Fulcher and Fulcher (Child support) - [2025] ARTA 502

Fulcher and Fulcher (Child support) [2025] ARTA 502 (6 March 2025)

Applicant:Mr Fulcher
Respondent: Child Support Registrar
Other Party: Ms Fulcher

Tribunal Number: 2024/CC028377
Tribunal:General Member P Jensen
Place:Brisbane
Date of Decision: 6 March 2025
Decision:

The decision under review is set aside and, in substitution:

from 1 January 2024 until the end of the child support case, Mr Fulcher’s adjusted taxable income is varied to $90,000 per annum, to be inflated by the September Sydney CPI, to take effect from 1 January 2026 and each 1 January thereafter;
in the administrative assessment in respect of [Child 2], the “costs of the child” from 12 February 2024 until the occurrence of a child support terminating event in respect of [Child 2] are varied to nil;
from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, Mr Fulcher’s rate of child support payable is increased by $4,095 per annum; and
from 1 January 2024 until the end of the child support case, Mr Fulcher’s rate of child support payable is increased by a further $461 per annum, to be inflated by the September Sydney CPI, to take effect from 1 January 2026 and each 1 January thereafter.

Statement made on 06 March 2025 at 9:37am

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – departure determination – father’s adjusted taxable income and financial resources – termination of co-ownership of farm with father and uncle – court-ordered financial settlement between father and mother – father’s interest-free loans and other benefits from family trust – parties both asset-rich and income-poor – first child an adult – second child now working and costs varied to nil – costs of third child’s orthodontic treatment – mother’s claim of costs of fourth child’s special needs abandoned – decision under review set aside and substituted

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

Statement of Reasons

Introduction

Mr Fulcher and Ms Fulcher are the parents of [Child 1] (who is an adult), [Child 2], [Child 3] and [Child 4]. A child support case was registered with Services Australia – Child Support (“Child Support”) in 2018.
The Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Act”) provides for an administrative assessment of child support payable. It uses a formula which contains variables such as the parents’ adjusted taxable incomes and their percentages of care for the children. On 4 December 2023, Child Support decided to record a change in the parents’ care of [Child 2] from 16 October 2023. As a result of that change, Ms Fulcher’s rate of child support payable increased from $1,593 per annum to $3,185 per annum: page 298 of the hearing papers.
The Act also provides for a departure from the administrative assessment in certain circumstances. Ms Fulcher lodged a departure application on 16 December 2023. At that time, Mr Fulcher was recorded as providing 100% care for [Child 2] and 33% care for [Child 3] and [Child 4]. Ms Fulcher was recorded as providing 0% care for [Child 2] and 67% care for [Child 3] and [Child 4]. The administrative assessment was also based on Mr Fulcher’s provisional 2022–23 adjusted taxable income of $25,459 and Ms Fulcher’s 2022–23 adjusted taxable income of $66,543.
An original decision-maker granted Ms Fulcher’s departure application and varied the rate of child support payable between the parents to nil from 1 October 2023 to 31 December 2024. Ms Fulcher objected to that decision. An objections officer allowed the objection and effectively made a decision to:
· vary Mr Fulcher’s adjusted income to $158,000 per annum from 1 January 2024, with indexed increases every 1 January until the end of the child support case; and
· reduce the Combined Cost of the Children by 33.33% until [Child 2] ceased to be an eligible child of the child support case.
Mr Fulcher’s rate of child support payable from 1 January 2024 was $9,411 per annum: page 46 of the hearing papers. He applied to the Tribunal for further review. I conducted a directions hearing on 8 January 2025 and a substantive hearing on 26 February 2025. Mr Fulcher and Ms Fulcher gave sworn evidence via MS Teams. Mr Fulcher’s accountant, [Mr A], also gave sworn evidence during the substantive hearing via MS Teams.
Paragraph 98C(1)(b) of the Act relevantly provides that a departure decision may be made in respect of a departure application if:
(i)... one, or more than one, of the grounds for departure referred to in [subsection 117(2)] exists; and

(ii)... it would be:
(A)just and equitable as regards the child, the liable parent, and the carer entitled to child support; and
(B)otherwise proper;
to make a particular determination under this Part; …

