FSF18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

FSF18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 917

File number(s): MLG 3253 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
Date of judgment: 13 June 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (class XA) (subclass 866) visa – visa refused – decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm delegate’s decision – application for extension of time – where proposed grounds of review lack merit – no real prospects of success – application for extension of time refused – application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) ss 5H, 5J(1)(a), 5J(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 424A, 424A(1), 424A(3), 425, 425A, 477(1), 477(2), 477(2)(b), 477A(2), 477A(2)(b), 499

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2, pt 2, div 1, item 2

Cases cited:

BBU15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1324

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

DWK17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 66

GOK18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 169

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176, 3 FCR 344

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Parker v R [2002] FCAFC 133

Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144, 286 FCR 556

QAAH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 9

SZKDC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 164

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533

Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, 276 CLR 579

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 37
Date of last submission/s: 30 April 2025
Date of hearing: 14 May 2025
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Slankard
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 3253 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

FSF18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GOSTENCNIK

DATE OF ORDER:

13 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The applicant’s application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) may be made is dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,189.38.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 917
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FSF18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved an application by a Malaysian citizen, who had arrived in Australia in April 2016, for an extension of time to seek judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision to affirm the Minister’s refusal of her application for a Protection (class XA) (subclass 866) visa. The applicant's claims for protection centred around allegations of bullying, harassment, and threats from members of the broader Malay community because she is of Indian-Malaysian ethnicity. The Tribunal had affirmed the delegate’s decision that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a Protection visa under ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Court should exercise its discretion under s 477(2) of the Act to extend the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review under s 477(1) may be made. The Court considered the principles guiding such decisions, as outlined in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen and Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs. These principles include the necessity of an acceptable explanation for the delay, fairness and equity, prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the underlying application.

In deciding whether to grant an extension of time, the Court held that the proposed grounds of review lacked merit and there were no real prospects of success. The Court found that the applicant had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay in seeking judicial review. Additionally, the Court noted that the absence of prejudice to the Minister was not sufficient to justify the grant of an extension. Consequently, the Court refused the application for an extension of time and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The final orders of the Court were that the application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review may be made is refused, and the application is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons explained below, the application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application under s 477(1) of the Act may be made is refused and the application will be dismissed.BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who arrived in Australia in late April 2016 as the holder of an Electronic Travel Authority (Class UD) (Subclass 601) visa. On 25 April 2016, the applicant applied for a student visa, which was refused on 6 July 2016. The applicant subsequently applied on 22 July 2016 for the Protection visa the subject of the Tribunal’s decision. The applicant’s claims for protection centre around allegations that she suffered bullying, harassment and threats from members of the broader Malay community because she is of Indian-Malaysian ethnicity. She alleged that she cannot live peacefully in Malaysia because she is mentally tortured, and that the risk of harm she faced because of her ethnicity and religion extends to all of Malaysia. On 14 October 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused the applicant’s application for a Protection visa on the grounds she failed to satisfy ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. The applicant was notified of the refusal decision by letter dated 14 October 2016, which enclosed a copy of the delegate’s decision record. The delegate’s decision record sets out the applicant’s claims for protection advanced in her protection visa application as follows:(a)she was bullied and tormented by people in her village in Malaysia; she was scolded and called ‘Hindu’. She described the harm she suffered as ‘mental torture’; (b)she asked her alleged tormentors to stop, but they did not;(c)she sought help from family and friends, but they were too scared to assist;(d)she believes if she returns to Malaysia, more people will torment her because “Malay people are everywhere”; and(e)she claims the police are unable to assist her because the harm she suffered is not considered serious enough for them to take any action. Assessing whether the applicant was a refugee under s 36(2)(a) of the Act, the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant’s claimed fears of persecution were well-founded, as required by s 5J(1)(a). The delegate referred to the 2014 Country Information Report for Malaysia prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in addressing the applicant’s claims about racial discrimination. The delegate’s decision records that the applicant’s claims were minimal and vague, and that she failed to properly explain the reasons or background against which she experienced harm. Based on the available country information, the delegate was not satisfied that Indian-Malaysians experienced violence or discrimination daily, and that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. The delegate reasoned the applicant thereby failed to satisfy s 5J(1)(a), was consequently not a refugee as described in s 5H, and was not therefore owed protection under s 36(2)(a). TRIBUNAL PROCEEDING

