ms Margaret Bannon (Exhibit 26, paras 29-30). Ms Bannon was suffering from ill health, and Mr Garber says that he took over the practice immediately, with no inperson handover and Ms Bannon's assistance was extremely limited (Exhibit 26, para 31).
Mr Garber accepted a role as Chief Executive Officer of a timeshare management company, and he worked in this role for sixteen months, in 1987 and 1988, in addition to working as a legal practitioner (Exhibit 26, paras 40-41).
Disbarment in California
The State Bar of California (State Bar) commenced investigating Mr Garber in 1988 and on 13 August 1990 Mr Garber was served with a notice to show cause, alleging thirteen counts of professional misconduct between the years 1986 to 1988.
On 18 September 1990, the State Bar filed an Application to Enter Default and the Office of Trial Counsel sent a letter of warning regarding involuntary inactive status of the State Bar to Mr Garber on 25 September 1990.
As Mr Garber did not respond to the notice, Mr Garber became an inactive member of the State Bar by order of the State Bar Court.
Mr Garber did not appear at the State Bar Court proceedings when the allegations of professional misconduct were heard on 15 November 1990.
The thirteen counts of alleged professional misconduct were in relation to separate incidents in respect of several clients and involved breaches of the Business and Professions Code of California and the Rules of Professional Conduct of California. The State Bar Court upheld twelve out of the thirteen counts.
Count one
The State Bar Court found that during the period September to December 1987 Mr Garber failed to return telephone calls to his client, failed to perform the legal services for which he was retained, and failed to refund fees paid by his clients where he had not performed the legal services for which he was retained.
Count two
The State Bar Court found that during the period November 1987 to March 1988 Mr Garber ceased communications with his client, failed to complete the legal services for which he was retained and instead moved his office without notifying the client.
Count three
The State Bar Court found that during the period December 1986 to January 1987 Mr Garber committed acts of dishonesty by issuing cheques on his bank account when he knew or should have known that the cheques would be dishonoured by the bank due to insufficient funds in the account, and Mr Garber by attempting to use his client's trust account to pay personal debts.
Count four
The State Bar Court found that during the period October 1987 to mid1988 Mr Garber committed acts of dishonesty by repeatedly making false representations to his client that a complaint had been filed on the client's behalf when it had not, Mr Garber withdrew from his retainer without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to his client, moved his office without notice and did not return the client's file despite request and that Mr Garber failed to refund upon request $1,000 in fees paid by his client as advanced fees, where he did not earn the fees since he did not perform the legal services for which he was retained.
Count five
The State Bar Court found that during the period August 1987 to June 1988, Mr Garber failed to keep his client reasonably informed of significant developments in the client's case, including the date of his client's deposition and the fact that his case had been dismissed. Mr Garber committed acts of dishonesty by making misrepresentations to his client and opposing counsel in order to cover up his misdeeds. He withdrew from his client's case, ceased to prosecute his client's case and moved office without notifying the client. He failed to perform the legal services for which he was retained.
Count six
The State Bar Court found that during the period August 1987 to November 1987 Mr Garber committed acts of dishonesty by instructing the secretary of a colleague (Mr Marshall) who shared office space with Mr Garber to draw a cheque on Mr Marshall's account to pay for Mr Garber's deposition expenses without his authorisation, and by instructing Mr Marshall's secretary to sign Mr Marshall's name without his authorisation.
Count seven
The State Bar Court found that during the period November 1987 to February 1988 Mr Garber committed acts of dishonesty by twice cashing cheques on his client trust account when the account did not contain sufficient funds.
Count eight
The State Bar Court found that during the period September 1987 to May 1988 Mr Garber improperly withdrew from his client's case as he moved his office without notice to the client and refused to take steps to avoid prejudice to the client's case.
Count nine
The State Bar Court found that during the period November 1987 to January 1988 Mr Garber committed acts of dishonesty by not informing his client the case had settled, by forging, or causing to be forged, his client's endorsement on the settlement cheques, by misappropriating the funds for his own use and by misrepresenting to the client that he had not received any money on her behalf when, in fact, he had then received two cheques totalling $5,000, and he failed to account to the client for the settlement funds received and he misappropriated funds received for the benefit of his client.
Count ten
The State Bar Court found that during the period October 1987 to May 1988 Mr Garber used his client trust account to pay his personal expenses.
Count eleven
The State Bar Court found that during the period January 1987 to April 1988 Mr Garber committed acts involving dishonesty by issuing several cheques on his client trust account when he knew or should have known that the account had insufficient funds.
Count twelve
Count twelve alleged that during the period April 1987 to May 1988 Mr Garber engaged in a deliberate scheme to avoid payments to his creditors. However, the State Bar Court found that this count was not made out.
Count thirteen
The State Bar Court found that Mr Garber failed to respond to and cooperate with the State Bar in the investigation of Counts one, two, five, six, seven, ten and eleven and he also failed to respond to numerous letters concerning these counts.
