G, JJ v Police - [2012] SASCFC 139

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
G, JJ v POLICE
[2012] SASCFC 139
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
20 December 2012
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING OF JUVENILES - NON-CUSTODIAL ORDERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER - AGE OF OFFENDER - YOUNG OFFENDER
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING OF JUVENILES - OTHER MATTERS
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES - SENTENCE
The defendant and appellant pleaded guilty in the Youth Court to three counts of aggravated driving without due care, contrary to section 45 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) - the one road accident caused injury to three people - the defendant received convictions for the three counts, was released on a six month good behaviour bond and his driver's licence was disqualified for two years - whether the circumstances of the accident gave rise to the one offence of aggravated careless driving - whether the charges the subject of the three counts were duplicitous - whether the defendant should have been sentenced by way of family conference pursuant to section 17 of the Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA).
Held per Gray J (Peek and Nicholson JJ concurring): Appeal allowed - the circumstances gave rise to the one offence of aggravated careless driving - the charges the subject of three counts were duplicitous - the Youth Court Judge sentenced the defendant on the basis of a material misunderstanding of the law that the defendant had committed three offences; not one - matter not appropriate to be referred to a family conference - convictions recorded by the Youth Court Judge and the sentence imposed set aside - no conviction recorded - a sentence of community service of 120 hours imposed - defendant disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of 18 months - the order for disqualification backdated to commence on 8 August 2012 - no order for costs.
Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 45; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 26; Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 3, s 4, s 6, s 7, s 12 and s 17; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 16, referred to.
R v Police (2002) 224 LSJS 210; Police v G, PA (2007) 97 SASR 6; Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108; Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277, considered.

G, JJ v POLICE
[2012] SASCFC 139
Full Court: Gray, Peek, Nicholson JJ
GRAY J.

This is an appeal against a sentence imposed by a Youth Court Judge.
The Judge, following pleas of guilty to three counts of aggravated driving without due care contrary to section 45 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA), convicted the defendant and appellant. The defendant was released on a six month good behaviour bond. A driver’s licence disqualification for two years was imposed.
The defendant, a male youth aged 17 years, drove a vehicle on 26 January 2012, causing a collision which gave rise to the charges outlined above. The defendant’s vehicle collided with the rear of a Daihatsu sedan, which was stationary at a set of traffic lights at the intersection of Port Road, Park Terrace and Adam Street, Thebarton. Evidence from the scene and the accounts by witnesses established that the defendant failed to slow down, stop and avoid a collision with the Daihatsu, instead pushing the Daihatsu into the intersection and causing four further collisions to occur with oncoming traffic.
The collision occurred shortly before midnight. The defendant and his girlfriend had been at Australia Day functions and were driving home. His girlfriend had apparently fallen asleep and was unaware of the circumstances of the collision. The defendant has no memory from a time shortly after commencing driving to go home. There is a possibility that he too fell asleep. There had been no consumption of alcohol or any other drugs by the defendant.
The consequences of the immediate collision and the result of the collisions are truly tragic. No doubt there are many occasions of a want of care leading to a heavy impact, but little or no injury. On the other hand, quite minor departures from the standard of care can lead to devastating consequences. The defendant’s driving on this occasion involved a want of care. It was not characterised, and properly so, as driving in a manner dangerous to the public. It may be characterised as a young driver failing to recognise a state of tiredness, leading to a wholly inadequate lookout. As noted above, there is the possibility that he fell asleep.
Three passengers in the Daihatsu each suffered serious injury as a result of the collision. DS suffered multiple pelvic fractures and a right ulnar fracture. Additionally, there was significant soft tissue trauma to her buttocks and lower back. She lost considerable weight and remained bed-ridden for more than four months. Although neurologically intact, she faces ongoing rehabilitation in the future. Her final mobility functions are unknown. She underwent 15 operations with painful recoveries. She described the pain as “unbearable” and at many points “wanted to die”. DS is further disadvantaged as she is deaf and requires the use of her arms and hands to communicate through sign language. As a result, she has had trouble signing for long periods of time, hindering her ability to communicate.
