Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 6)

Link copied
Case Copied 22 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 6) [2024] FCA 1320   

File number: WAD 126 of 2022
Judgment of: FEUTRILL J
Date of judgment: 15 November 2024
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to reopen security for costs orders – dismissal of proceeding following determination of separate questions

COSTS – liability for legal costs – consideration of indemnity principle –  costs awarded on a lump sum basis   

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1322(4)(b)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1E)(a), 37M, 43, 43(3)(d)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 30.02, 39.05(c), 40.02(b); Sch 3

Cases cited:

Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd [1921] 1 KB 495

Angor Pty Ltd v Ilich Motor Co Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 65

Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44

Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd v Clipso Electrical Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 37

eInduct Systems Pty Ltd v 3D Safety Services Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 284; 90 NSWLR 451’

Frigger v Banning (No 13) [2023] FCA 923

Frigger v Banning (Application for Security for Costs on Review of Taxation) [2024] FCA 1207

Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1477

Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 520

Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 5) [2024] FCA 420

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Dimension Agriculture Pty Ltd (in liq) [2023] FCAFC 140; 299 FCR 224

Marsh v Baxter [2015] WASCA 179

Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 403

Wentworth v Rogers [2006] NSWCA 145; 66 NSWLR 474

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 40
Date of hearing: 3 July 2024
Counsel for the Plaintiffs: The plaintiffs appeared in person
Counsel for the Defendants: Mr TR Stephenson
Solicitor for the Defendants: Eastwood Law

ORDERS

WAD 126 of 2022
BETWEEN:

HARTMUT HUBERT JOSEF FRIGGER

First Plaintiff

ANGELA CECILIA THERESA FRIGGER

Second Plaintiff

AND:

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES OF AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 082 879 641)

First Defendant

SANDRA MAY BANNING

Second Defendant

ORDER MADE BY:

FEUTRILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 NOVEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The plaintiffs’ originating process, as amended, be dismissed.

2.The plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs of the proceeding in a lump sum to be assessed by the docket judge.

3.The plaintiffs’ interlocutory application filed on 25 May 2023 for orders to reopen and set aside orders made on 9 December 2022 be dismissed.

4.The plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs of the interlocutory application filed on 25 May 2023, with such costs to be paid as part of the lump sum to be assessed in accordance with paragraph 2 of these orders.

5.By 29 November 2024 the defendants file and serve a minute of the proposed orders and lump sum assessment, any affidavit(s) and an outline of submissions (limited…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 6) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1320
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 6) revolves around a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants, concerning the dismissal of the originating process and the allocation of legal costs. The defendants sought orders to dismiss the proceeding, while the plaintiffs opposed such orders and requested the reopening of security for costs orders. The legal issues before the court included whether the proceeding should be dismissed and whether the indemnity principle was satisfied to warrant the awarding of costs to the defendants. The court determined that the proceeding should be dismissed as the determination of separate questions rendered any further trial unnecessary. It further found that the indemnity principle was satisfied, leading to the conclusion that the defendants were entitled to their costs.

The court meticulously examined the evidence presented by both parties, including the circumstances surrounding the security for costs orders and the defendants' liability for legal costs. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were not liable to pay costs due to a lack of invoices and certain statements made during a taxation hearing. However, the court rejected these arguments, noting that the indemnity principle could be satisfied even without rendered invoices or payments. The court emphasised that legal liability to pay costs arises from the terms of the retainer and that the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants were not liable.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the proceeding, ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs in a lump sum, and rejected the plaintiffs' application to reopen the security for costs orders. The defendants were granted leave to file a minute of their proposed orders and a lump sum assessment, along with supporting affidavits and submissions. The plaintiffs were also required to file their responses within specified timelines, culminating in a hearing for the assessment of the lump sum and determination of the orders for payment of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiffs’ originating process, as amended, be dismissed.

2. The plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs of the proceeding in a lump sum to be assessed by the docket judge.