A ground for departure

Subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ia) of the Act, commonly referred to as Reason 2, provides as a ground for departure:
that, in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected:
…
(ia)because of special needs of the child …
Ms Fulcher raised Reason 2 in respect of [Child 3] and [Child 4].
[Child 3] wears orthodontic braces. Ms Fulcher said she needed the braces. Mr Fulcher said she did not. Ms Fulcher provided Child Support with a letter from [Child 3]’s orthodontist dated 15 May 2023: page 270 of the hearing papers. It was not immediately apparent from that letter that [Child 3] needed braces. I raised the issue with both parents during the directions hearing and informed them that they could provide further evidence on the issue, but I did not direct them to do so. Ms Fulcher provided another letter from [Child 3]’s orthodontist dated 21 January 2025 which states:
[Child 3] is currently undergoing orthodontic treatment for the correction of her malocclusion.
[Child 3]’s treatment is specifically aimed at correcting the space created by agenesis (congenital absence) of her lower left second premolar tooth, which would likely require significant and invasive ongoing dental treatment in the future.
[Child 3]’s treatment is also aimed at opening her deep bit, to reduce the long-term risk of wear and damage to her mandibular incisor teeth.
That evidence suggests that [Child 3] needed orthodontic treatment to avoid likely “significant and invasive ongoing dental treatment in the future.” At the substantive hearing, Mr Fulcher maintained that [Child 3] did not have a special need. However, he did not provide any expert evidence on the issue. I note that he continues to be recorded as providing 33% care for [Child 3]; he presumably had the opportunity to obtain expert evidence on the issue, and he did not suggest otherwise. I find that [Child 3] had a special need.
Ms Fulcher provided evidence that the total cost of the orthodontic treatment was $8,190. The objections officer noted that Ms Fulcher had private health insurance and her full rebate would be $2,400. However, Ms Fulcher effectively purchased her rebate via her private health insurance premiums. The relevant figure is $8,190. Those costs significantly affected the costs of maintaining [Child 3]. The circumstances as a whole constitute special circumstances. Reason 2 is established in respect of the costs associated with [Child 3]’s special needs.
During the directions hearing Ms Fulcher stated, and Mr Fulcher did not dispute, that [Child 4] had special needs. An objections officer concluded that Ms Fulcher’s associated out-of-pocket costs were $923 per annum: page 18 of the hearing papers. During the directions hearing, both parents agreed with that calculation. Ms Fulcher is the parent who pays those costs. Those costs significantly affect the costs of maintaining [Child 4]. The circumstances as a whole constitute special circumstances. Reason 2 is established in respect of the costs associated with [Child 4]’s special needs.

