G & L

This decision concerns an appeal from a discretionary judgment. The court was required to consider the principles applicable to assertions that a decision appealed was unreasonable or plainly unjust, and the level of satisfaction necessary before an appellate court will find a mistake of fact.

The legal issues before the court were the appropriate standard of review for discretionary judgments and the circumstances under which an appellate court is entitled to interfere with such a decision. Specifically, the court considered the width of a trial court's discretion and the caution an appellate court should exercise when reviewing these decisions.

The court reiterated established legal principles, emphasizing that appellate courts should be slow to overturn a primary judge's discretionary decision, particularly on grounds involving conflicting assessments of matters of weight. The court cited numerous authorities, including *Bellenden v Satterthwaite*, *Norbis v Norbis*, *Australian Coal & Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth*, *Gronow v Gronow*, and *CDJ v VAJ*, to illustrate that an appellate court should only interfere if the decision is "plainly wrong" or exceeds the "generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible." The court noted that an actual disagreement is insufficient; the strength of the disagreement must be such that the decision is clearly wrong. Furthermore, the court acknowledged the trial judge's advantage in assessing evidence and the "feeling" of a case, which an appellate court reading a transcript cannot always fully share.