RP was admitted to the Royal Adelaide Hospital with severe spinal and chest injuries and remained in the intensive care unit for a substantial period of time. He was transferred to Hampstead Rehabilitation Centre on 12 April 2012, where he remains. He has been classified as having a spinal cord injury from T3 to C3, known as tetraplegia. RP will not regain any feeling below his upper chest and, as a result, bladder, bowel and sexual function have been compromised. In addition to these injuries, RP has been referred for assessment of sleep apnoea, diabetes and obesity issues, and an adjustment disorder based on his inability to deal with his prognosis. As a result of his spinal cord injury, RP will remain dependent on a wheelchair, carers and ongoing rehabilitation for the remainder of his life.
TP was admitted to the Royal Adelaide Hospital with multiple spinal fractures. She underwent life-saving surgery but the resultant cord injury remained. TP was transferred to Hampstead Rehabilitation Centre on 14 February 2012 with no power or reflexes in her left leg and minimal movement in her right. She now uses a wheelchair and can walk with the use of a frame, but not independently and she needs standby assistance. TP has to catheterise her bladder five times per day and take medication to enable her bowel to function, both of which are done independently. These may be permanent disabilities. Although it is believed that she will gain independence in mobility through combined use of a walking frame and wheelchair, TP will need ongoing therapy and rehabilitation when she leaves the hospital and will require follow-up treatment for life due to her spinal cord injuries.
When sentencing, it is to be accepted that the three victims have suffered grievous injury. In many respects their lives have been ruined. Their victim impact statements are not only a testament to their suffering, frustration and anger, but also to their resilience and a determination to continue their lives as best they can in their own homes.
The defendant made an apology to each of the victims. I am in no doubt that this apology was genuine. A family member of one of the victims expressed a sense of outrage at the apology. It was described as being “like someone had spat in my face”. It is understandable but unfortunate that there should be such a reaction. It is hoped that over time such an attitude may change.
At the hearing before the Youth Court, a family conference had been sought with a view to the defendant meeting with the victims in that environment. The Judge declined to order a family conference. However, since being sentenced by the Youth Court, the defendant sought a face to face meeting with the three victims. This was arranged through the police.
At the meeting on 27 August 2012, the victims, their friends and family, the police, the defendant, his parents and his solicitor were present. In an affidavit before the Court, the defendant deposed that he had requested a face to face meeting with the victims as he knew he was responsible for their injuries and had been horrified to hear of the extent of the hardship that had been caused to them, their friends and their families. He said that he wanted to do anything he could to help them with their recovery process. According to the defendant’s affidavit, at the meeting, at least one of the victims and her family conveyed that they were pleased that the meeting had taken place. Each of the victims indicated that they did not wish to ruin the defendant’s life but they wanted him to understand the devastating consequences of his actions. At the closure of the meeting, the defendant said that he would do all he could to help and that he wished to meet with them again. The defendant described the meeting as “extremely confronting”, but as being “a very positive and worthwhile experience for [him] and [he hopes] it was of some assistance to the victims, their families and friends”.
This attendance, to my mind, was a significant step toward restorative justice. The process was arranged through the police and conducted in what appears to have been an appropriately sensitive manner. I am confident that there will be follow-up meetings. I am satisfied that the defendant’s character is such that he will take such steps as are available to him to assist the victims in their rehabilitation.
Issues on Appeal
The defendant’s vehicle was found to be in a reasonable condition prior to the collision. The road weather conditions at the time were not considered to be a factor in the collision. Tests confirmed that alcohol and drugs were not contributing factors and the defendant’s phone records concluded that he was not using his mobile phone at the time of the collision.
When the appeal was called on for hearing, the Court raised the issue of duplicity. Attention was drawn to the terms of section 45 of the Road Traffic Act, which relevantly provides:
Careless driving
(1)A person must not drive a vehicle without due care or attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road.
(2)If a court convicts a person of an offence against this section that is an aggravated offence, the following provisions apply:
(a)the maximum penalty for the offence is 12 months imprisonment; and
(b)the court must order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for such period, being not less than 6 months, as the court thinks fit; and
(c)the disqualification prescribed by paragraph (b) cannot be reduced or mitigated in any way or be substituted by any other penalty or sentence.
