FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gao v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2001] FCA 1683
PENG YUAN GAO -v- THE FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT and THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 1068 of 2001
RYAN J
16 NOVEMBER 2001
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 1068 of 2001
BETWEEN:
PENG YUAN GAO
ApplicantAND:
THE FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
First RespondentAND
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
Second RespondentAND
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Third RespondentJUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 NOVEMBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS:
1. THAT the application be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 1068 of 2001
BETWEEN:
PENG YUAN GAO
ApplicantAND:
THE FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
First Respondentand
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
Second Respondentand
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE:
16 NOVEMBER 2001
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In this matter the applicant, on 4 October 2001, filed an application to which there were three respondents, the Federal Privacy Commissioner (“the FPC”), the Attorney-General's Department, (“the AGD”), and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (“DIMA”). The relief claimed in the application is as follows:
(1)That DIMA paid [sic] compensation in respect of the breach of the Privacy Act 1988 to the applicant [the amount of compensation is at discretion of the Federal Court].
(2)The DIMA prosecutor investigate that Yu Jing Ju had taken the advantage of deceiving marriage to deceive sponsor and the DIMA for her permanent resident in Australia.
(3)Yu Jing Ju committed perjury offence and should be prosecuted.
(4)There is no reason to prevent the applicant from knowing the finding of paragraph 2 and 3 from the DIMA and Robert Garran Offices of Attorney-General's Department.
The grounds on which that relief is claimed are said to be set out in the accompanying affidavit. However, the affidavit filed on behalf of the applicant is not in the usual form and does not contain a narrative or other coherent recital of the facts on which the applicant relies. I have been assisted in ascertaining the factual background by an outline of submissions filed on behalf of the respondents in support of their motion that the substantive application be dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The factual background has also been elaborated in oral submissions which I have received today from Mr Gao and which have been supplemented by the provision of copies of various orders made in the Family Court.
It seems that Ms Ju travelled to Australia with her second husband, a resident of Hong Kong, and shortly afterwards decided not to return to Hong Kong with him. Thereafter, the applicant sponsored her application for permanent residence in Australia. It seems that, for a short time at least, she lived with the applicant. The applicant claims that he raised a…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 1683
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the application against DIMA was properly before the court and if the applicant had the right to directly challenge the decision of the Federal Privacy Commissioner. The court considered whether the complaint against DIMA could be directly made to the Federal Court or if it should have been referred to the Privacy Commissioner. Additionally, the court examined whether the time limits for reviewing the decision of the Privacy Commissioner had expired and if so, whether the application could be revived or recommenced.
The court held that the complaint against DIMA was not properly before the Federal Court. Instead, such complaints should be made to the Privacy Commissioner under section 36 of the Privacy Act. Furthermore, the court found that any decision by the Privacy Commissioner rejecting a complaint was reviewable by the Federal Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, but no right of review existed against the agency allegedly responsible for the privacy infringement. The court also noted that the time limit for reviewing the Privacy Commissioner's decision had expired, rendering the application time-barred. Consequently, the application was dismissed. The court did not make an order regarding costs but indicated that if Mr. Gao sought to revive the proceedings, the court would consider the current proceedings and the order made in this case when exercising discretion on costs in any subsequent proceedings.
In conclusion, the Federal Court dismissed Mr. Gao's application as it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The court suggested that if leave for an extension of time was sought, the proceedings might be reconsidered. However, for the present, the only order made by the court was the dismissal of the application.
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