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

By letter dated 20 April 2018, the Tribunal notified the applicant that it had decided to affirm the delegate’s decision. The notification letter was transmitted to the applicant by email on that day, which email attached a copy of the Tribunal’s Statement of Decision and Reasons (Decision). The Decision is dated 19 July 2018, but as it was provided to the applicant on 20 April 2018, the date recorded in the Decision is incorrect.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION AND REASONS The Tribunal begins by setting out the relevant statutory criteria relevant to the grant of a Protection visa: Decision at [3]–[7]. The Tribunal considers the applicant’s claims and evidence from [9] to [84], noting at [9] and concluding at [85]–[87] that the delegate’s decision is affirmed. The Tribunal records that it must consider a range of factors and materials in accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 56 (Direction No 56) made under s 499 of the Act. The Tribunal notes that it took into account the policy guidelines in the PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian – Refugee Law Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian – Complementary Protection Guidelines (PAM3) prepared by the Department of Immigration, as well as country information prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to the extent relevant: at [8]. Recounting the applicant’s visa and immigration history, the Tribunal noted that the applicant arrived in Australia intending to study business management but was refused the required student visa. The applicant told the Tribunal she was unsure why her application for a student visa had been refused. She had applied for the visa assisted by a migration agent: Decision at [14]. The applicant told the Tribunal that she asked her migration agent for a refund so that she could return home, but the migration agent suggested that she apply for a Protection visa. The applicant appears to have conceded during the hearing that she would not have applied for a protection visa had she been granted a student visa: at [28]. The applicant told the Tribunal that her migration agent had completed all the documents on her behalf: at [14], [16]. The applicant acknowledged that the claims set out in her protection visa application were mostly correct, but that she had not referred to herself as suffering “mental torture”: at [27]. The Tribunal recorded that after making the protection application, the applicant realised that the migration agent was “a crook” and she made a report to Victoria Police: at [31]–[32]. Queried about the discrimination she claimed to face, the Decision records the applicant said she had been subjected to discrimination and harassment in the workplace and in her community, and she claimed that the Malaysian authorities failed to afford her meaningful protection, or selectively applied the law in a manner which was discriminatory, because she is Indian-Malaysian: Decision at [20]–[23]. The applicant gave the Tribunal examples of discrimination, which included experiencing sexual harassment in the workplace and subsequent police inaction. The Decision records that the applicant did not accept any suggestion that the discrimination she faced in Malaysia was ‘low-level’, notwithstanding that discrimination did not deprive her access to stable employment where she was selected through an open and competitive application process: at [25].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal therefore determined that the applicant did not meet the criteria in ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) and was not a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations. On that basis the decision under review was affirmed.CONSIDERATION On 29 October 2018, the applicant applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, and she seeks an order under s 477(2) of the Act extending the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review under s 477(1) may be made. Section 477(2) allows the Court, on application, to order an extension of the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, 276 CLR 579, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court’s discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu'uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: Tu’uta Katoa at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176, 3 FCR 344 at 348–9: Tu’uta Katoa at [13]. The non-exhaustive principles set out in Hunter Valley to which reference in Tu'uta Katoa is made, were cited with approval in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] as follows: 1. applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an "acceptable explanation for the delay"; it must be "fair and equitable in the circumstances" to extend time; 2. action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished; 3. any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension; 4. however, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and 5. the merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. See also Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [33]–[36]; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33]; Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144, 286 FCR 556 at 566 at [40].