G and G
[2004] FMCAfam 9
•7 January 2004
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| G & G | [2004] FMCAfam 9 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Application to vary and discharge child support agreement – father not forthcoming with primary financial material regarding his income – father alleged three distinct grounds to justify a variation – duress – contact with children had increased so as to justify a change to account for the time he spends with his children and that his financial position had changed – father’s veracity doubted due to financial discrepancies – application dismissed – no special circumstances established. COSTS – Costs awarded in accordance with the Family Law Scale – where the Federal Magistrates Court Scale would not sufficiently provide for the expense incurred by the wife in the course of proceedings. |
Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), ss.3, 4, 4(3), 92, 95(2), 117, 117(2)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.117, 117(1), 117(2)(a), 117(2)(b), 117(2)(c), 117(2)(d), 117(2)(e), 117(2)(f)
Wild v Ballard (1997) FLC 92-771
Bryant & Bryant (1996) FLC 92-690
Gyselman & Gyselman (1992) FLC 92-279
Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311
| Applicant: | T G |
| Respondent: | L G |
| File No: | MLM 6508 of 2003 |
| Delivered on: | 7 January 2004 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Hearing Date: | 5 January 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Bryant CFM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Sweeney |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Lander & Rogers |
ORDERS
That all applications be dismissed.
That the husband pay the wife's costs of and incidental to these proceedings, if not agreed to be taxed on the Family Law Scale.
That the tendered documents be returned to the parties tendering the same at the expiration of 30 days unless leave to appeal has otherwise been sought.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLM 6508 of 2003
| T G |
Applicant
and
| L G |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
( Revised from transcript)
Introduction
This matter concerns an application by the husband filed 29 September 2003 to vary a child support agreement made on 21 January 2002 between the parties (the agreement). The agreement provides for the husband to pay periodic child support for the two children of the relationship in sums increasing from $50 per week per child in 2002 and rising to $175 per week in 2006. At present the amount payable is $300 per week, apportioned equally between the children. The agreement also provides for the husband to pay school fees, uniforms and extracurricular activities but the children do not attend private schools and no payments for such expenses have been paid nor are apparently sought.
The husband seeks to depart from the assessment created by the agreement and to have the agreement discharged. In lieu he seeks to pay child support based upon an administrative assessment of child support pursuant to the provisions of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (the Act).
It was with some difficulty that I elicited from the husband the amount that he expected he would be paying if the provisions of the Act relating to administrative assessment were applied. He indicated in his closing address that he understood from the Child Support Agency he would have a liability of about $50 per week in total, based upon his taxable income, if the provisions of the Act were applied without departure.
Thus, in effect, the husband's application is to reduce his current child support commitment from $300 per week to about $50 per week. The wife opposes the application and seeks a dismissal of his application.
The Law
The law applicable in the circumstances is to be found in the provisions of the Act. The obligation to pay child support is created by the Act. Section 3 contains the obligation that parents maintain their children. The objects of the Act are found in section 4. Each of the objects needs to be borne in mind when deciding an application under the Act. Section 4(3) of the Act recognises the desirability of parents reaching agreement for the financial support of their children. Sections 114 and 121 identify that the further objects of Division 4 and 5 of Part 7 include:
“(a) that children have their proper needs met from reasonable and adequate shares in the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of both their parents; and
(b) that parents share equitably in the support of their children.”
Thus the Act includes provisions that provide a scheme for the implementation of consent arrangements. Part 6 Division 3 contains the provisions that relate to applications to the Child Support Registrar for acceptance of a child support agreement executed in accordance with the terms of Divisions 1 and 2. The Registrar must make a decision to accept or refuse to accept the agreement under section 92. Once accepted the liability to pay child support arises where child support was not already payable pursuant to an administrative assessment. Provisions contained in a child support agreement for periodic payments have effect, for the purposes of Part 5, as if they were an order made by consent by a Court under Division 4 of Part 7 (see section 95 (2)).
