Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 591

File number: WAD 364 of 2017
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 1 May 2018
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application to set aside a bankruptcy notice – whether the applicants have a counterclaim – whether there is an entitlement to damages pursuant to a prior undertaking – applicability of National Credit Code – where there was a failure to advance arguments in previous proceedings
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(d)

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Sch 1 s 44

National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 24

Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 272

Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 140

Cases cited:

Brott v Shtrambrandt & Ors [2009] VSC 467

Re Cox (1934) 7 ABC 98

Dekkan v Evans [2008] FCA 1004

Ebert v Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346

Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2016] WADC 71

Geeveekay v Director of Consumer Affairs (Vic) [2008] VSC 50

Re Glew; Glew v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers(N7350 of 2002) (2003) 198 ALR 331

Grey v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1

Murfett Legal Pty Ltd v Frigger [2015] WASC 406

Murfett Legal Pty Ltd v Frigger (No 2) [2017] WASC 262

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589

Date of hearing: 19 October 2017
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Applicants: The Applicants appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr LJ Davies
Solicitor for the Respondent: Murfett Legal

ORDERS

WAD 364 of 2017
BETWEEN:

ANGELA CECILIA THERESA FRIGGER

First Applicant

HARTMUT HUBERT JOSEF FRIGGER

Second Applicant

AND:

MURFETT LEGAL PTY LTD

Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice be dismissed.

2.The applicants pay the costs of the respondent to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

THE APPLICATION

  1. Mr and Mrs Frigger (the Friggers) apply to set aside a Bankruptcy Notice, BN213703, served upon by them by Murfett Legal Pty Ltd.  The Bankruptcy Notice is in respect of unpaid legal fees.  The Friggers contend that they have a counter-claim of $315,807 in damages, plus exemplary damages said to be pursuant to Grey v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1. Mrs Frigger also contends, on her own behalf and on behalf of her husband, that the Bankruptcy Notice was issued to put pressure on her and her husband to pay various costs orders, rather than to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to insolvency, in circumstances where Murfett Legal is aware that the Friggers are not insolvent.

    BACKGROUND

  2. Pursuant to a costs agreement between Murfett Legal and…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 591
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd, the applicants sought to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the respondent. The dispute arose from a legal services agreement between the Friggers and Murfett Legal, which included a costs agreement. The respondents issued a bankruptcy notice following the Friggers' failure to pay outstanding legal fees and costs. The applicants argued that the bankruptcy notice should be set aside due to alleged abuse of process and the existence of a counterclaim against the respondents. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the applicants had a valid counterclaim or set-off that would justify setting aside the bankruptcy notice.

The primary legal issue was whether the applicants had a prima facie case against the respondents that was both genuine and had a fair chance of success. The Court also considered whether the respondents were entitled to rely on the Friggers' contractual undertaking to provide security by lodging caveats on the Friggers' properties. The Court had to examine whether the caveats were properly lodged and whether the respondents had a right to claim against the Friggers. Furthermore, the Court needed to decide if there was a valid entitlement to damages under the prior undertaking.

The Court held that the applicants had failed to demonstrate a valid counterclaim or set-off. The Master noted that the respondents had succeeded in their action in the Magistrates Court, which established that they had a right to claim against the Friggers. The evidence did not suggest that the caveats were improperly lodged, and the respondents were justified in maintaining the caveats until the fees were paid. The Court concluded that the applicants' abuse of process argument was unfounded, as the respondents' intention to petition for a sequestration order was not, in itself, an abuse of process. Therefore, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was dismissed.

The Court ordered that the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice be dismissed, and the applicants were to pay the respondents' costs. The orders were to be assessed if not agreed upon.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the costs of the respondent to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