3. The plaintiffs’ interlocutory application filed on 25 May 2023 for orders to reopen and set aside orders made on 9 December 2022 be dismissed.

4. The plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs of the interlocutory application filed on 25 May 2023, with such costs to be paid as part of the lump sum to be assessed in accordance with paragraph 2 of these orders.

5. By 29 November 2024 the defendants file and serve a minute of the proposed orders and lump sum assessment, any affidavit(s) and an outline of submissions (limited to 5 pages) in support of the requested orders and assessment.

6. By 13 December 2024 the plaintiffs file and serve a minute of the proposed orders and lump sum assessment, any affidavit(s) and an outline of submissions (limited to 5 pages) in support of the requested orders and assessment.

7. By 20 December 2024 the defendants file and serve any affidavit(s) and (or) submissions (limited to 3 pages) purely in response to any documents the plaintiffs file and serve in accordance with paragraph 6 of these orders.

8. The hearing for assessment of the lump sum and determination of the orders for payment of that sum be listed on a date to be fixed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

These reasons concern what, if any, orders should be made after the determination of certain separate questions that were the subject of a judgment delivered on 26 April 2024. The defendants seek orders dismissing the originating process with costs. The plaintiffs oppose orders dismissing the proceeding and, in any event, any order awarding the defendants costs on the ground that the indemnity principle is not satisfied. Further, for the same reason, the plaintiffs apply to reopen orders that were made for security for the defendants’ costs and seek an order that the security given in accordance with those orders be returned to them.Background To place the issues addressed in these reasons into context it is necessary to provide a brief description of the background to the competing orders the parties now seek. On 12 October 2022 orders were made listing the originating process for final hearing over two days on dates to be fixed. Orders were also made for the parties to complete various interlocutory steps before the final hearing. The final hearing was later listed on 2 and 3 March 2023. In the meantime, the defendants applied for security for their costs. That application was contested. On 9 December 2022 orders were made requiring the plaintiffs to give security for the defendants’ costs in the sum of $35,000: Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1477. The plaintiffs gave that security by way of payment of the sum into Court. The final hearing commenced on 2 March 2023 but was not completed within the two days allocated and was adjourned part heard and relisted for a further two days on 28 and 29 June 2023. After the adjournment of the final hearing the plaintiffs made interlocutory applications for leave to adduce expert evidence and to issue subpoenas. On 1 May 2023 the defendants applied, pursuant to liberty granted at the time the orders for security for costs were made, for an order that the plaintiffs give further security for their costs and filed an affidavit of Cameron Victor Eastwood sworn 24 April 2023 in support of that application and in response to the application to adduce further evidence filed by the plaintiffs. On 23 May 2023 orders were made to determine certain legal questions arising in the proceeding separately. The listing of the continuation of the final hearing was vacated and the determination of the separate questions was listed for hearing on 28 June 2023: Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 520. On 25 May 2023 the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory application, in substance, to reopen the orders made on the security for costs application and set aside most of the orders made on that application. An affidavit of Angela Frigger sworn 3 May 2023 was filed in support of that application. The defendants’ application for security for costs and the plaintiffs’ application to reopen the orders for security for costs were listed for hearing on 2 June 2023. Having regard to the orders that had been made for the determination of separate questions, the defendants’ application for further security was not pressed at that time. Likewise, the plaintiffs’ application to reopen the security orders was not pressed. Orders were made on 2 June 2023 adjourning each of these applications to a date to be fixed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The orders of 9 December 2022 were interlocutory. Therefore, r 39.05(c) of the Rules confers power on the Court to vary or set aside those orders even though they have been entered. Nonetheless, the power to reopen interlocutory orders that have been entered is to be exercised judicially and in accordance with established principles. The power is usually exercised where there has been a material change in circumstance or the discovery of new material that could not reasonably have been put before the Court on the hearing