Further findings of the State Bar Court
Apart from the specific findings in respect of the thirteen counts outlined above, the State Bar Court made further findings including that Mr Garber's conduct was surrounded by bad faith and dishonesty (Counts three to seven and Count nine) and involved trust account violations (Counts three and Counts nine to eleven). Further, it was found that Mr Garber's misconduct caused significant harm to the relevant clients. He demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his misconduct and displayed a lack of candour and cooperation to any of the victims of his misconduct.
On 2 April 1991, the State Bar Court recommended Mr Garber be disbarred in California and, on 26 September 1991, an order was made by the Supreme Court of the State of California that Mr Garber, who was then 38 years old, be disbarred.
Move to Australia and Australian Citizenship
In June 1999, Mr Garber moved to Australia and on 19 March 2013 became an Australian citizen.
Extradition application
On 26 April 2000, Mr Garber was charged in the State of Colorado with embezzlement of funds belonging to a bankrupt estate.
On 31 July 2000, a warrant was issued for Mr Garber's arrest by the United States District Court of Colorado because Mr Garber had failed to appear in court to face the charges.
An application for extradition from Western Australia was heard in the Perth Magistrates Court and was ultimately dismissed on 23 May 2003. The reason for dismissal was that the material offered in support of the extradition application did not meet the requirements of the relevant legislation.
Fair Work Act proceedings
On 18 March 2010, the Fair Work Ombudsman instituted proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia against Nerd Group Australia Pty Ltd (Nerd Group) and Mr Garber as the sole director and secretary of Nerd Group. These proceedings arose as a result of Nerd Group's failure to comply with a notice requiring it to make available copies of records relating to the employment of Ms Tingka Lin. It was alleged that Ms Lin had not been paid for the last three weeks of her employment with Nerd Group.
The proceedings were then amended to include a similar allegation that Mr Craig Blackie had not been paid for the last week of his employment with Nerd Group and that Nerd Group and Mr Garber had also failed to provide records for Mr Blackie.
On 11 May 2012, the Federal Magistrates Court found that Nerd Group and Mr Garber had not established a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the notices and Nerd Group and Mr Garber had contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA).
The Federal Magistrates Court ordered that Nerd Group be wound up and Mr Garber was ordered to pay a penalty of $5,280 to the Commonwealth Consolidated Revenue Fund. The Federal Magistrates Court found that:
(a)Mr Garber engaged in conduct undermining the utility and effectiveness of the FWA;
(b)his course of conduct in failing to provide the records was serious, deliberate and ongoing;
(c)he adopted a course of conduct inconsistent with contrition;
(d)Mr Garber belligerently expressed threats of legal action directed to the Ombudsman;
(e)there was an almost complete lack of cooperation by Mr Garber with the Ombudsman;
(f)there was no evidence of corrective action being taken by Mr Garber; and
(g)Mr Garber did not evidence, at any stage, credible regret or a real willingness to facilitate the course of justice in the proceedings.
Nerd Group
As stated earlier, Mr Garber was the sole director and secretary of Nerd Group and had been the sole director and secretary since 6 November 2004. This registered company was ordered to be wound up by the Federal Court on 29 November 2011 due to insolvency.
Other business dealings
Mr Garber registered and held an Australian Business Number (ABN) up to 15 September 2015, but that ABN was cancelled on that date until 13 February 2017. In August 2017, Mr Garber successfully backdated his ABN registration to 15 September 2015.
Mr Garber conducted businesses under the ABN during this period, holding the registered names Nerd Shop, Hire a Nerd, Dial A Nerd and Dr Nerd and the unregistered names Nerds 4 Hire, Linq Internet Solutions, My Nerd, Verisafe and Rockwell Aviation.
Application for assessment of qualifications
On 12 July 2013, Mr Garber applied to the Board for assessment of his overseas qualifications. Mr Garber included a statutory declaration dated 12 July 2013, in which he stated that he was eligible for admission to the Californian Bar. He included with his application a resume in which he stated that he was a 'Judge Pro Tem panel' of the Beverly Hills Local Court from 1997 to 1999 and that he was engaged in legal practice from 1983 to 1989.
Mr Garber was asked by the Board for a copy of his certificate of admission in California and he informed the Board that due to the passage of time since he had practised in California he did not have one. On 5 August 2013, the Board issued an assessment statement to Mr Garber.
In 2015, Mr Garber completed a Graduate Diploma in Legal Practice at the University of Western Australia. In 2016, he completed the College of Law's Practical Legal Training.
On 29 June 2016, Mr Garber filed an application for admission to the legal profession. He lodged a notice of his application with the Board.
The notice to the Board included a statutory declaration from Mr Garber, attaching:
1)the order disbarring the applicant from practice in California;
2)the State Bar Court's reasons for the disbarment;
3)the decision in Fair Work Ombudsman v Nerd Group Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FMCA 891 (Fair Work and Nerd) imposing a penalty on Mr Garber for contraventions of s 712(3) of the FWA for failing to produce employment records;
4)a determination of eligibility for surrender under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth); and
5)character references in support of his application.
