FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
FSF18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 917
File number(s): MLG 3253 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 13 June 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (class XA) (subclass 866) visa – visa refused – decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm delegate’s decision – application for extension of time – where proposed grounds of review lack merit – no real prospects of success – application for extension of time refused – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) ss 5H, 5J(1)(a), 5J(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 424A, 424A(1), 424A(3), 425, 425A, 477(1), 477(2), 477(2)(b), 477A(2), 477A(2)(b), 499
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2, pt 2, div 1, item 2
Cases cited: BBU15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1324
BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218
DWK17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 66
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176, 3 FCR 344
Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113
Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144, 286 FCR 556
QAAH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 9
SZKDC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 164
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, 276 CLR 579
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 37 Date of last submission/s: 30 April 2025 Date of hearing: 14 May 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Slankard Solicitors for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 3253 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: FSF18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.The applicant’s application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) may be made is dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,189.38.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 917
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Court should exercise its discretion under s 477(2) of the Act to extend the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review under s 477(1) may be made. The Court considered the principles guiding such decisions, as outlined in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen and Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs. These principles include the necessity of an acceptable explanation for the delay, fairness and equity, prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the underlying application.
In deciding whether to grant an extension of time, the Court held that the proposed grounds of review lacked merit and there were no real prospects of success. The Court found that the applicant had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay in seeking judicial review. Additionally, the Court noted that the absence of prejudice to the Minister was not sufficient to justify the grant of an extension. Consequently, the Court refused the application for an extension of time and dismissed the application for judicial review.
The final orders of the Court were that the application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review may be made is refused, and the application is dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal therefore determined that the applicant did not meet the criteria in ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) and was not a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations. On that basis the decision under review was affirmed.CONSIDERATION On 29 October 2018, the applicant applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, and she seeks an order under s 477(2) of the Act extending the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review under s 477(1) may be made. Section 477(2) allows the Court, on application, to order an extension of the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, 276 CLR 579, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court’s discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu'uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: Tu’uta Katoa at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176, 3 FCR 344 at 348–9: Tu’uta Katoa at [13]. The non-exhaustive principles set out in Hunter Valley to which reference in Tu'uta Katoa is made, were cited with approval in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] as follows: 1. applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an "acceptable explanation for the delay"; it must be "fair and equitable in the circumstances" to extend time; 2. action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished; 3. any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension; 4. however, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and 5. the merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. See also Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [33]–[36]; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33]; Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144, 286 FCR 556 at 566 at [40].