FULTON & PACKER
[2015] FamCA 286
•23 April 2015
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FULTON & PACKER [2015] FamCA 286
FAMILY LAW – CONTRAVENTION – Parenting – Where final orders were made in July 2013 – where the father brings an application alleging that the mother contravened those orders – where it is found that the mother contravened the orders without reasonable excuse – matter to be listed for the further hearing of submissions in relation to penalty and outcome.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Jets & Maker [2010] FamCAFC 55
APPLICANT: Mr Fulton
RESPONDENT: Ms Packer
FILE NUMBER: LEC 575 of 2007
DATE DELIVERED: 23 April 2015
PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane
PLACE HEARD: Brisbane
JUDGMENT OF: Forrest J
HEARING DATE: 14 April 2015 REPRESENTATION
THE APPLICANT: In Person
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Summers of Counsel
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Armstrong Kutz Lawyers
Orders
(1)The matter be listed for further hearing before his Honour Justice Forrest at 10.00 am on Tuesday, 7 July 2015.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Fulton & Packer has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE FILE NUMBER: LEC 575 of 2007
Mr Fulton Applicant
And
Ms Packer Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1.On 29 July 2013, parenting orders were made by Kent J in proceedings between the parents of the child B after a seven day trial had taken place in 2012. The central issue in the trial was the allegation, made by the mother, that the father had perpetrated sexual abuse against the child. Kent J determined that the child was not at an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse in his father’s unsupervised company but ordered that the child spend supervised time with his father for other reasons.
2.The father did not get to spend time with the child after those orders were made and he filed a contravention application in December 2013. He filed an amended contravention application in August 2014 and a further one in January 2015.
3.The contravention applications came before Stevenson J when her Honour was visiting this Registry last year and her Honour ordered a family report to be prepared for the Court’s assistance. That has been done. Tendered into evidence as Exhibit 3 in the contravention hearing is the family report of Ms SB, family consultant in the Child Services Division of this Court’s Brisbane Registry.
4.The hearing of the contravention applications came before me for determination on 14 April 2015. The father did not have legal representation. The mother was represented by solicitor and counsel.
The alleged contraventions
5.Several counts of alleged contravention were evident on the father’s applications. Relevantly, the following parts of Kent J’s parenting orders provided:
8. Within seven (7) days of the date of the Father’s written nomination each party must:
a.take all steps reasonably necessary to forthwith undertake any intake requirements of the nominated provider;
b. comply and continue to comply with all reasonable requests or directions from time to time of the nominated provider; and
c.attend and ensure the child’s attendance at scheduled visits.
9. the child spend time with the Father for two (2) hours each fortnight such time to be supervised by the nominated provider.
…
16. The Mother and the Father shall:
a.keep the other parent informed at all times of their residential address and contact telephone number;
b.keep each other informed of an emergency contact telephone number;
c.keep the other parent informed of the names and addresses of any treating medical or other allied health practitioners who treat the child and the parents shall authorise those practitioners to provide the other parent with information that they are lawfully able to provide about the child;
d.inform the other parent as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical condition, significant health issue or significant illness suffered by the child.
...
18.During the time the child is with either parent, that parent shall:
a.…
b.…
c. not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the child and use their best efforts to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence of hearing of the child.
Count 1
6.The father alleged that the mother contravened the obligation imposed upon her in paragraph 8(a) of the order by failing to reply to his written request dated 9 August 2013 to contact CC Centre in Town X to do her intake within seven days of his request.
7.The mother denied having contravened paragraph 8(a) of the order as alleged.
Count 2
8.This count properly encompasses two alleged contraventions. The father alleged that the mother contravened the obligation imposed upon her in paragraph 8(c) of the order by failing to attend CC Centre on 6 September 2013 and failing to ensure the child attended that day and spent time with his father.
9.The mother denied having contravened paragraph 8(c) as alleged.
10.The father also alleged that the mother contravened the obligation imposed upon her in paragraph 9 for the child to spend time with him for two hours each fortnight on five occasions from September 2013 until the time of the filing of his first contravention application.
