Gammon and Lockwood
[2016] FCCA 2647
•28 October 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| GAMMON & LOCKWOOD | [2016] FCCA 2647 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Property – de facto relationship – nine year relationship – third party interests – transactions to defeat claims not established – no alteration of interests in property. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), pt.VIIIAA Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), pt.VIIIAB |
| Cases cited: Stanford & Stanford (2012) HCA 52; [2012] 247 CLR 108. |
| Applicant: | MS GAMMON |
| Respondent: | MR LOCKWOOD |
| File Number: | NCC 2038 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Middleton |
| Hearing dates: | 30 & 31 May 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 31 May 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Newcastle |
| Delivered on: | 28 October 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Tregilgas |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Braye Cragg Solicitors |
| The Respondent: | In person |
ORDERS
The application in a case filed 1 April 2016 is dismissed.
The applicant's application for orders pursuant to section 90SM is dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Gammon & Lockwood is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT NEWCASTLE |
NCC 2038 of 2014
| MS GAMMON |
Applicant
And
| MR LOCKWOOD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is a dispute about the alteration of interests in property involving a de facto relationship.
The applicant de facto wife Ms Gammon is aged 66 years. The respondent de facto husband Mr Lockwood is aged 69 years.
Proceedings were commenced on 11 August 2014. The respondent denied the existence of a de facto relationship.
Over three days commencing 2 December 2014 and continuing on 17 and 18 February 2015 His Honour Judge Coakes, as he then was, heard the preliminary issue as to whether there was at law in existence a de facto relationship between the parties.
On 29 May 2015 His Honour made the following order:
“(1) That pursuant to section 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Court declares that the applicant Ms Gammon and the respondent Mr Lockwood were in a de-facto relationship which commenced in (omitted) 2003 and continued until September 2012 and the Court declares further that there was no child of the de-facto relationship and that the de-facto relationship took place in the State of New South Wales.”
Accordingly the applicant and the respondent were in a de facto relationship between September 2003 and September 2012.
At the time of the trial the respondent was married to Ms G having married her on 20 May 2013.
The respondent and his current wife transferred the properties that they each owned from their sole ownership to joint tenants on or about 7 March 2014.
The applicant asserts that the transfer of the respondents’ property to his wife was done so as to avoid an appropriate division of property between herself and the respondent.
The orders sought
The applicant seeks the following orders:
(1)That pursuant to Section 106B of the Family Law Act that the transfer by the husband of lot (omitted) being Property G, New South Wales to Ms G be set aside.
(2)That pursuant to Section 106B of the Family Law Act that the transfer by the husband of lot (omitted) being unit Property T, (omitted) New South Wales to Ms G be set aside.
(3)That the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $150,000 within 42 days of the making of the orders.
(4)That each party be declared to be the sole owner and have exclusive rights to all other property and chattels held in their respective names and in their respective possession.
(5)That each party indemnify the other with respect to any liability that they each have in their respective names.
The respondent seeks the following orders:
(1)That the application in a case filed on 1 April 2016 be dismissed.
(2)That the applicant's application be dismissed.
The issues
The issues are as follows:
(a)Whether pursuant to section 90SM(3) it is just and equitable to make the order sought by the applicant.
(b)Whether the transfers of Property G and Property T should be set aside.
(c)Should I find that it is just and equitable to set aside the aforementioned transfers and thereafter alter the parties interests in property, what is an appropriate adjustment?
Short history of events
At the commencement of the relationship the applicant had the following property:
(a)A studio apartment at Property P with an estimated value of $165,000.00 and subject to a mortgage of approximately $5,800.00 with an equity of approximately $159,000.00.
(b)An interest in a property at Property C with an estimated value of $90,000.00 and subject to a mortgage of about $12,000.00 and with a net equity of approximately $78,000.00.
(c)Savings of approximately $45,000.00.
(d)1,862 (omitted) shares worth approximately $8,362.00.
(e)312 shares in (omitted) Group with an estimated value of $1000.00.
(f)700 units in (omitted) Fund with an estimated value of $1,250.00.
