Gabriel v Noble Services & Co Pty Ltd
[2025] NSWPIC 216
•19 May 2025
| CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER | |
| CITATION: | Gabriel v Noble Services & Co Pty Ltd & Ors [2025] NSWPIC 216 |
| APPLICANT: | Gabriel Gabriel |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: | Noble Services & Co Pty Ltd |
| SECOND RESPONDENT: | Chauffers Australia Pty Ltd (t/as Royal Limousines) (subject to a Deed of Company) |
| THIRD RESPONDENT: | Prime Limousines Group Pty Ltd |
| FOURTH RESPONDENT: | Bartolotta Royal Investment Pty Ltd (t/as Royale Limousines) |
| FIFTH RESPONDENT: | Syddeck No. 3 Pty Ltd t/as Royal Limousines) |
| SIXTH RESPONDENT: | Global Chauffeurs Pty Ltd (t/as Royale Limousines) |
| SEVENTH RESPONDENT: | Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (iCare) |
| MEMBER: | Diana Benk |
| DATE OF DECISION: | 19 May 2025 |
CATCHWORDS: | WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987; whether applicant was a worker or deemed worker at the time of injury and who employed him; claim that the sixth respondent was a section 20 principal; injury and incapacity not in dispute; Held – the applicant was a worker as defined by section 4 employed by the first respondent who contractually engaged the applicant and paid the applicant; Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd, Abdalla v Viewdaze, and Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills discussed; determined first respondent was uninsured; seventh respondent deemed to be insurer of the first respondent as at the date of injury with reference to section 142A; awards for the third and sixth respondents; section 20 not satisfied as no contract or agreement demonstrated. |
| DETERMINATIONS MADE: | The Commission determines: 1. The applicant was a worker in the employ of the first respondent on 2 August 2023. 2. The applicant sustained an injury to his right tibia and fibula arising out of or in the course of his employment with the first respondent on 2 August 2023. 3. The applicant’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to his injury. 4. The applicant has no current work capacity from 2 August 2023 to date. 5. The first respondent did not maintain a policy of insurance as at the date of injury for the purposes of Part 4 Division 6 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. 6. The seventh respondent is deemed to be the insurer of the first respondent as at the date of injury pursuant to s 142A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. 7. The sixth respondent was not “the principal” in accordance with section 20(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 as at the date of injury and is not liable to pay weekly compensation. The Commission orders: 8. Award for the third and sixth respondent. 9. The seventh respondent to pay the applicant weekly compensation at the agreed pre-injury average weekly earnings of $1,680 gross per week (as indexed) from 2 August 2023 to date and continuing. 10. Liberty to the parties to apply in respect of any pre-injury average weekly earnings dispute or calculations within 14 days. A brief statement is attached setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination. |
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND
There is no dispute Mr Gabriel Gabriel (the applicant) sustained a right spiral tibia and fibula fracture on 2 August 2023 and claims weekly compensation from that date. The issue in dispute is whether he was a “worker” or deemed worker within the definition of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) and Workplace Injury Management Act and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) and if so, who employed him.
This was not a straightforward matter with the proceedings being brought against seven respondents. Multiple preliminary conferences saw the proceedings being discontinued against all but the first, third, sixth and seventh respondents. There was considerable confusion as the applicant and his counsel used the term Royal and Royale interchangeably to refer to the alleged employer. The use of these terms and to whom they referred to unfortunately was not clarified throughout the protracted course of the proceedings or at the conciliation/arbitration, much to the annoyance of counsel for the seventh respondent, the late Mr Combe. However, ultimately after an assessment of the evidence I find that nothing turns on this, but certainly agree that this did obfuscate matters.
In its s 78 notice, the sixth respondent (Global Chauffers) maintained it was not liable as the applicant was not a worker or a deemed worker. It acknowledged whilst Global Chauffers did at times contract with Prime Limousines (the third respondent), it was not satisfied that such contractual relationship existed at the time of the injury, thereby denying any liability with respect to s 20 of the 1987 Act.
