FXF v Children's Guardian

[2024] NSWCATAD 254

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

FXF v Children’s Guardian [2024] NSWCATAD 254

Hearing dates:

21 February 2024

Date of orders:

28 August 2024

Decision date:

28 August 2024

Jurisdiction:

Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division

Before:

A Starke, Senior Member
P Foreman, General Member

Decision:

The decision of the Children’s Guardian dated 11 July 2023 to refuse to grant the applicant a working with children check clearance is affirmed.

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — Application for review under s 27(1) of Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 — Risk assessment triggered by Schedule 1 matter where, despite his conviction for indecent assault being quashed on appeal, the applicant was a person against whom criminal proceedings had previously been commenced for a charge of indecent assault of a person under 16 years of age pursuant to s 61M of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) — Allegations of sexual harassment of young teenage female students as well as allegations of inappropriate behaviours as a teacher including swearing at students and bullying and harassing of students — Whether the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.

Legislation Cited:

Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW)

Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW)

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Teaching Service Act 1980 (NSW).

Cases Cited:

AYU v NSW Office of the Children’s Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 69

BFX v Children’s Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 115

BHY v Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWCATAD 91

BKE v Office of Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

CHB v Children’s Guardian [2016] NSWCATAD 214

Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949

Commissioner for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111

Commissioner for Children and Young People v IK [2005] NSWSC 1136

CRG v Children’s Guardian [2017] NSWCATAD 295

CTE v Children’s Guardian [2018] NSWCATAD 28

CXZ v Children’s Guardian [2020] NSWCA 338

CYY v Children’s Guardian (No 2) [2017] NSWCATAD 262

DAI v Children’s Guardian [2017] NSWCATAD 308

Drake v Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1970) 2 ALD 60

DYH v Public Guardian [2021] NSWCATAD 136

ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 162

McDonald v Guardianship and Administration Board [1993] VR 521

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1; [2006] HCA 53

Office of the Children’s Guardian v CFW [2016] NSWSC 1406

Smith v Commissioner of Police [2014] NSWCATAD 184

Tilley v Children’s Guardian [2017] NSWCA 174

VQB v The Secretary to the Department of Justice (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 789

YG & GG v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247

ZZ v Secretary, Department of Justice [2013] VSC 267

Texts Cited:

None cited

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

FXF (Applicant)
Children’s Guardian (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
A Zheng (Respondent)

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2023/00234762

Publication restriction:

With the exception of expert witnesses and officers of government agencies, the publication or broadcast of the name of any person mentioned in these proceedings is prohibited. This order was made on 17 August 2023 under section 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

Note: A reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction and overview

1. In this case the applicant asked the Tribunal to undertake, pursuant to s 27(1) of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) (“the Act”), an administrative review of the respondent’s decision dated 11 July 2023 to refuse to grant a working with children check clearance to him on the grounds that he poses a risk to the safety of children (“the Refusal Decision”).

2. The applicant had previously held a clearance which was cancelled on 20 December 2018 when the Children’s Guardian became aware that proceedings had been commenced against him for indecent assault and aggravated indecent assault of a person under the age of 16 years under s 61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (“the TriggerOffence”). The offences were alleged to have been committed by the applicant against one of his students in the schoolroom environment in the second half of 2016, although the complainant did not disclose the matter until some time later, in 2018. The applicant was charged on 19 December 2018, suspended from duty and placed on the “not to be employed” list held by the Department of Education (“DoE”).

3. As a result of the proceedings commenced against him, the applicant was then a “disqualified person” within the meaning of the Act. He was convicted of the indecent assault charge by the Local Court on 31 January 2020. The applicant then successfully appealed the conviction in the District Court on 4 February 2021.

4. Following his successful appeal, the applicant applied for a new clearance on 7 June 2021. Having had his conviction quashed, he was no longer a “disqualified person”. However, the applicant was still subject to an “assessment requirement” under s 14 of the Act because matters specified in Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 of the Act applied to him. The Children’s Guardian was therefore required to conduct a risk assessment pursuant to s 15(1) of the Act.

5. After completing an assessment, the Children’s Guardian concluded that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children on a number of grounds concerning the applicant’s alleged conduct in the teacher-student context, and that the applicant used his position of authority to put students at risk of sexual and psychological harm. Multiple allegations were made between 2010 and 2016 by a number of students that the applicant used inappropriate language and engaged in unwanted touching in the classroom. Additionally, DCJ investigations substantiated allegations of sexual abuse, and named the applicant as a “person causing harm”.

6. With respect to the Trigger Offence which was the most recent conduct complained of, the Children’s Guardian noted that despite quashing the applicant’s conviction, the District Court appeal judge found that it was likely that he had a sexual interest in the complainant and had acted upon that interest. Whilst not being satisfied to the criminal standard of proof to uphold the conviction, her Honour did not find that the allegation was baseless.

7. In proceedings before this Tribunal, the applicant maintained his denial of the Trigger Offence and asserted that the allegation was a complete fabrication. With the exception of admitting that he had used inappropriate language on occasions, the applicant strenuously denied all other allegations.

8. As part of the apparent conflict in the school environment involving the applicant, the complainant’s boyfriend had been arrested and cautioned by Police on 10 August 2018 for assaulting the applicant. During his interview with Police, the complainant’s boyfriend disclosed that the applicant had been touching one of his female students inappropriately. As noted in the transcript for the Local Court sentencing hearing and the District Court Judgment, this interview with Police concerning an assault on the applicant became the “springboard” for the Trigger Offence to subsequently be reported.

9. The applicant had made a worker’s compensation claim for psychological injury against the DoE, resulting in a determination by the Workers Compensation Commission in August 2019 that he be paid weekly compensation and be referred to a Approved Medical Specialist for whole person impairment assessment. The basis of his claim was that the school had not supported him after a number of incidents where he asserted that he had been bullied and harassed by staff and students and, in particular, that he had been assaulted by the complainant’s boyfriend. The applicant is also currently pursuing a claim for psychological injury in District Court proceedings against the DoE.