(g)Managed funds invested with (omitted) worth approximately $3,500.00.
(h)An interest in (omitted) Superannuation worth approximately $5000.00.
(i)An interest in another (omitted) Superannuation Fund worth approximately $11,000.00.
(j)An interest in (omitted) Superannuation Fund worth approximately $93,300.00.
At the commencement of the relationship the respondent owned a house at Property A in New South Wales that he had acquired in approximately 1997 and he also owned a townhouse in Property B having purchased that in approximately 1996. I was not provided with any evidence of as to either the value of those properties or the equity held in those properties by the respondent at the time of the commencement of the relationship.
In July of 2004 the parties purchased a property at Property H for a price of $182,000.00, purchased by the applicant as to a 45% share, her son Mr G a 5% share and the respondent a 50% share as tenants in common. This property was let.
In late 2004 the respondent purchased Property T in his own name and the applicant made no financial contribution to the purchase.
In March 2006 the parties purchased Property F as tenants in common as to a 70% share to the applicant and a 30% share to the respondent. The purchase price was $165,500.00 of which the applicant contributed $115,850.00 and the respondent contributed $49,650.00. Of those contributions the applicant gave a mortgage to (omitted) Bank for $102,400.00 and the respondent gave a mortgage to the same mortgagee $30,000.00.
The applicant and respondent paid their respective mortgage repayments individually but they had a joint and several liability had one or the other defaulted. Overheads including body corporate fees, rates and any other liabilities were paid by each of the parties proportionally in accordance with their share of ownership. The property was let to the Housing Commission for a two-year period and the rent was distributed to the applicant and respondent in the same ratio as their ownership.
In October 2007 the parties purchased a three-bedroom villa at Property S for the purchase price of $215,000.00 with the applicant receiving a one third share and the respondent a two third share in accordance with their respective contributions. The property was owned as tenants in common in those shares.
In approximately January 2008 the respondent sold his Property A property for approximately $467,000.00.
In July 2008 the applicant retired and received $37,500.00 by way of lump sum payment and receives a fortnightly pension of approximately $950.00 per week (as at the date of trial).
In 2009 the property at Property H was sold for $232,000.00.
The respondent received $116,000.00 and the applicant and her son received $116,000.00. The applicant retained her son's share of the proceeds by way of an agreement reached between them.
In late 2009 or early 2010 the respondent purchased in his own name a property at Property G at a cost of $325,000.00. The applicant did not make any financial contribution to this property.
In July 2010 the parties sold Property S for $242,000.00. The applicant received $81,000.00 from the sale proceeds and the respondent $162,000.00 from the sale proceeds commensurate with the proportion of their initial contributions.
In July 2011 the applicant purchased a 55% share in a property at Property E from a Mr and Mrs L who retained a 45% interest in the property. The respondent made no financial contribution to this property.
In March of 2012 the applicant sold her property at Property P for approximately $210,500.00 and retained the proceeds.
In early September 2012 the applicant purchased the respondents’ 30% interest in the unit at Property F paying the respondent $50,000.00. The respondent says that the applicant and he agreed on a price of $55,000.00 however the applicant paid her $50,000.00 in cash and an additional $1,000.00 nearly 5 months later and never paid him the other $4,000.00.
In June of 2013 the applicant sold the property at Property C for approximately $139,000.00 and purchases Property L for approximately $123,000.00.
The respondent married on the (omitted) 2013.
The respondent and his wife as between them cause transfers to be registered so as to achieve a 50-50 ownership in the properties that they each then owned and they transfer those properties as joint tenants.
The evidence
The applicant relied on the following documents:
(a)Orders and reasons dated 29 May 2015;
(b)Application filed 11 August 2015;
(c)Amended application filed 17 July 2015;
(d)Application in a case filed 1 April 2016;
(e)Financial statement filed 13 May 2016;
(f)Affidavit of the wife filed 1 April 2016;
(g)Affidavit of the wife filed 13 May 2016;
(h)Affidavit of Rogers filed 19 April 2016;
(i)Affidavit of Mr P filed 26 May 2016.