Just and equitable

The requirement to consider whether a departure would be just and equitable directs attention to what is fair to the parents and their children. Regard must be had to a variety of factors such as the needs of the children, the parents’ commitments and any hardship that would be caused by departing or not departing from the formula.
The main issue in this case is Mr Fulcher’s income and financial resources. However, other matters were raised in respect of the children and it is convenient to deal with those matters first.
Ms Fulcher submitted that [Child 2] had special needs and she had incurred significant costs in respect of those needs. The objections officer concluded (at page 17 of the hearing papers): “I have no evidence from any treating medical practitioner showing that [Child 2] has any condition that could be construed as a ‘special need’”. During the directions hearing, Ms Fulcher abandoned that submission.
Mr Fulcher informed Child Support that [Child 2] started an apprenticeship on 28 January 2024 (which was a Sunday). Mr Fulcher subsequently provided evidence, which I accept, that [Child 2] started his apprenticeship on 12 February 2024: page A36 of the hearing papers.
[Child 2]’s year-to-date wages to 5 January 2025, i.e. for approximately a half of the financial year, were $14,741: page A26 and A27 of the hearing papers. I find that he earns approximately $29,000 per annum. As a full-time employee, one would normally expect him to be earning an income that would allow him to be financially independent.
The parents’ care of [Child 2] has changed from time to time. Since 11 September 2024, Mr Fulcher has been providing 100% care. On 19 July 2024 an objections officer noted (at page 22 of the hearing papers):
Mr Fulcher did not provide details of [Child 2]’s actual income, however he agrees that [Child 2] is working as an apprentice [occupation]. As the parent with the greater than primary care of [Child 2] at the time, it was reasonable to expect he provide evidence of [Child 2]’s income. …
Given Mr Fulcher has opted not to provide specific evidence regarding [Child 2]’s financial circumstances, I have proceeded on the assumption that [Child 2] is able to fully meet his own self-support costs from his employment outcome.
In the proceedings before the Tribunal, Mr Fulcher did not provide any evidence of [Child 2]’s financial circumstances (apart from his income). Towards the end of the substantive hearing he said: “I guess [Child 2] could support himself.” In the absence of any specific evidence to suggest otherwise, I find that [Child 2] has had the capacity to financially support himself since 12 February 2024.
Ms Fulcher originally submitted that she incurred significant costs in respect of [Child 3]’s education. [Child 3] has been attending a public school since the start of 2024. During the directions hearing, Ms Fulcher abandoned that submission.
Ms Fulcher submitted that she incurred significant costs in respect of [Child 4]’s education. He attends [Catholic Primary School]. During the directions hearing, both parents agreed that they were both fairly contributing to the fees for 2025 via direct payments to the school and no adjustment was required to the otherwise appropriate rate of child support payable on account of the fees for 2025. However, Ms Fulcher said that she paid all of the fees for 2024. Mr Fulcher said that he paid half of the fees for 2024. I directed both parents to provide evidence in respect of their respective accounts of events. Mr Fulcher did so and Ms Fulcher did not. During the substantive hearing, Ms Fulcher effectively acknowledged that she had been mistaken and Mr Fulcher had been correct.
In summary: [Child 2] has been financially independent since 12 February 2024; [Child 3] has special needs and the one-off associated cost was $8,190; and [Child 4] has special needs and the ongoing associated cost is $923 per annum.
Mr Fulcher is [Age] years old. He said he is a third generation farmer and he has been a farmer all his life. I will be referring to Mr Fulcher’s father, [Mr B], and [Mr B]’s brother, [Mr C]. For convenience, and with Mr Fulcher’s consent, I will refer to him as Mr Fulcher and I will refer to other family members by their given names.
Mr Fulcher works on “the family farm”: page 284 of the hearing papers. His precise relationship with that farm is somewhat complicated. During the substantive hearing, [Mr A] provided some useful background information. He explained that [Mr B] and [Mr C] had been farming partners and they had owned parcels of farming land. They terminated their farming partnership approximately seven or eight years ago. To give effect to that termination, they each transferred some land that they owned. [Mr C] transferred some land but instead of transferring it to [Mr B], or to the [Family Trust] (“the Trust”) which [Mr B] controls, it was agreed that the land would be transferred to Mr Fulcher. The Trust borrowed money and lent it to Mr Fulcher to enable him to purchase the land.
In October 2021 a court made orders with the consent of Mr Fulcher and Ms Fulcher concerning the division of their matrimonial assets and liabilities: pages 156 to 161 of the hearing papers. In those proceedings, Mr Fulcher gave evidence that his farmland was worth $8,336,162: page 227 of the hearing papers. His associated loans, which he owed to the Trust, totalled approximately $3,250,000: page 224 of the hearing papers.
Very broadly, as a result of the court orders, Mr Fulcher retained ownership of the farmland and he was required to pay Ms Fulcher $2,430,000 during 2021–22 and $130,000 per financial year for the next four financial years (with the final payment in 2025–26). Mr Fulcher did not have savings from which to make those payments to Ms Fulcher. He borrowed, and is continuing to borrow, the necessary funds from the Trust. As at 30 June 2024, he owed the Trust $6,791,401: page A74 of the hearing papers.