10. In arguing the grounds for his application for administrative review, the applicant contended, largely through biblical references and prayers, that the quashing of his conviction for indecent assault was a judgment given by God, and that thereby his innocence had been established.

11. The applicant contended that the complainant was motivated to falsely accuse him because he had pressed charges against her boyfriend for assaulting the applicant.

12. In a submission that was not entirely clear, the applicant asserted that the DoE was motivated to gain an advantage in his civil damages case by colluding with the Children’s Guardian. He asserted that by not having a clearance, his ability to work as an educator is restricted such that he is placed in a position where he cannot argue future economic loss in the calculation of his damages.

13. The applicant argued that he does not pose a risk to children and that, whilst he is now too sick to work, he is motivated to clear his name once and for all.

14. He asked the Tribunal to overturn the Refusal Decision.

15. The respondent argued that the applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children, and sought to have the Refusal Decision affirmed.

16. On the evidence before us, we have decided that the correct and preferable decision is to affirm the Refusal Decision. Our reasons follow.

Prohibition order

17. Due to the sensitive nature of these proceedings and to protect against the identity of any alleged victim being disclosed, an order was made on 17 August 2023 pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (“the NCAT Act”) that the publication or broadcast of the name of any person mentioned in these proceedings or referred to in the documentary material lodged in these proceedings (except for expert witnesses and officers of government agencies) is prohibited. To further protect against the identity of any alleged victim being disclosed, these Reasons do not identify the names of any schools or geographic locations of courts where proceedings took place.

Jurisdiction and procedure

18. Since the applicant was self-represented, the Tribunal explained the general process for the hearing. Noting that written submissions and documentary evidence in support of his application had not been put before the Tribunal before the hearing, the Tribunal invited the applicant to make opening oral submissions.

19. The applicant’s opening submissions comprised prayers and scriptural references, appealing to the “court of heaven” to overturn the Refusal Decision.

20. The Tribunal respectfully acknowledged the applicant’s personal views with respect to his spiritual beliefs, and asked whether he would be making any legal submissions. The applicant asserted that the scriptural references were, indeed, his legal submissions.

21. The Tribunal explained that its jurisdiction is found in the Act and related legislation, and asked the applicant to address the fundamental issue as to whether he poses a risk to the safety of children.

22. Despite a number of requests from the Senior Member, asking him to refrain from reading scripture to the Tribunal, the applicant persisted with prayers and biblical references. The Tribunal considered that it had allowed a reasonable amount of time and latitude to the applicant with respect to his pronouncements relying upon scripture, and ascertained that the applicant was prepared to file a document containing his written submissions. On that basis, the Tribunal decided to move from hearing oral submissions, to hear the applicant’s oral evidence.

23. The applicant objected to the Tribunal’s decision, arguing that it was his “right and privilege” to make oral submissions.

24. The Senior Member explained to the applicant that the Tribunal had not issued a formal direction and had simply decided as a step in the process to move to hearing his oral evidence since he was prepared to hand up his submissions in writing. The Senior Member assured the applicant that he would have an opportunity to make further submissions and also noted that the Tribunal could determine matters of procedure as set out in the relevant legislation.

Material and evidence before the Tribunal

25. The applicant sought to rely upon the following material handed up during the hearing:

1. a copy of the Court Order Notice from the District Court dated 4 February 2021 confirming the appeal against his conviction had been upheld (marked for identification as “Exhibit A1”);

2. a copy of the District Court order made on 20 May 2021 revoking the Apprehended Violence Order that had been made against him on 31 January 2020 for the benefit of the complainant (marked for identification as “Exhibit A2”);

3. a copy of the Medical Assessment Certificate dated 1 October 2019 issued in connection with the applicant’s worker’s compensation claim for damages for a psychological injury against the DoE (marked for identification as “Exhibit A3”);

4. a copy of an email dated 12 February 2024 from the District Court Registry to the applicant confirming orders made on that date in connection with a forthcoming hearing in the District Court (marked for identification as “Exhibit A4”);

5. a copy of a Certificate of capacity/certificate of fitness completed by the applicant and his treating medical practitioner, dated 16 February 2024, in connection with his worker’s compensation claim for the injury he sustained as a result of being assaulted by a student on 10 August 2018 (marked for identification as “Exhibit A5”);

6. a copy of newspaper articles concerning the principal (now deceased) of the school where the applicant had been employed (marked for identification as “Exhibit A6”);

7. written submissions (not marked).

26. The respondent relied upon the following material:

1. a bundle of documents filed on 23 August 2023 pursuant to s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (“the ADRAct”) (marked for identification as “Exhibit R1”);

2. a further bundle of documents (comprising two volumes) filed on 7 September 2023 pursuant to s 58 of the ADR Act (marked for identification as “Exhibit R2”);

3. written submissions dated 13 February 2024 (not marked).

Oral evidence

27. The applicant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined during the hearing.

Oral submissions

28. Both parties made oral submissions.

Issue for the Tribunal’s determination

Test to be satisfied in determining the application

29. Section 18(2) of the Act provides that the Children’s Guardian must grant a clearance to a person who is subject to a risk assessment unless the Children’s Guardian is satisfied that the person “poses a risk to the safety of children”. Applying that test, and on the material before the Tribunal, the issue for determination is whether the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety of children.

No presumption that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children

30. In undertaking this administrative review, there is no presumption that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children. Neither party bears the onus of proof, although the applicant has a practical or forensic onus: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1; [2006] HCA 53 at [39]-[40].