The Board sought further information from Mr Garber. In particular, the Board asked Mr Garber why he had not previously advised of his disbarment in California. Mr Garber advised the Board that the reference in his assessment application to being eligible for the State Bar was based on the fact that his recollection was that the State Bar of California's Code of Practice allowed for a disbarred practitioner to reapply after five years had elapsed.
Mr Hooper's file note
The Legal Profession Complaints Committee (LPCC) received a copy of a file note made by Mr Rodney Hooper SC dated 3 August 2015 and the LPCC sent this to the Board on 29 July 2016. The file note detailed Mr Hooper's concerns about the potential serious misconduct of Mr Bryan Stokes.
The file note also detailed that, in the meeting between Mr Garber and Mr Hooper, Mr Garber queried why Mr Stokes should seek advice about any serious misconduct or disclose conduct to the LPCC when a complaint had not been made to the LPCC. It contained Mr Hooper's conclusion that he was 'concerned about Mr Garber's ethical attitudes'.
Mr Garber's dealings with Mr Hooper related to a modification of a spousal maintenance application in the Family Court of Western Australia which was listed for trial on 13 July 2015. One of the parties to the matter was represented by Mr Stokes. Mr Garber stated that he was assisting Mr Stokes as a paralegal as part of his 'work study' to achieve the hours required for a practising certificate. Mr Hooper was retained by Mr Stokes as counsel (ts 6 and 7, 13 June 2018).
It is not in dispute that Mr Stokes and Mr Hooper had a fractious relationship (ts 13 and 14, 13 June 2018)
Mr Garber stated that part of the work that he was doing to assist Mr Stokes was the preparation of the Form 13 financial affidavit to be sworn by the client (ts 9, 13 June 2018).
On the day the matter was to be heard in the Family Court, Mr Stokes 'called in sick' and Mr Garber attended Court. The matter was then stood down for the purposes of negotiation. The matter subsequently settled on the basis that there would be a payment of $24,505 to Mr Stokes' client, on the understanding that neither Mr Hooper nor Mr Stokes would render any further fees, or in the case of Mr Hooper, any fees (ts 14, 13 June 2018).
When Mr Stokes learned of the outcome of the Family Court proceedings, he was said to be particularly upset that Mr Hooper had settled the matter on the basis that Mr Stokes' client would not be liable to pay Mr Stokes any more fees at all (ts 15, 13 June 2018).
On 31 July 2015, Mr Hooper sent a letter to Mr Stokes, a copy of which Mr Garber took with him when he was sent by Mr Stokes to meet Mr Hooper on 3 August 2015 at his office to discuss the issues that Mr Hooper raised (ts 16, 13 June 2018). The major concerns Mr Hooper had expressed in his letter were that Mr Stokes did not have a trust account for his client and that he did not render invoices based on his billable time to his client (ts 18, June 13 2018).
The issues for determination
The issue which falls for determination in these proceedings and which is agreed between the parties, is whether the Tribunal is satisfied that Mr Garber is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession in Western Australia.
The Tribunal must consider suitability matters and any other matter the Tribunal considers is relevant.
The general principles to be applied
Fit and proper person
In the case of Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Bachmann [2011] WASC 309 the Court said at [46]:
Fitness to practise law requires that the practitioner must command the personal confidence of his or her clients, fellow practitioners and judges. Fitness to practice is to be decided at the time of the hearing, not as at the time the relevant conduct was entered into.
(citations omitted)
Further, in the case of Frugtniet v Board of Examiners [2002] VSC 140, Pagone J stated at [10] that the personal qualities necessary to be a fit and proper person for admission to practise include:
… a commitment to honesty and, in those circumstances when it is required, to open candour and frankness, irrespective of self interest or embarrassment[.]
Chief Justice Malcolm, Steytler and Wheeler JJ in Skerritt v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 28 at [61] found as follows:
There is, in many of the reported decisions concerning the question of fitness to practice, a concern demonstrated by the courts to ascertain the extent to which the person whose conduct is in question appreciates the seriousness of that conduct, and has insight into its relevance for the person's fitness to practice and insight into its effects on others[.]
In Mungar v Legal Practice Board of WA [2009] WASC 135, Martin CJ, Le Miere and Beech JJ considered at [13] that:
… [the applicant's] insight into the seriousness of his previous misconduct was a most material consideration in its assessment of the likelihood of repetition of any form of misconduct if [the applicant] was readmitted to legal practice[.]
Good fame and character
The phrase 'good fame and character' describes the test of ethical fitness for admission to the legal profession; In Re Davis [1947] HCA 53; (1947) 75 CLR 409 (In Re Davis) at 420 (Dixon J). A person may be of good fame (good reputation amongst those who then knew him or her) but intrinsic character is a different matter; In Re Davis at 416.