An application to vary a child support agreement must be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 117 of the Act. The Full Court of the Family Court described the approach to be taken in Wild v Ballard (1997) FLC 92-771. At page 84-490 the Court held:
“In order to vary a consent order made under the provisions of Division 4 of Part 7 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act a Court must be satisfied that a ground for departure mentioned in section 117(2) of the Act exists, and that it would be just and equitable as regards to the child, the carer entitled to child support from the liable parent, and otherwise proper within the meaning of section 117 to make an order changing an existing order.”
This is the genesis for the three-step approach described in Gyselman & Gyselman (1992) FLC 92-279.
Further in Wild v Ballard the Full Court stated, after referring to the Full Court's determination in the case of Bryant & Bryant (1996) FLC 92-690 at pages 84-492 and 493:
“The requirements of s 117 as explained in Bryant obliged his Honour, when dealing with the husband's application for the reduction in his obligation to pay periodic child support, to determine firstly whether by reason of a change of circumstance, a ground for departure existed, and then required his Honour to determine whether it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make an order departing from the existing assessment.
That is the law which must be applied in this case.
The husband's grounds for variation
The husband relied upon three grounds to support his application:
(a)that the agreement was entered into as a result of duress;
(b) that the amount of time for which he has contact with the children since the making of the agreement has increased so as to justify a change to the agreement to account for the amount of time the children spend with him; and
(c)that his financial circumstances have changed and he is no longer able to pay $300 per week on account of his income and his own commitments to support himself.
Duress
What constitutes duress was discussed by McHugh JA Crescendo Management Pty v Westpac BankingCorporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40, 46:
"The proper approach ... is to ask whether any applied pressure induced the victim to enter into the contract and then ask whether that pressure went beyond what the law is prepared to countenance as legitimate? Pressure will be illegitimate if it consists of unlawful threats or amounts to unconscionable conduct. But the categories are not closed. Even overwhelming pressure, not amounting to unconscionable or unlawful conduct ... will not necessarily constitute economic duress."
On 21 August 2001 the husband and wife resolved by agreement issues relating to the children. In summary, the children were to live with the wife and the husband was to have contact on alternate weekends from Friday after school until Monday; on Thursday after school until school on Friday in the alternate week; and after school on Monday until Tuesday in the alternate week; and half the term school holidays. In addition there was to be contact on special days. It was common ground that the effect of the orders was that the husband had the children with him for about 137 nights per annum.
Property issues were also settled by the parties in January 2002. The husband complained that the wife received a greater share of the assets of the parties than he anticipated and feels aggrieved by both the result, and the advice that he received from his legal representatives. In his Affidavit sworn 26 September 2003 he asserts that he was under duress when he consented to the parenting orders and was misled as to their effect in that he thought they were temporary. He alleges that he had spent a great deal of money on legal costs and that the results of both parenting and the property orders were unsatisfactory and he felt pressured and stressed by the proceedings. That was the extent of his evidence relating to duress and it falls far short of establishing duress in a legal sense.
Increase in nights spent caring for the children
The husband asserted that there has been an increase in nights spent caring for the children. The genesis for this assertion as a ground for varying the agreement comes, as I perceive it, from the structure of the Act. The Act itself provides for the Registrar to take into account in making an administrative assessment the nights during which a non-resident parent has contact with the children. The Act provides for some reduction for the non-resident parent depending upon the amount of nights the children spend with the payer.
The husband's evidence was that his care of the children had increased from about 39 to 40 per cent, which was the amount provided in the orders, to 44 per cent in 2002. The wife disputed the amount of nights the husband claims to have had the children and provided a calculation of nights she said that he actually had them. On her calculation the nights in 2003 were 141, which is about 39 per cent; and in 2002 were 153, which is about 42 per cent.
However, in 2002 the husband requested extra time to take the children to Disneyland for a holiday with him and other nights were requested by him. That accounted for most of the increase. In 2003 the extra nights included a school camp which the husband attended, although he was not caring for the children, and some nights when only one child was with the husband and the other child remained with the wife.
The husband did not dispute the wife's calculations. On the evidence I am not persuaded that I should find that in 2003 the husband had both children in his sole care for the amount of time he asserted. In 2002 although he did have them for extra time this was occasioned by their trip to Disneyland with him, a trip requested by him.