Full disclosure of relevant matters is required

31. Whilst there is no statutory presumption that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children, he nonetheless has a statutory obligation to “fully disclose to the Tribunal any matters relevant to the application”: s 27(4) of the Act.

Background

Family history

32. The applicant is 50 years of age, divorced and the father of two children. He was the third child in a four sibling family, and his parents are now deceased.

33. He stated in his letter dated 14 November 2022 to the Children’s Guardian that he has full custody of his son (who is now almost 18) and that he had shared custody of his daughter (who is now aged 19) on weekends. It appears that the applicant separated from his wife in around 2010. There is no suggestion that the applicant behaved inappropriately towards his children and no allegations have been made against him regarding their safety.

34. The applicant was educated in catholic schools, and completed his Higher School Certificate.

35. His first employment was as a service station assistant when he was about 18 years of age. He then commenced studying law at a University in Sydney, with plans to work as a Police Prosecutor. He was recruited into the NSW Police Force and was trained in Goulburn. He worked as a Constable before resigning in 1999 after 3 years in the Police Force. According to his letter dated 14 November 2022 to the Children’s Guardian, he resigned from the Police Force on a ‘without prejudice’ basis and was not subject to any concerns including disciplinary complaints, reports or proceedings.

36. The applicant then trained to become a high school teacher. He worked as a casual teacher at various catholic primary and high schools before commencing employment with the DoE in around 2002. He was employed as a teacher within the social sciences faculty at the high school where the Trigger Offence and other incidents were alleged to have occurred, until August 2018.

37. In his submission to the Children’s Guardian dated 27 July 2021, the applicant stated that he had made three successful workers compensation claims against the DoE for workplace bullying and harassment. He asserted that he suffered stress and psychological injury as a result of having complaints made against him for efficiency and conduct which were false. He also stated that the complaints arose from interpersonal issues between himself and the principal of the school.

38. The applicant had been on an extended period of workers’ compensation between 26 August 2016 to mid-2018. He had worked on a part-time basis in Term 1 in 2017, and returned to teaching in August 2018.

39. On 10 August 2018, a student who was the complainant’s boyfriend (“KA”) assaulted the applicant. The police were called and the student was cautioned. This is discussed more fully under “Consideration”.

40. In the course of being interviewed about his assault of the applicant, KA disclosed that the applicant had assaulted the complainant. On 15 August 2018, the allegation that the applicant had indecently assaulted the complainant was reported to the police and subsequently to the Child Abuse Squad. The complainant was interviewed on 17 August 2018 which was electronically recorded.

41. Also on 17 August 2018, the Child Abuse Squad advised the Employment Performance and Conduct Directorate (“EPAC”) of the DoE that an Apprehended Violence Order (“AVO”) had been served on the applicant. Under the AVO, the applicant was not to attend the school premises.

42. On 23 August 2018, investigators conducted further interviews with other students.

43. By letter dated 21 August 2018, the applicant was suspended from duty and was directed to undertake non-teaching duties pending the outcome of an investigation by the EPAC. The applicant supplied a medical certificate and did not attend for duties. The investigation related to alleged inappropriate contact and improper comments with students. The applicant was directed to not have contact with the complainant and not attend the grounds of the school.

44. On 19 December 2018, the applicant was arrested and charged. He declined to participate in an electronically recorded interview.

45. The applicant was then suspended from duty without pay effective from 7 February 2019 and his name was temporarily placed on the list of people who are not to be employed (“NTBE”) in any capacity by the DoE. The NTBE list is a confidential database and those persons who are placed on the list are ineligible for employment by the DoE in any paid or voluntary capacity.

32. In a determination by the Workers Compensation Commission dated 16 August 2019, the applicant’s claim against the DoE for psychological injury resulted in the applicant being awarded a weekly payment of $2,003. The basis for the claim was that the applicant suffered a psychological injury as a result of having been assaulted by KA on 10 August 2018 and that he was not supported by the school in his notification of the assault to police. The claim did not turn on any unreasonableness in the treatment of the applicant following the complainant’s disclosure of the 2016 incident. The determination recognised that the DoE had “little alternative but to move the alleged assailant off the school grounds and did so quite appropriately”. The applicant’s psychological injury was diagnosed as an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Depression and Anxious Mood.

33. On 31 January 2020, the applicant was found guilty of the Trigger Offence.

34. Having been found guilty of the offence, the applicant became an unauthorised person pursuant to s 93R1(a1) of the Teaching Service Act 1980 (NSW). As a consequence, pursuant to s 93T of that Act, the applicant was dismissed as a member of the teaching service. He was advised of his dismissal by letter dated 1 February 2021. He was also advised that his name had been permanently placed on the NTBE list. The DoE confirmed, in an email to the Children’s Guardian on 4 October 2022, that the applicant’s name remained on the NTBE list.

35. He was sentenced on 15 July 2020 to 12 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 months. We understand he was granted bail and did not serve any time in prison.

36. On 4 February 2021, the applicant’s appeal was successful in the District Court and his conviction was quashed.

37. On 20 May 2021, the AVO against the applicant for the protection of the complainant was revoked.

38. Notwithstanding that his conviction was quashed and the AVO was revoked, we understand that the applicant’s name remains on the NTBE list.

39. Although the applicant has stated that he is too ill to work, he has also expressed a desire to return to teaching, possibly in a Christian school, and would require a clearance.

Applicable legislation and legal principles

Object of the Act

54. The protective jurisdiction of the Act is plainly evident from its stated object as set out in s 3:

3 Object of Act

The object of this Act is to protect children—

(a) by not permitting certain persons to engage in child-related work, and

(b) by requiring persons engaged in child-related work to have working with children check clearances.

Paramount consideration

55. The paramount consideration in the operation of the Act is set out in s 4:

4 Safety, welfare and well-being of children to be paramount consideration

The safety, welfare and well-being of children and, in particular, protecting them from child abuse, is the paramount consideration in the operation of this Act.