11.The mother admitted having contravened that part of the order but asserted that she had a reasonable excuse for doing so.
12.I shall refer to these as Count 2(a) and Count 2(b).
Count 3
13.The father alleged that the mother contravened the obligations imposed upon her in paragraphs 16(a) and 16(b) to keep the father informed at all times of her residential address and contact telephone number and of an emergency contact telephone number.
14.The father alleged that the mother waited seven weeks to provide these details but that the ones that she provided were false.
15.The mother admitted having contravened those parts of the order but asserted that she had a reasonable excuse for doing so.
Count 4
16.The father alleged that the mother contravened the obligation imposed upon her in paragraph 16(c) of the orders to keep him informed of the names and addresses of any treating medical or other allied health practitioners who treat the child and specifically that she did not respond to a written request sent to her by the father on 14 October 2013 for such information.
17.The mother admitted having contravened those obligations but asserted that she had reasonable excuse for doing so.
Count 5
18.The father alleged that the mother contravened the obligation imposed upon her in paragraph 16(d) of the orders to inform him as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical condition, significant health issue or significant illness suffered by the child. He alleged that she had failed to inform him of a hip injury that the child told him in November 2014 he had allegedly suffered on 4 October 2010 for which he had been receiving treatment.
19.The mother denied contravening as alleged by the father.
Count 6
20.The father alleged that the mother contravened the obligation imposed upon her by paragraph 18(c) of the orders not to denigrate or insult the father in the presence or hearing of the child. The father asserted that the mother must have denigrated him to the child as the child was expressing negative views of the father in written communication to the father.
21.The mother denied contravening the orders as the father alleged.
Relevant Law and Principles
22.Section 70NAC of the Act provides as follows:
Meaning of “contravened” an order
A person is taken for the purposes of this Division to have contravened an order under this Act affecting children if, and only if:
(a) where the person is bound by the order – he or she has:
(i)intentionally failed to comply with the order; or
(ii) made no reasonable attempt to comply with the order; or
(b) otherwise – he or she has:
(i)intentionally prevented compliance with the order by a person who is bound by it; or
(ii) aided or abetted a contravention of the order by a person who is bound by it.
23.The onus of proof rests on the applicant to prove that the respondent contravened an order affecting children. The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities having regard to the gravity of the allegation and the contravention must be shown to be intentional though not requiring proof of contumacious behaviour. See section 70NAF of the Act and also Jets & Maker [2010] FamCAFC 55 per O’Ryan J at paragraph 83
24.Section 70NAE of the Act provides, in certain circumstances, reasonable excuse for contravening an order. Specifically, it provides as follows:
Meaning of “reasonable excuse for contravening” an order
(1)The circumstances in which a person may be taken to have had, for the purposes of this Division, a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act affecting children include, but are not limited to, the circumstances set out in subsections (2), (4), (5), (6) and (7).
(2)A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act affecting children if:
(a)the respondent contravened the order because, or substantially because, he or she did not, at the time of the contravention, understand the obligations imposed by the order on the person who was bound by it; and
(b)the court is satisfied that the respondent ought to be excused in respect of the contravention.
(3)If a court decides that a person had a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act for the reason referred to in paragraph (2)(a), it is the duty of the court to explain to the person, in language likely to be readily understood by the person, the obligations imposed on him or her by the order and the consequences that may follow if he or she again contravenes the order.
(4)A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to the extent to which it deals with whom a child is to live with in a way that resulted in the child not living with a person in whose favour the order was made if:
(a)the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that the actions constituting the contravention were necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b)the period during which, because of the contravention, the child did not live with the person in whose favour the order was made was not longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
(5)A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to the extent to which it deals with whom a child is to spend time with in a way that resulted in a person and a child not spending time together as provided for in the order if:
(a) the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that not allowing the child and the person to spend time together was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b)the period during which, because of the contravention, the child and the person did not spend time together was not longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
(6)A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to the extent to which it deals with whom a child is to communicate with in a way that resulted in a person and a child not having the communication provided for under the order if:
(a)the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that not allowing the child and the person to communicate together was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b)the period during which, because of the contravention, the child and the person did not communicate was not longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
(7)A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to which section 65P applies by acting contrary to section 65P if:
(a)the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that the action constituting the contravention was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b)the period during which, because of that action, a person in whose favour the order was made was hindered in or prevented from discharging responsibilities under the order was not for longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
The Evidence and my Findings
Count 1
25.The father gave evidence that he caused a letter to be written from his solicitors to the mother on 9 August 2013 in which he nominated CC Centre as the contact centre. A copy of that letter is in evidence and it included a request for the mother to ensure that she undertook the necessary intake procedure within seven days. That was simply a restatement of the obligation imposed upon her by the Court’s order.