Pursuant to section 117 of the Act, to which I have referred, the Court must be satisfied that special circumstances exist by reason of a change in circumstances to establish a variation. I am not persuaded on the evidence that there has been an increase as asserted by the husband and that even if there has, that it would warrant a variation. Even if the husband had the children in both years for an extra 4 to 5 per cent of extra time I would not find that constituted special circumstances by reason of which the agreement should be varied. In these particular circumstances however I am not persuaded on the evidence that he in fact had that amount of extra time with the children.
Change in financial circumstances
The husband filed a Financial Statement on 24 November 2003 and claimed his weekly income was $290 per week and that he receives further benefits of $20 for fuel and $10 for telephone. He receives a Centrelink pension (which I assume to be a family allowance) of $31. He has only modest assets and has some liabilities, including $20,000 to family members. He has a modest superannuation entitlement.
If I believed his financial statement was accurate and he had a gross income of only $290 per week it would be demonstrable that he could not afford to pay $300 per week child support. However, I do not accept the accuracy of the husband's financial statement or his oral evidence regarding his income.
The husband's veracity
The husband derives his income through two company structures, R N Pty Ltd trading as H Plumbers and M Plumbing Pty Ltd. The husband is a plumber by trade and has been self-employed all his working life.
There are a number of matters that emerged during cross-examination which have led me to doubt the veracity of the husband's financial statement and his oral evidence as to his financial position.
Failure to provide primary source documents
The evidence established that many small jobs were not invoiced by the husband and not all of the invoices therefore relating to work done were produced. At least one of the husband's work diaries was not produced and the husband said it could not be located. Between July and August 2003 some invoices for up to $1000 were produced but the husband's receipt books did not tally with them. There were other receipts for which invoices were not able to be produced. There was evidence from the husband that receipts were written up from deposit books, but these were not produced. On his own admission work was done for several jobs but not invoiced and fees are owed to him which have not been accounted for. The receipt books themselves which were produced by the husband to support his position were written up by his mother all at one time in September 2003 for the financial years ending 2002 and 2003. Not all of the primary source documents which would have supported the entries in the books were produced by the husband.
M Plumbing
Both the husband's parents are retired pensioners. In his Financial Statement filed in relation to the property proceedings which took place in the Family Court and were concluded in January 2002, the husband showed no interest in M Plumbing. This company was established after the parties had separated and apparently during the time there was litigation in the Family Court between them. His mother was the Director of the company and the company carried out plumbing work. His mother had no qualifications as a plumber. There may have been some other work done by other subcontractors but the evidence establishes that the husband was the main source of the work for this company.
In May 2002, shortly after the property proceedings were concluded, the control of the company was handed to the husband and his mother has no interest in the company now. The husband conceded in his evidence that the purpose of establishing the company ostensibly controlled by his mother, was to avoid the wife having any claims upon his business and income in the property proceedings. He asserted that he was concerned that his wife's claims would ruin his business and it is for this reason that this arrangement was entered into.
Whatever the legitimacy of the husband's concerns about the wife's action, there is no doubt that the arrangement was one entered into for the husband to have business interests and derive benefits which were not disclosed to the wife and were in fact hidden from her. Despite his assertion that he received no benefit from the company during that time the evidence clearly establishes that that is not the case.
A $26,000 management fee was paid to R N Pty Ltd, and as the husband was the sole controller of that company the benefit of that money effectively went to him. He asserted that it was simply a paper transfer but there was evidence to show that there were deposits made to R from the company which do not accord with the husband's evidence.
The corollary of the establishment of the company was that the husband was able to present a picture to the Court and the wife in the property proceedings that Roldian was doing badly at a time when M Plumbing were doing most of the work, and most of it being done through the husband.
In the property proceedings the husband asserted that he had debts of about $60,000 to his mother which have now been extinguished. He says that they have been extinguished by transfer of a motor vehicle to his mother. However, the car is still stored at his home and there appears to have been very little change in the reality of the ownership of the vehicle, notwithstanding his assertion. In addition, the loan accounts which provided for liabilities to the husband's mother which were apparently loans from her to him have now been extinguished. Finally, M Plumbing paid the husband's legal fees and again, any loan accounts established at the time have subsequently been extinguished.