In its s 78 notice, the seventh respondent, Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (ICare), disputed liability concluding the applicant was not a worker nor a deemed worker of Royale Limousines (the third respondent) and further suggested that the evidence revealed a possible employment relationship by Noble Services (first respondent) with Chauffers Australia Pty Ltd t/as Royal Limousines (second respondent) as principal. It further maintained that as the principal held a policy of insurance as at 2 August 2023, the claim was improperly made against the uninsured liabilities scheme. Proceedings were ultimately discontinued against the second respondent.
The matter ultimately proceeded to arbitration where Mr Joseph of counsel instructed by Mr Zac Gabriel appeared for the applicant. Mr Perry of counsel instructed by Mr Biscevic represented the sixth respondent. The late Mr Combe of counsel instructed by Ms Davis represented the seventh respondent. There was no appearance by the first or third respondents despite being put on notice by all of the parties of these proceedings. Mr Combe at hearing collectively referred to the first and third respondent’s as being uninsured. Submissions from the seventh respondent late in the peace confirmed this status. The seventh respondent in response to Directions, sought additional orders of recovery in the event of any findings of liability. These are not recovery proceedings. Nothing prevents the seventh respondent from engaging in the actions required pursuant to s145(1) and s145(2) of the 1987 Act in respect of recovery. These orders were not sought at the conciliation/arbitration and further no submissions were led on the issue. I decline to make such orders at this juncture.
Further, despite an initial dispute, pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE) was ultimately agreed (following further directions) between the applicant and seventh respondent at $1,680 gross per week. The PIAWE submitted by the sixth respondent was $1,596 which suggests a 95% figure of the earnings. There is no evidence to contradict the applicant’s injury or claim of total incapacity and I understood from the submissions these were not disputed.
No oral evidence was called. Excluding documents from parties who were discontinued, the following evidence was considered;
(a) Application to Resolve a Dispute (ARD) and its annexures;
(b) Reply filed by the seventh respondent and its annexures;
(c) Reply filed by the sixth respondent and its annexures;
(d) multiple Applications to Lodge Additional Documents (ALAD’s), and
(e) responses to Directions.
In summary, the issues for determination are
(a) whether the applicant is a “worker” or “deemed worker” within the definition of the 1998 Act;
(b) who employed the applicant;
(c) whether the sixth respondent was “the principal” in accordance with s 20 of the 1987 Act and liability to pay compensation, and
(d) the extent and quantification of the applicant’s entitlement to weekly compensation.
Service
Neither the first nor third respondent appeared at the multiple preliminary conferences or the conciliation/arbitration hearing despite being notified of these key events by not only the applicant but also the sixth and seventh respondents. Annexures to the multiple ALAD’s confirm service as I had directed at the various conferences.
The letter from the sixth respondent to the first and third respondent was clear in its terms relevantly stating:
….“strongly suggest you obtain legal representation at the hearing on 12 March 2025. Failure to do so may result in significant penalties or a default finding against you. I wish to advise you that it is my client’s intention to pursue you for recovery of any costs incurred as a result of the application of section 20 in the event that you were uninsured.”[1]
[1] Folios 5-6 of the sixth respondent’s reply.
It was confirmed at the conciliation/arbitration and in response to a subsequent Direction that neither the first nor third respondent held a policy of workers compensation insurance as at the time of injury.
The finalisation of these proceedings was in part delayed due to the multiple conferences in which I sought reassurance that all parties had been served correctly, particularly given the potential for recovery proceedings with reference to s 145 of the 1987 Act. I am satisfied that proper service has been undertaken and so find.
Is the applicant a worker or deemed worker of the first or third respondent?
Section 4(1) of the 1998 Act defines “worker” as follows:
“In this Act - worker means a person who has entered into or works under a contract of service or a training contract with an employer (whether by way of manual labour, clerical work or otherwise, and whether the contract is expressed or implied, and whether the contract is oral or in writing).”
There is a considerable body of law defining “worker”. In an attempt to make the complex simple, to establish “worker”, the applicant must;
(a) establish he was employed under a contract either express or implied as there can be no employment without a contract;[2]
(b) show any service provided or “work” done was in performance with a contractual obligation to another person[3];
(c) demonstrate he supplied a set of skills demanded/required by that person[4];
(d) for which there is a wage or remuneration.[5] and
(e) finally that there is an obligation for one party to provide and the other party to undertake the work.[6]
[2] (Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1956] UKHL 6; [1957] AC 555 at [587]).