The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is protective, and not punitive

56. Having regard to that paramount consideration, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under s 27 of the Act is protective, and not punitive, in nature: DAI v Children’s Guardian [2017] NSWCATAD 308 (‘DAI’) at [8]; AYU v NSW Office of the Children’s Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 69 (‘AYU’) at [34]; Commissioner for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111, per Young JA at [61]. The object of the Act is not to impose additional punishment on a person such as the applicant, but to eliminate possible risks to children: CYY v Children’s Guardian (No 2) [2017] NSWCATAD 262 (‘CYY’) at [26].

57. The protective jurisdiction of the Act was emphasised in CXZ v Children’s Guardian [2020] NSWCA 338 (‘CXZ’) per Simpson AJA at [58]:

“It is plain that in some cases this will be the cause of potential injustice to the applicant for a clearance. A person entirely innocent of any allegations may be refused a clearance because the evidence does not permit a conclusion that the allegations are without foundation and the inability to reach such a conclusion leaves open sufficient possibility that the risk exists. Analysis of the relevant provisions of the Child Protection Act satisfies me that the legislature preferred the risk of injustice to an applicant to risk to the safety of children.”

Definition of “children”, “child abuse” and the meaning of “risk to the safety of children”

58. “Children” is defined in s 5(1) of the Act to mean “persons under the age of 18 years”.

59. The words “child abuse” appearing in s 4 above are not defined in the Act. The Tribunal stated in BFX v Children’s Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 115 at [29] that the words would be aptly described as “maltreatment of a child consisting of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, neglect, or any combination of these, and includes exposure to harm caused by or being subjected to family violence”.

60. The meaning of “risk to the safety of children” is defined in s 5B of the Act to mean a “real and appreciable risk to the safety of children.” The meaning of the word ‘risk’ was considered by Young CJ (in Equity) in Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476 at [42]:

“One does not define risk as meaning minimal risk. One would… exclude fanciful or theoretical risk but what one is looking for is whether, in all the circumstances, there is a real and appreciable risk in the sense of a risk that is greater than the risk of any adult preying on a child. One, however, must link the word ‘risk’ with the words that follow, namely ‘to the safety of children’…”

61. His Honour’s consideration of the meaning of risk was cited with approval in a number of cases before the Tribunal and the NSW Supreme Court: CTE v Children’s Guardian [2018] NSWCATAD 28 at [30]; BKE v Office of Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523 (‘BKE’) at [26] and AYU at [39]. Ultimately, the Tribunal must consider whether a clearance, if granted, will create a “real and not fanciful” risk to the safety of children: CXZ per Basten JA at [26].

Child-related work requires a WWCC clearance

62. Under s 8(1) of the Act, a worker must not engage in child-related work unless the worker holds a clearance. A worker who is subject to an interim bar must not engage in child-related work: s 8(2) of the Act.

63. Work that involves direct contact by a worker with a child or children and that contact is a usual part of and more than incidental to the work is defined as “child-related work” for the purposes of the Act: s 6(1) of the Act.

64. In order to work as a teacher, the applicant requires a clearance.

The Tribunal’s function

65. The Tribunal must determine what the “correct and preferable” decision is: s 63(1) of the the ADR Act. In determining an application, the Tribunal exercises all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision (in this case, the Children’s Guardian): s 63(2) of the ADR Act.

66. However, in exercising those functions, the Tribunal must not simply “stand in the shoes” of an administrator. The Tribunal does not conduct a review of the Refusal Decision. The Tribunal reviews the application for clearance ‘de novo’ (meaning ‘afresh’ or ‘again’). As explained in DYH v Public Guardian [2021] NSWCATAD 136 at [21], the Tribunal must conduct its review without any presumption as to the correctness of an administrator’s decision:

“The effect of these two subsections is sometimes characterised as the Tribunal being required to “stand in the shoes” of the administrator who made the decision. But that is not entirely accurate. I must conduct this review without any presumption as to the correctness of the decision: McDonald v Guardianship and Administration Board [1993] VR 521 at [530] and I am required to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material before me. It is clear that that may include material which postdates the making of the decision: YG and GG v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247 (‘YG’) at [25], Drake v Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1970) 2 ALD 60 at 77.”

67. The Tribunal has regard to the material before it, including material that may not have been before the Children’s Guardian, and the applicable law: YG at [25], per Hodgson JA (with whom Foster and Brownie A-JJA agreed); applied in BHY v Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWCATAD 91 at [14].

The Tribunal can determine its own procedure

68. The “guiding principle” to be applied to practice and procedure with respect to proceedings in the Tribunal is set out in s 36 of the NCAT Act. That principle is stated to be “to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings”.

69. Section 38 of the NCAT Act provides that the Tribunal can determine its own procedure in relation to any matter for which that Act or the procedural rules do not otherwise make provision.

70. Parties to proceedings in the Tribunal are under a duty to co-operate with the Tribunal to give effect to the guiding principle and, for that purpose, to participate in the processes of the Tribunal and to comply with directions and orders of the Tribunal: s 36(4) of the NCAT Act.

What orders the Tribunal can make

71. The Tribunal may make orders that include an order to affirm the Refusal Decision or vary it, or set it aside and make a decision in substitution, or set it aside and remit the matter to the respondent for reconsideration: s 63(3) of the ADR Act.

Mandatory risk assessment triggered by Schedule 1 matters

72. Under s 14 of the Act, a person is subject to an “assessment requirement” if any of the matters specified in Schedule 1 apply to the person.

73. Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the circumstances that trigger an assessment requirement with respect to offences that are specified in clause 1 of Schedule 2 (Disqualifying Offences). The relevant sections of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 are set out below:

“Schedule 1—Assessment requirement triggers

1 Offences

(1) Proceedings have been commenced against a person—

…, or

(b) for an offence specified in clause 1 of Schedule 2, if the offence was committed as an adult, and the person is not because of those proceedings a disqualified person.”