As Newnes JA said in Real Estate and Business Agents Supervisory Board v LJW [2011] WASCA 35 (LJW) at [28], the expression good character and repute [or, using the word in the LP Act, 'fame'] involves two discrete elements. The phrase 'good character' ordinarily refers to a person's moral qualities (whether known to others or not). The estimation in which (fairly or unfairly) the person is held by others, is their repute, or, using the word in the LP Act, their fame.
His Honour went on to say that 'good character' and 'repute', (and therefore 'fame') respectively are to be used in their ordinary sense. A person may be of good repute, but unbeknown to those who hold that opinion, have serious deficiencies in their moral character, and conversely, a person may not be of good repute or fame because of a widespread but mistaken belief that (for instance) he or she is dishonest, but in fact be possessed of good moral qualities; LJW at [30].
The distinction between fame and character was emphasised by Dixon J in In Re Davis at 426:
The second contention depends in part on the facts of the case and in part upon an argument that whether a man is of good fame and character is a question of his general reputation and not of his moral standards or qualities. This latter argument is quite wrong and comes from a confusion between the rule of criminal evidence allowing an accused to prove his 'good character' as part of his defence, and the question whether a man is fit to enter one of the four traditional professions.
His Honour went on to say:
But a prerequisite, in any case, would be a complete realization by the party concerned of his obligation of candour to the court in which he desired to serve as an agent of justice. The fulfilment of that obligation of candour with its attendant risks proved too painful for the appellant, and when he applied to the Board for his certificate he withheld the fact that he had been convicted.
Mr Garber's contentions
Disbarment
Mr Garber contends that due to the 30-year time span between his current application and his disbarment in California, minimal consideration should be given to the disbarment. He states that the United States of America disbarment did not take place in this jurisdiction or in Australia and he has never suffered any disqualifications in Australia of any nature.
He submits that even though he was only in practice for two years in California, he makes no excuses for his conduct, takes full responsibility for it and recognises the seriousness of his breaches. Mr Garber submits that he 'disclosed his California disbarment on social media and in public debate without prompting'; applicant's closing submissions pages 1 and 2.
He further states that the disbarment was 'a trial in absentia' and he regrets not appearing at the trial (ts 4, 8 August 2018, Exhibit 26, para 54). He was severely embarrassed and did not feel that he could deal with it.
Mr Garber says that it has been almost 30 years since his disbarment and his other more recent breaches are not in the upper range of seriousness. His failures as a lawyer 'occurred over thirty years ago, in another country, under a different set of rules and standards' (Exhibit 26, para 204, page 35).
Mr Garber says that when he took over Ms Margaret Bannon's personal injuries practice, Ms Bannon was ill and she was unable to offer regular assistance to Mr Garber (Exhibit 26, para 31). Mr Garber states that he did not realise when he took over her practice that her practice had deteriorated with only a handful of cases remaining. He had limited or no support or mentoring from senior practitioners to assist him (Exhibit 26, paras 27 and 35).
Mr Garber acknowledges that several complaints from the State Bar leading to Mr Garber's disbarment arose from his management of Ms Bannon's practice in the period 1987-1988.
Community service
Mr Garber submits that he has conducted an IT business, using his skills as a former Certified Public Accountant, servicing over 20,000 customers.
Mr Garber emphasises that he has given hundreds of hours to the Perth community and has been actively involved in school boards, and is currently Chairperson of a primary and secondary school council. He successfully operated as Treasurer on a school board, in charge of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Further, Mr Garber submits that he is heavily involved in lobbying for public education.
Mr Garber states that he has not sought support from the welfare system for his three boys, one of whom is severely disabled.
He submits that he is 'an older and wiser person and the mistakes of the past will not be repeated as he will have the benefit of two year's close supervision', his work for charity is evidence of his current good character and he has had 'no criminal convictions anywhere or at any time in his life'; applicant's closing submissions page 2.
Business practices
With regard to his IT business, Mr Garber submits that neither the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) nor the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has asserted that he has violated any laws or pursued any actions against him and that the Board is incorrect in stating that he has breached any laws.
Mr Garber asserts that the ATO cancelled his ABN without his knowledge on 15 September 2015 and he did not become aware of this until February 2017 (Exhibit 26, para 200, page 37).
He submits that the prosecution by the Fair Work Ombudsman is 'irrelevant to these proceedings'; applicant's closing submissions page 3.
Finally, Mr Garber states that to censure him would be punitive as opposed to protective of the profession and the community.
Mr Hooper
With regard to the file note made by Mr Hooper, Mr Garber contends that Mr Hooper treated him in a brusque and condescending manner (Exhibit 26, para 205, page 36). He asserts that he had no knowledge of any misconduct occurring at the time.
Further, Mr Garber states that Mr Hooper is at fault on many grounds, including for failing to keep Mr Bryan Stokes informed of developments in the case. Mr Garber states that, despite Mr Hooper's denial, Mr Hooper did report Mr Stokes to the LPCC, Mr Hooper did compromise legal fees and Mr Hooper did fail to keep an agreement regarding storage of documents for collection.
