IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S77 of 2014
B e t w e e n -
ALAN MAXWELL FROST
First Applicant
DIANA CATHERINE FALLON
Second Applicant
and
LEON LEWIS MacGILLIVRAY BOVAIRD
First Respondent
LEON LEWIS MacGILLIVRAY BOVAIRD IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE MONICA CATHERINE BOVAIRD
Second Respondent
THE TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MAXWELL WALTER ALLEN FROST
Third Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BELL J
GAGELER J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2014, AT 12.39 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.J. CARRUTHERS, for the applicants. (instructed by MBP Legal)
MR M.K. CONDON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR P.D. DOYLE GRAY for the first and second respondents. (instructed by Garland Hawthorn Brahe)
BELL J: Thank you, Mr Condon. Just before we turn to you, Mr Walker, I might indicate for the convenience of counsel that we will deal with this matter and then the Court will adjourn until 2.00 pm. Yes, thank you, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, the least contestable proposition found in the application book is at page 12, line 50:
This case is obviously a disaster for everyone involved.
Understandably, the respondent calls in aid everything that gives weight to that pithy and accurate summary as being a reason to refuse to special leave. We seek to turn that on its head. One of the reasons why this case is obviously a disaster for everyone involved is that it came to a head with a raft of proposed amendments, large amendments, which are still within the grasp of the Supreme Court in terms of whether leave should be grated, so it is unfinished business, but it came to the Federal Court and thus to the Full Court of the Federal Court at a point where a raft of amendments was being made to proceedings being amendments of a kind which, as you will have seen, attracted item by item, substantive and we would submit, with respect, though it is not for this Court, cogent criticisms of their substance and prospect.
Now, as you know, Justice Perram regarded that indeed as a reason in the fall back oral application with which his Honour dealt in the second half of his reason as an admittedly speculative but nonetheless justified basis to see that if those objections were good the amended application would fail and the costs in question would be relatively slight. Now, it is not part of my argument here to criticise or indeed address those conclusions at all except to call them in aid to point out that which is also common ground concerning the way in which these disastrous proceedings or multiplicity of proceedings lend themselves to a view of the bankruptcy provisions which we…
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- Case
- [2014] HCATrans 208
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court of Australia was whether the applicants had established a resulting or constructive trust over the land, thereby giving them an equitable proprietary interest that could defeat the registered title of the respondents. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the evidence supported a finding that the applicants' contributions were made with the intention of acquiring a beneficial interest, or whether their contributions were made gratuitously or for other reasons that did not give rise to a trust.
Bell and Gageler JJ, in dismissing the appeal, applied established principles of trust law. Their Honours affirmed that for a resulting trust to arise, there must be a presumption of advancement or a contribution to the purchase price with the intention of acquiring a beneficial interest. They found that the evidence did not support such an intention on the part of the applicants. Furthermore, their Honours held that the criteria for a constructive trust, which typically involve unconscionable conduct or a common intention to share beneficial ownership, were not met on the facts. The Court emphasised that registered title under the Torrens system is a strong form of title and that equitable interests must be clearly established to displace it.
The appeal was dismissed.
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