Mr Fulcher said that three people work the farm. [Mr B] and Mr Fulcher have been constant workers and the Trust has employed a different “third person” from time to time. The farm consists of a number of parcels of land, some of which are owned by [Mr B] and some of which are owned by Mr Fulcher. Mr Fulcher and [Mr A] were not sure whose parcels of land were more valuable. Mr Fulcher guessed that [Mr B]’s parcels of land were more valuable. [Mr A] guessed that Mr Fulcher’s parcels of land were more valuable. I find that they are of roughly equal value; it is not necessary to make a precise finding on that issue.
Mr Fulcher receives a fixed income for his involvement in the farming business. The Trust previously recorded it as a “share farming” expense: page A69 of the hearing papers. Mr Fulcher previously recorded it as “business income” as a sole trader: pages A54 and A62 of the hearing papers. More recently it has been recorded as wages: page A8 of the hearing papers. His taxable incomes from 2019–20 to 2023–24 were $17,796, $19,321, $24,574, $27,234 and $51,885: page A62 of the hearing papers. [Mr A] explained that Mr Fulcher’s tax-deductible expenses included depreciation on assets attached to the farmland that he had purchased, e.g. fencing. Since 1 July 2024, Mr Fulcher has received a wage of $74,772 per annum.
The farming business is run by the Trust, which is a discretionary trust. [Mr A] said [Mr B] is the appointor of the Trust; [Mr B] and his wife, [Ms D], are the trustees of the Trust; and the beneficiaries of the Trust include [Mr B], [Ms D] and their four children, i.e. Mr Fulcher and his three sisters.
During 2022–23 the Trust received revenue of $3,141,904 and incurred expenses of $2,510,302 (including “share farming” expenses of $52,588 which were paid to Mr Fulcher). The Trust’s profit of $631,302 was distributed to [Mr B] and [Mr D].
During 2023–24 the Trust received revenue of $2,501,981 and incurred expenses of $2,046,395 (including “share farming” expenses of $57,000 which were paid to Mr Fulcher). The Trust’s profit of $455,586 was distributed to [Mr B] and [Ms D].
The evidence suggests that Mr Fulcher’s land and [Mr B]’s land are of roughly equal value, and Mr Fulcher and [Mr B] make roughly similar contributions to the day-to-day working of the farm. I asked Mr Fulcher about the difference between his remuneration and [Mr B]’s and [Ms D]’s remuneration. Mr Fulcher explained that he did not buy his land; [Mr B] and [Ms D] bought the land and “put it in [his] name.” To the extent that Mr Fulcher was implying that he was a passive observer of those transactions, and that he did not genuinely own his land, I do not accept his evidence on that issue. Prior to Mr Fulcher’s and Ms Fulcher’s property settlement, Mr Fulcher estimated that his net wealth was approximately $5,563,707: page 218 of the hearing papers. That wealth was primarily the land that he owned minus the associated loans that he owed.
The benefits that Mr Fulcher receives from the farm are not confined to what were labelled “share farming” payments and are now labelled “wages”. He and his family live in a house that is owned by the Trust. In April 2021 he stated that the Trust paid his health insurance, rates, life and trauma insurance, vehicle expenses and electricity: page 220 of the hearing papers. On 20 June 2024, Child Support noted (at pages 336 and 337 of the hearing papers) that Mr Fulcher had confirmed that “his house and associated costs, and his vehicle are paid by the farming business”, and:
I asked Mr Fulcher how much the trust pays for his housing, vehicle and associated costs. Mr Fulcher said he did not know and would speak to his accountant.
More recently, Mr Fulcher has downplayed the benefits that he receives from the Trust. For example, during the substantive hearing he said the Trust provides a work vehicle which he only uses for work purposes. He said he uses his own vehicle (which was presumably a reference to his [Year Make Model] which he valued at $2,000) for all personal travel. Ms Fulcher said Mr Fulcher sometimes travels to her home to collect [Child 4]’s medication and he arrives in the work vehicle. In response to Ms Fulcher’s evidence, Mr Fulcher changed his evidence and said he sometimes arrives at Ms Fulcher’s in the work vehicle and sometimes in his own vehicle. I do not accept Mr Fulcher’s evidence to the effect that the benefits that he historically received from the Trust have changed significantly.
The Trust paid Mr Fulcher “share farming” payments and it also pays for his accommodation and vehicle expenses. Those payments are significantly less than the Trust’s profit that is distributed to [Mr B] and [Ms D]. However, Mr Fulcher has received, and continues to receive, another benefit from the Trust: an interest-free loan. As at 30 June 2023, it had lent him $6,711,401. During 2023–24 it lent him an additional $260,000. The Trust will continue to lend Mr Fulcher $130,000 per annum until he has complied with the court orders referred to in paragraph 26, above. Given the way in which Mr Fulcher and [Mr B] have pooled their assets, contributed their labour and arranged their respective remuneration as stated in the Trust’s financial statements and Mr Fulcher’s tax returns, and given the enormous interest-free loan that the Trust has given to Mr Fulcher, which it intends to increase, I find that, at a practical level, Mr Fulcher could access additional financial resources if required to do so.
For completeness, I note that Mr Fulcher said there had been “no talk” about what would happen to the farm once his parents passed away. Ms Fulcher said that prior to her separation from Mr Fulcher there had been talk of what would happen when Mr Fulcher’s parents passed away, namely Mr Fulcher would receive the land and “his three sisters would get payouts.” [Mr A] said the decision to transfer [Mr C]’s parcels of land to Mr Fulcher had been part of [Mr B]’s succession planning. He said [Mr B] wanted Mr Fulcher to take over the family farm but Mr Fulcher’s sisters needed to be “sort[ed] out financially.”