[3] (Abdalla v Viewdaze (2003) 122 IR 215 at [23]).
[4](Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills; (1949) 79 CLR 389 at [404]-[405])’
[5] (Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497 at [515]).
[6] Wilton v Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 725; (2007) 161 FCR 300 at [162]).
Evidence in relation to the work arrangement
The applicant has provided multiple statements which only complicate matters as both he and his son referred to possible employers or principals by using the titles Royal and Royale. This is significant as the second respondent and fifth respondent traded using the word Royal yet the fourth and sixth traded using the word Royale. This lack of precision was initially paramount in this matter given the significance of the findings sought. I understand it was the reason previous proceedings filed in the Commission had been discontinued.
In his statement dated 1 May 2024[7] the applicant confirms the contractual arrangement was negotiated between his son and Michael Barhy, the director of the first respondent (Noble Services) a friend from their church. The work to be done was for the transfer of referees for the FIFA World Cup to various locations. The applicant had the necessary skills to undertake such transport services and had agreed to an hourly rate. The work was allocated via a roster system.
[7] Folios 12 – paragraph 12 of the ARD
The applicant confirms he participated in an induction hosted by “Stan” a representative from Royale Limousines[8] and Ari Bekker from FIFA. The applicant then satisfied a police and licence check and was given a lanyard with his photo ID issued by Royale Limousines. Private parking at the venue was organised by Carlos Ardila, Finance Manager for Royale Limousines. The applicant and his son understood Royal Limousines to have employed him to provide driving services at an agreed rate and states:
“…my understanding is that the main contract with FIFA was Royal Limousines and Royal Limousines then contracted work to Prime Limousines, who in turn then asked Noble Services Pty Ltd to locate drivers. My friend Michael is the director of Noble Services Pty Ltd and his involvement was to find drivers and co-ordinate things.”
[8] Folio 5 – paragraph 33 of the ARD
It is unclear how the applicant or his son derived this knowledge as there is no written or oral communication to establish this.
In other parts of the statement, the applicant maintains he was employed by Royale Limousines[9] (and not Royal Limousines), yet another respondent.
[9] paragraphs 33, 38, 42, 45 and 84 of the applicant’s statement
The applicant’s son, Oram in his statement dated 20 February 2024[10] expanded on the above and provided detail about payment for services. He was required to complete a time sheet/invoice on excel and states (unedited):
“…the document was preformatted and provided by Royal Limousines and emailed to Noble Services Pty Ltd. Michael on behalf of Noble Services Pty Ltd forwarded the email to myself. I completed the time sheet/invoice for myself and one for my father Gabriel Gabriel and emailed it back to Noble Services Pty Ltd. He in turn forwarded the email to Royal Limousines for payment….
I and my dad received payment via Michael from Noble Services Pty Ltd who deposited money into my brother Joseph Gabriel’s account as my dad did not have pay ID activated on his bank account…”
[10] Folios 13 – paragraph 15 of the ARD.
The above arrangement was confirmed in a text message received from Michael Barhy who followed up whether payment had been made and requested that an invoice be sent to [email protected].[11] Payment was then received from Michael Barhy electronically[12] and not by anyone associated either with the Royal or Royale companies.
[11] Folio 196 of the ARD.
[12] Folio 197 of the ARD.
Submissions on the issue of worker and s 20 principal
On behalf of the applicant it was submitted;
(a) there was a contract for more than $10 and so there cannot be a dispute that the deemed worker provisions apply;
(b) as regard worker, the applicant was paid an hourly rate. The equipment was supplied (Minivans for transporting the referees), the applicant did the work himself, he did not subcontract it to other persons and finally the applicant followed directions issued by others. He performed tasks subject to rostered hours. It is admitted that taxation was not deducted from ultimate payment but this does not detract from the fact that the applicant was employed to provide services at another’s request and direction, and
(c) the claim that sixth respondent (Global) is the s 20 principal in this case is a difficult one to establish as there is no documentary evidence, just inferences by the applicant and his son.