“Schedule 2—Disqualifying offences

1 Specified offences

(1) The following offences are specified—

...

(e) an offence under section 61I, 61J, 61JA, 61K, 61KC, 61KD, 61KE, 61KF, 61L, 61M, 61N, 61O or 61P of the Crimes Act 1900,

…”.

74. In this case, clause 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 of the Act applied to the applicant’s circumstances with respect to an offence which is specified in clause 1(1)(e) of Schedule 2 of the Act, triggering a mandatory risk assessment. Specifically, proceedings had been commenced against the applicant for the alleged offence of indecent assault contrary to s 61M of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The applicant was an adult at the time of the alleged offence and, at the time of the assessment, he was no longer a disqualified person.

Matters that the Children’s Guardian may consider in undertaking an assessment

75. In making an assessment, the Children’s Guardian may consider the matters set out in s 15(4) of the Act.

76. If the Children’s Guardian is not satisfied of risk based on the s 15(4) matters alone, the ‘reasonable person’ and ‘public interest’ tests set out in s 15(4A) of the Act must be considered:

(a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the applicant that was not directly supervised by another person while the applicant was engaged in any child-related work, and

(b) it is in the public interest to make the determination.

77. If the person fails either the ‘reasonable person’ or the ‘public interest’ test, clearance will not be granted.

Mandatory matters for the Tribunal’s consideration under s 30(1) of the Act

78. In determining this application, the Tribunal must consider the matters set out in s 30(1) as set out below:

30 Determination of applications and other matters

(1) The Tribunal must consider the following in determining an application under this Part—

(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar,

(b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred,

(c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred,

(d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim,

(e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person,

(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,

(g) the person’s present age,

(h) the seriousness of the person’s criminal history and the conduct of the person since the matters occurred,

(i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition,

(i1) any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person,

(j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application,

(j1) any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A,

(k) any other matters that the Children’s Guardian considers necessary.

Further considerations under s 30(1A) of the Act

79. In addition, if the Tribunal is considering making an order enabling an applicant to work with children, it must then consider the two-part test set out in s 30(1A) of the Act:

(1A) The Tribunal may not make an order under this Part which has the effect of enabling a person (the affected person) to work with children in accordance with this Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that—

(a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in any child-related work, and

(b) it is in the public interest to make the order.

First limb of the two-part test under s 30(1A)(a) - the “reasonable person” test

80. The first limb of the two-part test is known as the “reasonable person” test. It requires the application of an objective standard based upon the views of the “reasonable person”. It assumes that the “reasonable person” is acquainted with all the relevant facts of which the Tribunal is aware: CHB v Children’s Guardian [2016] NSWCATAD 214 at [127]; CYY at [26].

81. The legislation in Victoria contains provisions similar to those in s 30(1A) of the Act. In VQB v The Secretary to the Department of Justice (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 789 (‘VQB’) at [36], the Tribunal held that an objective test was called for by the legislation:

“… The reasonable person would, in reaching his or her conclusions, acquaint himself or herself with all of the matters that have been placed before me, giving an applicant for a positive assessment a right to be heard, as well as considering the material gathered by the Secretary. A reasonable person would not approach the task with a closed mind, thinking that once a person has offended, he or she can never be redeemed. The reasonable person, however, would not put aside all scepticism and reasonable caution in this most difficult area in some over-optimistic attempt to facilitate rehabilitation.”

82. The reasonable person approach taken in VQB was endorsed in NSW in CRG v Children’s Guardian [2017] NSWCATAD 295 at [85] and DAI at [90]. In DAI at [91], the Tribunal said:

“In order to properly consider this test, a ‘reasonable person’ would need to know about the disqualifying offence, the circumstances surrounding the offence, the applicant’s entire criminal history, the length of time since those offences occurred, his conduct since then and any expert assessment made for him.”

Second limb of the two-part test under s 30(1)(b) - the “public interest” test

83. The second limb of the two-part test is referred to as the “public interest” test. The notion of “public interest” was addressed by the High Court of Australia in ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 162 in which French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ said at [20]:

“The term ‘in the public interest’ is one of broad import. When used in a statute, the term classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters confined only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute in question.”

84. Accordingly, in proceedings under the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012, the “public interest” must be considered in light of the paramount purpose of the Act, namely, to ensure the protection of children from sexual or physical harm: s 4 of the Act.

85. When applying the public interest test, the Victorian Supreme Court has endorsed a broad and not a narrow approach: ZZ v Secretary Department of Justice [2013] VSC 267 (‘ZZ’) per Bell J at [205]. While emphasising the main purpose of the Victorian legislation (equivalent to the NSW legislation) is the protection of children from harm, the decision in ZZ at [202] also acknowledged the relevance and importance of rehabilitating offenders and their right to work. The private interests of an applicant such as their right to work in their chosen area of employment are also a factor to be taken into consideration insofar as those private interests also have a broader community benefit as per Bell J at [203]:

“In the context of the right to work, the tribunal has (in my view, correctly) taken into account the public interest in enabling persons to engage in their chosen field of employment or in the field in which they are most suited to work, in not lightly turning people away from their commitment to a chosen career and in encouraging people to use their qualifications, experience and expertise for the benefit of others.”

86. The concept of public interest has been determined by the Tribunal on the basis of giving priority to the broad interests of the community over private interests: Smith v Commissioner of Police [2014] NSWCATAD 184; CYY at [75].

87. If the Tribunal is not satisfied that an applicant has met either of the first or second limbs in the two-part test, it is precluded from making an order enabling the applicant to work with children.