of the original application. However, the overarching principle is that the power may be exercised to ‘do whatever the interests of justice require in the particular circumstances of the case’: see Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46-47 (McLelland J). I accept that if evidence emerged after the security for costs orders were made indicating that the defendants are not liable to pay legal costs that could provide a reason, in the interests of justice, to reopen those orders.Evidence concerning liability for legal costs The plaintiffs rely, in part, on materials in proceeding WAD 607 of 2015. Mrs Frigger deposes that in that proceeding the defendants in this proceeding filed a bill of costs for taxation in November 2021. In February 2023 the defendants’ solicitor (Mr Eastwood) produced invoices issued by the defendants’ counsel (Mr Stephenson). The bill of costs and invoices are exhibits to Mrs Frigger’s affidavit of 3 May 2023. Mrs Frigger deposes that during the taxation of the bill of costs Mr Eastwood said:In so far as the accounts in my firm are concerned, it was explained that because of the tax arrangements that we operate under being not a cash basis, but an accrual basis, we are deferring the billing of those matters until such time as we are certain that we're going to be paid and given the long history of this matter and the range of other matters where there are various cost orders that remain outstanding, have done for some time. It's not a practise. That's a commercial decision. Mrs Frigger deposes that Mr Eastwood later said that he did not understand the indemnity principle. The plaintiffs have not obtained a transcript of the taxation hearing and, therefore, a transcript of what was said and by whom at that hearing is not before the Court. Additionally, Mrs Frigger’s affidavit exhibits a letter the defendants’ solicitors sent to my chambers dated 16 February 2023. In that letter, the author (who I assume to have been Mr Eastwood) indicated that certain documents had been produced to the Federal Court Registry in compliance with orders I made on 10 February 2023 in this proceeding. Among the documents produced were copies of invoices Mr Stephenson had issued with respect to WAD 607 of 2015. The author then said:… In the case of the solicitors acting, both this firm, and its predecessor firm Eastwood Sweeney Law, operate on an accrual basis whereby tax is paid on accounts once rendered. Accordingly, all work done in relation that action remains work in progress and no invoices are produced because none have been rendered yet.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The defendants have applied for orders dismissing the plaintiffs’ originating process, as amended, under r 30.02 and for an order that the plaintiffs pay their costs of the proceeding to be fixed as a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Rules. The plaintiffs oppose those orders and have applied to re-list their interlocutory application to reopen the security for costs orders.Judgment after determination of separate questions The plaintiffs’ originating process is an application made under s 1322(4)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to remove the first defendant from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s Organisation and Business Names register. In the originating process the plaintiffs seek a declaration that the registration of Liberty Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (ACN 082 879 641) was invalid ab initio. Liberty Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd was the former name of the first defendant in the proceeding and its name at the time it was registered. The plaintiffs also seek an order to the effect that ASIC rectify the Organisation and Business Names register by removing Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (the first defendant) from that register. The separate questions were determined on the basis of agreed and assumed facts which, in substance, agreed or assumed all facts upon which the plaintiffs relied in support of their contention that the original registration of the first defendant was invalid and that ASIC was obliged to rectify its register. Upon the statement of agreed facts and upon the statement of assumed facts the separate questions were answered as follows:(1)Was the registration of the company with the name Liberty Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd and Australian Company Number 082 879 641 invalid ab initio?No.(2)On the proper construction of section 1322(4)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), has the Court power, on the application of the plaintiffs, to make an order directing the Australian Securities Investments Commission to rectify the register kept by ASIC under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to remove Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 082 879 641) from that register? No.