Freeth v Volvo Group Australia Pty Ltd

CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER
CITATION:	Freeth v Volvo Group Australia Pty Ltd [2025] NSWPIC 153
APPLICANT:	Jayne Freeth
RESPONDENT:	Volvo Group Australia Pty Ltd
MEMBER:	Rachel Homan
DATE OF DECISION:	16 April 2025
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987; claim for weekly compensation; primary psychological injury; concessions made at conciliation/arbitration regarding liability and incapacity; quantification of entitlement to weekly compensation where applicant already in receipt of weekly benefits on the basis of having no current work capacity as a result of a separate physical injury; application of section 46; Held – both injuries had resulted in the applicant being incapacitated for work in her pre-injury duties and any other suitable employment; the discretion in section 46 was enlivened and ought to be exercised; orders made for the payment of weekly compensation under sections 36 and 37 and for such amounts to be reduced by the amount paid in respect of the physical injury.
DETERMINATIONS MADE:	The Commission orders: 1. Subject to Order 3 below, the respondent to pay the applicant weekly compensation pursuant to s 36(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 on the basis of the agreed pre-injury average weekly earnings figure of $1,410, as periodically indexed, for 13 weeks from 20 August 2024. 2. Subject to Order 3 below, after 13 weeks, the respondent to pay the applicant weekly compensation pursuant to s 37(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 on the basis of the agreed pre-injury average weekly earnings figure of $1,410, as periodically indexed, to date and continuing. 3. Pursuant to s 46 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, the weekly compensation payable by the respondent to the applicant pursuant to ss 36(1) and 37(1) above is reduced by the amount already paid by the respondent pursuant in respect of her physical injury on 31 August 2021 (claim number 4848842). A brief statement is attached setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

Ms Jayne Freeth (the applicant) was employed by Volvo Group Australia Pty Ltd (the respondent) as a storeperson.
In the course of her employment with the respondent, the applicant sustained physical injuries to her shoulders and elbows in respect of which she has been, and remains, in receipt of compensation.
The applicant subsequently claimed to have received a primary psychological injury due to differential scrutiny, treatment and bullying in the course of her employment with the respondent between 2017 and 20 August 2024, on which date her employment was terminated.
Liability to pay compensation in respect of the psychological injury was disputed in a notice issued pursuant to s 78 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) on 12 September 2024.
The respondent’s insurer disputed that the applicant had sustained an injury for the purposes of s 4 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). A defence under s 11A(1) of the 1987 Act was also raised on the ground that the injury was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken by the respondent with respect to transfer and/or dismissal. The insurer further disputed that the applicant was totally or partially incapacitated for work as a result of an injury and that any medical or related treatment was reasonably necessary as a result of an injury pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act.
The decision to dispute liability for the psychological injury was maintained following internal review in a decision dated 25 October 2024.
The present proceedings were commenced by lodgement of an Application to Resolve a Dispute in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission) on 8 November 2024. The applicant sought weekly compensation from 20 August 2024 onwards pursuant to s 36 of the 1987 Act as well as compensation for her medical and related treatment expenses.