It is demonstrably clear that the husband received significant benefits from M Plumbing during the period of the property proceedings, and subsequently, although he had presented his case to establish to the wife and the Court that he had nothing to do with the company, let alone any benefit from it.
Husband's former partner
The husband asserted that he was unable to work because of the illness and death of his former partner. In paragraph 7 of his Affidavit filed 11 November 2003 the husband said as follows:
That I have worked very little since my partner became seriously ill in August 2002. She recently passed away in February 2003.
The partner referred to was K A. However, the evidence discloses the following:
i)that she was never a de facto partner of the husband;
ii)that the relationship broke down in November 2002 before her illness; and
iii)that the husband has had another partner with whom he is still living, since 2002.
I am prepared to accept that the husband was upset by her illness and subsequent death. However, there is no evidence that he was unable to work due to this. Indeed, there is evidence that he did work during this period, including work on her bathroom for which he was paid by her father.
The most important aspect of this evidence however, in paragraph 7, is that his Affidavit is a blatant attempt to mislead the Court and the wife as to his present financial circumstances.
Other financial discrepancies
The husband's BAS statements appear to have all been done in September 2003 at the same time as the receipt books were written up and the tax returns for 2002 and 2003 were completed. There are however a number of anomalies:
(a)the sums shown as receipts in the BAS statements do not tally with the deposits;
(b)there are instances where cash and cheques were deposited but no cash is shown in the receipt books;
(c)some receipts are not recorded.
For example, the husband did work for E Constructions which he apparently invoiced in October 2003, according to his records. He said that he had not been paid but it is clear from his Visa statements that moneys were paid direct to his Visa account. He asserted the job was done at an earlier time but that does not accord with his own records. When he was asked specific questions about the deposit to his Visa account he admitted that it came from E Constructions. His explanation for it not being included in the record of receipts was that it would be adjusted by the accountant when the accounts for the end of the financial year were done and that his mother had simply not picked it up.
There was a second payment which was also not recorded in the records and was paid direct to the husband's Visa account. He also said this would be picked up in the accounts for 2003-2004. It was put to the husband however that there were at least two more payments which fell into the previous financial year on 4 June and 19 June from Malden Constructions which were not recorded in the receipt books and clearly were not adjusted in the accounts for the 2003 financial year. The husband was unable to give any explanation for this other than to say that they had been overlooked.
I find that the husband's financial statements and his receipt books as produced to the accountant are not an accurate record of the husband's real income and cannot be relied upon. There are also instances where the husband conceded that he received ‘contras’ in the form of work done by others for work done by him. These were not recorded. There are several instances of invoices not being sent out. There are outstanding fees conceded by the husband of about $6000 at the present time. He received $4000 the day before the hearing. I am not satisfied that the husband has collected all of the fees which he is entitled to, and there were many instances in which he conceded that there was money owing to him which he had not even invoiced.
The husband appears not to have been fully occupied in earning an income. He has taken considerable time off to assist with the children's school. In a case where a party is making a proper contribution to the support of the children to their mother in accordance with their commitments, it is no doubt laudable that they are prepared to play a significant part in the children's schooling. However, it is used by the husband in this case, in my view, as an excuse to refuse to pay child support.
I accept the submission by Counsel for the wife that by working a bit more at the charge-out rate which the husband says he can obtain, he would have no difficulty in earning sufficiently to pay child support to the mother.
There are other matters which arise from the financial statements tendered by the husband to which I will refer. He made no explanation of these nor was there any cross-examination. It may be that they are simply book entries but they merit some comment.
The balance sheet for R N Pty Ltd for 30 June 2003, trading as H Plumbing, shows an unsecured loan was treated as repaid between June 2002 and June 2003. The husband's own borrowings from the business increased from $247,747.29 to $361,135.41 in that period. On the husband's own figures in some form or another the husband withdrew from the business during that period $86,388.12.
The profit and loss account for Huntingdale Plumbing the year 2002 shows sales $130,359, in the year 2003 $39,025. That is partly accounted for by trading through M Plumbing. However, a significant amount of expenditure was incurred by R N Pty Ltd resulting in a net loss. One effect of that is that the company continues to have the benefit of significant losses to carry forward and no tax to be paid.