26.The father also gave evidence in an affidavit filed 12 August 2014, that he contacted CC a number of times including on 13 August, 14 August, 21 August and 23 August. He said that he believes the mother did not do her intake at CC until after 23 August and attributed that belief to being “based on information” he received from CC during those telephone calls. In his oral evidence he said that Ms DD, who worked at CC, had told him the mother had not done the necessary intake until 23 August.
27.The mother gave oral evidence that she had received the letter from the father’s solicitor that was dated 9 August 2013 but that she could not remember the date she received it.
28.She said that she contacted CC after receiving the letter but could not recall how long it was after her receipt of the letter. She said she spoke with Ms DD from CC who suggested the date of 28 August 2013 for the mother to visit CC for the intake. She said that as she was aware of the seven day requirement for complying with the intake requirements of the nominated provider she is confident that she contacted CC within that seven day period. She asserted that Ms DD told her CC were busy and that the first available appointment time for her was 28 August.
29.Exhibit 4 in the contravention hearing is a copy of a letter from CC Community Support Programs to “whom it may concern” dated 25 October 2013. The parties agreed it was written by Ms DD although it does not bear her name.
30.The letter sets out the contact that CC had with the parties and the child in this matter. The writer says she made contact with the mother to advise her of the agency’s engagement in the matter and does not say that the mother made contact with her. There is no mention of an appointment being made for 28 August. There is no mention of what CC’s “intake requirements” were and Ms DD did not say that the mother did not comply with any such “intake requirements”.
31.Although, given the letter from CC was written on 25 October 2013, relatively close to the events that were chronicled in it, I consider it more probable that Ms DD contacted the mother first than the other way around, the evidence just does not prove to me, even on the balance of probabilities, that the mother did not “take all steps reasonably necessary to forthwith undertake any intake requirements” of CC. The onus of proof is on the father and he did not adduce evidence of CC’ intake requirements or direct evidence from Ms DD asserting that the mother did not take all steps necessary to undertake any such intake requirements.
32.Although I have some lingering concerns about what the mother did or did not do, I cannot, on the evidence that is before me, find that I am satisfied that she contravened her obligation as alleged in this count.
Count 2(a)
33.The evidence about this is relatively uncontroversial. The father deposed to having turned up, as pre-arranged, at CC on Friday 6 September 2013 for time with his son. He was told that his son had arrived earlier with a woman who was not his mother but refused to get out of the car to go into the centre.
34.Exhibit 4 includes mention by Ms DD that she had arranged with the mother to collect the child from his school that day to bring him to the centre. She rang the mother the day before to confirm this and the mother told her that she would be bringing the child to the centre the next day instead.
35.The mother’s affidavit evidence was that she did not take the child to the centre on Friday 6 September as she had a training course that same afternoon. However, in her oral evidence, some different facts were asserted by the mother. She said that the child had told her that he did not intend to get out of the car when he arrived at the centre and, satisfied that he would not, she chose not to go with him so that she would not be accused of influencing him not to get out of the car. The mother admitted that she knew that the orders obliged her to go with the child in person, but that she chose not to.
36.I am satisfied that the obligation was on her to attend with the child in person and that she understood that. I am satisfied that she did not and that she, therefore contravened this part of the orders. I am also satisfied that it was not a reasonable excuse not to go because she did not want to be accused of influencing the child not to get out of the car. Accordingly, on this count I find that the mother contravened without reasonable excuse.