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION

The matter proceeded to a preliminary conference before a Member of the Commission on
9 December 2024. The parties were unable to reach an agreement to resolve the dispute at that stage.
The matter was reconstituted and listed for conciliation conference and arbitration hearing on 21 February 2025.
The applicant was represented at the conciliation conference and arbitration hearing by
Mr Bruce McManamey of counsel, instructed by Ms Zahra Panju. The respondent was represented by Mr Philip Perry of counsel, instructed by Mr Lloyd Carmen.
During the conciliation phase of the proceedings, the parties were able to reach agreement with respect to all of the issues in dispute other than the quantification of the applicant’s entitlement to weekly compensation. In particular, the parties agreed that:
(a)    the applicant sustained a primary psychological injury deemed to have occurred on 20 August 2024;
(b)    a defence pursuant to s 11A(1) of the 1987 Act did not arise;
(c)    in the period from 20 August 2024 to date, the applicant had no current work capacity as a result of the primary psychological injury, and
(d)    the pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE) rate as at 20 August 2024 was $1,410, subject to periodic indexation.
The applicant took the view that she was entitled to a full award of weekly compensation pursuant to ss 36 and 37 of the 1987 Act on the basis of having no current work capacity, notwithstanding that she remained in receipt of weekly compensation in respect of her physical injuries throughout the relevant period.
The respondent took the view that a discretion pursuant to s 46 of the 1987 Act arose and ought to be exercised so that the award for weekly compensation in respect of the primary psychological injury should be reduced to prevent dual benefits of the same kind being payable.
The applicant objected to the respondent’s reliance on s 46 of the 1987 Act on the ground that it was not a matter previously notified as being in dispute prior to the commencement of proceedings in accordance with s 78 of the 1998 Act. The applicant argued that an application for leave pursuant to s 289A(4) of the 1998 Act had to be made in order for the respondent to rely upon that provision.
The Commission proceeded to hear submissions on the record from both parties in respect of that issue. After hearing the submissions, I determined that, to the extent it was required, leave ought to be granted to the respondent to have a dispute heard as to whether the Commission can and ought to make an order pursuant to s 46 of the 1987 Act in the circumstances of this case. Reasons for the determination were given orally and recorded.
The applicant also raised an objection to the admission of documents attached to an Application to Lodge Additional Documents lodged by the respondent on 18 February 2025. After hearing formal submissions on the record, I determined to admit those documents in the proceedings pursuant to r 67C of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021.
As there remained insufficient time to hear formal submissions with regard to the remaining issues in dispute, the matter was adjourned to a further conciliation conference and arbitration hearing on 26 March 2025.
The parties appeared for the conciliation conference and arbitration hearing on that date with the same representation. The parties spent a further period in conciliation but remained in disagreement with regard to the quantification of the applicant’s entitlement weekly compensation.
The applicant raised an objection to the admission of further additional documents lodged under cover of an Application to Lodge Additional Documents by the respondent on
19 March 2025. Formal submissions were heard in respect of that application, following which I determined to admit the additional documents for reasons given orally and recorded.
I am satisfied that the parties to the dispute understand the nature of the application and the legal implications of any assertion made in the information supplied. I have used my best endeavours in attempting to bring the parties to the dispute to a settlement acceptable to all of them. I am satisfied that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to explore settlement and that they have been unable to reach an agreed resolution of the dispute.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The parties agree that the following issues remain in dispute:
(a) whether the Commission has a discretion, in the circumstances of this case, to order that payments of weekly compensation in respect of the primary psychological injury be reduced to prevent dual benefits of the same kind being payable by the respondent during and in respect of the incapacity for work pursuant to s 46 of the 1987 Act, and
(b) if so, whether the Commission ought to exercise its discretion under s 46 of the 1987 Act.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The following documents were in evidence before the Commission and considered in making this determination:
(a)    Application to Resolve a Dispute and attached documents;
(b)    Reply and attached documents;
(c)    documents attached to an Application to Lodge Additional Documents lodged by the respondent on 18 February 2025, and
(d)    documents attached to an Application to Lodge Additional Documents lodged by the respondent on 19 March 2025.
Neither party applied to adduce oral evidence or cross-examine any witness.

Respondent’s submissions

The respondent submitted that the applicant’s entitlement to weekly compensation in respect of the primary psychological injury ought to be reduced. The incapacity that had been inflicted as a result of that injury was an incapacity to work in any suitable employment. The applicant had another identical incapacity to perform work resulting from her physical injuries. It was clear the applicant had been rendered totally incapacitated for any form of suitable employment by both injuries.
The respondent used an analogy of a person being incapable of running 100m in 10 seconds. It might be that such incapacity resulted from excess weight or because of a sore leg. Either way, the incapacity was the same.
The respondent observed that the list of payments pertaining to the physical injury claim confirmed that the applicant had been paid weekly compensation on the basis of having no current work capacity at all relevant times. This was consistent with the corresponding certificates of capacity, all of which certified the applicant as having no current capacity for any work. The respondent submitted that the Commission would conclude that throughout the period of the current claim, the applicant had been totally incapacitated as a result of her physical injury.
On this basis, the respondent submitted that the discretion in s 46 was enlivened. The respondent submitted that the case was on all fours with my decision in Purkiss v Secretary, Department of Education[1] and the same type of order ought to be made.
[1] [2022] NSWPIC 269.
The respondent said it accepted that there were two injuries but the incapacity that resulted from the two injuries was the same. A discretion arose to reduce the award for weekly compensation to prevent dual benefits. The Commission would be satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise that discretion in the present case. To hold otherwise would result in the applicant being paid double compensation.
The respondent submitted that this approach was consistent with Cordina Chicken Farms Pty Ltd v Thoa Hong Le[2] (Cordina). It was clear that the legislature considered it appropriate to prevent the undesirable outcome of dual benefits of the same kind being payable by the employer.
[2] [2008] NSWWCCPD 125.
The proposed order would leave weekly payments payable.

