Gallienne Pty Ltd v S.W. Hart & Company Pty Ltd

[1987] FCA 321

NOT INTENDED FOR GENERAL

DISTRIBUTION

I N THE FEDERAL COURT	)
OF AUSTRALIA	1

WESTERN AUST ALIA 1

DISTRICT REGISTRY	1	NO. WAG 3 3 Of 1986
B E T W E E N :	GALLIENNE PTY LTD

I	as	T r u s t e e f o r	t h e	J . D .	M i l n e
I

I F a m i l y T r u s t

A p p l i c a n t

and

S. W. HART & CO. PTY LTD

F i r s t R e s p o n d e n t

and

ANTHONY MARWICK

Second Respondent

CORAM : FRENCH J .

19 J u n e 1987

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

G a l l i e n n e P t y L t d ("Gal l ienne") is a d e a l e r i n S o l a h a r t

p r o d u c t s m a n u f a c t u r e d b y S.W. Hart & C o . P t y L t d . ( " H a r t " ) .

T h e p r o d u c t s c o m p r i s e items o f e q u i p m e n t t h a t u t i l i s e

s o l a r ene rgy a n d i n c l u d e h o t w a t e r s y s t e m s , p o o l h e a t i n g systems

a n d s p a c e h e a t i n g systems.

G a l l l e n n e d i s t r i b u t e s t h e m i n t h e R o c k i n g h a m area i n a

t e r r i t o r y	d e f l n e d	b y	a	D e a l e r s h i p	A g r e e m e n t	b e t w e e n	i t s e l f	a n d
Hart.

" *

: I

2. ! :

i 1

, .

The Dealershlp Agreement arose pursuant to an asslgnment

to and undertaking by Gallienne of rlghts and obligations under an

agreement between Hart and the previous distrlbutor in the area.

i

~	Gallienne contends, and	it	1s admltted,	that	under	the
!

terms of the agreement it was appointed for 3 years and 1 month as

I

excluslve agent for Hart In the Rockingham terrltory.

Hart, it alleges, has breached the agreement by

competing with Gallienne in the supply of Solahart equipment in

!

I that territory. It d1d this, at least In part, pursuant to a

policy under whlch it supplied Solahart products direct to

builders and other "trade" purchasers. The pollcy 1s sald to have	L. _ .
pre-dated the assignment of the Dealership Agreement and to be inconsistent wlth oral pre-contractual representations of

exclusive access to all	purchasers of Solahart products	in the
territory.

Gallienne has commenced proceedings in this Court in

whlch it seeks damages and declaratory and other relief against

Hart.

The causes of action upon which reliance is placed in

its re-amended statement of claim are as follows:-

1.   Fraud by reason of the pre-contractual representations (para 3 E ) .

,

. * I '

* . c -

3 .

2. Misleading or deceptive conduct In contravention of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 constltuted by the pre-contractual representations and failure to furnish relevant information. (paras. 3F and 3G).

3 . Breach of the Dealershlp Agreement or a contract collateral to It embodying the representations as to excluslvity. (para.7)

4. Abuse of market power in contravention of s .46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (para.8).

5. Breach oE the Dealership Agreement for failure to provlde Gallienne with information and leads to posslble Solahart product purchasers In the Rockingham territory (para.9).

6 . Price dlscrimination in contravention of s.49 of

the Trade Practices Act 1974 (para.10).

7. Breach of a fiduciary duty by misuse of

confidentlal information relating to prices and

discounts. (para.12)

Gallienne also alleges that Hart has repudiated the

Dealership Agreement and that it has accepted the repudiation and termlnated the agreement.

Anthony Marwick, the second respondent, who is the

i -.

general manager of Hart, is brought into the action as one who was

sald to have been knowingly involved in the pleaded contraventions

to the Trade Practices Act withln the meaning of s.75B.

Hart moves the Court to strike out paragraphs 3G, 4A,

4B, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 16 of the re-amended statement of claim

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pursuant to 0.11 r.16 on the grounds that these paragraphs:-	,,
l-

l.	Do not disclose a reasonable cause of action:
and/or l '

L .

. I

4 .

2. May p r e ~ u d l c e , embarrass or d e l a y t h e Ealr t r i a l of

t h i s a c t i o n ; a n d / o r

3. Are o the rwise an abuse of the p rocess o f the Cour t .

To a p p r e c l a t e t h e a t t a c k o n p a r a . 3 G i t is n e c e s s a r y t o

reEer b a c k t o p a r a . 3 D i n w h i c h p r e - c o n t r a c t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d

f a i l u r e t o t e n d e r c e r t a i n l n f o r m a t l o n a r e p l e a d e d a s f o l l o w s : -

"3D. D u r l n g t h e m o n t h s o f F e b r u a r y and March 1984 Apri l

and May 1 9 8 5 , A p p l i c a n t t h e F i r s t t h e d

R e s p o n d e n t h a d d l s c u s s l o n s w h e r e b y t h e F i r s t

Respondent : -

r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t t h e e v e n t i n t h a t t h e I

A p p l i c a n t e n t e r e d i n t o a D e a l e r s h i p A g r e e m e n t

w i t h t h e F i r s t R e s p o n d e n t , t h e F i r s t

R e s p o n d e n t w o u l d b e c o n f e r r e d t h e e x c l u s i v e

r i g h t s u p p l y t o S o l a h a r t P r o d u c t s t h e i n

c o u r s e o f	r e ta i l	sale	t o -	a l l p u r c h a s e r s ;	I.
!.

f a i l e d t o i n f o r m t h e A p p l i c a n t t h a t t h e F i r s t

Responden t con templa t ing , was or had

i m p l e m e n t e d , o r was a b o u t t o i m p l e m e n t h e

p o l l c y u p o n t h e x e c u t i o n o f a n y D e a l e r s h i p

Agreement t o b e e n t e r e d i n t o ;

f a i l e d t o i n f o r m t h e A p p l i c a n t t h a t t h e p o l i c y

w o u l d b e i m p l e m e n t e d i n r e s p e c t of t h e s u p p l y

of S o l a h a r t e q u i p m e n t w l t h i n t h e i n t e n d e d

D e a l e r s h i p Area of t h e A p p l i c a n t ;

s p e c i f i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t "sole s e l l i n g

r i g h t s " w o u l d a c c r u e t o t h e A p p l i c a n t u p o n t h e

e x e c u t i o n o f t h e D e a l e r s h i p A g r e e m e n t ; t h e

A p p l l c a n t	s a y s	t h a t	"sole	s e l l i n g	r i g h t s "	,.
L-.

mean t , and were i n t e n d e d b y t h e R e s p o n d e n t s

a n d e a c h of them t o r e f e r to , t h e x c l u s i v e ' _

r i g h t t o s u p p l y S o l a h a r t p r o d u c t s t h e i n

c o u r s e o f r e t a i l s a l e t o a l l p u r c h a s e r s ,

w i t h l n t h e s a id D e a l e r s h i p Area.

PARTICULARS OF DISCUSSIONS

V e r b a l , from time t o time, b e t w e e n MR J O H N

MILNE ( a d i r e c t o r of t h e A p p l i c a n t ) a n d t h e

Second Respondent and MR TONY ROBINSON, Sales

Manager o f t h e F i r s t R e s p o n d e n t , o n b e h a l f of

t h e F i r s t Respondent . "

1 ~

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5.

I

P a r a g r a p h 3G t h e n is i n t h e f o l l o w i n g terms:-

“3G. F u r t h e r or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e F l r s t Respondent

engaged i n c o n d u c t w h i c h w a s m i l e a d i n g o r

d e c e p t i v e , or which was l i k e l y t o mislead o r

deceive i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f S e c t i o n 5 2 o f t h e T r a d e

P r a c t i c e s Act 1 9 7 4 , i n t h a t i n a s much a s t h e

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s r e f e r r e d t o p a r a g r a p h i n 3D

c o n s t i t u t e d s t a t e m e n t s of f u t u r e i n t e n t i o n or

p r o m l s e s , a t t h e t ime o f t h e i r m a k i n g t h e s a i d l ‘ ~

statements of f u t u r e i n t e n t i o n or p r o m l s e s 1 : I .

I n c o r p o r a t e d t h e r e i n I m p l i e d s t a t e m e n t s of e x i s t l n g

f a c t s t h a t t h e F i r s t R e s p o n d e n t h a d t h e t h e n

p r e s e n t i n t e n t i o n o f u l f u l l i n g t h e statements of

f u t u r e i n t e n t i o n o r p r o m l s e s a n d t h e m e a n o f s so ,-.

d o i n g , b u t a t l l mater ia l times, t h e F i r s t

R e s p o n d e n t ,	b u t	i ts	s e r v a n t s	o	r	a g e n t s ,	n e v e r	h e l d	i:
I .

t h e s a i d i n t e n t i o n , t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e

s t a t e m e n t s or p r o m l s e s . ” ( s i c )

I :

C o u n s e l	f o r	Hart	asserts	t h a t	p a r a .	3 G	does	n o t	i d e n t i f y	! ‘
I _,
!.

w h i c h o f t h e m a t t e r s p l e a d e d i n p a r a . 3D are t h e “ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s “

1-

i .:

r e f e r r e d

t o .

T h e

p a r a g r a p h ,

l t

i s

s a i d ,

a l s o

l e a v e s

o p e n

t h e

i

I	.
,	.~

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q u e s t i o n o f t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s r e l l e d u p o n i.: ! :

“ c o n s t i t u t e d statements	f u t u r e	i n t e n t l o n	o f	or	p r o m l s e s ” .	l
!
i
I

F u r t h e r ; , ~t is c o n t e n d e d , t h a t t h e p a r a g r a p h f a i l s to I. . ,

g i v e p a r t i c u l a r s o f	t h e a l l e g e d a b s e n c e o f	t h e r e l e v a n t p r o m i s s o r y	!
r

i n t e n t l o n ,	t h a t	a l leged	a b s e n c e	b e i n g	a	condition of	mind of	which	-	L ’
!I ,
! ’ I .
r -

p a r t i c u l a r s m u s t b e g i v e n u n d e r 0 . 1 2 r . 3 . r

I a m s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o “ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ” L ,

r e f e r r e d	t o	p a r a .	i n	3D	s u f f i c i e n t l y	i d e n t i f i e s	t h e	I .: I
i .

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s relied upon a s t h o s e i n s u b - p a r a s . ( a ) and ( d ) o f

f -

3D.

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I -

6.

The plea In para. 3G relies upon a characterisatlon of

the representatlons In 3D(a) and (d) as promissory. This

characterlsatlon 1s an alternative their primary to

l

characterlsatlon as express representations of existlng facts and .,

supports a plea of lmplled representatlon as to the intention of

Hart at the time the promlses were made.

Glven that the plea, in essence, raises an alternatlve

characterisatlon, it 1s not lnapproprlate that it should refer to the representatlons "In as much as they constituted statements of future intention or promlses".

The attack upon para. 3G therefore fails.

I am of the view however that the last part of the

paragraph pleads a condition of mind and that Hart 1s entitled to

particulars under 0.12 r.3.

These particulars may be given by further amendment or . .

by flling a separate document embodying them.

Hart next attacked para. 4A which alleges:-

"Further or alternatively the representations pleaded in paragraph 3D were incorporated in the Dealership

Agreement as express warrantles or, further or

alternatively, formed the subject of a collateral

contract made between the Appllcant and the First

Respondent In consideration of the Applicant entering

Into the Dealership Agreement.''

I

- - I --

7.

The complaints made of paragraph 4 A are:-

1. The representatlons relied upon are not adequately Identified.

2. The terms of the collateral contract pleaded

confllct wlth those of the principal agreement.

3 . The terms of the collateral contract are not

pleaded wlth sufflclent detail. i

I re~ect the first complaint on the same grounds as the

I

like complalnt about paragraph 3G.

It is not apparent that the terms of the representatlon said to be embodied in the collateral contract conflict with

anythlng in the principal agreement. They may or may not

establlsh more stringent exclusive rights than those conferred by

the agreement and pleaded in paragraph 5, but that does not

necessarlly give rlse to an inconsistency. Even were an

inconsistency identifiable at this stage, I would not on that I .

basis strike out the paragraph.

As to the allegation of insufficiency in the pleading of

the terms of the collateral contract, I consider that it is

,.

I '

necessary for the applicant to do no more than	plead the terms on	i
I.
which it relies.	I '

The attack on paragraph 4 A therefore also fails.

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8 . , .

I. .

I-

As to paragraph 4B, i t I S cnntnnd~.d t h a t one set of

damages 1s pleaded flowlng EKom three causes of action, two of

which at least attract different measures of damage. In my

!	opinion however, it 1s not apparent on the face of the pleading
!	that the dlfferent measures may not coalesce in the particular
case. If the damages partlcularlsed cannot be related to the
measure appropriate to each of the pleaded causes of action, then Gallienne may have to seek leave to amend at some stage wlth attendant costs and the risk of having Its motlon refused or the hearing of the application ad~ourned.
i

The problem, if there is one, is not so obvious that I

would strike out the paragraph.

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1_. . .

Paragraph 8 has four substantive sub-paragraphs,	each of	..
I _ I. - i

which is followed by	various	allegations	designated	as	\;':	I .
g	\~
"PARTICULARS",	-	.	:..
!*	~
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' /

The four substantive sub-paragraphs are:-

"(1) The Appllcant and the First Respondent are

competltors in a market wlthin the meaning of

Section 46 of the Trade Practlces Act 1974 as

amended ( "the Act") .

(2) The First Respondent IS in a positlon substantially

to control a market for goods.

( 3 ) The Applicant has used his market power for the purpose of eliminating or substantlally damaging a person belng a competitor in that market.

( 4 ) In the premises, the First Respondent has

contravened Section 4 6 of the Act and the Applicant has suffered loss and damage by reason of such contravention."

9.

The flrst and principal objection to paragraph 8 was

that It falled to plead material facts to establish	a cause of
actlon as Kequlred by 0.11 r.2.

I

This is a deficiency, lt is said, which cannot be made

good by the provislon of partlculars.

The relevant parts of s.46 of the Trade Practices Act

1974 as It stood prior to the 1986 amendments provides:-

"46(1)	A corporation that is in a position substantlally to control a market for goods or
servlces shall not take advantage of the power in L-t ..
relation to that market that It has by virtue of
belng In that position for the purpose of -
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a

person, being a competitor in that market or in any other market of the corporation or of a

body corporate related to the corporation:

( 3 ) A reference in this section to a corporation or

other body corporate being in a position substantially to control a market for goods or services includes a reference to a corporation or other body corporate, as the case may be, having, by reason of its share of the market, or its share

of the market combined with the availability to it of technical knowledge, raw materials or capital, the power to determine the prices, or control the production or distribution, of a substantial part

of the goods or services In that market.

(4) A reference in this section to substantially

controlling a market for goods or services shall be

construed as a reference substantially to

controlling such a market either as a supplier or as an acquirer of goods or services in that market."

j

. _ . -

10.

T a k e n w l t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o p a r t i c u l a r s , t h e t h e

s u b s t a n t l v e s u b - p a r a g r a p h s o f p a r a g r a p h 8 do n o t i n my o p l n i o n

d l s c l o s e a n y r e a s o n a b l e cause of a c t l o n .

The m a r k e t i n w h i c h G a l l i o n n e a n d Har t compe te is not

I

i d e n t i f i e d , no t - 1 s t h e m a r k e t w h i c h i t 1s s a i d Hart 1s l n a

p o s l t l o n s u b s t a n t i a l l y t o con t ro l .

Sub-pa rag raph ( 3 ) o n t h e f a c e o f I t does n o t i d e n t l f y

t h e p e r s o n who is t h e s u b ~ e c t of t h e a b u s l v e c o n d u c t .

Sub-pa rag raph (4) d i s c l o s e s n o causal r e l a t i o n s h i p

b e t w e e n t h e a l l e g e d c o n t r a v e n t l o n of s . 4 6 and t h e d a m a g e s u f f e r e d .

I N o w o f c o u r s e i t is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e r e a r e mat ters . .

a l leged i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r s w h i c h m i g h t s t a n d a s a l l ega t ions of

m a t e r i a l f a c t s s u p p o r t l n g t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n .

C o u n s e l f o r G a l l i e n n e s a y s t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d t h e s e

p a r t i c u l a r s i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e p l e a d i n g IS t o

p r e f e r form o v e r s u b s t a n c e .

I t is a p p r o p r i a t e In t h e l i g h t of t h a t s u b m i s s i o n t o

b e a r i n m i n d t h e d i s t l n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e f u n c t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r s

a n d a l l e g a t i o n s o f material f a c t s a s expounded by Noh-thh-op J. i n

H.1976 Nominees Pty L t d v G a l l i ( 1 9 7 9 ) 4 0 FLR 2 4 2 .

I

11.

At 2 4 6 his Honour reasserted the baslc proposition that in order to dlsclose a reasonable cause of action, a statement of claim must contain statements of material facts which support the

claims made. As his Honour polnted out, particulars are not

statements of materlal facts, they perform a dlfferent purpose.

As Scott LJ sald In Bruce v Odhams Press, Ltd ( 1 9 3 6 ) 1

..

K5 G97 at 712, In a passage relied upon by Northrop J.:- _..

"The function of "particulars" . . . . They are not to be

used in order to fill material gaps in a demurrable

statement of clalm - gaps whlch ought to have been

filled by approprlate statements of the various material facts which together constltute the plaintiff's cause of

actlon. The use of particulars is intended to meet a

further and quite separate requirement of pleading,

imposed In fairness and lustice to the defendant. Their

function is to fill in the plcture of the plaintiff's

cause of actlon with information sufficiently detailed

to put the defendant on his guard as to the case he has

to meet and to enable him to prepare for trial.

Consequently in strictness particulars cannot cure a bad

statement of claim. But in practice it is often

difficult to distinquish between a "materlal fact" and a "particular" piece of information which it is reasonable to give the defendant in order to tell him the case he

has to meet: hence in the nature of things there is

often overlapping. And the practice of sometimes putting particulars into the statement of claim and sometimes delivering them afterwards either voluntarily,

OG upon request or order, without any reflection as to

the true legal ground upon which they are to be given has become so common that it has tended to obscure the very real distinction between them."

Northrop J. having cited Scott LJ in Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd (supra), went on to agree with what had been said by

Adam J. ~n Rubenstein v Truth Sportsman Ltd (1960) VR 4 7 3 at 476:-

12.

" W h e r e , as i n t h c p re sen t CJSC, t hc rc h a s bccn a c lcar

l n f r l n g e m e n t o f t h e r u l e a s t o s t a t l n g a l l m a t e r l a l

f a c t s a n d n o t m e r e l y a f a l l u r e t o g i v e s u f f i c i e n t

p a r t i c u l a r s	f a c t s	o f	w h l c h	h a v e	been	p l e a d e d	( a	I	-
, -

d l s t l n c t i o n made c lear by Sco t t , L . J . , l n Bruce v Odhams

P r e s s L i m l t e d . ..) t h e p r e f e r a b l e c o u r s e , I c o n s l d e r , I n

t h e i n t e re s t s o f p r o p e r p l e a d i n g is to s t r i k e o u t h e

o f f e n d i n g p l e a d l n g , w l t h l i b e r t y t o a m e n d , r a t h e r t h a n

t o order p a r t l c u l a r s . "

T h e s u b s t a n t i v e p o r t l o n s o f p a r a g r a p h 8 s h o u l d e f i n e

t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n u n d e r s.46 by p l e a d i n g t h e m a t e r i a l f a c t s . ..*

T h i s t h e y f a l l t o do.

I t w o u l d , I n my o p l n l o n , b e c o n t r a r y t o p r i n c i p l e a n d

a u t h o r i t y t o r e l y u p o n t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t o s u p p l y t h e deficiencies.

T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y so where t h e p a r t i c u l a r s , as i n t h i s case, seem

t o	embody	b o t h m a t e r i a l f a c t s a n d p a r t i c u l a r s .
I n a n y e v e n t , t h e l r s u f f i c i e n c y I n s u p p l y i n g t h e d e f e c t s

of t h e p l e a d l n g is open t o q u e s t i o n .

I .

I t m i g h t be I n f e r r e d f r o m p a r t i c u l a r s t h e t o .-

s u b - p a r a g r a p h	(1)	t h a t	h e	a p p l l c a n t	a l l e g e s	t h a t	h e	f l r s t	. .
l. .

r e s p o n d e n t 1s i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h I t i n a m a r k e t f o r t h e s u p p l y of L

c e r t a i n p r o d u c t s a n d for t h e i r i n s t a l l a t l o n , repair a n d s e r v i c e .

T h e p a r t l c u l a r s a l l e g e t h a t t h e p r o d u c t s s u p p l i e d , i n s t a l l e d ,

r e p a i r e d a n d s e r v i c e d b y t h e f i r s t r e s p o n d e n t are S o l a h a r t

p r o d u c t s . T h a t d o e s n o t amount t o a n a l l e g a t l o n t h a t t h e p r o d u c t

market r e l i e d upon is a b rand name m a r k e t . T h e f i r s t r e s p o n d e n t

is s a i d t o h a v e e n g a g e d i n t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e D e a l e r s h i p

! 1 3 .

Area. Again, that does not constltute a clalrn that the relevant

geographical market invoked 1s so deflned.

I

On the material issue of market definition by reference

to product and geography, the reader 1 s left to guess what is

alleged even after reading the particulars.

I

Turnlng to sub-paragraph ( 2 ) of paragraph 8 , it is alleged that the flrst respondent 1s in a position substantially	! I
k -

i i'

to control "a market for goods". Again market deflnltlon is not ,

i

I

I to be found from the substantive pleadlng.

i

This time, however, there is an attempt in the

particulars to define the market, including, In the alternative a

brand name product market.

Sub-paragraph ( 3 ) alleging abuse of market power, is

supported by extensive and somewhat confusing particulars.

The paragraph ought, in my opinion, to be struck out. I

will, however, afford to the applicant the opportunity to further amend its statement of clalm in this regard to properly plead the

cause of action under s.46 if it wishes to pursue that course.

The next paragraph of the re-amended statement of claim

to come under scrutiny was paragraph 9 , but the attack was

abandoned when it was discovered that the deflclency In the sense

of the paragraph was attributable to a simple typographical error.

14.

Paragraph 10 alleges prlce discrimination contrary to

s.49 of the Trade Practlces Act.	Its substantlve sub-paragraphs
are as follows:-

"10. Further or alternatlvely:

The Flrst Respondent has in trade or commerce

discrimlnated between purchasers of goods of like grade and quality In relation to the prices charged for the goods, and to any dlscounts, allowances, rebates OK credits given OK allowed ln relation to

the supply of the goods.

The discrlmlnatlon is of such magnitude OK 1s of

such a recurring or systematlc character that it

has or is likely to have the effect of

substantlally lessening competition In	the market
for goods.

In the premlses, the FlKSt Respondent has contravened Sectlon 49 of the Act thereby causing loss and damage to the Applicant."

Particulars follow the each of substantive

sub-paragraphs and incorporate cross references to specific parts

of the particulars provlded to paragraph 8 .

.	-	._ - - I _^_	_- ,C.	- -.
This technique, I may say, while it may be convenient in

some- .cases, 1s often an obstacle to a rapid and clear

_ - -

comprehension of the pleading.

---.	- _
z - :	- .

. .

. I - . - 7 .

.. - - - . _. In my opinlon the substantlve pleading in paragraph 10

II -

- . -.

____"

dYs.plXys the same lack of specificity and pleading of material

- -. .. ..

. - - . I

. ._.

. . . - - _. .

fact as does paragraph E. It too should be struck out.

_ - - --

--

. . . . - .

The second respondent seeks to strike out paragraph 11

- _ _ _,

which pleads:- -. _ _ .

- _ -- - -

-..	I-=
!

. .

15.

"11. The Second RespondenL, In his capacity as the

general manager of the First Respondent has knowledge of all the matters herelnbefore pleaded and has aided, abetted, counselled or procured and

has been directly or indirectly, knowingly

concerned in, or party to all the pleaded contraventlons of the Act and was thereby a person

involved I n the said contraventlons wlthin the

meanlng of Section 758 of the Act."

The crlticism made of this paragraph 1 s that no material

I facts are pleaded to support the allegatlons. Whlle the paragraph

is very general it does not, in my oplnlon, warrant strlking out.

No doubt the second respondent is entitled to

partlculars.

c

Paragraph 12 1s a rather mysterlous pleading.

It 1s in the following terms:-	: ,
i
I '

"12. Further, or alternatively:

(1) The Applicant repeats paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7

and the Partlculars "A" to paragraph 8(3) hereof.

(2)	(a)	By reason of the relationship between the
parties of wholesaler/distributor and dealer a l
fiduclary relationship existed between the
Applicant and the First Respondent whereby the
sald prlces and discounts in Clause 3(a) referred to in the Particulars "A" to paragraph 8(3) hereof constitute information I
which the Applicant says is confidential and which the Applicant says should not be used other than in the course of dealings between the Applicant and First Respondent.

(b) In the premlses the First Respondent was under a fiduciary duty not to use the said information in a manner detrimental to the Applicant nor to use the same to derive a profit for itself.

I

U;;---..

I

. 16.

( 3 ) Tlle AppliLallL is a n L l L l e d L0 an accuunC in respec l

o f p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e s a l e o f S o l a h a r t e q u l p m e n t i n

b e r e a c h (s1c) of t h e s a l d f l d u c l a r y d u t y . "

I t does n o t a p p e a r , e v e n a f t e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e o t h e r

p a r t s oE t h e r e a m e n d e d s t a t e m e n t of claim i n c o r p o r a t e d I n t o t h e

p a r a g r a p h , how i t 1s t h a t confidential l n f o r m a t 1 o n was used by t h e

f i r s t r e s p o n d e n t .

I ?'

I

T h e mere f a c t t h a t t h e f l r s t r e s p o n d e n t h a s s o l d t o

c u s t o m e r s w l t h l n t h e D e a l e r s h i p Area does n o t a m o u n t t o a n

a l l e g a t i o n t h a t i t h a s m l s u s e d c o n f l d e n t l a l l n f o r m a t i o n a s t o

p r i c e s a n d d i s c o u n t s .

T h e r e l e v a n t d l s c o u n t s I n a n y e v e n t were t h o s e g i v e n b y

t h e f i r s t r e s p o n d e n t t o t h e a p p l i c a n t .

!

I n my o p i n i o n , t h e p a r a g r a p h is well n i g h u n i n t e l l i g i b l e I

a n d s h o u l d b e s t r u c k o u t .

As t o p a r a g r a p h 16 of t h e r e - a m e n d e d s t a t e m e n t of claim,

t h e f i r s t r e s p o n d e n t c o m p l a i n s t h a t it does n o t make sense.

W h l l e ~t 1s n o t w i t h o u t ~ t d i f f i c u l t y , s I do n o t

c o n s i d e r	t h a t	~t	1s	so	o b v i o u s l y	u n t e n a b l e	t h a t	i t	o u g h t	t o	be
s t r u c k o u t .

1 7 .

I n summary, I wlll s t r i k e o u t p a r a g r a p h s 8 , 10 and 1 2 of

t h e r e -amended s t a t emen t of c l a m . I wlll h e a r f r o m t h e p a r t i e s

a s t o costs and any c o n s e q u e n t i a l o r d e r s .

I c e r t l f y t h a t t h l s a n d t h e p r e c e d l n g

s i x t e e n ( 1 6 ) pages a re a t rue copy of

t h e Reasons for Judgment of h i s

Honour M r Jus t l ce French .

C o u n s e l :

. for t h e A p p l i c a n t : M r D.H.Solomon

i n s t r u c t e d b y P h i l l l p s Fox

. f o r t h e F i r s t a n d S e c o n d R e s p o n d e n t s : Mr P.S. F i t z p a t r i c k

i n s t r u c t e d by Robinson Cox

Date of Hearing: 1 6 J u n e 1987

i Date of Judgement : 19 J u n e 1 9 8 7