The balance sheet for R N Pty Ltd for the year ended 30 June 2002 shows that between 2001 and 2002 the unsecured loans to the husband increased from $174,895 to $274,747. Again, the husband has drawn down in some form $99,852.
The sales figures show that for the year ended 30 June 2001 sales were $519,322 compared with 2002 where the sales were $130,359. There is no explanation other than the proceedings that were then on foot between the parties and what I have found to be the husband's desire to conceal assets from the wife for the apparent change in this position.
The husband relied upon tax returns which he tendered. Those returns show that he had the following taxable income: 30 June 2003, $15,154; 30 June 2002, $14,109; 30 June 2001, $43,713, which is salary of $35,150 plus interest; 30 June 2000, $27,852; and 30 June 1999, $19,639.
Given that not only his income for 30 June 2001 would have been known to the husband when he entered into the child support agreement in January 2002, but also a further 6 months trading, I can only infer that he consented to the agreement in the knowledge of his taxable income and that despite it, he believed that he could pay the sum agreed. The 2001/2 year was also the time when M plumbing was established and he was seeking to conceal from the wife his true income.
The husband's attitude to the child support
Despite his assertion that he would be liable for $50 per week if his application was successful, the husband has paid nothing since April 2002, a period of 19 months during which time he has continued to work and has taken the children for a trip to Disneyland.
His attitude to the property settlement, notwithstanding it was made by consent, is that the wife received an inappropriate share of the assets and that the agreement was unfair to the husband. I infer that the husband's attitude to payment to the wife, as he has paid nothing since April 2002, is a direct response to his dissatisfaction with the property settlement and his current asset position, as he perceives it.
Special circumstances
Has the husband established special circumstances by reason of which there should be a discharge or variation to the agreement?
For the reasons that I have already indicated, I do not accept that the husband's taxable income ever represented the real amount that he was earning. If it had, he would never have entered into the agreement.
In the following year, that is 2002-2003, his taxable income increased slightly. Thus it could not be said, even looking at his taxable income, that it has decreased since the agreement was changed. If I were to look at his taxable income, as he asserts that I should do, then I must find that there are no changed circumstances and indeed his circumstances have slightly changed for the better.
However, the evidence establishes that the husband's taxable income is not an accurate reflection of his real position, for a number of reasons. He has lied about his income and in particular I refer to the assertion in paragraph 7 of his Affidavit which purported to suggest that he could not work because of the illness of his partner. That is, in my view, a blatant attempt to mislead the Court and the wife.
He has tried to obscure his income by establishing a company, M Plumbing, which his mother ostensibly operated but for which in the main he was the income generator. He did so, on his own admission, to avoid the wife being able to claim assets associated with him in property proceedings. This was clearly devised to hide his assets and income.
The husband's financial position is so attenuated by doubt occasioned by the way he has conducted himself that I am unable to make a positive finding as to his real income and benefits. He conceded that a salaried plumber would earn approximately 600 to 700 dollars per week which is an annual income of $36,400. However, he rejected the possibility of obtaining a salaried position as he has been self-employed since the age of 19.
There is an evidentiary onus on a litigant who seeks to establish special circumstances so as to establish a ground under section 117(2) of the Act. The husband has failed to satisfy that onus and has not established that his financial position has changed to his disadvantage. With the amounts he agreed to pay in the face of his taxable income, I must infer that the husband has at all times known and accepted that his taxable income did not reflect the real income that he has been earning.
As a result of his evidence I am left in the position where I am unable to make a finding as to his real income at the time he entered into the agreement or his real income at the present time. However, I am satisfied that it is certainly not the taxable income that he relies upon. He has therefore failed to establish that there are special circumstances by reason of changed circumstances to justify a departure from the agreement and his application must be dismissed.
There are two possible scenarios as to the husband's financial position. One is that he has income of a significant amount and is well and truly able to meet the child support agreement. I infer from the evidence and from his actions in entering into the agreement this is the more likely scenario. It is possible, I suppose, that the husband's real financial position is such that it does make it difficult for him to pay the amount set out in the agreement. However, I am left in the position where the husband's lies and obfuscation about his income do not enable me to find what his real circumstances are now or what they were at the time of the agreement and therefore that they have changed so as to constitute a special circumstance.