More importantly for the present application, the Master noted that if the proceedings were an attempt to seek damages pursuant to the undertaking given, the claim must fail as Murfett Legal succeeded in its action in the Magistrates Court. That being so, as the Master held, it must be the case that Murfett Legal had a right to claim against the Friggers. Moreover, as the Master noted, there was nothing in the evidence or on the findings of Le Miere J which suggested that it was not open to Murfett Legal to rely upon the Friggers’ contractual undertaking to provide security by lodging the caveat. There was nothing to suggest, as would be a fundamental necessity to warrant any claim for damages, that the caveat was improperly lodged. The Master said ‘[i]f anything the evidence points to Murfett Legal being entirely justified in lodging the caveat and maintaining it until they were paid their fees’ (at [8]). EVIDENCE It was necessary for the Friggers to deal with, amongst other things, the content of the affidavit of Mr Jason Kristyan De Silva, director of Murfett Legal, who deposed to much of the content referred to above. Specifically, Mr De Silva swore that the caveats were lodged after numerous invitations by Murfett Legal to the Friggers to apply for assessment of costs, even after the 12 month had expired. The Friggers did not apply for Murfett Legal’s costs to be assessed. Mr De Silva deposed to the fact that Le Miere J held that Murfett Legal was entitled to lodge its caveats over the Friggers properties, pursuant to the costs agreement between the parties. Mr De Silva noted that the only matter remaining for determination in the caveat proceeding was the question of costs of that proceeding. He expressed an opinion that Murfett Legal would be entitled to its costs, given that it has been wholly successful in the substantive proceedings against the Friggers regarding the debt and interest owed by them to Murfett Legal, in what I have described as ‘the recovery proceedings’. As Mr De Silva noted, it is the costs order and signed allocatur in the District Court appeal which is the subject of the Bankruptcy Notice in the present set aside application. Further, on the question of reasonableness, Mr De Silva deposed to the fact that Murfett Legal also invited the Friggers to advise of alternative security which could be used to replace the security then held by way of caveat L775693, with a view to its removal. They failed to do so. Murfett Legal also proposed to the Friggers that they pay a further amount into Court to cover interest to that date and further interest to accrue on the debt owed to Murfett Legal as alternative security to caveat L775693, pending determination of Murfett Legal’s action in the Magistrates Court for recovery of the debt. The Friggers did not accept that proposal. The balance of the debt and interest, the subject of the Magistrates Court judgment, but not costs, has been paid by the Friggers and caveat L775693 has been removed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to the abuse of process argument, this is entirely without foundation. Mr De Silva has deposed to the fact that he intends to petition the Court for a sequestration order in the event of non-compliance by the Friggers with the Bankruptcy Notice. The simple fact that the Friggers may contemplate or may have commenced some other proceeding does not, of itself, justify a conclusion that it is an abuse to proceed with the Bankruptcy Notice. It is evident they do so quite frequently. As is clear from the comments of Master Sanderson as to the reasonableness of the conduct of Murfett Legal, there cannot possibly be an abuse.CONCLUSION For those reasons, the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice must be dismissed with costs and the orders will be:(1)The application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice be dismissed.(2)The applicants pay the costs of the respondent to be assessed if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

If the costs agreement was covered by the national legislation, the Friggers contend that the charging clause is void ‘pursuant to s 40 National Consumer Code’ as it does not identify or describe the property and charges all of the property of the Friggers. As such, Murfett Legal, the Friggers contend, had no reasonable cause to lodge the caveats. Additionally, it is contended, the Bankruptcy Notice has been used for an ulterior purpose.CONSIDERATION The onus is on the Friggers to satisfy the Court that they have a valid counter-claim or set-off and that the facts are such that it is just for the Court to permit them to have the matter heard and determined in the usual way, rather than be forced to comply with the bankruptcy notice by a payment: Re Glew; Glew v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers(N7350 of 2002) (2003) 198 ALR 331 (at [10]-[12]). There Lindgren J said:10In Brink [Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd (1980) 44 FLR 135] Lockhart J said (at ALR 438-9; FLR 141) that the court is not required to “undertake a preliminary trial of the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand”. But, clearly, the application of the criteria above requires the court to make some kind of preliminary assessment, though obviously not to determine the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand finally. And in Guss v Johnstone (2000) 171 ALR 598, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ stated (at 606):[40]The state of satisfaction referred to in s 40(1)(g), and s 41(7), involves weighing up considerations as to the legal and factual merit of the claim relied upon by the debtor, and the justice of allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go ahead or requiring them to await the determination of the claim.11Plainly, in order to “satisfy” the court for the purposes of s 40(1)(g), the debtor is not required to prove, as on a final hearing, the asserted entitlement to recover from the creditor. Accordingly, evidence tendered on an application to set aside is to be tested for admissibility, not as if the proceeding were one in which the debtor’s claim was being finally determined, but by reference to the question whether the court should be satisfied that the debtor has a claim deserving to be finally determined.12Perhaps little more can usefully be said than that a debtor must satisfy the court that there is sufficient substance to the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand asserted to make it one which the debtor should, in justice, be permitted to have heard and determined in the usual way, rather than be forced to comply with the bankruptcy notice by payment or to commit an act of bankruptcy. It is for the Friggers in this instance to demonstrate that they have a prima facie case against Murfett Legal, that they have a fair chance of success in such a matter, and that the claim is genuine or bona fide: see Dekkan v Evans [2008] FCA 1004 per Jacobson J (at [52]):His Honour [referring to Lindgren J in Glew v Harrowell (at[9])] observed that the authorities indicate that an applicant must satisfy the Court of three interrelated, and sometimes overlapping matters: first, that he or she has a “prima facie case”, even if evidence is not adduced which would be admissible on a final hearing; second, that he or she has “a fair chance of success”; third, that the claim is “genuine” or “bona fide.”