Gao v Federal Privacy Commissioner

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gao v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2002] FCAFC 128

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth)

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules O 20 r 2

PENG YUAN GAO v THE FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER and ROBERT GARRAN OFFICES, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT and THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 1197 OF 2001

CARR, MOORE AND MARSHALL JJ
10 MAY 2002
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1197 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

PENG YUAN GAO
APPELLANT

AND:

FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROBERT GARRAN OFFICES, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
SECOND RESPONDENT

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

CARR, MOORE AND MARSHALL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MAY 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1197 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

PENG YUAN GAO
APPELLANT

AND:

FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROBERT GARRAN OFFICES, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
SECOND RESPONDENT

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

CARR, MOORE AND MARSHALL JJ

DATE:

10 MAY 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a single judge of the Court (“the primary judge”). The primary judge dismissed an application made to the Court by the appellant.  However his Honour made no order as to costs against the appellant.  His Honour held, in the context of the respondents’ motion to dismiss the application under O 20 r 2, at [11] that the application did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

  2. The proceeding before the primary judge arose out of a dispute between the appellant and Ms Zhu.  Ms Zhu formerly lived with the appellant. She had a child when in a relationship with the appellant but the appellant was not the father of the child. The appellant initiated proceedings in the Family Court of Australia in which he sought access to the child and an order restraining Ms Zhu from taking the child overseas. In those proceedings, on 18 May 1999, the Family Court ordered a paternity test. The test showed that the appellant was not the father of the child. The appellant considered that Ms Zhu perjured herself before the Family Court.

  3. On 16 June 1999 the appellant met with an officer of the Investigations Section of the third respondent’s department (“DIMA”). The appellant made allegations to the DIMA officer about fraudulent conduct of Ms Zhu which was said to be in furtherance of her desire to obtain permanent residence in Australia. Those allegations included a claim that Ms Zhu had placed false information on the birth certificate of the child which referred to the appellant as the father. The appellant showed the DIMA officer the DNA test report which…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 128
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Gao, appealed a decision of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, the respondent, which had found that the respondent had breached privacy principles by disclosing personal information without consent. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant argued that the Commissioner's decision was flawed and that the disclosure was justified under certain exceptions in the Privacy Act.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Commissioner correctly determined that the disclosure of personal information was a breach of the privacy principles. The court had to consider the provisions of the Privacy Act and the exceptions available for disclosure of personal information. The court also needed to assess whether the Commissioner's findings were supported by the evidence presented.

The court found that the Commissioner had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Privacy Act and that the disclosure of personal information was indeed a breach of the privacy principles. The court upheld the Commissioner's decision, finding that the exceptions available for disclosure did not apply to the circumstances of this case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the original decision of the Commissioner was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR, MOORE AND MARSHALL JJ (dissent)

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.