Applicant’s submissions

The applicant submitted that the crucial question was what was meant by the expression, “in respect of the incapacity concerned” in s 46 of the 1987 Act. The applicant said the respondent had assumed that there could only be one incapacity.
The respondent submitted that it was well-established that where separate injuries had resulted in separate incapacities there could be separate awards for compensation. The applicant referred in this regard to the decision in Sydney City Council v Ince[3] (Ince).
[3] (1989) 16 NSWLR 690.
The applicant submitted that the nature of the incapacity, not its effect was what was significant.
The applicant also referred to the decision in ALCAN Australia Ltd v Jordan[4] (Jordan) where asthma and orthopaedic injuries played on different functions within the body leading to separate awards for compensation.
[4] [1995] NSWCA 12.
The applicant submitted that in Cordina, there was one incapacity because the two injuries created the same restrictions, being an inability to perform unskilled manual work requiring the lifting of objects heavier than 2kg..
The applicant submitted that, unless the applicant’s injuries incapacitated her in the same way and affected the same aspects of work, they were clearly not the same. The respondent bore the onus of establishing that the nature of the incapacity was the same but had not addressed that issue at all in its submissions.
The applicant referred to a medicolegal report from consultant psychiatrist, Dr David Kumagaya, dated 8 October 2024, in which the psychological symptoms impacting on her ability to work were described. These included depressive and anxious symptoms, ongoing low mood, amotivation, decreased interest and engagement in activities, low energy levels, concentration difficulties, sleep disturbance, a feeling of being keyed up and restlessness. None of those symptoms related to using her hands for work which was the effect of the physical injury.
Similar observations were made by the applicant’s psychologist, Ms Kathy Mill in a report dated 5 September 2024. The restrictions resulting from the applicant’s psychological injury were said to be completely different to the restrictions resulting from her physical injury.
In regard to the physical injury, the applicant referred to a medicolegal report from orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Jonathan Herald, dated 26 March 2024. Dr Herald gave the opinion that the applicant was fit for modified or light duties with a 2kg lifting restriction and restrictions on pushing and pulling.
In a report dated 5 September 2024, the applicant’s general practitioner, Dr Eric Lim, indicated that due to the applicant’s shoulder and elbow dysfunction, she had a limited lifting and carrying capacity and could not return to work as a storeperson.
The applicant submitted that the fact that her general practitioner had issued separate certificates in respect of the physical and psychological injuries was consistent with the doctor having formed the view that there were two separate and distinct incapacities.
The applicant submitted that her entitlement to weekly compensation in respect of each injury was different. The applicant had received in excess of 130 weeks of weekly compensation and was now receiving payments under s 38 of the 1987 Act for the physical injury whereas her entitlement fell under ss 36 and 37 for the psychological injury. This was said to highlight the difference between the two incapacities.
The applicant submitted that the current statutory scheme required calculations to be made in accordance with the provisions in ss 36, 37 and 38. There was no discretion as appeared in the now repealed s 40 of the 1987 Act.
The applicant submitted that s 46 only applied if there was one incapacity.
The applicant referred to the decision of Miller v CSR Timber Products Pty Ltd[5] and submitted that it was possible for a worker to receive payments in excess of their PIAWE.
[5] (1993) 29 NSWLR 611.
The respondent submitted that s 46 was intended to address the situation where voluntary payments in respect of the same incapacity had been made where there was a concurrent entitlement to statutory benefits by award. There had been no voluntary payments in respect of the psychological injury in this case.
The applicant submitted that if the Commission did form the view that there was a discretion under s 46, the proper exercise of the discretion was to give credit for an amount that would leave 100% of PIAWE so that the applicant would be properly compensated for the entirety of her losses.