The respondent relied upon the following documents:
(a)Response filed 15 September 2014;
(b)Affidavit of the respondent filed 13 April 2016;
(c)Response to application in a case filed 13 April 2016;
(d)Affidavit of the respondent filed 10 May 2016;
(e)Financial statement of the respondent filed 10 May 2016;
(f)Affidavit of the respondent filed 23 May 2016.
The law
Since Stanford[1] in considering applications for alteration of property interests the Court must:
(1)Identify the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in property;
(2)Consider whether it would be just and equitable in the particular circumstances to make an alteration;
(3)If an alteration should be made, to consider the matters contained in (relevantly) section 90SM(4) and section 90SF(3) of the Family Law Act in coming to an adjustment;
(4)Analyse and consider whether the adjustment under consideration would be just and equitable.
[1] Stanford & Stanford (2012) HCA 52; [2012] 247 CLR 108.
Identifying the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in property
The applicant filed a balance sheet on 13 May 2016. The respondent at the commencement of the trial adopted the balance sheet in its entirety both as to the assets available for alteration of property interests and the value of same.
Accordingly the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in property is as follows:
| Ownership | Description | Wife/de facto partner’s value | Husband/de facto partner’s value | ||||
| ASSETS | |||||||
| 1. W | Property F | $170,000.00 | $170,000.00 | ||||
| 2. W | Property E (55% share) | $85,250.00 | $85,250.00 | ||||
| 3. W | Property L | $140,000.00 | $140,000.00 | ||||
| 4. W | Bank Account ((omitted) Bank) | $24,892.00 | $24,892.00 | ||||
| 5. W | (omitted) Account | $2,833.00 | $2,833.00 | ||||
| 6. W | Term Deposits ((omitted) Bank) | $210,000.00 | $210,000.00 | ||||
| 7. W | (omitted) Shares (1862) | $10,874.00 | $10,874.00 | ||||
| 8. W | Hyundai (omitted) | $750.00 | $750.00 | ||||
| 9. W | Household Contents | $890.00 | $890.00 | ||||
| 10. H | Property G (50% interest) | $222,500.00 | $222,500.00 | ||||
| 11. H | Property T (50% interest) | $68,750.00 | $68,750.00 | ||||
| 12. H | Property D (50% interest) | $525,000.00 | $525,000.00 | ||||
| 15. H | Mercedes Benz | $15,000.00 | $15,000.00 | ||||
| 16. H | Hyundai (omitted) | $3,200.00 | $3,200.00 | ||||
| 17. H | Household Contents | $3,500.00 | $3,500.00 | ||||
| Total | $1,483,439.00 | $1,483,439.00 | |||||
| LIABILITIES | |||||||
| 18. W | (omitted) Bank Investment Loan | $106,892.00 | $106,892.00 | ||||
| Total | $106,892.00 | $106,892.00 | |||||
| SUPERANNUATION | |||||||
| Member | Name of Fund | Type of Interest | Wife/de facto partners’ value | Husband/de facto partners’ value | |||
| 19. W | (omitted) Super Fund | Pension Payment Phase | $369,477.00 | $369,477.00 | |||
| 20. W | (omitted) Super | $26,310.00 | $26,310.00 | ||||
| Total | $395,787.00 | $395,787.00 | |||||
The net assets available for distribution pursuant to the balance sheet total $1,772,334.00. The applicant has in her possession assets totalling $934,384.00 and the respondent has in his possession assets totalling $837,950.00 It should be noted though that included in the respondents’ assets is a 50% interest in a property at Property D which was transferred to him on or about the 7 March 2014 and prior to that time was owned by his current wife in her sole name.
Is it just and equitable to make an alteration to the interests or a transfer of the property?
The parties had jointly owned property throughout their relationship. An assessment of the evidence reveals that both the applicant and the respondent were at all times careful to ensure that they each received profits and income derived from the various properties held in their joint names in strict compliance with the percentage of the share that they respectively had in the property.
