FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 591
File number: WAD 364 of 2017 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 1 May 2018 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application to set aside a bankruptcy notice – whether the applicants have a counterclaim – whether there is an entitlement to damages pursuant to a prior undertaking – applicability of National Credit Code – where there was a failure to advance arguments in previous proceedings Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(d)
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Sch 1 s 44
National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 24
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 272
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 140
Cases cited: Brott v Shtrambrandt & Ors [2009] VSC 467
Re Cox (1934) 7 ABC 98
Dekkan v Evans [2008] FCA 1004
Ebert v Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346
Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2016] WADC 71
Geeveekay v Director of Consumer Affairs (Vic) [2008] VSC 50
Re Glew; Glew v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers(N7350 of 2002) (2003) 198 ALR 331
Grey v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1
Murfett Legal Pty Ltd v Frigger [2015] WASC 406
Murfett Legal Pty Ltd v Frigger (No 2) [2017] WASC 262
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589
Date of hearing: 19 October 2017 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Applicants: The Applicants appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr LJ Davies Solicitor for the Respondent: Murfett Legal ORDERS
WAD 364 of 2017 BETWEEN: ANGELA CECILIA THERESA FRIGGER
First Applicant
HARTMUT HUBERT JOSEF FRIGGER
Second Applicant
AND: MURFETT LEGAL PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice be dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the costs of the respondent to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
THE APPLICATION
Mr and Mrs Frigger (the Friggers) apply to set aside a Bankruptcy Notice, BN213703, served upon by them by Murfett Legal Pty Ltd. The Bankruptcy Notice is in respect of unpaid legal fees. The Friggers contend that they have a counter-claim of $315,807 in damages, plus exemplary damages said to be pursuant to Grey v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1. Mrs Frigger also contends, on her own behalf and on behalf of her husband, that the Bankruptcy Notice was issued to put pressure on her and her husband to pay various costs orders, rather than to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to insolvency, in circumstances where Murfett Legal is aware that the Friggers are not insolvent.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a costs agreement between Murfett Legal and…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 591
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the applicants had a prima facie case against the respondents that was both genuine and had a fair chance of success. The Court also considered whether the respondents were entitled to rely on the Friggers' contractual undertaking to provide security by lodging caveats on the Friggers' properties. The Court had to examine whether the caveats were properly lodged and whether the respondents had a right to claim against the Friggers. Furthermore, the Court needed to decide if there was a valid entitlement to damages under the prior undertaking.
The Court held that the applicants had failed to demonstrate a valid counterclaim or set-off. The Master noted that the respondents had succeeded in their action in the Magistrates Court, which established that they had a right to claim against the Friggers. The evidence did not suggest that the caveats were improperly lodged, and the respondents were justified in maintaining the caveats until the fees were paid. The Court concluded that the applicants' abuse of process argument was unfounded, as the respondents' intention to petition for a sequestration order was not, in itself, an abuse of process. Therefore, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was dismissed.
The Court ordered that the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice be dismissed, and the applicants were to pay the respondents' costs. The orders were to be assessed if not agreed upon.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the costs of the respondent to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
If the costs agreement was covered by the national legislation, the Friggers contend that the charging clause is void ‘pursuant to s 40 National Consumer Code’ as it does not identify or describe the property and charges all of the property of the Friggers. As such, Murfett Legal, the Friggers contend, had no reasonable cause to lodge the caveats. Additionally, it is contended, the Bankruptcy Notice has been used for an ulterior purpose.CONSIDERATION The onus is on the Friggers to satisfy the Court that they have a valid counter-claim or set-off and that the facts are such that it is just for the Court to permit them to have the matter heard and determined in the usual way, rather than be forced to comply with the bankruptcy notice by a payment: Re Glew; Glew v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers(N7350 of 2002) (2003) 198 ALR 331 (at [10]-[12]). There Lindgren J said:10In Brink [Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd (1980) 44 FLR 135] Lockhart J said (at ALR 438-9; FLR 141) that the court is not required to “undertake a preliminary trial of the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand”. But, clearly, the application of the criteria above requires the court to make some kind of preliminary assessment, though obviously not to determine the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand finally. And in Guss v Johnstone (2000) 171 ALR 598, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ stated (at 606):[40]The state of satisfaction referred to in s 40(1)(g), and s 41(7), involves weighing up considerations as to the legal and factual merit of the claim relied upon by the debtor, and the justice of allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go ahead or requiring them to await the determination of the claim.11Plainly, in order to “satisfy” the court for the purposes of s 40(1)(g), the debtor is not required to prove, as on a final hearing, the asserted entitlement to recover from the creditor. Accordingly, evidence tendered on an application to set aside is to be tested for admissibility, not as if the proceeding were one in which the debtor’s claim was being finally determined, but by reference to the question whether the court should be satisfied that the debtor has a claim deserving to be finally determined.12Perhaps little more can usefully be said than that a debtor must satisfy the court that there is sufficient substance to the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand asserted to make it one which the debtor should, in justice, be permitted to have heard and determined in the usual way, rather than be forced to comply with the bankruptcy notice by payment or to commit an act of bankruptcy. It is for the Friggers in this instance to demonstrate that they have a prima facie case against Murfett Legal, that they have a fair chance of success in such a matter, and that the claim is genuine or bona fide: see Dekkan v Evans [2008] FCA 1004 per Jacobson J (at [52]):His Honour [referring to Lindgren J in Glew v Harrowell (at[9])] observed that the authorities indicate that an applicant must satisfy the Court of three interrelated, and sometimes overlapping matters: first, that he or she has a “prima facie case”, even if evidence is not adduced which would be admissible on a final hearing; second, that he or she has “a fair chance of success”; third, that the claim is “genuine” or “bona fide.”