Gaffy v Tennant Creek Town Council (No 2)

Gaffy v Tennant Creek Town Council (No 2) [2002] NTCA 8
PARTIES:GAFFY, LISA MICHELLE
v

TENNANT CREEK TOWN COUNCIL

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION:  APPEAL FROM SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:AP 17 OF 2000 (9608483)
DELIVERED:  2 October 2002
HEARING DATES:  19 and 20 March 2001
JUDGMENT OF:  MARTIN CJ, THOMAS & BAILEY JJ
CATCHWORDS:
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:J Reeves QC and S M Gearin
Respondent:  P Day
Solicitors:
Appellant:Povey Stirk
Respondent:  Collier & Deane
Judgment category classification:    C
Judgment ID Number:  mar0227
Number of pages:  3

mar0227
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
Gaffy v Tennant Creek Town Council (No 2) [2002] NTCA 8
No. AP17 OF 2000 (9608483)

BETWEEN:
LISA MICHELLE GAFFY

Appellant
AND:
TENNANT CREEK TOWN COUNCIL

Respondent

CORAM: MARTIN CJ, THOMAS & BAILEY JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 2 October 2002)

An appeal from the learned Judge at first instance delivered on 21 June 2000 was allowed by this court on 15 October 2001 to the extent that the judgment and orders made by him with respect to past loss of earnings, interest thereon and future loss of earnings capacity were set aside. In lieu thereof damages were increased. Interest on past loss of earnings was allowed for a period of 8 years at 4 per cent ($13,440). The reasons for all that appear from this Court’s judgment.

The order was taken out and authenticated on 9 November 2001 in the following terms:
“The appeal is allowed to the extent that the judgment and orders made by the learned trial judge with respect to past loss of earnings, interest thereon and future loss of earning capacity was set aside and lieu thereof there will be judgment for the appellant in the sum of $315,664.89.”
By summons of 9 May 2002 the appellant sought orders in respect of interest on the extra amount awarded by this court for future economic loss for the period from 21 June 2000 to date of payment or, alternatively, a declaration that interest runs on the extra amount for future economic loss awarded by this court on 15 October 2001 from 21 June 2000 until payment.
We sought and obtained written submissions from both parties. It was noted that counsel for the appellant upon the hearing of the appeal did not seek any particular order in relation to the date from which interest upon which any increased award should commence to run. The parties addressed themselves to the application of the slip rule, the provisions of s 85 of the Supreme Court Act and r 59.02 of the Supreme Court Rules.
Section 85 provides that except as provided by a law in force in the Territory the judgment carries interest from the date of judgment at such rate as is fixed by the Rules. Plainly it is not necessary to seek an order for interest after judgment. It is a statutory right.
The rule provides that a judgment of the court shall bear the date of and take effect on and from the day it is given, unless the court otherwise orders.
In our opinion the orders of this court substituting its award for that of the learned trial Judge, by implication, directs that its judgment take effect from the date of judgment at first instance (Official Receiver in Bankruptcy v Schultz (1990) 170 CLR 306 at 318). Should there be any real doubt about that then we declare that that was the intention of the court.
Of course, any interest paid upon the original judgment will be taken into account in calculating interest on the substituted award.
Although this issue has been resolved in favour of the appellant we are of the view that there should be no order as to costs. The issue going to clarification of the court’s order was a matter in respect of which both parties were asked to make submissions.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Gaffy v Tennant Creek Town Council (No 2) before the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory involved Lisa Michelle Gaffy as the appellant and the Tennant Creek Town Council as the respondent. The case originated from a judgment delivered on 21 June 2000, which was subsequently appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on 15 October 2001, setting aside the trial judge's orders regarding past loss of earnings, interest, and future loss of earning capacity. In lieu of the original orders, the damages were increased, including interest on past loss of earnings for an 8-year period at 4% ($13,440). The appellant later sought orders regarding interest on the extra amount awarded for future economic loss from the date of the original judgment to the date of payment. The court examined the application of the slip rule, section 85 of the Supreme Court Act, and rule 59.02 of the Supreme Court Rules.

The central legal issues before the court involved the correct application of interest provisions under section 85 of the Supreme Court Act and the implications of the slip rule as it pertains to the date from which interest should commence. The appellant argued that interest should run from the date of the original judgment, while the respondent contended that the interest should run from the date of the Court of Appeal's judgment. The court had to determine whether the Court of Appeal's judgment, by substituting its award for the trial judge's, intended to have retrospective effect to the date of the original judgment. Additionally, the court had to clarify whether any interest paid on the original judgment would be taken into account in calculating interest on the substituted award.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the orders of the court, by substituting its award for that of the trial judge, implied that the judgment should take effect from the date of the original judgment, as per the slip rule. The court clarified that under section 85 of the Supreme Court Act, unless otherwise provided by law, judgments carry interest from the date of the judgment at a rate fixed by the Rules. The court noted that any interest paid on the original judgment would be taken into account when calculating interest on the substituted award. The court concluded that there should be no additional order as to costs as the issue pertained to the clarification of the court's order, which both parties had been asked to address in their submissions.

The final orders clarified that interest would run from the date of the original judgment to the date of payment, taking into account any interest previously paid on the original judgment. The court emphasized that the issue of interest was resolved in favor of the appellant, and no further orders as to costs were necessary.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established