The parties agree that neither of them made financial contributions to the others’ real property.
The parties no longer possess jointly owned property.
The manner in which the assets are held no longer represents a consensual agreement between the parties. The applicant does not consent to the transfer of the respondent’s property to his wife.
The parties no longer receive the benefit of the jointly owned property nor the benefit of the income derived from their individually owned property in a manner in which they had agreed during their relationship because the applicant is now required to reside in one of her own properties.
In Stanford, the High Court at paragraph 42 said:
“In many cases where an application is made for property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife. No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship.”[2]
[2] Ibid [42].
In the circumstance of this case I am satisfied that should I make an order adjusting property interests the just and equitable requirement is satisfied.
Should an order pursuant to section 106B be made?
Section 106B(1) provides:
(1) In proceedings under this Act, the court may set aside or restrain the making of an instrument or disposition by or on behalf of, or by direction or in the interest of, a party, which is made or proposed to be made to defeat an existing or anticipated order in those proceedings or which, irrespective of intention, is likely to defeat any such order.
Subsection (3) provides:
(3) The court must have regard to the interests of, and shall make any order proper for the protection of, a bona fide purchaser or other person interested.
If I were to make an order setting aside the transfer to the respondents wife as sought this would obviously affect a third parties interest.
The leading case on the Courts power to bind third parties was Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper. [3] In that case the High Court found:
a)An order cannot be made where the effect of the order will be to deprive the third party of an existing right or where it would impose a duty which the party would not otherwise be liable to perform.
b)It was not intended by the Parliament that the legitimate interests of third parties should be subordinated to the interests of a party to a marriage or that the Family Court should be able to make an order that would operate to the detriment of third parties.
[3] (1981) FLC 91-000.
The provisions of Part VIIIAA of the Family Law Act override Ascot Investments.
Part VIIIAA applies to de facto couples who separated after 1 March 2009 by virtue of section 90TA of the Family Law Act. Pursuant to that section a reference to section 79 contained within section 90AE of the Act is to be replaced with a reference to section 90SM.
Section 90AE(2) provides:
(2) In proceedings under section 79 the court may make any other order that:
(a) directs a third party to do a thing in relation to the property of a party to the marriage; or
(b) alters the rights, liabilities or property interests of a third party in relation to the marriage.
Subsection (3) provides:
(3) The court may only make an order under subsection (2) if:
(a) the making of the order is reasonably necessary, or reasonably appropriate and adapted, to effect a division of property between the parties to the marriage; and (relevantly)
(c) the third party has been accorded procedural fairness in relation to the making of the order; and
(d) the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order; and
(e) the court is satisfied that the order takes into account the matters mentioned in subsection (4).
The matters referred to above in section 90AE(3) and (4) are clearly in the nature of safeguards to third parties. It follows in my view that the position of third parties who may be affected by orders made under the Family Law Act must always be approached with caution.
Is the making of the order reasonably necessary or reasonably appropriate to affect a division of property between the parties?
An assessment of the evidence satisfies me that the respondent does not have at his disposal cash that would enable him to pay the sum of $150,000.00 to the applicant as she seeks.
The respondent was not cross examined as to whether he had the capacity to obtain finance secured by his interests in the property in his possession so as to satisfy the orders sought by the applicant.
The respondent provided no evidence as to whether he could borrow sufficient sums to pay the amount sought by the applicant.
Historically the evidence clearly establishes that the respondent was able to obtain finance, secured over various assets in his possession, at various times throughout the relationship. The evidence is clear that the respondent did not work at any time throughout the relationship and at the time of trial he was not working.
It follows that the respondent may be in a position to borrow sufficient funds to satisfy, should I make an order, any order I make. In simple terms I am left in the dark as to the respondent's current capacity to borrow funds secured against property in his possession.
In those circumstances I could not be satisfied that it is reasonably necessary or reasonably appropriate to set aside the transfer so as to affect the division of property between the parties to the marriage.
Has the third party been afforded procedural fairness?
The applicant filed an affidavit of service on 28 April 2016.