Mr Garber asserts that he was placed in a difficult position regarding Mr Hooper and was 'merely acting [as] an agent of Mr Stokes'. Mr Garber, he says, in working for Mr Stokes, was simply trying to complete his 70 hours work experience as part of his College of Law admission. 'Mr Hooper should not have engaged him or try to set him against his employer'; applicant's closing submissions page 4.
Mr Garber further asserts that during the proceedings in the Tribunal Mr Hooper demonstrated rudeness and arrogance, and the '10 minute encounter between Mr Garber and Mr Hooper should not carry any weight in this Tribunal's decision to allow Mr Garber to practice his profession'; applicant's closing submissions page 5.
Preparation for practice
Mr Garber contends that due to his passion for the law, he has spent three years 'regain[ing] personal respect and apply[ing] the insight he has gain (sic) from his past' including meeting the Western Australian requirements for admission at his own cost, including a College of Law degree. He has worked for/with Mr Bryan Stokes, Mr Chris Stokes and Mr Jim Sutherland over a two year period to ready himself for practice.
Mr Garber is clear that at the age of sixtyfour, it is unlikely that he will practise for more than six years.
Insight into prior conduct
Mr Garber outlines that he has been seeing a psychologist, with references to a report of Dr Leonie Coxon 'not about his situation but for what he did wrong in the past and what he would do different (sic) now'. Thirty years ago, he says, he lacked the ability to see the consequences of his actions. That vision is now clear and is the cause of his emotions when dealing with his past (Exhibit 20, Report of Dr Leonie Coxon, 31 December 2017).
Mr Garber explains that 'he was a young man who was concerned about meeting his immediate needs and failed to see the needs of others'. Mr Garber attributes this to his 'lack of experience, lack of a mentor and where he was in his career at a young age'; applicant's closing submissions pages 5 and 6.
He emphasises that he 'no longer identifies with that person' and 'wants to be seen as a person that can be trusted'. With the benefit of hindsight, Mr Garber reports he would have done things differently; he would deal with clients professionally and would have cooperated with the State Bar Court proceedings and California Bar investigation.
Remorse for prior conduct
Mr Garber says that that he is sorry, and 'he cannot change the past, he can only promise not to repeat it'; applicant's closing submissions page 6. He has attended a further ten psychology sessions since the report from Dr Coxon was written and his counselling sessions are ongoing.
Mr Garber states that he takes responsibility for his wrongful actions in the past (ts 6, 8 August 2018).
Mitigation of risk
Mr Garber states that he does not pose a risk to the community or the legal practice profession (ts 6, 8 August 2018).
He states that he will agree to mitigate any risk by accepting the nature of the required two year restricted practice, agree not to maintain a trust account while in practice and continue to engage with a psychologist.
He states his love and respect for the practice of law and being a lawyer, and:
A.There is no risk of the applicant committing further serious breaches of rules of professional practice;
B.The most recent breaches occurred over 7 years ago;
C.The applicant has displayed considerable remorse and not simply expressing sorrow or regret;
D.The applicant is not seeking to blame others;
E.The applicant has a genuine understanding of the seriousness of his breaches, the reason for his application to the Tribunal, the purpose of the rules for professional conduct and the Legal Practice Act and the importance of complying with the rules;
F.The applicant has shown insight into and remorse for his conduct.
It is submitted that the applicant deserves a second chance.
(Applicant's closing submissions page 7)
Other contentions
Mr Garber further contends that as the Board did not crossexamine his character witnesses, the Board cannot now contradict their testimony:
Their testimony in this case evidences over and over again that the applicant has displayed considerable remorse and just not simply expressing sorrow or regret.
(Applicant's closing submissions page 2)
He states that Mr Bryan Stokes, in particular, was not crossexamined about Mr Garber's 'competence as a lawyer whilst I worked for him in that two-year period. Stokes says in his witness statement I have appropriate legal education and professional working competence to be certified' (ts 4, 8 August 2018).
Mr Garber states that with regard to the embezzlement charge following his disbarment in California, he was exonerated from these charges (ts 1, 15 March 2018).
The findings of the Tribunal
The Tribunal accepts that Mr Garber is eligible for admission under s 21(2) of the LP Act and that his application for admission was in accordance with the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2009 (WA), meeting the requirements of s 31(1)(a)(i) and 31(1)(b) of the LP Act.
However, after careful consideration of each of the suitability matters, and other matters referred to in these reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that Mr Garber is not a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession.
Disbarment in California
It is not disputed that Mr Garber was disbarred in California and is not entitled to practice in that jurisdiction. Both of these points are suitability matters for consideration by the Tribunal: s 8(1)(h)(iii) and s 8(1)(i) of the LP Act.
The State Bar Court found that Mr Garber's misconduct giving rise to his disbarment involved multiple acts of wrongdoing, was surrounded by bad faith and dishonesty and also involved trust account violations, forgery, significant harm to a number of clients, a lack of candour and cooperation to any of his victims and indifference to rectification or atonement (Exhibit 27, Document of State Bar Court, 3 April 1991).