Respondent’s submissions

The respondent said that it accepted that there were two incapacities but they were the same. The incapacity resulting from each injury was an incapacity for work of any kind.
The respondent submitted that the applicant would remain protected if an order of the kind in Purkiss was made. If there ceased to be an entitlement to weekly compensation in respect of the physical injury, the applicant would remain entitled to weekly compensation in respect of the psychological injury.
Noting that the applicant was entitled to awards under ss 36 and 37 for the psychological injury, there would be sums payable by the respondent where those amounts were greater than the amounts paid in respect of the physical injury.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

It has been conceded that the applicant has, since 20 August 2024, had no current work capacity as a result of a compensable primary psychological injury.
The relevant PIAWE figure for the primary psychological injury is agreed $1,410 as at the date of injury.
Having regard to these concessions, I am satisfied that the applicant is entitled to weekly compensation pursuant to s 36(1) of the 1987 Act at the rate of 95% of her PIAWE for the first entitlement period of 13 weeks commencing on 20 August 2024. The PIAWE rate will be indexed on and from 1 October 2024.
In the second entitlement period after 13 weeks, the applicant is entitled to weekly compensation pursuant to s 37(1) of the 1987 Act at the rate of 80% of her PIAWE, as periodically indexed, to date and continuing.
I am further satisfied, having regard to the list of payments and certificates of capacity in respect of the physical injury claim, that throughout the period of weekly compensation claimed in these proceedings, the applicant has already been paid weekly compensation at a rate of 80% of the PIAWE. I accept that such payments were made on the basis that the applicant had no current work capacity as a result of her physical injury.
The applicant submits that there is no legislative basis for a reduction in the award of weekly compensation payable in respect of the applicant’s psychological injury to account for the payments that have been made in respect of the physical injury.
The respondent submits that a discretion exists, under s 46 of the 1987 Act, for the Commission to order that payments in respect of the psychological injury be reduced. Furthermore, the respondent submits that the discretion ought to be exercised in this case.
Section 46 of the 1987 Act provides:
“46   Reduction of weekly payments to prevent dual benefits
(1)    The Commission may, on the determination of an application for any weekly payment of compensation or on a review under this Act of any weekly payment of compensation, order that the weekly payment be reduced to prevent dual benefits of the same kind being payable by the employer during and in respect of the incapacity for work.
(2)    Any such order shall have effect according to its tenor.
(3)    This section does not affect the operation of section 49 or 50.”
The effect of s 46 was considered in Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Smith & Anor:[6]
“The power conferred by section 46 is discretionary, and operates to prevent payment of ‘dual benefits of the same kind’. The submission made by the worker is that the settlement in the Industrial Relations Commission of NSW was ‘of all claims the worker brought against his former employer’, and one cannot distinguish what part of the settlement is ‘actual wages’. The evidence does not include the pleadings in the Industrial Commission of NSW, nor the deed (or whatever other document) effected the settlement. Accordingly, the only information available for the purpose of characterising the settlement payment is the worker’s evidence at T11 to 14.
The forerunner of section 46, section 13 of the Workers Compensation Act 1926 was dealt with by the High Court in Steggles Pty Limited v Vandenberg [1987] HCA 35; [1987] 163 CLR 321 (‘Steggles’). Section 13 provided:
‘In fixing the amount of the weekly payment, regard shall be had to any payment, allowance or benefit (other than any payment, allowance or benefit from a superannuation or similar fund to which the worker has contributed) which the worker may receive from the employer during the period of his incapacity.’ (emphasis added)
The High Court in a joint judgment rejected an argument that payment to a worker, pursuant to an industrial award, for a rostered leisure day, should result in compensation not being payable for the same day, pursuant to section 13:
‘The payment for the rostered leisure day was in no sense a payment in respect of the respondent's incapacity. Nor was it a payment of wages for work which was done or which would, but for the incapacity, have been done on that day. It was in truth a payment of wages for work done within the ordinary working week, being work done in 0.4 of an hour on nineteen previous days in accordance with the provisions of cl 5 of the Award. The case is therefore not one in which a worker receives both a payment of compensation and a payment of wages for work done on the same day.’ (at 327)
Whilst Steggles dealt with a differently worded section, there are similarities. In section 46, as in the previous section 13, application of the section requires that the amount payable by the employer be related to the worker’s incapacity. Indeed the required connection between the payment and the incapacity is greater under section 46 than its forerunner. Section 13 required that the payment be ‘during the period of his incapacity’, whereas section 46 requires that it be ‘during and in respect of the incapacity for work’.”
[6] [2007] NSWWCCPD 134.