The affidavit of service satisfies me that the third party, Ms G, was served on 12 April 2016 at 7:50pm with the applicant's application in a case filed 1 April 2016, her affidavit affirmed on 1 April 2016 and a brochure ‘marriage, families and separation.’
I am satisfied that the third party has been made aware of the proceedings and of the orders sought by the applicant.
In those circumstances I am satisfied that the third party has been afforded procedural fairness.
Am I satisfied that the orders sought takes into account the matters mentioned in subsection (4)?
There was absolutely no evidence provided by either the applicant or respondent in relation to the matters mentioned in subsection (4).
The respondent was not cross examined in relation to any of the matters referred to in subsection (4).
Accordingly I cannot be satisfied that the orders sought takes into account the matters mentioned in subsection (4).
Is it just and equitable to make the order?
I am of the view that in order to satisfy me that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the orders sought by the applicant I must have regard to the considerations pursuant to section 90SM(4) and any relevant section 90SF(3) matters.
As previously referred to in these reasons the applicant and respondent were very careful to ensure that the financial contributions to any joint property were represented in the shares that they each respectively held in relation to jointly owned property.
Furthermore the parties were equally careful to ensure that any profits or income received from the jointly owned property was received by each of them in accordance with their respective share of the property.
In terms of the property owned by the parties individually both parties conceded that neither of them made any direct financial contribution to those assets.
The applicant says that during the relationship both she and the respondent contributed equally to:
“much of the day-to-day running of the five residences which Mr Lockwood and I had occupied for domestic purposes".
The respondent vehemently denies this and under cross examination said on a number of occasions he was the:
“chief cook and bottle washer."
The nature of the cross examination of the respondent revealed that in real terms the level of contributions of a non-financial nature made by the applicant were quite minimal.
The applicant at paragraph 173 of her trial affidavit filed 13 May 2016 says:
“as well as paying for all of my personal effects and for all my jointly owned property, I also contributed to a ‘kitty’ which Mr Lockwood collected. I contributed $10 per night and extra if we had friends over for example.”
Although the parties lived together from time to time it was also very clear from the evidence that the applicant would often be absent the respondent whilst she stayed with friends and visited family from time to time.
The applicant says that she assisted the respondent in locating some lost super. The respondent agreed to that and said that they found approximately $2,700.00 in lost super. He vehemently denied that the applicant found $30,000.00 in lost super as she asserted. His evidence was “she is dreaming”.
The respondent asserts that all of the property individually owned by the applicant was tenanted throughout the relationship. This was not in contention. Accordingly as a result of living with the respondent, at least part of the time on any view of the evidence, the applicant received income from her properties for a period of approximately ten years.
The applicant says that she cared for the respondent during two periods of illness. The respondent says that she cared for him approximately three days and that whilst she may have been present he, in the main, cared for himself.
The applicant gave evidence under cross examination that:
“I never expected any of his money nor he of mine.”
The respondent whilst being cross examined said:
“I never knew what she had.”
It was put to the respondent that he could not have purchased any of his properties without the applicant and that he required her assistance to purchase. The respondent agreed that was the case stating it was also the case for the applicant.
It is not in contention that the applicant made no contributions in any way to the Property D property that the respondent has a 50% interest in with his current wife.
It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the respondent through his transfers has diminished the property pool. I do not accept that. As a result of the transfers that occurred on or about 7 March 2014 the respondent holds real property valued at approximately $816,250.00. Had those transfers not occurred the respondent would hold real property totalling $582,500.00. The pool has not been diminished.
It was submitted that the applicant had the ideas and contacts necessary for the acquisition of the jointly owned property. The applicant's affidavit provides evidence that she was not interested in continuing to purchase properties from approximately January of 2008, indeed at paragraph 86 of her affidavit she says:
“I was by now exhausted from the processes of the real estate transactions and believed we both needed to just enjoy our life together.”
The applicant's own evidence is that the properties purchased thereafter were purchased at the insistence of the respondent. In those circumstances I cannot be satisfied that the applicant had the ideas and contacts as asserted, or the superior skills, that brought about the parties acquisition of property.
