Fuller & Anor v Lawrence - [2024] HCATrans 62

[2024] HCATrans 062

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B24 of 2024

B e t w e e n -
BIANCA FULLER
First Appellant
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF QUEENSLAND CORRECTIVE SERVICES
Second Appellant
and
MARK LAWRENCE
Respondent

GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
GLEESON J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT HOBART ON TUESDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER 2024, AT 10.00 AM

MR A.D. SCOTT, KC: May the Court please, I appear with MR P.K. O’HIGGINS, KC on behalf of the appellants. (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))

MR M. BLACK: May it please the Court, I appear with MS R.H. BERRY for the respondent. (instructed by Suncoast Community Legal Service)

GAGELER CJ: Thank you, Mr Black. Mr Scott.

MR SCOTT: Thank you, your Honours. As all of your Honours will appreciate, the question in this appeal concerns the application of the second limb of the test identified by the plurality in Griffith University v Tang. For your Honours’ reference, that test appears at volume 3 of the authorities bundles, page 440, and there appears at page 130 of the Commonwealth Law Report paragraph 89, where the plurality identified the two qualities that must exist for a decision to be a decision made under an enactment within the meaning of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) so as to give it the character of a decision to which that Act applies, and amenable to an application for statutory order of review under that Act. The second limb, which appears there in that paragraph, is that:

the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations –

The decision in question in this case to which this question relates is the direction given by the corrective services officer. Your Honours can find that if you wish in the appellants’ book of further materials at page 28.

Your Honours will see if you have it there an instrument purporting to be a reasonable direction given to the respondent dated November 2022, and the words conveying the direction appear just below the middle of the page under the words “you are hereby directed”. Whilst the terms of the direction are relatively inelegantly drafted, it is common ground that what it required was that the respondent not have in‑person contact with the person named in it.

GAGELER CJ: Do you accept that the making of that direction was a decision reviewable for jurisdictional error?

MR SCOTT: Yes, your Honour, we do, because of course it would be – the obligation to comply with the direction depends upon it being within the meaning of the supervision order, and if it is outside the ambit of the supervision order, then it is outside the ambit of the Act.

BEECH-JONES J: But it is also outside, contrary to section 16C.

MR SCOTT: Yes, your Honour.

BEECH-JONES J: So, you accept that it would be reviewable by a court – not by the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2024] HCATrans 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal in *Fuller & Anor v Lawrence*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a clause within a deed of settlement that purported to release the respondents from liability for certain claims. The appellants, as beneficiaries of a trust, sought to enforce claims against the respondents, alleging breaches of trust.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the release clause in the deed of settlement was effective to preclude the appellants from pursuing their claims for breaches of trust. This required the Court to determine the proper construction of the release clause, particularly in light of the specific wording used and the context in which the deed was executed. The Court also had to consider whether the claims brought by the appellants fell within the scope of the release.

The High Court held that the release clause was not effective to release the respondents from liability for the alleged breaches of trust. The Court reasoned that the language of the release was not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to encompass claims for breaches of trust that were not specifically contemplated or identified at the time the deed was executed. Applying principles of contractual interpretation, the Court found that the release was limited to claims that were the subject of the settlement negotiations and did not extend to unknown or unquantified breaches of trust. The Court therefore allowed the appeal.

Orders