Gage v Florance No. DCCIV-01-768

Gage & Anor v Florance
[2002] SADC 49
Judge Lee
Civil

The plaintiff is claiming damages for personal injuries which she sustained in a road accident at about 6:40am on 16 May 2000 at Bedford Park. The accident occurred at the intersection of South and Sturt Roads. South Road does not run precisely north and south, but for the purposes of these reasons I will assume that it does. The plaintiff was driving her Commodore station wagon along the northbound carriageway of South Road and in the course of turning right into Sturt Road. She was alone. The defendant was driving his Ford Falcon sedan along the southbound carriageway of South Road and in the course of proceeding through the intersection. He was accompanied by his wife in the front passenger seat and by her mother in the back seat. The vehicles collided in the intersection. It was still dark, and both vehicles had their headlights on. The only issue for determination at this stage is liability.
The plaintiff commenced her right hand turn from a stationary position at the mouth of the intersection. Two dedicated lanes were available to traffic turning right, and she was in the lane furthest from the medium strip. The traffic lights applicable to her were green, amber and red right turn arrows, and the lights applicable to northbound through traffic were green, amber and red discs.
The defendant drove towards the intersection in a lane which was one removed from the medium strip. The traffic lights applicable to him were green, amber and red discs. Two dedicated lanes were available to traffic turning right into Sturt Road, and the lights applicable to that traffic were green, amber and red arrows.
Traffic signal information supplied by the Department of Motor Transport shows that, for northbound through and turning traffic on South Road, both the disc lights and the arrow lights remain red through five phases before, in the sixth phase, the disc lights turn green for through traffic. During this sixth phase, the turn right arrow lights remain red. Then occurs the only phase which will illuminate the turn right green arrow light to allow turning right traffic to proceed. During this seventh phase, the through traffic disc lights remain green. The first five phases may be reduced in number by the activation of a traffic monitor, but, irrespective of the demands that monitors place upon the system, the seventh phase is always preceded by the sixth. The disc lights for southbound through traffic are green in the sixth phase and red in the seventh phase. In the transition between those two phases, the disc lights for southbound traffic will show four seconds of amber after green, and four and a half seconds of red after amber, before the red arrow lights for northbound traffic turn green.
When shown a Department of Road Transport plan of the intersection, each of the witnesses placed the approximate point of impact in the north-east part of the intersection. It is agreed by counsel that the width of the intersection from north to south is about 63 metres.
The facts which I have recounted to this point are not in dispute. I turn now to each of the eyewitness accounts of what happened. The defendant’s mother-in-law was not called, but it is common ground that she can not be of any assistance.
The plaintiff said that both the disc and arrow lights applicable to northbound through and turning traffic were red as she approached the intersection. She was stationary for probably just under a minute. The right hand turn arrow lights turned green and she moved off to execute a right hand turn. She did not see the defendant’s vehicle except in the corner of her left eye a moment before impact. It took approximately five to six seconds to reach the point of impact from her stationary position. Her vehicle sustained severe damage to the left front and side panels. She cannot offer any explanation why she did not see the defendant’s vehicle before the impact.
The defendant said that he approached the intersection at a speed about 65 kph. The speed limit for the area was 70 kph. There was another vehicle just ahead of him in the lane immediately to his right. It was travelling at about the same speed. He became conscious of the traffic lights about 100 metres before the intersection. The disc lights were green. He eased his foot off the accelerator. The lights remained green as he entered the intersection. Then “all of a sudden this vehicle (the plaintiff) appeared across the front of the vehicle that was slightly ahead of me (the other vehicle) and there it was slap bang in front of me”. He braked hard and veered slightly to his left, but the collision occurred.
The defendant’s wife said that, as they were heading down South Road, she noticed another southbound vehicle on the right hand side. It was slightly to the front and travelling at about the same speed. The disc lights were green and remained green as they entered the intersection. The plaintiff’s vehicle “sort of appeared on our right front side and there was a high impact or smash”. The other vehicle was “kind of blocking my vision of anything coming from the right”. She was aware of her vehicle braking and veering very slightly to the left. She presumed that the plaintiff managed to go either in front of the other vehicle or after it, but she could not precisely say.