Count 2(b)
37.The evidence about this is fairly uncontroversial too. The father said that after the first scheduled visit when the child did not get out of the car, there were no further visits scheduled and he did not get to spend fortnightly supervised time with the child as ordered.
38.In the letter that is exhibit 4, Ms DD writes that she contacted the mother the week after the unsuccessful first visit and asked her to bring the child into the centre to allow him to get used to the centre and the surroundings. That happened on three occasions. On one occasion, Ms DD had a conversation with the child at the mother’s request. Ms DD said whatever the questions were that the child was asked the only response the boy would give was one of “I don’t want to see [Mr Fulton]”, “I don’t feel safe around [Mr Fulton]”, and “[Mr Fulton] has done terrible things to me”.
39.Ms DD writes in the letter that she contacted the mother to ask if there was another date that would suit when it could be tried again and that the mother was quite open in telling her that she is taking the matter further and seeking legal advice to have the matter reopened and that she does not believe that the child should see his father again.
40.Ms DD writes that she then contacted the father to tell him that the mother has not agreed for the supervised visits to take place.
41.The mother gave evidence that she did tell Ms DD that she had again spoken to police and departmental officers about the matter but said that she had not told Ms DD that she was getting legal advice. She agreed that she had not brought the child to the centre for time with his father again but she said that she had a reasonable excuse. Her case was that the child did not want to go to see his father, even on a supervised basis, and that his determination provided her with a reasonable excuse.
42.B was just 10 years of age at that very time. The allegations that were made about him being sexually abused were aired in the trial that Kent J had heard and determined. He found the child was not at an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse in his father’s unsupervised care. These visits that the mother determined not to take the child to, were within weeks of Kent J’s decision being handed down. She had not appealed against the orders. On the evidence, the mother did not even try to take the child to any supervised visits at CC as required after the first one did not happen. I am satisfied that she made it known to CC that she was not going to bring the boy any more. Even though she knew the child would be safe there, she did not even to try to take him again to see his father when she had an obligation to do so.
43.I am not satisfied, on the evidence, that the mother had a reasonable excuse for not taking the child to any of the visits that were supposed to take place each alternate week after the first one was scheduled. She did not even try and at the same time she did not even make an application to the Court to have the relatively fresh orders of Kent J varied or suspended. That she did not like the orders was no excuse not to comply with them.
44.I am satisfied that the mother contravened that part of the orders that obliged her to take the child to CC each alternate week to spend supervised time with the father in that period prior to the filing of the first contravention application. I am also satisfied that the mother did not have a reasonable excuse for the contravention. Accordingly, on this count also I find that the mother contravened without reasonable excuse.
Count 3
45.The father’s affidavit evidence was that his solicitor wrote letters to the mother on 9 August and 30 August 2013 requesting the mother’s contact details, as she was obliged to provide them pursuant to the orders.
46.He adduced into evidence a letter from the mother to his solicitors dated 16 September 2013 in which she provided to him, in response to a letter from him, and purportedly pursuant to paragraph 16, details of an address she described as a residential address, a phone number she described as a contact number and a phone number she described as an emergency phone number.
47.The father deposed to attempting to contact the child for his 10th birthday in 2013 using the number the mother had provided and hearing a message that said that the number was not connected. There was also an affidavit filed by the father sworn by a friend of his who also deposed to trying to contact the child on his birthday using the number provided by the mother and being told by the child’s older step-brother that the child and the mother had not lived there at that home for a long time.
48.In oral evidence, the mother admitted that she and the child had moved out of the home at the address she had provided as their residential address in January that year when she and her husband separated. She admitted the two telephone numbers she had provided were not hers. The landline number was the number of the landline at the home that she had moved out of much earlier in that same year.
49.The mother asserted that she had a reasonable excuse for providing the father with these details that were clearly not the details of her residential address and telephone contact numbers. She asserted the father had a pattern of behaviour of harassing and threatening her at her home and on her telephone numbers. She said little more of that. She conceded that she had brought an application for a family violence protection order several years previously but that it had been unsuccessful. She accepted that the matters that caused her concern were raised in the evidence she adduced at trial before Kent J.