It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that she provided greater contributions because she did the paperwork in relation to the properties. The respondent said that might be so but he did the majority of the cooking and cleaning and household maintenance of the properties.
Having assessed the evidence I am satisfied that the parties contributed equally in relation to the non-financial contributions and to the welfare of the family as constituted by the parties. I am further satisfied that the parties made financial contributions to the acquisition conservation or improvement of the properties in strict accordance to their respective interests held therein.
Relevant section 90SF(3) factors
At the time of trial the applicant was 66 years of age and the respondent 69. The applicant provides no evidence as to her current health and neither does the respondent. It is noted however that the respondent suffered a heart attack and a kidney stone infection during the course of the relationship.
The applicant currently owns a property and assets in her possession with a net worth of $934,384.00. The applicant receives a pension from her superannuation of $950.00 per fortnight gross. The respondent receives approximately $744.00 per fortnight gross.
The respondent is currently married and as a result has a commitment to support his current wife. The financial circumstances of the husband's relationship are not known. The respondent provides no evidence and he was not tested in relation to that. The applicant does not have a commitment to support another person.
The de-facto relationship continued for 9 years. The applicant worked until she retired in 2008. The relationship did not have an impact on the applicant’s earning capacity.
Was the transfer of property done to avoid an adjustment of property?
It was submitted that the respondent transferred the property that he owned to his current wife in order to avoid an appropriate division of property between he and the applicant. The respondent agreed that he received a letter on 9 October 2012 which set out that the applicant wanted to commence proceedings. He gave evidence that he rang the solicitor and the solicitor informed him that he would not take the matter any further.
The respondent agreed that he received a further letter on 28 August 2013 again informing him that the applicant wished to commence proceedings. He said though that he was of the view:
“if you don't put anything in you can't get anything out".
I am satisfied that the respondent honestly believed that as between he and the applicant there was no necessity to adjust their property interests as they had each received profits and income from the jointly owned properties they held in strict compliance with the respective interests they held in those properties. I accept that he was of the view that he had no entitlement to any of the property owned by the applicant as he had not contributed to it and that similarly the applicant had no entitlement to any property held his name as she had not contributed to that.
The respondent married his current wife in (omitted) 2013 and he gave evidence, which I accept, that as a result of his wife being in a position where she was about to “lose her home” they agreed to alter the interests that they each had in their own property so as to achieve a 50-50 ownership of their joint property as husband and wife.
I am not satisfied, despite the timing of the transfers, that the respondent transferred the property so as to avoid an appropriate adjustment of property interests as between he and the applicant.
I am not satisfied, having regard to the above considerations, that an order should be made pursuant to section 106B of the Family Law Act.
Should there be an adjustment of property interests?
The applicant currently has in her possession 52.7% of the current pool taking into account the half share that the respondent now owns in the Property D property.
Had it not been for the transfers the net property pool would total $1,516,884.00. Of that pool the applicant has in her possession property and assets totalling 61.5% of the total assets.
I have assessed the parties’ contributions of a non-financial nature as equal and in terms of financial contributions in strict adherence to their respective shares.
The parties no longer have jointly owned property and each received income and profits in strict adherence to their respective shares.
There are no section 90SF(3) factors which would satisfy me that there should be an adjustment in favour of either the applicant or the respondent.
Having assessed sections 90SF(3) and 90SM(4) factors I am not satisfied that it would be just and equitable to make any order adjusting the property of the parties.
The parties effectively have had the benefit and use of their respective properties throughout the period of the relationship. Their interests in their individual properties were not affected throughout the relationship and they remain unaffected.
An assessment of the evidence does not satisfy me that either party made contributions to the others’ property that would bring about an alteration of their interests.
The evidence does not satisfy me having regard to the sections 90SF(3) and 90SM(4) factors that there are any relevant factors that would make it just and equitable to adjust the interests held in their respective properties.
Accordingly for the reasons I have set out I make the following orders.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and seven (107) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Middleton
Date: 24 October 2016
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