On behalf of the sixth respondent it was submitted:
(a) the evidence demonstrates the applicant was contracted to provide services by Noble Services and the company search confirms Michael Barhy as director;[13]
(b) any argument about a contract of service as opposed to a contract for services is redundant. It is clear the applicant and his son were approached by Michael Barhy, the director of the first respondent and ultimately paid by him. Had the applicant not been paid, his recourse for payment of unpaid entitlements at law would be against Michael Barhy directly;
(c) there was no contract between the applicant and the third respondent Prime Services. There was no contract between the applicant and Global Chauffers, the sixth respondent. Whilst the applicant suggests that there was, there is no evidence as to how he obtained this knowledge or its source;
(d) the applicant was asked to send his invoice for services to [email protected] and ultimately received payment from that company;
(e) there is a demonstrated absence of payment from Prime and no direction as to the nature of work to be undertaken by Prime. No obligation or contract has been established with Global Chauffers;
(f) there is no suggestion in the documents that the applicant had been engaged or had been working with any other person other than Noble Services Pty Ltd;
(g) the applicant is correct in stating that the s 20 case/claim against Global is a difficult one. The applicant must discharge on the balance of probabilities that the contract which would establish a s 20 principal arrangement is as required in s 20(1) of the 1987 Act. This cannot be done via inference. The evidence falls short of establishing such an arrangement;
(h) there is no suggestion the applicant was a direct employee of the sixth respondent, and
(i) it is acknowledged that the sixth respondent had historical contracts with the third respondent (in August 2022) to provide drivers as needed, but again there is no evidence of any contractual relationship at the time of the injury nor evidence to suggest that any contractual relationship extended to any alleged employment of the applicant and or with the third respondent.[14]
[13] Folio 202 of the ARD.
[14] Folio 131 of the Reply filed by the sixth respondent.
On behalf of the seventh respondent it was submitted:
(a) the first and third respondents did not have a policy of workers compensation insurance at the time of the applicant’s injury;
(b) the applicant has not established that he had a contract for services with either the first or third respondents;
(c) a contract requires meeting of the minds. The applicant’s own statement suggested that he would be employed by Royale or Royal Limousines (the sixth respondent) and not the first or third respondent;
(d) taxation was not deducted. Superannuation was not paid. Payment was on an hourly basis which is not indicative of an employment arrangement;
(e) control or direction of any activity rendered by the applicant was not done at the direction of the first or third respondents but by the sixth respondent;
(f) it is unsatisfactory for the applicant to allege he had an employment relationship with either the first or third respondents when the day-to-day control of his work including the allocation of his shifts was done by the sixth respondent;
(g) the applicant cannot establish the necessary indicia of worker and has not even demonstrated who provided the transfer vehicles;
(h) the applicant represented to the world that he was an employee of “Royale Limousines” as seen by his lanyard. This is contra to the indication of an employment relationship with either the first or third respondents. I was referred to the authority of Hollis[15] where the majority in that case focused on the issue of control as well as weighing other indicia of employment;
(i) whilst the applicant may have ultimately been paid by the first respondent, there is no evidence of any control being exercised by it or the third respondent;
(j) the applicant has not established that he is a deemed worker as the circumstances show that this was a contract for services that would not attract the deemed worker provisions;
(k) there is a s 20 principal, that is, the sixth respondent who was responsible for providing transport for the referees involved in the FIFA Cup. This is demonstrated by the emails from Carlos as representative for Royale Limousines, the lanyard provided which suggested “to the world” the applicant was employed/ representing or connected with Royale Limousines and the arrangements to secure discounted parking for personnel providing services to FIFA. Therefore the sixth respondent had a relationship with either the first or third respondents and the s 20 provisions apply as the first and third respondents were uninsured;
[15] Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 22 NSWCCR 428 (2001) 181 ALR 263; [2001] HCA 44.
In response, the sixth respondent submitted:
(a) s 20 of the 1987 Act does not apply as the applicant has failed to establish an agreement between the sixth respondent and the first or third respondent, that is there is no evidence of a contract between the parties.
In response, the applicant submitted:
(a) the evidence is far from pristine and there needs to be an examination of the facts as a whole. It is clear that the applicant engaged in the provision of services with the first respondent, he accepted that offer and payment was made by the first respondent.