The approach to fact finding and the assessment of risk

88. In recognition of the protective jurisdiction of the Act and the paramount consideration being the safety, welfare and well-being of children, the Tribunal is bound to follow the decision in BKE at [33] when assessing risk:

“Thus in such cases it may be that NCAT can be satisfied that an allegation of sexual abuse against an applicant is established. Equally, NCAT may be affirmatively satisfied that the relevant incident did not occur, in which case it can be put aside. However, in a context where the welfare of the child is paramount and the question being posed concerns the risk of harm to children, NCAT may not be satisfied that an allegation of abuse has been made out, but nevertheless conclude that the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or course of conduct means that there is a risk to a child or, more correctly, that the existence of a risk has not been disproven.”

89. The approach to fact finding as explained in BKE at [33] has been approved by the Court of Appeal in Tilley v Children’s Guardian [2017] NSWCA 174 at [34]-[45] and in CXZ per Simpson AJA at [57]:

“The task of the Tribunal is, to expand on what Beech-Jones J said in BKE, to determine, even if it is unable to be satisfied one way or the other as to the truth of all or any of the allegations, whether, by reason of the possibility that the alleged conduct occurred, the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children. [emphasis in original] If so, the Tribunal must refuse to grant a clearance. Of course, in that process the Tribunal will give consideration to the strength of the evidence supporting the allegations and will, inevitably, reach conclusions about the truth or falsity of some. If it finds any allegation to be without foundation it will discard it from further consideration. If it is satisfied that the allegation is well founded, it will assign to it such weight as it sees fit, in the consideration (inter alia) of the circumstances listed in s 30. It is the allegations between those two extremes, those that are neither proved nor disproved, that the Tribunal must address in determining whether the applicant for a clearance poses a risk to children.”

90. Thus, relying upon the analysis in CXZ at [51], many cases will not lend themselves to definitive factual determination. Where an allegation is neither “well founded” nor “groundless”, the Tribunal must decide whether, on the evidence before it, the possibility that the conduct did occur justifies a finding that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children: CXZ at [52]. The assessment and the weight to be assigned to allegations will depend upon the seriousness of the allegations, the strength of any evidentiary support for those allegations, and the relevance of the conduct the subject of the allegations to the risk to the safety of children if a clearance is granted to the applicant: CXZ at [53].

91. A positive finding by the Tribunal that alleged conduct has taken place will generally be determinative of an application: Office of the Children’s Guardian v CFW [2016] NSWSC 1406 (CFW) at [14]-[15], per Justice Harrison:

“The first proposition is that, in assessing whether there is a risk to the safety of children, the court or tribunal should first consider whether (a) positive findings can be made as to any alleged act(s) of wrongdoing on the balance of probabilities, or (b) whether the court or tribunal has “no hesitation in rejecting the allegation as groundless”. A positive finding on the balance of probabilities that relevant conduct has taken place, if such a finding can be made, will generally have a “decisive impact” on the outcome of the application.

The second proposition is that, even if no such “positive finding” can be made, the court or tribunal is still obliged to consider questions of risk that may be indicated by all of the facts, unless it is determined that the allegation is “groundless”.”

92. In determining the application, the Tribunal is required to consider “the totality of the evidence”: BKE at [28] citing The Commissioner for Children and Young People v IK [2005] NSWSC 1136 at [83]-[84]. The Tribunal is to make a decision based on the “cumulative effect” of the matters before it: CYY at [69]-[71].

Civil standard of proof

93. The standard to which the Tribunal must be satisfied before making a positive finding in relation to an allegation is the civil standard, that is, on the balance of probabilities, and not the criminal standard: CFW at [14]-[17], subject to the need to have regard to the principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 (Briginshaw). The Briginshaw principle can broadly be described as a standard of satisfaction to be reached where serious allegations are concerned. Put simply, serious allegations with serious consequences require more compelling evidence for the decision maker to reach the necessary state of reasonable satisfaction that the facts in dispute are more likely than not to exist.

94. Because of the seriousness of the allegations and the gravity of their consequences, the Tribunal must have “a reasonable satisfaction” that the particulars of a complaint have been proved, as per Dixon J. in Briginshaw at [362]:

“The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.”

95. Section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) provides that matters including the gravity of the matters alleged may be taken into account when making findings of fact. However, s 38(2) of the NCAT Act provides that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. Therefore, strictly speaking, neither the Briginshaw civil standard (having the particulars of a complaint proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal) nor s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 applies directly in decision-making by the Tribunal: Bronze Wing International Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2017] NSWCA 41.

96. In summary, the general accepted approach is that when deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the civil standard of proof, the Tribunal will be informed by matters including the seriousness of an allegation and the gravity of the consequences of making the finding.

Consideration

97. In closing submissions, arguing the principle of ‘double jeopardy’, the applicant voiced his strong objection to being ‘prosecuted’ again for the Trigger Offence in connection with his application for clearance. We wish to clarify a number of important matters.

98. First, the applicant’s conviction for the Trigger Offence was quashed by the District Court, and he cannot be tried again for that criminal offence.

99. Second, this Tribunal is tasked with determining whether the applicant poses a risk to children. In assessing that risk, we consider the proceedings against him for the Trigger Offence and allegations made against him for his conduct towards and around children.

100. Third, when considering allegations against the applicant, this Tribunal applies the civil standard of proof (i.e. on the balance of probabilities), subject to having regard to the Briginshaw principle. The civil standard is a lower threshold to meet, unlike the criminal standard (that the offence is proven beyond reasonable doubt) which applied in the proceedings in the Local and District Courts with respect to the Trigger Offence. We note this, in particular, since the applicant’s written submission and closing oral submissions suggested, erroneously, that the Judgment which quashed his conviction was made on the civil standard of proof. Her Honour did not reject or disbelieve the complainant but found there was sufficient doubt concerning some matters (which we note below) and therefore it was not possible to uphold the conviction as a matter that was “beyond reasonable doubt”.