The Tribunal is not persuaded that, as Mr Garber submits, the reasons for his disbarment are not serious. The Tribunal also rejects Mr Garber's submission that, in light of his more recent conduct in Australia, those reasons should be given little or no consideration.
The Tribunal acknowledges that the events leading to disbarment happened approximately thirty years ago. However, the Tribunal is of the view that the issues raised in his disbarment are still relevant and should be considered.
The findings of the State Bar Court involved serious misconduct including dishonesty. Because Mr Garber has previously been struck from a roll of legal practitioners, the Tribunal considers that he carries an onus of proving there is no significant prospect of repetition of the conduct of the kind which resulted in the removal of his name from the roll. The Tribunal relies on the decision in ReStokes; Ex Parte Stokes [2008] WASC 269 at [32] for this finding, notwithstanding the fact that in this case the roll was in another country.
The Tribunal accepts that Board's submissions that if Mr Garber had committed the misconduct in Australia, he would have faced similar disciplinary consequences. On this basis, while Mr Garber's statement in his closing submissions that 'the USA disbarment did not take place in this jurisdiction or Australia' is undoubtedly true, the inference that this somehow lessens the seriousness of the issue is not one which the Tribunal can make (applicant's closing submissions page 6).
Unfortunately Mr Garber has given several different explanations for his conduct which resulted in his disbarment. This leads the Tribunal to conclude that Mr Garber does not have insight into the underlying misconduct, which in turn indicates to the Tribunal that there is some likelihood of a repetition of that misconduct.
For example, in a letter to the Board dated 29 June 2016 (Exhibit 31) Mr Garber stated that he made no excuses and took full responsibility for his conduct. In his witness statement for this Tribunal he repeated that assertion (Exhibit 26, para 139).
However, he then seeks to mitigate the findings of the State Bar. For example, in the applicant's email to the Board dated 30 August 2016 (Exhibit 28), he referred to Ms Bannon, the lawyer whose practice he had taken over running in California, and seeks to lay at least some responsibility for his disbarment at her door. This explanation was expanded on in a letter from Mr Garber to the Board on 14 November 2016 (Exhibit 21).
In contrast, in evidence before the Tribunal, Mr Garber acknowledged that Ms Bannon's involvement was not significant (ts 8182, 14 March 2018).
In respect of the State Bar Court findings, Mr Garber at times accepted the accuracy of those findings (Exhibit 26, para 139, Exhibit 28 and Exhibit 31) yet on other occasions he denied or questioned findings of the State Bar Court. For example:
Count one
In his witness statement Mr Garber stated that the State Bar Court found he was only entitled to charge a fee on the successful underwriting of certain projects (Exhibit 26, para 65), an explanation he repeated in cross-examination (ts 75, 14 March 2018). However he later acknowledged that the Court made no such finding and he could offer no explanation for having claimed otherwise (ts 77-78, 14 March 2018).
Count four
In answer to whether he questioned the finding that he had mislead his client, Mr Garber stated that he had not appeared in the State Bar proceedings so the evidence was unchallenged and untested, implying that he did not necessarily accept the finding of the State Bar Court in relation to that count (ts 93, 14 March 2018).
Count five
This finding was that Mr Garber told his client he would receive $10,000 from a settlement (ts 95, 14 March 2018). However before the Tribunal he denied telling him that the case had settled for $10,000 and said he remembered the case very well (ts 97, 14 March 2018).
Count six
This related to Mr Garber having instructed a colleague's secretary to issue a cheque to pay for certain expenses incurred by Mr Garber. Before the Tribunal he denied doing so (ts 105, 107, 14 March 2018).
However, later in the same exchange he referred to having no recollection of the facts and then stated that, to the extent that they are State Bar Court findings, he accepted them (ts 107, 108, 14 March 2018).
Count ten
In his witness statement Mr Garber acknowledged the finding that he used his trust account for personal expenses and knew it was wrong (Exhibit 26, para 129). However, in crossexamination he again referred to the findings being untested (ts 36, 15 March 2018) but then acknowledged that he engaged in conduct which he knew was wrong (ts 40, 15 March 2018). He later stated that, at the time, he did not recognise that 'there were dishonest acts going on' (ts 72, 13 June 2018).
Extradition from Australia
The Tribunal notes that subsequent to his disbarment in the United States, Mr Garber was charged with embezzlement in Colorado, but that attempts to extradite him from Western Australia to face those charges failed.
Although Mr Garber claimed that he had been exonerated because of the dismissal of the extradition application and because of a civil judgment dismissal (ts 61, 15 March 2018), the position is that there has never been a determination of the embezzlement charges on the merits and the Tribunal will therefore regard the charges themselves as untested and does not rely on them in coming to its decision. The Tribunal is, however, concerned by the fact that Mr Garber considers that he was exonerated from those charges.