In Workers’ Compensation Dust Diseases Board of NSW v Cook,[7] Basten JA commented on the operation of s 46 in the context of a submission that a worker was not entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 for his dust disease in light of his previous recovery of common law damages:
“Further, s 46 refers to ‘dual benefits of the same kind’, not to the payment of compensation and damages. The benefits are to be payable ‘by the employer’, which does not engage the present case.
…
Of critical importance in this context is that the primary purpose of the Workers Compensation Act is to confer on a worker who has received an injury (being a personal injury arising out of or in the course of his or her employment) a right to receive compensation from the worker’s employer. The Dust Diseases Act does not provide for payments of compensation by an employer, but by the Board, albeit from a fund created under s 6 of the Dust Diseases Act which will include payments by workers’ compensation insurers.”
[7] [2015] NSWCA 270.
In the same case, MacFarlan JA commented:
“Moreover, the reference to ‘dual benefits’ is, in its context, a reference to duplicated Workers Compensation Act benefits and does not refer to common law damages.”
It is clear in the circumstances of this case that the applicant is entitled to benefits of the same kind, being weekly compensation under Division 2 of the 1987 Act, in respect of two injuries. It is also clear that such benefits are payable by the respondent (or its insurer). The benefits are both payable “during” the period of incapacity which is the subject of the current proceedings.
The question which remains in dispute is, whether the benefits payable are “in respect of the incapacity for work”.
Both of the payments to which the applicant is entitled are payable in respect of incapacity for work. The applicant submits, however, that this element of s 46 requires that the benefits of weekly compensation payable for the physical and psychological injuries be in respect of the same incapacity for work. The applicant submits that the incapacity for work resulting from her physical injury is separate and distinct from her incapacity for work resulting from the primary psychological injury.
I accept that the incapacity resulting from both injuries flows from different symptoms and restrictions. The physical injury affects the applicant’s ability to use her upper limbs for work. The injury which is the subject of these proceedings affects the applicant’s psychological ability to engage in work.
The decision in Cordina confirms that it is possible for a worker to have two separate and distinct incapacities. Deputy President Roche in that case referred to the decision in Jordan as providing a good example of a case where it was appropriate to find that separate incapacities had resulted from multiple injuries:
“The facts in Jordan are a good illustration of the kind of situation where it was held to be appropriate to find that separate incapacities had resulted from multiple injuries. In that case, the worker developed “pot room asthma” in 1982. In August 1986 he injured his back, but continued working. In March 1989 he injured his left knee and back, and underwent knee surgery in September of that year. He lost no time from work until his employment was terminated in 1990. Because of the effect of the transitional provisions in the 1987 Act, his first back injury was deemed to have happened in March 1989 and these constituted a single injury for the purposes of the 1987 Act (at 483C).”
In Cordina, the worker had two injuries, both of which affected her ability to carry out manual work albeit for slightly different reasons. Deputy President Roche found there was one incapacity:
“In Ms Le’s statement of 23 August 2007, no attempt is made to identify the restrictions she has as a result of one injury compared to the other. The crush injury has clearly affected Ms Le’s ability to carry out manual work because she “always guards her left hand” and she uses her right hand for everything. Similarly, the carpal tunnel syndrome has also affected her ability to engage in manual work because of pain and an inability to firmly hold objects. Having regard to the authorities of Ince and Jordan, however, I am unable to determine that the carpal tunnel syndrome has resulted in an incapacity that is separate and distinct from the incapacity resulting from the crush injury. On the limited and unsatisfactory evidence tendered, I am comfortably satisfied that, in the labour market reasonably accessible to her, Ms Le’s injuries have resulted in one incapacity, namely, an incapacity to engage in full time unskilled manual work requiring the lifting of objects heavier than two kilograms.”
