G S Technology Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

G S Technology Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2007] FCA 279

ESTOPPEL – estoppel by judgment – res judicata – issue estoppel – cause of action estoppel

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – exploitation – Crown exploitation – Crown use

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 11, 13, 39, 47, 122, 126, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, Schedule 1, (6)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules O 20 r 2
Patents Regulations 1991(Cth) reg 6.3

Patents, Designs and Trademarks Act 1883-1888 (Imp) s 27
Patents and Designs Act 1907 (Imp) s 29
Patents Act 1977 (UK) ss 55, 58

Stack v Brisbane City Council [2004] FCA 354 considered
Stack v Brisbane City Council [1999] FCA 1279 considered
Stack v Davies Shephard Pty Ltd & Ors [2001] FCA 501 considered
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 considered
N V Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken & Anor v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655 cited
Singh v Singh (1897) LR 24 Ind App 50 considered
Mills v Cooper [1967] 2 QB 459 considered
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] AC 853 considered
O’Donel v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (1938) 59 CLR 744 considered

Terrell C, Terrell on the Law of Patents (4th ed, Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 1906)
Terrell C, Jaffe A, Terrell on the Law of Patents (6th ed, Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 1921)
Terrell C, Corsellis D, Terrell on the Law of Patents (7th ed, Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 1927)

Spencer Bower, Turner & Handley, The Doctrine of Res Judicata (3rd ed, Butterworths, 1996)

G S TECHNOLOGY PTY LTD v BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

QUD 268 OF 2006

DOWSETT J
7 MARCH 2007
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 268 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

G S TECHNOLOGY PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Respondent

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MARCH 2007

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The notice of motion filed on 1 November 2006 be dismissed.

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the hearing of the notice of motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 268 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

G S TECHNOLOGY PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Respondent

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

7 MARCH 2007

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant (“GST”) seeks the following relief as against the respondent (the “Council”), apparently pursuant to Ch 17 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the “Act”):

    ‘1.A declaration that the (Council) is an authority of the State of Queensland within the meaning of section 162 of the Act;

    2.A declaration that the (Council) has exploited and continues to exploit the invention for the services of the State of Queensland, within the meaning of s 163(1) of the Act;

    3.A…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 279
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

G S Technology Pty Ltd (the applicant) filed a notice of motion against the Brisbane City Council (the respondent) seeking an order for remuneration for the exploitation of certain inventions under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). The respondent argued that the applicant's claim was precluded by res judicata due to a previous determination in a related matter. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the respondent's plea of res judicata was valid and, if so, whether it precluded the applicant's claim.

The court examined the elements necessary to establish res judicata, focusing on the identity of the parties and causes of action in both proceedings. It found that the relevant causes of action were the same in each proceeding and that there was an identity of parties. The court also considered the operation of Chapter 17 of the Patents Act, which deals with the exploitation of inventions before the grant of a patent. The court concluded that the primary rights conferred by the Act are those conferred by section 13 and supporting sections, which are conferred upon patentees. Since the applicant had not yet been granted a patent, it did not have any enforceable rights in connection with the exploitation of the invention.

Based on the above findings, the court dismissed the applicant's notice of motion and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant's costs of the hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The notice of motion filed on 1 November 2006 be dismissed.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the hearing of the notice of motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOWSETT J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOWSETT J

At par 15 of its written submissions, the Council identifies the various elements necessary to establish its plea of res judicata:‘(a)the judgment was a final judgment on the causes of action it addressed. The fact that there are some other causes of action yet to be litigated in that action does not change the status of the judgment; a fortiori given the Court’s separation of issues, by order, in the earlier proceedings.(b) it was a judgment on the merits, following a trial.(c)there was relevantly an identity of parties – the present Applicant was an applicant in the previous proceedings and the present Respondent was one of the respondents. The relevant cause of action was pursued against the present Respondent. Other causes of action were pursued against other respondents.(d)The causes of action were the same in each proceeding.’For present purposes, elements (c) and (d) are of primary relevance.OPERATION OF CH 17 For present purposes it may be accepted that the Council is an authority of the kind contemplated in s 162 and that it has engaged in, or authorized conduct which amounts to exploitation of the invention as disclosed in the current patents. The Council’s submission is that the question of GST’s entitlement to remuneration for such exploitation was determined against it in the previous proceedings. This submission seems to depend upon the proposition that a patentee’s rights pursuant to Ch 17 are derived from the “invention” rather than from the relevant patent. The chapter certainly contemplates exploitation of an invention prior to grant of a patent and the fixing of the terms for such exploitation, including remuneration. In the course of argument the parties identified numerous difficulties in understanding the operation of the chapter. In the end, they may not matter for present purposes, but I will set out my understanding of the chapter and say a little about comparable legislation in the United Kingdom. The word “exploit” as defined in Schedule 1,‘… in relation to an invention, includes:(a)where the invention is a product – make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or (b)where the invention is a method or process – use the method or process to do any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use.’ The term “invention” is defined in Sch 1 to the Act to mean:‘… any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and includes an alleged invention.’ Such a manner of new manufacture may not necessarily be a patentable invention under the Act. See the decision of the High Court in N V Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken & Anor v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655. Other requirements of the Act must also be satisfied. The inclusion in the definition of an ‘alleged’ invention is also relevant. It is arguable that s 165 contemplates remuneration for exploitation of an invention which is not patentable. However such an interpretation seems unlikely. The notion of remuneration for exploitation implies some recognizable “right” in the invention which is protected or recognized by the Act. An applicant may, prior to grant, have a right to such grant and a right to assign, but it is difficult to see how Crown use could, absent s 161, “infringe” such rights. The primary rights conferred by the Act are those conferred by s 13 and supporting sections such as those contained in Ch 11. Those rights are conferred upon patentees. If an applicant has, prior to grant, any rights in connection with exploitation of the invention, they are inchoate. Infringement before grant may be actionable after grant because the patent will probably have retrospective effect pursuant to ss 47 and 39. As the Act confers no rights in connection with the exploitation of a non-patentable invention, it seems unlikely that s 165 does so. Of course the parties may agree terms of exploitation upon a mistaken belief as to the patentability of an invention, but this case concerns legal rights and obligations, not freedom of contract.