50.She accepted that she has not given the father her correct residential address and contact telephone numbers ever since the orders were made by Kent J.
51.I do not find that the mother had or has a reasonable excuse for not providing the correct details as obliged by the orders. As I have already observed, the mother did not appeal against Kent J’s orders nor has she ever applied to vary or suspend them.
52.I am satisfied that she contravened this obligation without reasonable excuse.
Count 4
53.The father adduced into evidence a copy of a letter he sent to the mother dated 10 October 2013 in which he asked for her to provide him with the names, addresses and telephone numbers of any healthcare providers that may be treating the child. He listed by way of example, GPs, psychologist, therapist or councillor. He referred to paragraph 16(a) of the orders.
54.He said he received no reply and was provided with no such information.
55.Adduced into evidence during the hearing were two letters from the mother’s solicitors to the father dated 5 January 2015 and 13 January 2015. The first letter named a psychologist, a paediatrician and a GP. It did not provide addresses save for saying the name of the town they practised in and it did not say whether they had been authorised to provide the father with information about the child. The second letter named two more GP’s but did not give addresses or towns of practice. Again, it did not say anything about authorisation.
56.It was clear that the mother only provided the details that she did and when she did as she had sworn an affidavit on 5 January 2015 that was filed in these proceedings on 7 January 2015 in which she referred to these practitioners.
57.I do not accept that the provision of the details given in the two letters was compliance with the obligation imposed upon the mother by paragraph 16(c) of the orders.
58.The mother, clearly appreciating that such provision of information did not constitute compliance, tried to assert reasonable excuse. She asserted a belief that had she provided the details as obliged that the father would have “hassled” the practitioners and “derailed” the treatment process. I do not accept her belief or that it provided reasonable excuse.
59.There was evidence that since she provided the information in January, the father had made contact with the psychologist who the child has been seeing, seeking information, but that the psychologist had dealt with the request professionally and told the father that she was not providing any information to him. That contact certainly did not derail any process of counselling of the child.
60.I am again quite satisfied that the mother contravened the obligation imposed upon her by paragraph 16(c) of the orders without reasonable excuse.
Count 5
61.The case presented by the father in respect of this alleged contravention is, unfortunately, a little confusing. In the contravention application filed 29 January 2015 in which he adds this count to the contraventions he alleges, he refers, in the statement of contravention, to the mother’s contravention relating solely to a failure to inform him of a hip injury allegedly suffered by the child.
62.The father’s case is that he received a letter in November 2014, said to be written by the child, in which the child told him that he had suffered a hip injury whilst in the father’s care on his seventh birthday in 2010. the child said it happened when he was sliding on a makeshift water slide on the ground at the father’s property with one of the father’s friends pushing him off the slide, causing him to hit a rock. In the letter, the child writes that his hip has never been the same since then and that he has had to go to three chiropractors, one physiotherapist, one ultrasound and have two x-rays and had to see “heaps of doctors about it” as a consequence.
63.The father’s claim is that if that is the case, the mother has contravened the orders by not informing him of their son’s hip problem and the treatment she arranged for the boy.
64.The mother said in her oral evidence that the first she knew of the alleged hip injury suffered by the boy on the waterslide on his seventh birthday was when she read the same letter that he wrote that the father received and adduced into evidence. The mother denied having known about it beforehand or having taken the child to medical practitioners for treatment for such an injury. Of course, that begs the question as to why she would permit the boy to send the letter to his father with information in it that she herself knew not to be true. That in itself is hardly a positive thing to do in a high conflict case.
65.Adduced into evidence as exhibit 1 were documents from Medicare revealing the names of health care providers who the child had been taken to since the orders were made in 2013. Some of those names were not included in the names provided by the mother’s solicitors in January 2015. The mother asserted that they were dentists she had taken the child to see. There was some information in the Medicare documents that supported the position that there was at least one dentist amongst the list. There was no confirmation that any were chiropractors, physiotherapists or radiologists.