Findings on the issue of worker
As can be seen from the above, the case is far from perfect and the factual matrix difficult. What is clear from the evidence is that the applicant was initially introduced to the role by the first respondent and ultimately his services were paid for by the first respondent. It does appear that he attended various meetings and was ultimately given a photographic lanyard which nominated Royale Limousines but this of itself does not suggest he was employed by Royale Limousines. Even if it did, which Royale Limousines was he employed by? It cannot be ignored that both the fourth and sixth respondents trade under the name of Royale Limousines. Granted, the fourth respondent was ultimately discontinued from these proceedings, but there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the applicant performed work for the sixth respondent. A lanyard of itself and the attendance at meetings co-ordinated by Royale, Royal or even FIFA is not of itself enough to establish an employment relationship. It was suggested by counsel for the seventh respondent that these factors were suggestive of “control” but there is insufficient information for such a finding to be made.
Again complicating matters is that the applicant’s information at best is second hand. His son introduced him to the work and he entrusted his son to take care of the administration associated with performing the activities/services. The applicant himself did not have direct contact with any of the alleged parties and simply followed instructions sent out by multiple individuals via text who had some form of connection with the need to provide transportation services to FIFA referees. His son’s statement refers to Royal being the employer yet the applicant believes it was Royale. Again, nothing ultimately turns on this but it is raised to highlight the ad hoc service arrangements, suboptimal and unclear evidence relating to these separate entities and their relationship to the applicant, which in combination were responsible for the significant delay in finalisation of these proceedings and unnecessary and costly joinder of parties unrelated to the matter.
On the basis of the evidence, I find the applicant was approached by the first respondent (via his son) and deemed suitable to provide the work. There is no evidence that his suitability for the role was assessed by the other respondents in this matter. I accept that he underwent a police and license check and it was suggested that this was done at the request of one of the Royale entities but again there is no documentary evidence to verify this. I acknowledge Hollis and the important analysis of the control test. I accept the applicant did not control his hours or place of work but rather performed this work under direction. There are rosters in evidence[16] but these represent nothing more than unsophisticated spreadsheets which do not nominate who generated them. Heavy reliance was placed on a number of text messages that the applicant received. One such text stated “this is Carlos from Royale Limousines. This is to confirm your shift tomorrow”.[17] This does not translate to the fact that Carlos controlled the work provided to each driver, rather is just a confirmation email. I so find.
[16] Folio 50-60 of the ARD
[17] Folio 11 of the sixth respondent’s Reply.
Likewise the training email also sent by Carlos simply states “hey this Sunday must go for training to start this Tuesday. POC (person of contact) for the drivers on the day: Ari Bekker.”[18] Again, this email does not confirm that Carlos from Royale was the training co-ordinator or controlled the training. It simply suggests that he was the messenger. Likewise, the role of Ari Bekker is unclear, but I understand he may have been a representative of FIFA, who is not a party to this application. No statements are in evidence from either Carlos or Ari.
[18] Folio 17 of the Reply filed by the sixth respondent.
Overall, I find that the applicant was a worker within the meaning of s 4 of the 1998 Act and meets the indicia of employment as nominated in paragraphs 13 and 14 above. Certainly the arrangement was slapdash and amateur but nonetheless, I am satisfied that he undertook work for which he was suitable for, did such work on demand, was provided equipment to undertake the task, could not delegate the work and was paid an hourly rate for the work done. I further find that he was employed by the first respondent, who initially sourced him as being suitable for the work, arranged for him to undertake the work and more importantly paid for the hours worked. At no stage did the first respondent query the hours worked or claimed by either the applicant or his son which causes me to infer that the first respondent had knowledge of the rosters or control of the times worked. The email chains show that the first respondent was in regular contact with the applicant and his son about the work, the hours and provision of payment. I agree with the submissions of the sixth respondent, in that had the applicant not been paid for the work undertaken, his recourse for any unpaid entitlements would have been the first respondent. The applicant suggests that the first respondent was only there to source and co-ordinate and its role was limited. I do not accept this argument and it is unclear how this assumption is made. At the end of the day, the first respondent paid not only the applicant but also his son (who also undertook driving work) and such sums were substantial. If the first respondent was simply an agent or scout, it would not need to concern itself with payroll, which it clearly did, actually seeking out the excel spread sheet of hours worked and arranged payment for services promptly without querying the hours claimed. For these reasons, I find that the applicant was a “worker” of the first respondent. As a result exploration of the deemed worker provisions are unnecessary.