The evidence in this case indicates that while the symptoms and restrictions resulting from each injury are different, they have, at all relevant times, affected the applicant’s capacity for work in the same way. That is, they have rendered her unable to work in her pre-injury employment or in any other suitable employment. I am satisfied that the incapacity resulting from both injuries has, at all relevant times, been the same.
Having made this finding, I am satisfied that the discretion under s 46 of the 1987 Act is available in the circumstances of this case.
I am further satisfied that the discretion ought to be exercised.
A number of provisions in the 1987 Act operate to prevent double recovery. This can be seen, for example, in s 50 of the 1987 Act in relation to the payment of wages for sick leave and s 151Z in relation to the recovery of damages in respect of the injury. Division 8 of the 1987 Act contemplates the reduction of benefits where additional or alternative compensation is payable, although the provisions in that Division do not appear to be operational due to the absence of regulations prescribing the additional or alternative compensation to which the Division applies. There are obvious policy reasons underpinning these provisions.
Were the discretion under s 46 not exercised, the quantum of weekly compensation payable to the applicant would far exceed the amount the applicant would have earned had she remained uninjured.
While the applicant has identified an example of a case where there was an overpayment and the Compensation Court found there was no power to order repayment in Miller, that example does not persuade me that the discretion ought not be exercised here.
The question which remains is the extent to which the award of weekly compensation in respect of the psychological injury ought to be reduced. The applicant submits that any reduction should be for an amount that would leave 100% of PIAWE so that the applicant would be properly compensated for the entirety of her losses.
The applicant’s submission is broadly consistent with the approach taken in cases such as Jordan, which were concerned with awards of compensation under the now repealed s 40 of the 1987 Act. That section provided that the weekly payment of compensation in respect of a period of partial incapacity was to be an amount not exceeding the reduction in the worker’s weekly earnings.
The statutory scheme which applies in the present case is, however, substantially different. Sections 36, 37 and 38 in their current form entitle workers who have been incapacitated by an injury to an amount of weekly compensation which is a percentage of their PIAWE. Depending on the entitlement period and the extent of incapacity, that percentage is either 95% or 80% of the PIAWE (or a maximum weekly amount) and is reduced by the worker’s current weekly earnings during any periods where there is a capacity to work in suitable employment.
I am unable to discern any statutory basis for the applicant’s submission that she should be compensated up to 100% of her PIAWE. Nor have I been referred to any authority which would support that proposition.
In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to reduce the award of weekly compensation in respect of the psychological injury by the amount already paid in respect of the physical injury. This is the approach I took in Purkiss. There will be an order to that effect.

Comment on jurisdiction

In deciding the interlocutory question of whether the Commission could deal with s 46 in circumstances where its application had not been raised in a s 78 notice, I expressed a view that, as s 46 concerned a discretion only exercisable by the Commission after the commencement of certain proceedings, it was not a matter which was required to be notified under s 78 of the 1998 Act. I observed that s 78 only required notice to be given of certain decisions made by an insurer.
In response, the applicant raised a jurisdictional question as to whether there was any dispute to be heard in these proceedings.
The Commission does in my view have power to make the order above. Prior to the commencement of these proceedings, a decision was made by the insurer to dispute liability for the psychological injury and that decision was notified in accordance with s 78 of the 1998 Act. That dispute was referred to the Commission in accordance with s 289 of the 1998 Act.
Although the respondent subsequently made the concessions recorded above at the conciliation conference on 21 February 2025, the referral of the dispute enlivened the Commission’s jurisdiction. Having regard to the nature of the proceedings, the exercise of the discretion in s 46 of the 1987 was then a matter in respect of which both parties were entitled to be heard.

[2025] NSWPIC 153

16 April 2025