Therefore I am left in the position where I must simply find that the husband has not discharged the onus upon him and that he has not established that there are special circumstances by reason of which there should be any departure from the provisions of the existing agreement and that the husband's application must be dismissed.
Accordingly, the orders I propose to make are the husband's application be dismissed and that the exhibits tendered to the Court be returned to the parties tendering same at the expiration of 30 days unless an application for leave to appeal has been made.
Costs
An application by the wife for her costs to be paid by the husband has been made. Section 117 of the Family Law Act sets out the provisions in relation to payment of costs. Subsection (1) says that each party shall bear his or her own costs unless the Court otherwise orders. The High Court in Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311 has said that there is no presumption arising from this as to whether in a particular case costs should or should not be ordered and that each case depends upon its own facts.
Section 117(2)(a) sets out the matters that the Court should consider when considering what order, if any, should be made for costs. The Court must consider a number of matters to which I will refer. Firstly, the financial circumstances of each of the parties. The husband contends that I should, by reason of this section, refrain from making any order for costs because whilst the wife is in a reasonable financial position and has assets he clearly has no assets and says that his income position is such that he could not afford to pay an order for costs.
I accept that the wife is in a better asset position than he is, which largely arose from the property proceedings between them. However, she is, of course, maintaining the children, and they are with her, and has been doing so now for some 17 months without any support from the husband. Given the findings that I have made in my Reasons for Judgment I am not able to conclude that the husband would not be in a position to meet an order for costs.
Subsection (b) requires me to consider whether any of the parties are in receipt of legal aid, and that is not an issue in this case.
Subsection (c) requires me to consider the conduct of the parties in relation to the proceedings. In this case it is clear that despite the fact that proper disclosure was requested by the wife that the husband failed to properly disclose his financial position. The wife relies in particular on a letter dated 5 December 2003 which points out to the husband that the wife's legal advisers have by that time become aware of M Plumbing Pty Ltd and note that the company has been operating since the 2002 financial year and the existence of the entity and the husband's interest in it was not disclosed in the Family Court proceedings. They point out that consequences would arise from that non-disclosure and that given that fact it is all more vital that proper disclosure be provided. A large number of items were sought relevant to the husband's financial position.
The fact that disclosure was sought and attempts to obtain the documents were made, in many cases futile attempts in my view, indicates the husband's attitude to the proceedings. It is a relevant factor, in my view, as to whether he should pay costs.
Subsection (d) requires the Court should consider whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with previous orders. That does not apply in this case, in my view, independently of subparagraph (c).
Subparagraph (e) requires the Court to consider whether any party has been wholly unsuccessful. It is clear in this case that the husband has been wholly unsuccessful and I take that into account.
Finally, subsection (f) requires the Court to consider whether there have been any offers to settle the proceedings. Whilst there have not been any offers to compromise the proceedings a letter was written by the solicitors for the wife on 24 October 2003 indicating that they had given preliminary advice to the wife and that it is their view that the application was without foundation. The husband was invited to withdraw his application and he was informed that they were instructed, if he did not do so, to formally act on her behalf and that any costs incurred would be sought against him in the result that his application was unsuccessful.
While this was not an offer of compromise in the proceedings it was an offer to the husband to settle the proceedings by withdrawing his application and put him on notice well and truly of that point before most of the work was done that if he was unsuccessful the ultimate outcome may be an order for costs against him. That is a relevant matter as well, in my view and for those reasons in my view the husband should be ordered to pay the wife's costs.
The wife sought an order for indemnity costs but I am not satisfied that the circumstances in this case give rise to the situation in which that would be appropriate. However, a great deal of work has had to be done by way of interlocutory process and discovery to prepare the matter for hearing in view of the lack of information provided by the husband and in view of his obfuscation – deliberately, I have found – of his financial position.
I therefore do not consider that the Federal Magistrates Court scale, which is a lump sum scale, would provide sufficiently for the wife's costs in this matter and in this unusual case I propose to order that the husband pay the wife's costs to be taxed in accordance with the Family Law Scale.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Bryant CFM
Associate: Peter Smith
Date: 8 January 2004
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