Fair Work proceedings
We have referred earlier in these reasons to Fair Work and Nerd and the adverse comments made by Lucev FM about Mr Garber. At several points in the decision his Honour was expressly critical of Mr Garber's conduct, stating at [23]:
The fact that the conduct in question is that by the sole Director, and the company secretary who signed correspondence to the FW Ombudsman as the Managing Director of Nerd Group, is an aggravating factor as to seriousness of the contraventions by Mr Garber.
And at [24]:
… Mr Garber controlled Nerd Group. … The nature of Mr Garber's involvement in the contraventions makes them more serious, particularly in circumstances where there has been, for reasons set out above, a deliberate course of conduct, and for reasons set out below, a lack of contrition and corrective action and virtually no cooperation with the FW Ombudsman.
At [26] His Honour stated:
There is no evidence of contrition by Mr Garber. Indeed, Nerd Group, through Mr Garber adopted a course of conduct inconsistent with contrition. Unwisely in the circumstances that course of conduct involved:
(a)belligerently expressed threats of legal action directed to the FW Ombudsman; and
(b)allegations about a former employees conduct and credibility which were relevant to compliance with the first NTP,
with those matters conveyed under the signature of Mr Garber as Managing Director of the Nerd Group.
At paragraph [30]-[32] His Honour further stated:
30.In the circumstances there has been an almost complete lack of cooperation by Nerd Group, at the behest of Mr Garber, with the FW Ombudsman, and no case is made out for any significant discount on penalty by reason of cooperation with the FW Ombudsman.
31.There is no evidence of corrective action taken by Nerd Group at Mr Garber's behest prior to Nerd Group being wound up. There is no case for a discount on penalty by reason of appropriate corrective action.
32.Overall, Mr Garber did not evidence, at any stage, credible regret or a real willingness to facilitate the course of justice in these proceedings.
In the Tribunal's view, those findings and comments by a judicial officer made as recently as 2012 in respect of Mr Garber's conduct are relevant when considering whether or not he is now a fit and proper person to be admitted. Further, Mr Garber does not assist his case by referring in his closing submissions to His Honour's remarks as 'gratuitous', and 'unfairly and unnecessarily referenced' (applicant's closing submissions page 3).
The Tribunal also finds particularly concerning Mr Garber's comment in his closing submissions that '[t]he same high standard of professional practice demanded in the Law, cannot be applied to business entrepreneur practice. In business the exigencies require more looseness' (applicant's closing submissions page 3).
Mr Garber acknowledges that he failed to participate in the Fair Work proceedings in the same way in which he did in the State Bar proceedings (ts 79, 15 March 2018) but denied that he would exhibit similar conduct should he be faced with any investigation into his professional conduct in the future (ts 80, 15 March 2018).
However, the independent evidence of Mr Garber's own psychologist Dr Coxon is that, if placed in such a situation again, Mr Garber would have a tendency to behave as he had towards the Fair Work Ombudsman although that would be subject to any successful treatment he might undergo (ts 45, 46, 14 March 2018).
Dealings with the Board
What is also of significance is the manner in which Mr Garber dealt with the Board. As we have already said, candour and frankness are necessary qualities to be a fit and proper person for admission.
In his first contact with the Board, by way of statutory declaration sworn on 12 July 2013, he ticked 'yes' beside the statement:
I am eligible for admission overseas or in other Australian jurisdiction, or I have completed a partially completed practical legal training such as a legal practice course or other professional training course in another jurisdiction.
He then stated in handwriting 'eligible for California Bar'.
Beside the statement 'I have been admitted in, or am eligible for admission in one of the following countries', Mr Garber ticked 'United States of America'. At no point did he make any reference to the fact that he had in fact been disbarred.
Neither Mr Garber's resume nor his professional practice summary (Exhibit 33), although referring to his legal practice in the United States, makes any reference to his disbarment.
By email of 16 July 2013, an admissions officer for the Board contacted Mr Garber to inform him that his application would be considered at a meeting of the admissions and registration committee of the Board on 31 July 2013 and requested that 'in the meantime, can you please provide us with a certified copy of your admission certificate to the California Bar and any evidence of the Bar exams you completed. The agenda will be finalised this week therefore you may email the documents in the first instance'.
By email of 19 July 2013 Mr Garber replied stating:
Thank you for your prompt attention to my application of overseas qualifications last Friday.
I am confirming our conversation this afternoon by this email. Therein I informed you I have not been involved in the practice of law since 1989. Therefore I do not have an admission certificate from the California Bar.
Further to our conversation regarding my passage of the California Bar, I call to your attention that my passage is noted on the official student academic record transcript that I provided to you under seal from Thomas Jefferson School of Law. You have acknowledged this is sufficient evidence of my completion of that bar exam. I have further notified you that I have never sat for any other bar exam other than the one time in California which I have passed.