(3)For the purposes of this section, an aggravated offence is—
(a)an offence that caused the death of, or serious harm to, a person; or
(b)an offence committed in any of the following circumstances:
(i)the offender committed the offence in the course of attempting to escape pursuit by a police officer;
(ii)the offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a vehicle knowing that he or she was disqualified, under the law of this State or another State or Territory of the Commonwealth, from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence or that his or her licence was suspended by notice given under this Act;
(iii)the offender committed the offence while there was present in his or her blood a concentration of .08 grams or more of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood;
(iv)the offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a vehicle in contravention of section 45A or 47.
(4)If a person is charged with an aggravated offence against this section, the circumstances alleged to aggravate the offence must be stated in the instrument of charge.
…
(5)In this section—
…
serious harm means—
(a)harm that endangers, or is likely to endanger, a person’s life; or
(b)harm that consists of, or is likely to result in, loss of, or serious and protracted impairment of, a part of the body or a physical or mental function; or
(c)harm that consists of, or is likely to result in, serious disfigurement.
The section creates the offence of aggravated careless driving and specifies under section 45(3)(a) that the offence is aggravated when the offence caused the death of or serious harm to a person. In accordance with the provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), the singular includes the plural so that the word person is to be read as person or persons.[1]
[1] Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) subsections 26(b) and 26(c).
The complaint against the defendant was that he drove without due care and caused serious harm to three persons. In my view, these circumstances gave rise to the one offence of aggravated careless driving. It follows that the charges the subject of the three counts were duplicitous. Counsel appearing for the police accepted that the charges were duplicitous and that the circumstances gave rise to only the one offence. Given this concession, the question arose as to how the matter should progress. The facts of the incident were not in dispute. The defendant admitted aggravated careless driving and admitted that serious harm had been caused to the three victims.
With the agreement of both parties, a fresh complaint was laid alleging the one offence of aggravated careless driving and particularising the allegation that serious harm was caused to three persons. The defendant, through his counsel, pleaded guilty to this charge. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that this Court set aside the convictions recorded on the three initial counts and direct that there be a dismissal of those counts. It follows that the Youth Court Judge proceeded to sentence the defendant on the basis of a material misunderstanding of the law and sentenced on the basis that the defendant had committed three offences; not one. In these circumstances, counsel appearing for the police accepted that this Court should consider afresh an appropriate sentence.
When determining an appropriate sentence to be imposed, regard should be had to the provisions of the Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) and the special regime created for the sentencing of young offenders. The Young Offenders Act provides the legislative framework for dealing with young offenders, with an emphasis on protecting the community through assisting young offenders to recognise their wrongdoings. The community may then facilitate the rehabilitation process by encouraging the realisation of their potential. These objects are reflected in section 3 of the Young Offenders Act, which provides:
Objects and statutory policies
(1)The object of this Act is to secure for youths who offend against the criminal law the care, correction and guidance necessary for their development into responsible and useful members of the community and the proper realisation of their potential.
(2)The powers conferred by this Act are to be directed towards that object with proper regard to the following statutory policies:
(a)a youth should be made aware of his or her obligations under the law and of the consequences of breach of the law;
(c)the community, and individual members of it, must be adequately protected against violent or wrongful acts.
(2a)In imposing sanctions on a youth for illegal conduct—
(a)regard should be had to the deterrent effect any proposed sanction may have on the youth; and
(b)if the sanctions are imposed by a court on a youth who is being dealt with as an adult (whether because the youth’s conduct is part of a pattern of repeated illegal conduct or for some other reason), regard should be had to—
(i)the deterrent effect any proposed sanction may have on other youths; and
(ii)the balance to be achieved between—
(A)the protection of the community; and
(B)the need to rehabilitate the youth.