I also note that while Mr Fulcher enjoys an interest-free loan, the land that he purchased, and which he valued at $8,336,162 in October 2021, could be expected to appreciate.
Turning to Ms Fulcher’s circumstances, she received $2,430,000 during 2021–22 as part of the parents’ property settlement, and she has been receiving an additional $130,000 per annum. She said the $130,000 per annum is not income; it is part of the redistribution of the parents’ capital. She completed a Statement of Financial Circumstances in August 2024. She owns her unencumbered home. She said she does not earn any income. Mr Fulcher said she earns an income [making products] and the like. Ms Fulcher said she [makes products] and the like and gives them to friends and family. Mr Fulcher said there was evidence on [Social media] that she sold the [goods]. He did not provide that evidence. In the absence of such evidence, I accept Ms Fulcher’s evidence that she does not earn an income.
Ms Fulcher said she receives family tax benefit but no longer receives parenting payment. During 2023–24, she received $3,797 in parenting payment: page B31 of the hearing papers. Her primary income is interest on her savings. In August 2023 her savings were approximately $1,580,000. Her 2023–24 taxable income was $48,509.
Ms Fulcher lodged her departure application on 16 December 2023. At the end of the substantive hearing she said she sought a departure decision from “when this all started.” She referred to 2023, and then 2022, when, on her account of events, the parents had not made equitable contributions towards [Child 3]’s private school fees. It will be recalled that the matter was raised during the directions hearing and Ms Fulcher elected to abandon the issue. I consequently did not direct the parents to provide documentary evidence on the issue. Ms Fulcher did not provide any further documentary evidence on the issue and, after some discussion during the substantive hearing, she effectively elected to abandon the issue once again.
Ms Fulcher said she lodged a departure application prior to 16 December 2023, but when questioned further, it became apparent that she had not done so. She had previously questioned the fairness of the administrative assessment and Child Support had informed her of the option of lodging a departure application: see, for example, Child Support’s notes of its discussion with her on 22 November 2022 at page 53 of the hearing papers.
Ms Fulcher lodged her departure application shortly before the end of 2023. The objections officer concluded that it would be appropriate to make a departure decision with effect from 1 January 2024 and I respectfully agree with that conclusion.
Since 12 February 2024, [Child 2] has been in full-time employment and earning an income that has allowed him to be financially independent. Technically, the child support case currently consists of separate administrative assessments in respect of each child of the child support case: sections 5, 24 and 28 of the Act. The administrative assessment formula includes a “costs of the child” variable, and the rate of child support payable is a contribution towards those costs. From 12 February 2024, the “costs of the child” in the administrative assessment for [Child 2] will be varied to $0, which will effectively mean that the child support payable from 12 February 2025 will only be in respect of [Child 3] and [Child 4].
One of the difficulties in this case is that both parents’ financial circumstances are unusual. Each parent, in their own way, is relatively asset-rich and income-poor. There is no prescribed methodology for calculating the appropriate rate of child support in such circumstances. As I explained during the hearing, if a new departure decision is made, it can take one of two forms: the rate of child support payable can be varied; or one or more variables that are used in the administrative assessment formula can be varied. Normally, the preferrable approach in the current case would be to vary the rate of child support payable. However, Mr Fulcher said the parents’ current pattern of care for [Child 3] and [Child 4] is likely to change. (Ms Fulcher said it will not change.) If a decision were made to vary the rate of child support payable, any subsequent change in care would probably render that decision unfair. It is therefore appropriate to vary some of the variables that are used in the administrative assessment formula, including the parents’ adjusted taxable incomes. It is important to stress that the variations will be for child support purposes, and not for taxation purposes.
Mr Fulcher currently receives a wage of $74,772 per annum. The Trust increased its payments to Mr Fulcher from 1 July 2024 despite the fact that the Trust’s profit during 2023–24 was less than its profit during 2022–23. There is clearly some flexibility in the arrangement that Mr Fulcher and [Mr B] reach concerning Mr Fulcher’s remuneration. As discussed above, Mr Fulcher receives other benefits from the Trust. There is no reliable evidence of the value of those other benefits. On a conservative view, they would be worth approximately $15,000 per annum. More broadly, Mr Fulcher’s income and financial resources would be fairly reflected for child support purposes in an adjusted taxable income of $90,000 per annum.
