IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M103 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
TABAN WILLIAM GANY
Applicant
and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 10 NOVEMBER 2006, AT 11.34 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR L.C. CARTER: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Matthew White & Associates)
MR P.A. COGHLAN, QC: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.A. GAMBLE, for the respondent. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Carter.
MR CARTER: Thank you, your Honour. When the Court of Appeal allowed the Director’s appeal on 7 July this year they sent the applicant to prison for a minimum term of 21 months. He had been in the community for 13 months and had achieved extraordinary, if not complete, rehabilitation. The Court of Appeal withdrew the mercy legitimately extended to the applicant by the sentencing judge who, in the exercise of his discretion and in accordance with authority, had wholly suspended a sentence of three years for three years.
In my submission for the reasons set out in writing, the Court of Appeal was wrong in law and there has been a miscarriage of justice. Special leave should be granted, however, not only to remedy this miscarriage but because the application raises two questions of general and practical importance to the administration of criminal justice. The first of those is ground 1 of the draft notice at application book 118.
The question is do the principles spelt out in the judgments of this Court in Everett extend to requiring Courts of Criminal Appeal in assessing the Crown’s stance at plea to take account of the failure on the part of the Crown to provide any assistance as to the range of sentence. That was this case. In response to a plea for a wholly suspended sentence the Crown argued that immediate imprisonment was appropriate, but did not contend that a sentence of three years imprisonment, the maximum that can be suspended, pursuant to the Sentencing Act (Vic) would result in an inadequate sentence.
HAYNE J: I am sorry, can you put that again?
MR CARTER: The issue before the judge, your Honour, if I could distil it this way, was plea is for a wholly suspended sentence. The Crown submission is must go to prison.
HAYNE J: So the Crown is arguing for immediate incarceration?
MR CARTER: No doubt about that.
HAYNE J: Yes.
MR CARTER: Where the issue arises, your Honour, is the Crown did not go on to argue, and in any event, wholly suspended sentence inappropriate because it is limited to three years, as is often the case. In my submission, the Court of Appeal erred by permitting the Director to argue that three years was manifestly…
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- Case
- [2006] HCATrans 629
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine the legal basis upon which the Director of Public Prosecutions could exercise certain powers, likely relating to criminal proceedings or prosecution decisions. The core of the legal issue revolved around the scope and limitations of the Director's statutory authority and whether their actions in this instance were consistent with that authority.
The judgment of Hayne and Crennan JJ would have elaborated on the relevant legislative provisions governing the Director's powers and interpreted these provisions in light of established principles of administrative and criminal law. Their Honours would have considered the extent to which discretion could be exercised and the circumstances under which such exercise might be challenged. The reasoning would have focused on the statutory framework and any relevant case law that defined the boundaries of prosecutorial discretion.
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi