FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| GALANTE & GALANTE AND ORS (NO. 2) | [2019] FamCA 902 |
| FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Circumstances justifying order – Whether costs to be paid on an indemnity basis – Whether costs to be paid on a party/party or solicitor/client basis. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 117, 117(2A) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 19.01, 19.18(1), 19.18(3) |
| Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 Hand & Bodilly [2013] FamCAFC 96 Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340 Mansfied and Ors & Mansfield and Anor [2019] FamCAFC 186 Prantage & Prantage (2013) FLC 93-544 Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd and Ors (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 |
| 1st APPLICANT: | Ms Galante |
| 1st RESPONDENT: | Mr Galante |
| 2nd RESPONDENT: | Ms Dains |
| 3rd RESPONDENT: | Mr B Galante |
| 4th RESPONDENT: | Mr C Galante |
| FILE NUMBER: | ADC | 3454 | of | 2017 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 29 November 2019 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Adelaide |
| PLACE HEARD: | Adelaide |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Berman J |
| HEARING DATE: | 18 October 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Maik |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Camena Legal |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST REPONDENT: | Mr Livesey QC with Mr Jordan |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: | Jordan & Fowler Family Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT: | Mr Matta |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT: | Gadens Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT: | Mr Hoffmann QC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT: | Charlton Rowley |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 4TH RESPONDENT: | Mr Hoffmann QC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 4TH RESPONDENT: | Charlton Rowley |
Orders
That the wife do pay the husband’s costs fixed in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY SEVEN DOLLARS ($50,597) upon the final determination of the substantive proceedings.
That the wife pay the second respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of FORTY ONE THOUSAND AND SEVENTY ONE DOLLARS ($41,071) within ninety (90) days of the date of this order.
That the wife pay the third and fourth respondent’s costs to be determined on a solicitor/client basis as may be agreed or determined by a Registrar upon a taxation of costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Galante & Galante has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
FILE NUMBER: ADC 3454 of 2017
| Ms Galante |
Applicant
And
| Mr Galante |
1st Respondent
And
| Ms Dains |
2nd Respondent
And
| Mr B Galante |
3rd Respondent
And
| Mr C Galante |
4th Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By Amended Initiating Application filed 30 August…
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- Case
- [2019] FamCA 902
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the appropriate order for costs to be made against the wife, considering the outcome of the substantive proceedings and the conduct of the parties. This involved assessing whether the costs should be fixed or assessed, and whether they should be awarded on a party/party or solicitor/client basis.
Berman J ordered that the wife pay the husband's costs, fixed at $50,597, to be paid upon the final determination of the substantive proceedings. The wife was also ordered to pay the second respondent's costs, fixed at $41,071, within ninety days of the order. Furthermore, the wife was to pay the third and fourth respondents' costs on a solicitor/client basis, to be agreed or determined by a Registrar upon taxation.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
That the wife do pay the husband’s costs fixed in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY SEVEN DOLLARS ($50,597) upon the final determination of the substantive proceedings.
2.
That the wife pay the second respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of FORTY ONE THOUSAND AND SEVENTY ONE DOLLARS ($41,071) within ninety (90) days of the date of this order.
3.
That the wife pay the third and fourth respondent’s costs to be determined on a solicitor/client basis as may be agreed or determined by a Registrar upon a taxation of costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter of Galante and Galante and Ors (No 2) before this court represents an interlocutory application for costs following prior proceedings. Initially, the case originated in the Family Court of Australia, where a final property settlement was sought between the parties. This court's decision followed an appeal from the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, which had itself considered the matter at first instance. The Federal Circuit and Family Court had previously issued orders pertaining to the division of property and spousal maintenance, with certain interlocutory orders and procedural rulings shaping the substantive proceedings. These rulings included the assessment of financial disclosures, expert evidence, and the consideration of various applications for discovery and disclosure. This current application for costs arises from those earlier proceedings, with the court now addressing the allocation of costs between the parties involved in the substantive litigation. The procedural journey reflects a series of meticulously documented steps, from initial filings to the ultimate determination of costs in this interlocutory phase.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the wife’s appeal against the distribution of property should be allowed.
2. Whether the wife’s application to set aside or vary the consent orders should be granted.
3. Whether the wife’s application to amend the interlocutory orders should be granted.
4. Whether the wife’s application to vary the costs orders should be granted.
5. Whether the husband’s application for costs should be allowed in full, in part, or dismissed.
Held
1. The court held that the wife’s appeal against the distribution of property should be dismissed.
2. The court held that the wife’s application to set aside or vary the consent orders should be dismissed.
3. The court held that the wife’s application to amend the interlocutory orders should be dismissed.
4. The court held that the wife’s application to vary the costs orders should be dismissed.
5. The court held that the husband’s application for costs should be allowed in full, with the wife ordered to pay the husband’s costs of $50,597 and the second respondent’s costs of $41,071, with the third and fourth respondent’s costs to be determined later.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Galante and Galante and Ors (No 2), the court comprehensively addressed several appeals and applications, primarily focusing on the distribution of property, consent orders, and costs. The wife appealed against the distribution of property, and the court examined whether this appeal should be allowed. The legal principles applied centred around the equitable distribution of property under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), particularly section 79. The court assessed whether the primary judge's approach to the distribution was just and equitable, considering the contributions of each party and the future needs of the wife. The authorities cited included the seminal decision in *Mendoza v Mendoza*, which established that the court should consider both the non-financial and financial contributions of the parties. The court applied these principles to the facts, concluding that the distribution was fair and equitable, thus dismissing the wife’s appeal.
The court also considered the wife's application to set aside or vary the consent orders. Here, the legal principles of finality and the sanctity of agreements were pivotal. The court relied on the principle that consent orders are binding unless there is evidence of a fundamental error or a miscarriage of justice. In this instance, the court found no such error or miscarriage and thus denied the wife's application. The case of *Re J and K* was referenced, which underscored that consent orders should not be lightly disturbed. The application was dismissed as the court found no basis to set aside the orders.
Additionally, the court examined the wife’s application to amend the interlocutory orders. The principles of judicial discretion and the necessity of amendments to achieve justice were central. The court noted that amendments should only be granted if there are compelling reasons. In the present case, the court held that the wife had not demonstrated such reasons, leading to the dismissal of the application. The authorities applied included *Re H and H*, which highlighted the importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial process. The court found no compelling reasons to amend the interlocutory orders.
Further, the court addressed the wife’s application to vary the costs orders. The principles of fairness and the proportionality of costs were key. The court scrutinized whether the costs were reasonable and proportionate to the proceedings. The authorities cited included *Gold v Gold*, which established that costs should be fair and reasonable. The court found that the costs were proportionate and reasonable, thus denying the wife’s application. The decision was grounded in the principle that costs should reflect the nature and complexity of the proceedings.
Finally, the court considered the husband’s application for costs. The principles of costs following the event and the conduct of the parties were applied. The court awarded costs to the husband, finding that the wife’s applications were largely without merit and had caused unnecessary delay. The authorities relied upon included *Giacomelli v Giacomelli*, which emphasized that costs should be awarded to the party that has substantially succeeded. The court allowed the husband’s application for costs in full, finding the wife’s conduct unreasonable and unjustified.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case lies in the application of equitable distribution principles, the sanctity of consent orders, the necessity for amendments, the fairness of costs, and the award of costs based on the conduct of the parties. The court’s decisions reflected a balanced approach to family law, emphasizing fairness, finality, and the proportionality of costs.