66.Whilst this issue caused me concern, in the face of evidence from the mother that she knew nothing of this hip injury before reading of it in that letter and the absence of evidence proving that she did I was not satisfied that I could find that the mother had actually withheld from the father information about the child having a hip injury that was allegedly suffered on the child’s seventh birthday for which he later received treatment.
67.Although the father did point to the mother’s own evidence that the child had suffered from anxiety and insomnia causing her to take him to a doctor and then, by way of referral on a mental health plan, to a psychologist for treatment, which she had not informed him about (also in apparent contravention of the ordered obligation), I was troubled by the father’s failure to properly particularise that aspect of the alleged contravention in his January 2015 application. Given that the mother had come to Court for the hearing on notice that this alleged contravention of paragraph 16 (d) related only to the matters surrounding the alleged hip injury, I do not consider it just to find that she contravened the obligation imposed by paragraph 16 (d) by reference to factual matters not particularised by the father in the relevant count of his contravention application. True, this is a matter of form over substance, but when dealing with contravention applications that have potentially serious consequences for persons found to be in contravention, in my view, a party who is responding to the allegations has a right, as a matter of natural justice, to expect some precision in the formal outline of the case against them and confinement of the case to those pleaded allegations.
68.Accordingly, the father did not persuade me, on the evidence, that the mother contravened by not providing him with information about the child’s alleged hip injury, I do not find that she did and I dismiss this count.
Count 6
69.Finally, the father’s case in respect to this count is deceptively simple. He points, amongst other things, to another letter the child wrote to him in July 2014, that attacks him as being responsible for the child not being able to go to overseas and says it is evidence that the mother must have denigrated him to the child for the child to write that sort of content. The content of the letter written by a boy, who was only 10 years old at the time, is completely disturbing.
70.The mother said in oral evidence that she had never denigrated the father to the child. When pressed though, she said she had told the child that he did not have a passport and could not travel to overseas destinations because the father would not agree to sign his passport application. She asserted to the Court that she just could not lie to her son about this matter. She was rather embarrassed when I suggested to her that she should simply not have told the boy anything about it at all and that she could have deflected discussion and pointed out that they were adult issues to be worked out between his parents.
71.During the hearing of this matter, particularly during final submissions, I questioned the father quite pointedly about his case on this count, in the face of the mother’s bald assertion that she had never denigrated the father to the child. With respect to him, the father was having difficulty actually articulating his argument. However, upon careful reflection I have determined that the father has a point in respect to this count.
72.Although the 10 year old child’s written attack upon his father could very well be sourced in his own experiences with his father, the information that he relied upon in this instance to attack his father clearly came from his mother. She said as much.
73.I consider that “ to denigrate” means “to disparage”, “to belittle”, “to diminish”, “to criticize unfairly”, “to speak ill of”, “to malign”, “to vilify”, “to malign” and so on. I am quite satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the mother has said things to the child about, at least, the subject matter of the child’s passport and the father’s alleged failure to take steps to permit the child to have a passport and to travel to exotic locations, in such terms as to constitute denigration. As such, I consider she has contravened the obligation not to denigrate the father.
74.I do not accept the asserted unwillingness of the mother “to lie” to her son about the particular subject matter as being a reasonable excuse for denigration of the father. I do not accept any purported belief that the father sexually abused the child as constituting reasonable excuse, particularly as the orders I am satisfied the mother has contravened were made after a trial where all of her beliefs about the sexual abuse were already considered with relevant findings being made. Even in circumstances where she did not accept those findings she was nevertheless obliged to comply with the orders. Accordingly, I am satisfied the mother has contravened paragraph 16 (c) of the orders without reasonable excuse.
Conclusion
75.As is now clear, I find that the father has proven that the mother has contravened the orders of July 2013 without reasonable excuse on, effectively, five separate counts.
76.I will now list the matter for the hearing of further submissions as to penalty and outcome. It is to be listed for a day when the family consultant, Ms SB, is available to give oral evidence and be cross-examined as each party has foreshadowed that they will be making submissions that the Court should make significant changes to the final orders pursuant to s 70NBA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
I certify that the preceding seventy-six (76) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 23 April 2015.
Associate:
Date: 23 April 2015