101. Fourth, in evaluating the evidence before us, it is not necessary to find that the offences or the alleged conduct occurred. Applying the rationale in BKE (approved by the Court of Appeal in Tilley and CXZ), it is sufficient to conclude that it is possible that the alleged conduct occurred before then proceeding to consider whether the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.

Mandatory considerations in s 30(1)(a)-(k) of the Act

102. In determining the application, we are obliged to consider the evidence under each of the headings in s 30(1)(a)-(k) of the Act.

The seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar: s 30(1)(a)

103. We deal first with the Trigger Offence. We then consider the conduct of the applicant with respect to allegations against him of a sexual nature, and allegations of a non-sexual nature, all of which preceded the Trigger Offence.

(1) Trigger Offence

104. The material before us included a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the Local Court on 15 July 2020, a transcript of the District Court appeal hearing on 22 January 2021 and a copy of the District Court Judgment handed down on 4 February 2021.

105. The hearing in the Local Court proceeded over three days between 29 and 31 January 2020. There is no transcript of those proceedings. The applicant entered a not guilty plea and did not give evidence.

106. The Magistrate found the offence to be a serious matter, and one that involved both some pre-planning as well as being opportunistic. The applicant was convicted and sentenced to a term of 12 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of four months. We understand that he was granted bail and did not serve any term of imprisonment.

107. The appeal in the District Court was heard on 22 January 2021. The applicant gave evidence, denying the allegation. The witness evidence was given by recorded interviews which Harris DCJ watched but were not recorded verbatim on the transcript. Her Honour made specific references to the evidence of the complainant and two witnesses and the manner in which they gave their evidence in their police interviews. Her Honour also made very clear Findings.

108. The District Court Judgment contains the following summary of the allegation:

“The complainant gave evidence that on a day in the fourth school term in 2016, the [applicant] asked her to stay behind after class. Four of her classmates asked if she wanted them to stay with her. She told them, “No,” and that she would meet up with them in the bathroom. After the other students had left the classroom, the appellant checked her work and as she packed her books away he closed the classroom door. He returned to where she was seated an grabbed her legs around to her buttocks. She was in the corner of the room and was backed into the corner. She tried to get up and push him away. He pulled her towards him. She told him to stop and put her hands up but he hit her hands away. He started to remove her skirt, which was fastened with a button and a zip. She said he may have broken the button as he pulled at her skirt. He zipped it down and pulled it off completely. She said “get away” but he pulled her back and started trying to take her tights off, pulling her tights down. People were heard moving and/or talking outside the classroom and the [applicant] let go of her and left the room. She dropped to the floor where she stayed for ten minutes. She then ran to her friends in the bathroom crying. She told them, her four school friends, including her friend GK, that she had fallen down the stairs in order to explain her distress.”

109. Whilst the complainant did not disclose the alleged incident to family or friends contemporaneously, her Honour noted that it is not uncommon for a victim of a sexual offence to disclose it in a piecemeal way.

110. The complainant’s evidence was that she had another geography lesson with the applicant the following day and that he did not talk to her or go near her. That lesson was the last class that the complainant recalled having with the applicant as her teacher in 2016, because he left the school and did not return until 2018. She said that upon his return to the school, the applicant approached her at an outdoor sport session and asked how she was and where she lived. This, apparently, scared her, and she went back inside the school and was crying. She told her boyfriend (KA) that the applicant had touched her in Year 7 and she did not like it. She apparently did not disclose the incident which was the subject of the Trigger Offence more fully to her boyfriend until the following school term, during a conversation with him and another male friend (“JY”).

111. The date on which the alleged indecent assault occurred is not precisely identified. The complainant believed the incident occurred in the middle of the fourth school term in 2016. However, the applicant was on leave due to a workers compensation claim from 26 August 2016 until mid-2018. This fact was heavily relied upon by the applicant in his defence. The District Court Judge took this into account when assessing the reliability of the complainant’s evidence. Her Honour noted that the allegation related to an incident two years earlier and that the complainant may have been genuinely mistaken about the timing.

112. Her Honour also took into account the brazen nature of the alleged offending in circumstances where the risk of being discovered was real, and accepted that the evidence of the complainant in respect of the particulars of the touching during the incident was by and large consistent and not shaken in cross-examination.

113. Her Honour also considered a perplexing aspect to the evidence involving the creating of a fictitious identity by the complainant, which may have been used as a “slow release valve” for the complainant’s disclosure, but overall it left her Honour with a degree of unease. Nonetheless, her Honour was of the view that the complainant’s disclosure to her boyfriend (KA) and JY was consistent with her evidence in Court.

Background to student’s assault of the applicant precipitating disclosure of the Trigger Offence

114. As previously noted, the complainant’s boyfriend had assaulted the applicant on 10 August 2018. In his interview with police, KA referred to the complainant’s allegation against the applicant but at that point in time, KA did not know the full details of the allegation. KA’s hand-written account on the day of the assault included a statement that the applicant had been “reported before about creeping among the girls in class and harassing them”. KA stated that the applicant “shouts and orders us like dogs” and that he “hovers over us which makes us all extremely uncomfortable”. He described his own actions, stating that he had been working alone in a workbook as directed by the applicant while his laptop was charging. He said the applicant wouldn’t leave him alone so KA started swearing at the applicant and then was walking out of the classroom as he had been directed. The applicant wouldn’t move so the student bumped into him and pushed him.

115. Four other students in Year 10 provided hand-written reports about KA’s assault of the applicant. One student (“AA”) described the class with the applicant as being “another obstacle to overcome” because of the “disrespect, bullying, harassing”. AA said the applicant was aggressive with KA to a point where KA “couldn’t take it anymore and swore at him and threw a pen at him and slapped his back and went outside”.