Was the sixth respondent “the principal”? - s 20 of the 1987 Act?
Section 20 of the 1987 Act provides:
“20. (1) If any person (in this section referred to as the principal) in the course of or for the purposes of the person’s trade or business, contracts with any other person (in this section referred to as the contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work undertaken by the principal, the principal is, if the contractor does not have a policy of insurance or is not a self-insurer at the time a worker employed in the execution of the work receives an injury, liable to pay any compensation under this Act which the principal would have been liable to pay if that worker had been immediately employed by the principal.”
Section 20 can only be enlivened if it has been established that there has been a contractual arrangement between either the first or third respondents with the sixth respondent. Counsel for the sixth respondent indicated that this has not been established by the applicant. Counsel for the applicant indicated that this was also difficult to establish. Whilst I appreciate these concessions, counsel for the seventh respondent indicated that as the sixth respondent held the contract to transport referees for the FIFA World Cup and as the services were provided by either the first or third respondents to fulfil that contractual obligation, then it naturally follows that the sixth respondent is the principal in this matter and therefore liable.
I acknowledge the submissions of the seventh respondent but conclude I cannot make findings that there was the involvement of the principal due to the complete dearth of evidence of a contractual arrangement. It was submitted that the terms of the contract could be inferred but I find there is insufficient evidence to make the inference and I do not agree that the contract can be inferred in complex circumstances such as this. Whilst I have discussed the texts above from representatives presumably connected with one of the Royale companies, there is insufficient information that they were acting in the capacity of principal or that there was in fact a contract between the parties/various respondents at the time of this injury. I acknowledge that there was a historical contract for the provision of services between the sixth respondent and the third respondent, but I have not found that the applicant was connected to the third respondent. Further, that agreement is dated 1 November 2022[19] and relevantly states (unedited):
“Global Chauffers Pty Ltd agrees to offer transport requests to Prime Limousines Group Pty Ltd on the following basis;
1.When the need arises
2.On a non exclusive basis
3.Prime Limousine Group Pty Ltd must have all the relevant insurances & workers compensation policies in place at all times.
4.If Prime Limousine Group Pty Ltd is unable to fulfil its commitment to Global Chauffeurs Pty Ltd, it must inform Global Chauffers Pty Ltd immediately.”
[19] Folio 131 of the Reply filed by the sixth respondent.
Reading this arrangement in its plainest terms, the agreement would not be binding as the third respondent (Prime) did not carry policies of insurance required in clause (3) above at the time of the applicant’s injury. Such policies may have existed at the time of agreement on 1 November 2022 but clearly did not exist at the date of the applicant’s injury. I acknowledge that the failure to have active policies of insurance may negate the commercial transaction between the parties but of itself would not result in the avoidance of any workers compensation liability with reference to the 1987 Act. I however find there is no evidence to demonstrate that at the time of the injury, a contract existed between the first and/or third and sixth respondents.
For these reasons, I cannot be satisfied that a contractual arrangement existed so as to enliven the provisions of s 20 of the 1987 Act. I make an award favour of the sixth respondent.
Evidence on incapacity
Injury was not in dispute. Serial medical Certificates of Capacity confirm the applicant remains totally unfit for work possibly requiring further treatment. I so find. I note that none of the respondents had any independent medical evidence to contradict capacity or injury nor were any submissions made on that point. I further note that PIAWE has been agreed by the parties but should there be any issues relating to calculation, I grant liberty to the parties to apply within 14 days should there be a calculation dispute. I grant this liberty as the papers suggest that the applicant may have received discrete periods of weekly compensation by various respondents prior to liability decisions being made which may require elucidation.
SUMMARY
For the above reasons, I make the findings and orders set out on page 1 of this certificate.
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