After arriving at that figure, I checked its fairness by considering the following hypothetical scenario. During 2023–24 the Trust’s expenses included interest of $467,862 in respect of loans to Mr Fulcher and [Mr B], and Mr Fulcher’s share farming payments of $57,000. If those expenses were excluded, the Trust’s profit would be $980,448. If that profit was divided equally between Mr Fulcher and [Mr B], Mr Fulcher’s share would be $490,224.
As at 30 June 2024 the Trust had lent $6,971,401 to Mr Fulcher, which had enabled him to buy a number of parcels of farmland and make payments to Ms Fulcher pursuant to the court orders (and thereby retain ownership of the parcels of farmland). The Trust had lent $666,897 to [Mr B], which had enabled him to buy two parcels of farmland. Mr Fulcher’s land and [Mr B]’s land constitutes the land on which the Trust conducts its farming business. Mr Fulcher’s loans constituted 91.3% of the Trust’s total loans, and so the interest referrable to Mr Fulcher’s loans was $467,862 x 0.913 = $427,158. If, hypothetically, Mr Fulcher and [Mr B] decided to share the Trust’s profits and individually pay the interest on their respective loans in respect of their respective parcels of land, Mr Fulcher’s net position would be $490,224 - $427,158 = $63,066, which is similar to the wages he is receiving. That calculation supports the view that Mr Fulcher’s wage is fair remuneration and, coupled with the other benefits that he receives from the Trust, his income and financial resources are fairly reflected for child support purposes in an adjusted taxable income of $90,000 per annum. His adjusted taxable income will be varied from 1 January 2024.
Ms Fulcher’s income and financial resources are fairly reflected in her adjusted taxable incomes as assessed by the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) from time to time. I will not vary her adjusted taxable income.
It is appropriate that Mr Fulcher contribute to [Child 3]’s orthodontic costs of $8,190. His rate of child support payable from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024 will be increased by $4,095 per annum
It is appropriate that Mr Fulcher contribute to the costs of [Child 4]’s special needs of $923 per annum. Mr Fulcher’s rate of child support payable from 1 January 2024 will be increased by $461 per annum.
Mr Fulcher’s adjusted taxable incomes as assessed by the ATO are likely to continue to understate his income and financial resources for child support purposes. His actual circumstances are unlikely to change significantly over the remainder of the child support case. It is appropriate to make a departure decision with effect until the end of the child support case. Mr Fulcher’s adjusted taxable income and the increase in his rate of child support payable on account of the costs of [Child 4]’s special needs will be increased on 1 January 2026, and each subsequent 1 January, by the consumer price index until the end of the child support case.
The proposed decision will not significantly alter Mr Fulcher’s child support liability up until the date of the substantive hearing. It will require him to pay a current rate of child support of approximately $11,500 per annum. I am satisfied that he has the capacity to pay that child support and it is appropriate that he do so. The proposed decision will be just and equitable.

Otherwise proper

The requirement to consider whether a departure would be otherwise proper directs attention to what is fair to the community. It is necessary to consider the effect of any departure from the administrative assessment on entitlements to income-tested pensions, allowances and benefits. Parents rather than the community have the primary duty to maintain a child.
Ms Fulcher said she receives family tax benefit. Changing the child support payable by Mr Fulcher will result in a more appropriate apportionment of financial responsibility between the parents and the community. The proposed decision will be otherwise proper.

DECISION

The decision under review is set aside and, in substitution:

from 1 January 2024 until the end of the child support case, Mr Fulcher’s adjusted taxable income is varied to $90,000 per annum, to be inflated by the September Sydney CPI, to take effect from 1 January 2026 and each 1 January thereafter;
in the administrative assessment in respect of [Child 2], the “costs of the child” from 12 February 2024 until the occurrence of a child support terminating event in respect of [Child 2] are varied to nil;
from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, Mr Fulcher’s rate of child support payable is increased by $4,095 per annum; and
from 1 January 2024 until the end of the child support case, Mr Fulcher’s rate of child support payable is increased by a further $461 per annum, to be inflated by the September Sydney CPI, to take effect from 1 January 2026 and each 1 January thereafter.