(3)Effect is to be given to the following statutory policies so far as the circumstances of the individual case allow:
(a)compensation and restitution should be provided, where appropriate, for victims of offences committed by youths;
(b)family relationships between a youth, the youth’s parents and other members of the youth’s family should be preserved and strengthened;
(c)a youth should not be withdrawn unnecessarily from the youth’s family environment;
(d)there should be no unnecessary interruption of a youth’s education or employment;
(e)a youth’s sense of racial, ethnic or cultural identity should not be impaired.
…
These objects provide guidance to the court when dealing with young wrongdoers. In order to appreciate the statutory objectives of the provision, the approach to sentencing must be distinguished from the sentencing of adult offenders. Rather than the focus including general deterrence, the objects of the Young Offenders Act are directed to rehabilitation and address the individual circumstances of the offending youth.
The Young Offenders Act provides a diversionary system allowing a matter to be referred to either informal or formal cautioning, family conferencing or court proceedings.[2] The police are vested with discretion to divert certain matters away from the traditional court process, however, this is restricted to “minor offences”. Parliament has also recognised that there may be cases where diversion is appropriate despite the police not exercising their discretion to divert. As a result, a judicial discretion was incorporated into the legislative scheme. Section 17(2) of the Young Offenders Act provides:
The Court may, even though a charge has been laid, refer the subject matter of the charge (after the youth’s guilt has been established either by admission or by the Court’s findings) to be dealt with by a police officer or by a family conference.
Unlike the police, the court’s power to divert has not been restricted by the legislation to include only minor offences. There is little indication in the wording of section 17 that Parliament intended to fetter the court’s discretion to divert, apart from those expressly provided for in section 17(3). As a result of section 17, the court has the power to refer the subject matter of a charge to the police for caution or to a family conference when considered to be appropriate.
[2] See Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) sections 6 and 7.
In R v Police, I discussed the extent of the court’s powers under section 17 of the Young Offenders Act and observed:[3]
There is no reason in principle to limit the court’s power to refer only minor offences. There will always be cases that have found their way into the court system that “should never really have got into it.” Section 17 contemplates that a court may conclude that a police caution or family conference may be appropriately used as an alternative to traditional sentencing to further the Act’s purposes and in the interests of the community and the young offender. The expansion and development of diversionary powers also suggest that Cox J’s observation is too narrow.
The objectives and policies embodied in the Young Offenders Act underscore the importance of tailoring a sentencing package to address young offenders’ needs. There is no reason to narrow the breadth or restrict the operation of the power given by section 17. Parliament chose not to limit the judicial discretion to divert in the same way that the police discretion has been restricted. The judicial discretion to divert is a broad, unfettered discretion that creates a legitimate sentencing alternative. It is in the interests of young offenders and the community that the advantages of the diversionary process as enacted by parliament are given their full effect by the courts. A wide interpretation should be given to section 17.
[3] R v Police (2002) 224 LSJS 210, [24]-[25]; see also G, R v Police [2012] SASC 195.

These observations were endorsed by the Full Court in G, PA,[4] further emphasising that the Youth Court’s power to divert is not limited to minor offences.
[4] Police v G, PA (2007) 97 SASR 6, [40].
It is also relevant to have particular regard to the wide range of powers invested in the family conference, contained under section 12 of the Young Offenders Act. It was the defendant’s submission to this Court that a section 12 diversion order should be made so that the matter could be dealt with through a family conference with particular regard to issues of restorative justice. Section 12 provides:
(1)A family conference has the following powers:
(a)the conference may administer a formal caution against further offending;
(b)the conference may require the youth to enter into an undertaking to pay compensation to the victim of the offence;
(c)the conference may require the youth to enter into an undertaking to carry out a specified period (not exceeding 300 hours) of community service;
(d)the conference may require the youth to enter into an undertaking to apologise to the victim of the offence or to do anything else that may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
(2)In exercising powers under this section, the family conference must have regard to sentences imposed for comparable offences by the Court.
(3)If a formal caution is administered, the caution must be put in writing and acknowledged in writing by the youth.
(4)An undertaking will have a maximum duration of 12 months.
(5)If a youth enters into an undertaking to pay compensation, a copy of the undertaking must be filed with the Registrar and payments of compensation must be made to the Registrar who will disburse the compensation to the victims named in the undertaking.