116. Another student (“BH”) described the applicant’s body language as being “extremely aggressive” and stated “the way he screams at us and points at us is extremely violent”.

117. Another student (“JS”) stated “This incident was caused because of the teacher being really aggressive” and added “Whatever happened today I think it would’ve happened anyways in future but it might have been some other student”.

118. Another student (“YC”) stated “This incident was caused by the build up of emotion in [the applicant’s] class.” He further stated “[The applicant] intimidates every single individual in the room with his body weight, voice and hand gestures” and “This incident was not just caused from one lesson rather every single lesson leading up to it as well. The consistent torment from this teacher has caused most of the students in the class to revolt (sic) geography”.

119. KA’s assault was clearly regarded as being entirely inappropriate conduct, warranting a police caution. We note however, that the assault may not have been entirely spontaneous or unprovoked, and appears to have resulted from a build up of antagonism in the classroom. A common thread in the witnesses’ accounts is that the applicant behaved aggressively through his language and body movements by being close to students, standing over them and pointing in their faces.

Applicant’s defence arguments

120. The applicant contended that the complainant’s allegation against him was completely false, and had been fabricated as ‘pay back’ for the applicant wanting to press charges against her boyfriend.

121. However, that contention does not offer an explanation for the complainant’s initial disclosure to KA before KA’s assault on the applicant. Indeed, the material before us demonstrates that KA’s assault on the applicant was partly driven by KA’s knowledge of what the complainant had told him.

122. As noted in the District Court Judgment, KA disclosed in his police interview that the applicant had been “touching one of his female students inappropriately”. Once KA made that disclosure in his police interview, an investigation by a Joint Investigation and Response Team (“JIRT”) followed, with the complainant and other students being interviewed, and not as a result of a disclosure initiated by the complainant. Indeed, the District Court Judgment noted that, if it had not been for KA’s assault on the applicant, the complainant may not have disclosed the alleged indecent assault incident to authorities. We also understand the complainant was reluctant to disclose the matter to anyone, including the principal of the school or the police.

123. The applicant’s sworn evidence in the District Court was that he did not assault or touch the complainant in any way. He denied that he had asked her to stay back after class. His evidence was that he had never, ever touched any part of her body with any part of his body and that none of the things she alleged, had happened.

Conviction quashed

124. Harris DCJ was not satisfied to the criminal standard of proof that the applicant committed the offence charged. Accordingly the conviction and consequent orders of the Local Court were quashed.

District Court Findings that the allegations were not baseless

125. However, Judge Harris stated that she did not find that the allegations were baseless. In her ultimate reasoning, she was left with a “level of suspicion”:

“While I retain a level of suspicion as to the guilt of the [applicant], notwithstanding his evidence of prior good character, I am left with a reasonable level of disquiet in respect of the allegation.”

126. Her Honour acknowledged that some of the complainant’s evidence was not so impressive, but accepted the complainant’s evidence of the incident as having the “ring of truth”:

“I accept that the evidence of the complainant in respect of the particulars of the touching during the incident the subject of the charge was by and large consistent and not shaken in cross-examination. Her evidence in that respect and the related hand gestures seen in her JIRT interview of the [applicant] batting her hands away did have the ring of truth.”

127. The evidence of another student (“GK”) who witnessed the applicant paying particular attention to the complainant in class, was found to corroborate the complainant’s evidence to a significant extent. Based on an assessment of the manner in which GK gave evidence in a JIRT interview, her Honour stated:

“Having regard to the tendency evidence, I am satisfied that it is likely the [applicant] on occasions intentionally touched the complainant’s leg with his hand when he was assisting her with her class work. The complainant’s evidence is corroborated to a significant extent by GK, who witnessed the [applicant] paying particular attention to the complainant in class, getting very close to her and placing his hands in a manner providing the opportunity to touch her in the manner the complainant described. GK’s observations of the complainant’s body language and anxiety when the appellant was checking her work and the complainant’s reluctance to go to geography class provide further support for the tendency evidence of the complainant. This generalised touching was the subject of the initial complaint by the complainant to her boyfriend.”

128. On the strength of the evidence, Harris DCJ was satisfied that:

“...it is likely the [applicant] on occasions intentionally touched the complainant’s leg with his hand when he was assisting her with her class work.”

129. Her Honour found:

“It is likely that [the applicant] had a sexual interest in the complainant and that he acted upon that interest by touching her knee and inner thigh in an opportunistic way in the classroom.”

130. Further, her Honour’s referred to the brazen nature of the alleged offending in an environment where there was a high risk of detection:

“I have also taken into account the particularity (sic) brazen nature of the alleged offending, including pulling off the complainant’s school skirt and trying to remove her tights when she was physically resisting him when there were, on the complainant’s account, students or teachers passing by the classroom”.

DCJ records

131. In considering the evidence, we have had regard to the DCJ records. On 15 August 2018, the complainant’s mother contacted the DCJ after a conversation with the school principal and subsequently attended the local police station with the complainant to report a series of incidents that were alleged to have occurred between 2016 and 2018. The complainant participated in an audio visual interview with JIRT on 17 August 2018.

213. The applicant continues to be defensive, and deflect blame onto other parties. There is no evidence before us that the applicant has genuinely reflected upon his offending conduct or engaged in rehabilitation. We therefore cannot be satisfied, on the evidence, that he will not repeat his offending conduct.

Conclusion

218. On the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children and should not be granted a clearance.

219. In light of the conclusion reached, it is not necessary to consider the reasonable person and public interest tests in s 30(1A)(a) and 30(1A)(b) of the Act.

Orders

220. The decision of the Children’s Guardian dated 11 July 2023 to refuse to grant the applicant a working with children check clearance is affirmed.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

Registrar

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 28 August 2024