(3)If the answer to question (2) is in the affirmative, has the Court power to make such an order with retrospective effect?No. Rule 30.02 of the Rules provides that if a decision on a question substantially disposes of the proceeding or renders any further trial of the proceeding unnecessary, a party may apply to the Court for judgment or an order dismissing the whole or any part of the proceeding. Having regard to the nature of the originating process, the foundation for that application, the orders sought in that application and the determination of the separate questions, there is no doubt that the proceeding should be dismissed. The determination of those questions has disposed of the whole of the proceeding or rendered any further trial of the proceeding unnecessary. The plaintiffs oppose orders being made to dismiss the proceeding. The plaintiffs filed written submissions to which they attached an application for leave to appeal from the judgment on the separate questions filed in proceeding WAD 104 of 2024 and an affidavit of Angela Frigger sworn 6 May 2024 in support of that application. The plaintiffs oppose orders dismissing the proceeding on the ground that orders dismissing the proceeding will prejudice their application for leave to appeal. I do not accept that submission.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Mr Eastwood’s affidavit of 8 November 2022 he deposes that the defendants had retained his firm and that they then intended to retain Mr Stephenson to conduct the defence of this proceeding. In his affidavit of 24 April 2023 he deposes, in effect, that both his firm and Mr Stephenson were, in fact, retained on the basis of the scales of costs relevant to the work being undertaken in accordance with Sch 3 of the Rules and the Court’s National Guide to Counsel Fees issued on 28 June 2013. Mr Eastwood also deposes to costs incurred up to the date of his affidavit by his firm and Mr Stephenson and an estimate of the likely future costs, at that time, of the continuation of the final hearing.Consideration of indemnity principle As already mentioned, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the legal practitioner on the record for a party is taken to be entitled to look to that party for costs. Mr Eastwood has deposed that his firm and Mr Stephenson are retained by the defendants. There is nothing in the materials to which the plaintiffs have referred to suggest that the defendants have not retained them or that the legal practitioners are not entitled to charge the defendants or that the defendants are not liable to pay legal costs. Further, I do not accept that the mere fact that the first defendant does not have an active ABN is an indication that it is not able to commence or defend legal proceedings or retain legal practitioners in such proceedings. The onus is on the plaintiffs to establish that the defendants have no liability for legal costs. It is not necessary that the legal practitioners have rendered invoices to the defendants or that the defendants have already paid the legal practitioners for legal costs in order for the indemnity principle to be satisfied: eInduct Systems Pty Ltd v 3D Safety Services Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 284; 90 NSWLR 451 at [24]-[25] (Basten JA, Beazley P agreeing); Wentworth v Rogers [2006] NSWCA 145; 66 NSWLR 474 at [126] (Basten JA). Moreover, the indemnity principle permits recovery of legal costs where there is a legal liability to pay those costs even though the likelihood of being called upon to do so is remote: Angor Pty Ltd v Ilich Motor Co Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 65 at 71-72 (French J), citing Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd [1921] 1 KB 495 at 501 (Bankes LJ), 504 (Atkins LJ), 507-508 (Younger LJ). In general, legal liability to pay legal costs arises from the terms (express or implied) of the retainer between solicitor and client. The evidence, such as it is, upon which the plaintiffs rely largely concerns proceeding WAD 605 of 2015. I understand that the plaintiffs contend that the Court should infer, from the absence of invoices rendered in WAD 605 of 2015, that the defendants have no liability to pay legal costs in that proceeding and that given the parties, firm and counsel are the same in this proceeding, the Court should infer the same circumstances apply to this proceeding. Insofar as WAD 605 of 2015 is concerned, it is evident that the plaintiffs objected to the amounts claimed in the bill of costs in that proceeding on grounds that included breach of the indemnity principle. Justice Colvin determined that the Registrar had authority to determine whether the indemnity principle had been breached within the taxation of the bill of costs: Frigger v Banning (No 13) [2023] FCA 923. Although no reasons of the Registrar are before the Court in this proceeding, it is evident that the Registrar determined that question against the plaintiffs as it is a matter of public record that they are seeking to have the Registrar’s taxation reviewed and that the Court has ordered them to give security for the costs of that review. The grounds of review include, amongst others, that the indemnity principle is not satisfied: Frigger v Banning (Application for Security for Costs on Review of Taxation) [2024] FCA 1207.