(6)If a youth enters into an undertaking to carry out community service, a copy of the undertaking must be filed with the Registrar.
(7)If a youth enters into an undertaking under this section to apologise to the victim of the offence, the apology must be made in the presence of an adult person approved by the family conference or a Youth Justice Co-ordinator.
(8)If a youth—
(a)fails to attend at the time appointed for a family conference; or
(b)does not comply with a requirement of the family conference; or
(c)does not comply with an undertaking under this section,
a police officer may lay a charge before the Court for the offence in relation to which the conference was convened.
(9)A charge may be laid under subsection (8) even though a period of limitation relating to the commencement of proceeding for the relevant offence has expired, but the charge must be laid not more than 12 months after the expiration of that period of limitation.
(10)If—
(a)a youth is cautioned, and no further requirements are made of the youth, under this section; or
(b)all requirements made of the youth under this section (including obligations arising from an undertaking given by the youth) are complied with,
the youth is not liable to be prosecuted for the offence.
(11)If a family conference deals with an offence under this Division, the Youth Justice Co-ordinator must—
(a)ask the victim of the offence whether he or she wishes to be informed of the identity of the offender and how the offence has been dealt with; and
(b)if the victim indicates that he or she does wish to have that information—give the victim that information.
It is clear that section 12(1) provides the family conference with a wide range of powers to compel the youth to undertake anything deemed as necessary in the circumstances. This may include requiring the youth not to drive for a specified period of time, to undertake community service and to take such other steps or actions as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. In this sense, a family conference offers a reasonable alternative to court proceedings which may expose the youth to long term consequences of conviction.
The defendant is a well-rounded young man who takes his academic life and community responsibilities very seriously. He is well supported and respected by family, teaching staff at Christian Brothers College and the Army Cadets of South Australia. As the defendant is a first offender, the option of proceeding without conviction may be invoked. One of the main objectives of the Young Offenders Act is to recognise that criminal behaviour may follow from immaturity. It is also recognised that the young offender may well present as a good candidate for rehabilitation. As earlier mentioned, successful rehabilitation enhances community protection. As noted by King CJ in Yardley v Betts:[5]
The protection of the community is also contributed to by the successful rehabilitation of offenders. This aspect of sentencing should never be lost sight of and it assumes particular importance in the case of first offenders and others who have not developed settled criminal habits. If a sentence has the effect of turning an offender towards a criminal way of life, the protection of the community is to that extent impaired. If the sentence induces or assists an offender to avoid offending in future, the protection of the community is to that extent enhanced.
[5] Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108, 112.
This opinion was upheld in Vartzokas v Zanker, where King CJ further observed:[6]
Rehabilitation as an object of sentencing is aimed at the renunciation by the offender of his wrongdoing and his establishment or re-establishment as an honourable law-abiding citizen. It is not confined to those who fall into wrongdoing by reason of physical or mental infirmity or a disadvantaged background. It applies equally to those who, while not suffering such disadvantages, nevertheless lapse into wrongdoing. The object of the courts is to fashion sentencing measures designed to reclaim such individuals wherever such measures are consistent with the primary object of the criminal law which is the protection of the community. Very often a person who is not disadvantaged and whose character has been formed by a good upbringing, but who has lapsed into criminal behaviour, will be a good subject for rehabilitative measures precisely because he possesses the physical and mental qualities and, by reason of his upbringing, the potential moral fibre to provide a sound basis for rehabilitation. It would be a great mistake to put considerations of rehabilitation aside in fashioning a sentence for such a person.
[6] Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277, 279.
A conviction may have detrimental impacts on the defendant’s future career prospects with the armed forces.
Material before the Court, including the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Beckett, established that a criminal conviction could impact on the defendant’s acceptance into the armed services. A manual concerning conditions of entry provides that a conviction and consequent penalty does not preclude acceptance, however it remains a relevant issue to be addressed.