Counsel for the plaintiff seeks a finding of negligence against the defendant upon the basis of one or other of two propositions. First, when the parties entered the intersection, the turning arrow lights applicable to the plaintiff were green, and the disc lights applicable to the defendant were red. Second, even if the reverse is true, the defendant’s lookout was faulty because he failed to see the plaintiff until just before the impact. As to the second proposition, counsel says that I should reject the defendant’s explanation that his vision of the plaintiff was obstructed by the other vehicle. Counsel argues that the position of the other vehicle as marked by the defendant on a Department of Road Transport plan of the intersection would have made it impossible for the plaintiff’s vehicle to have missed striking the other vehicle. Counsel argues that, if there was another vehicle, it must have travelled through the intersection and the plaintiff must have passed behind it in the unimpeded view of the defendant.
Counsel for the defendant seeks to avoid any finding of negligence. He argues that, if the arrow lights applicable to the plaintiff turned from red to green as she asserts, the disc lights applicable to the defendant must have been amber and then red for a considerable distance back from the intersection. That proposition arises from the fact that the disc lights applicable to the defendant would have remained amber for 4 seconds and red for 4.5 seconds before the arrow lights applicable to the plaintiff turned from red to green. Over a period of 8.5 seconds, a vehicle travelling at 60 kph, or 16.6 metres per second, would cover a distance of 141 metres, and a vehicle travelling at 70 kph, or 19.4 metres per second, would cover a distance of 165 metres.
So much for the facts and the opposing contentions of the parties. I turn now to my conclusions.
The first question to decide is whether the defendant entered the intersection against a red light. The plaintiff has not satisfied me that he did. The likely explanation is that, in a moment of inattention, the plaintiff mistakenly took the green disc light in the sixth phase as applying to her. She conceded that that is a possibility. The defendant and his wife, on the other hand, had a good opportunity to observe the state of the lights applying to them as they approached the intersection. They were confident that the lights for them were green at all relevant times. They gave me no reason to disbelieve their evidence. It is unlikely that both were mistaken.
That view of events is reinforced by the movement of the other vehicle through the intersection. I accept the uncontradicted evidence of the defendant and his wife that there was another vehicle, and that it entered the intersection ahead of them but within a short period of time.
The next question is whether the defendant’s lookout was defective in any way. The plaintiff has not satisfied me that it was. My findings relevant to this question are as follows. The defendant entered the intersection at about 60 kph or at about 16.6 metres per second. The impact occurred in the north-east part of the intersection. The intersection extended from south to north by about 63 metres. The presence of the other vehicle hindered the defendant’s view of the plaintiff as the plaintiff traversed the southern side of the intersection. Nevertheless, he saw the plaintiff before the impact, and reacted to the emergency by applying his brakes and veering to the left. I am not satisfied that there is anything more that he could or should have done in the circumstances.
It is possible to construct an argument – and, as I have said, counsel for the plaintiff did so – that the plaintiff would have struck the other vehicle if it had been where the defendant said it was when he first saw the plaintiff. But when the defendant was asked to mark the position of the other vehicle on the plan, he did so by way of a reconstruction nearly two years after the event. To the extent that the reconstruction produces any conflict, I prefer the clear and cogent recollection of the defendant and his wife that their view of the plaintiff was obstructed by another vehicle. There are possible reasons why the plaintiff’s vehicle did not strike the other vehicle. Perhaps the other vehicle was travelling slower than the defendant’s vehicle by the time the other vehicle reached the intersection. Perhaps it braked or veered to the right to miss the plaintiff’s vehicle. Whatever the reason, I am not satisfied that the defendant could or should have seen the plaintiff any sooner than he did.
In the result, there must be an order that the claim be dismissed.

[2002] SADC 49

2 May 2002