By further email of 23 July 2013, Ms McDonald, the admissions and registrations coordinator of the Board, wrote to Mr Garber stating:
I note that you have not provided any evidence of your admission in California. I note from question 6 of your application that you stated that you are eligible for admission at the California Bar but understand from your CV and your conversation with Ms Darling on 19 July 2013 that you were admitted to the California Bar in 1983. Please note that, when you apply for admission in Western Australia, you will be required to provide a current certificate of good standing from the California Bar, notwithstanding that you have not practiced there for many years. This document is not however required for your assessment application.
(Exhibit 34)
In evidence Mr Garber claimed that he understood he was being told he would be required to produce a certificate of good standing in that jurisdiction, if he had one (ts 91, 15 March 2018). However, the Tribunal rejects this. The Board clearly misunderstood the status of Mr Garber's eligibility to practice in California, and that misunderstanding was caused directly by Mr Garber's responses to the Board's queries.
A number of years later, in 2016, Mr Garber finally furnished a statutory declaration in support of his application for admission in which he attached a copy of the disbarment order from the State Bar Court (Exhibit 25). When asked in a letter from the Board dated 27 September 2016 why he did not say in the assessment application that he had been disbarred from practice in California and why he did not disclose the allegations of professional misconduct which were found to be proved, Mr Garber replied by letter of 14 November 2016 (Exhibit 21):
I did not disclose that I had been disbarred from the practice of law in California as of 26 September 1991 in the assessment application because:
1)at that time I had not made the decision to proceed with making an application to be admitted to the roll of practitioners in Western Australia;
2)in my review of the forms there was no provision for the making of such disclosure and I formed the view that the assessment application was solely concerned with the appropriateness of my previous academic qualifications;
3)I assumed that the appropriate time for me to disclose such matters was if I ultimately decided to make an application for re-admission to the practice of law (as I have since done).
In the remainder of that letter, Mr Garber denied the correctness of the findings of the State Bar Court and also denied that he had altered his position with regard to a number of aspects of his application.
In his witness statement (Exhibit 26, para 182) Mr Garber asserted that factors leading to the misconduct at that time included youth, lack of support, inexperience, arrogance and pride. However, it is clear that whilst Mr Garber was an inexperienced legal practitioner, he was a man in his thirties when the offending occurred.
Trust accounts
Mr Garber's contravention of laws respecting trust money was extremely serious as they involved findings of dishonesty (Count three, Count seven, Count nine and Count eleven), misappropriation (Count nine), use, or attempted use, of client trust money to pay personal expenses (Count three and Count ten) and forgery or procurement of forgery (Count nine), were committed over an extended period and, in relation to dishonoured cheques, occurred on multiple occasions.
The Tribunal accepts the evidence of Dr Coxon in her report, tendered by Mr Garber, who is of the opinion that Mr Garber has a tendency to be impulsive, a risk taker, self-centred (Exhibit 20) and liable to make impulsive and financially risky decisions in life (ts 44, 14 March 2018). The Tribunal therefore finds that there is a real risk of repetition of this kind of conduct.
Mr Hooper
The Tribunal prefers the evidence of Mr Hooper as opposed to Mr Garber's evidence in connection with the conversation which Mr Garber had with Mr Hooper on 3 August 2015. However, while it is disappointing that Mr Garber has chosen to take a disrespectful approach when dealing with a senior member of the legal profession, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that Mr Garber was making a misguided attempt to defend Mr Stokes against what he saw was an unwarranted criticism of his employer.
Conclusion Fit and proper person
The Tribunal, taking into account:
1)the findings of the Californian State Bar Court;
2)Mr Garber's disbarment in California;
3)the findings against Nerd Group and Mr Garber in the Fair Work and Nerd decision;
4)the remarks of Lucev FM about Mr Garber in that decision;
5)Mr Garber's unfounded claim that he was exonerated from the embezzlement charges in Colorado;
6)Mr Garber's lack of candour in the way in which he dealt with the Board;
7)the Tribunal's finding of Mr Garber's lack of insight into the conduct which lead to his disbarment in California; and
8)Mr Garber's contravention of laws in California about trust money and trust accounts;
finds that Mr Garber is not a fit and proper person for admission to the legal profession.
In addition, we have carefully considered the content of the witness statements provided by Mr Garber to the Tribunal in support of his application.
The character references indicate undoubtedly that Mr Garber has made a valuable contribution to the community. However, character references only indicate to the Tribunal that Mr Garber is held in high regard by those referees. In the light of the other findings of the Tribunal set out above, the Tribunal does not consider that those references on their own can justify a finding that Mr Garber is of good character.
The Tribunal would not have been assisted by cross-examination of Mr Garber's character witnesses.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Mr Garber is not a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession.
The Tribunal considers that the Board's decision not to issue and file with the Supreme Court (Full Bench) a compliance certificate for the purpose of s 31 of the LP Act is the correct decision and affirms that decision.
Orders
1.The decision of the Legal Practice Board made on 23 February 2017 to refuse to give Mr Jack Craig Garber a compliance certificate (as defined in s 31(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)) is affirmed.
2.The applicant's application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
JUDGE T SHARP, ACTING PRESIDENT
12 DECEMBER 2018
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