The evidence before the Court established that the defendant had, for many years, been determined to embark on a career in the armed services. He had been involved through schooling with services as a cadet and had demonstrated outstanding proficiency. His specific plan is to work as a pilot in the armed services and, with this in mind, he has already taken steps to obtain basic pilot qualifications. The evidence of his wider involvement in community services further demonstrates his commitment to public service and the likelihood that he would become a competent and respected member of the armed services. Where possible, this Court when sentencing, in accordance with the provisions of the Young Offenders Act, should fashion a sentence that will not provide a bar or an impediment to the defendant’s pursuit of a career in the armed services.
I do not consider that this matter is appropriate to be referred to a family conference. I have reached that conclusion as a consequence of the defendant having faced both the Youth Court and this Court. During the period between the two hearings, the defendant has, as discussed above, taken a significant step toward restorative justice through the meeting that he arranged with the victims and their families. He has taken this step on his own initiative and with the support of the police. The details of his meeting with the victims and their family have been set out earlier in these reasons. It is evident that much of what would occur at a family conference has already occurred. Since the time of the collision, the defendant has shown contrition and remorse and has demonstrated a responsible attitude and approach. It is clear that the defendant is acutely aware of the suffering he has caused and the suffering that will continue. I see little utility in a diversion to a family conference at this time. However, I do consider that it may have been a matter for closer consideration at the time of initial sentencing.
I have reached the conclusion that a conviction should not be recorded. As the defendant’s offence is a summary offence, section 22 of the Young Offenders Act gives the Youth Court the same powers to sentence the youth as the Magistrates Court.
Section 16 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) provides:
Imposition of penalty without conviction
Where a court finds a person guilty of an offence for which it proposes to impose a fine, a sentence of community service, or both and the court is of the opinion—
(a)that the defendant is unlikely to commit such an offence again; and
(b)that, having regard to—
(i)the character, antecedents, age or physical or mental condition of the defendant; or
(ii)the fact that the offence was trifling; or
(iii)any other extenuating circumstances,
good reason exists for not recording a conviction,
the court may impose the penalty without recording a conviction.
For the reasons set out above, I consider that the defendant is unlikely to commit such an offence again and having regard to his character, antecedents, and age, I have reached the conclusion that good reason exists for not recording conviction. I propose to impose a sentence of community service.
I would resentence the defendant to 120 hours of community service. It is to be hoped that his community service can be performed in circumstances where he is working with disabled victims who suffered their injuries in road collisions.
I consider that the defendant should also be disqualified from driving. As mentioned above, he has not driven since the time of the collision on 26 January 2012. This was a voluntary act on his part. On 8 August 2012, he was disqualified from diving for a period of two years by the Youth Court Judge. As a consequence, at the present time he has not driven a motor vehicle for almost 11 months. Having regard to the period during which he voluntarily did not drive, I would disqualify him from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of 18 months. I would backdate the order for disqualification to 8 August 2012.
Conclusion
I would set aside the convictions recorded by the Youth Court Judge and the sentence imposed. In respect of the offence of aggravated driving without due care, I would proceed pursuant to section 16 of the Sentencing Act and exercise my discretion not to record a conviction. I would impose a sentence of community service of 120 hours to be performed within 18 months and I would disqualify the defendant from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of 18 months. I would backdate the order for disqualification to commence on 8 August 2012. I would make no order for costs of the appeal.
PEEK and NICHOLSON JJ. We have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Gray J in draft form and respectfully adopt his Honour’s recitation of the facts and the history of the Court proceedings in this matter. We generally agree with his Honour’s approach to the special regime under the Young Offenders Act 1993.
With some considerable hesitation, we agree that good reason exists for not recording a conviction. We agree that the defendant should be sentenced to a period of 120 hours of community service and that this community service should, if possible, be performed in circumstances which will reinforce the defendant’s perception of the seriousness of the consequences that befall victims of motor vehicle collisions.
We agree that the defendant should be disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of 18 months, such period to commence on 8 August 2012. Having regard to the matters referred to by Gray J, this equates to an effective period of abstention from driving for a little more than 24 months which we consider to be the minimum appropriate period in the circumstances.
We agree that there should be no order as to costs of the appeal.