Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2004] FCAFC 318

BANKRUPTCY – vesting of rights of action in trustee – proceeding to compel trustee to prosecute or assign vested actions – no injustice or inequity shown so as to enliven Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – leave to appeal refused – appeal dismissed as incompetent

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 60(2), 60(3)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) Rule 668

Citicorp Australia Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1965) 71 FCR 550 applied
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 applied
Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2003] FCA 1233 affirmed

LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED & ANOR
Q 178 OF 2003

LEE, MERKEL & HELY JJ
1 DECEMBER 2004
SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 178 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
APPELLANT

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT

MATTHEW LESLIE JOINER AND PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON AS TRUSTEES OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LEE, MERKEL & HELY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

1 DECEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be refused, and the appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2.        The appellant pay the costs of the second respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 178 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
APPELLANT

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT

MATTHEW LESLIE JOINER AND PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON AS TRUSTEES OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LEE, MERKEL & HELY JJ

DATE:

1 DECEMBER 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. Mr Freeman is a bankrupt. By Notices of Motion filed in the bankruptcy proceedings he seeks orders pursuant to s 178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’) to compel his Trustees, the second respondent (‘the Trustees’), to prosecute proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland against the first respondent (‘the Bank’). The primary judge declined to make the orders sought and ordered that the Notices of Motion be dismissed (see: Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2003] FCA 1233 (Spender J)).

  2. Mr Freeman filed a Notice of Appeal against that decision.  Later he filed a motion seeking leave to file an Amended Notice of Appeal.  The motion also asked the Court to grant leave to refer to ‘new (fresh) evidence’.

    Leave to appeal is required

  3. When the matter came on for hearing, Mr Freeman appeared for himself without the benefit of legal assistance.  The Bank did not appear, although the Notice of Appeal had been…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 318
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd involved Mr Freeman, who sought leave to appeal against the decisions made by the Trustees of his bankrupt estate to abandon certain litigation. The primary judge had dismissed Mr Freeman’s application, finding that the Trustees' decisions were neither unjust nor inequitable. Mr Freeman subsequently applied for leave to appeal to a higher court, which required an assessment of whether the appeal was valid and whether the primary judge’s decision was correct.

The central legal issue was whether the Trustees' decision to abandon the litigation was unjust or inequitable, thereby requiring judicial intervention under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The court had to consider the Trustees' reasoning in abandoning the litigation, the prospects of success of the proposed litigation, and whether there were any grounds to doubt the Trustees' decision-making process. Mr Freeman argued that the Trustees had acted unreasonably and that their decisions had prejudiced his potential claims against the Bank.

The court found that the Trustees had carefully considered the potential risks and costs associated with continuing the litigation, and concluded that the decision to abandon the litigation was reasonable given the circumstances. The Trustees had legitimate concerns about the prospects of success and the availability of funds to support the litigation. The court held that the Trustees' decision was neither unjust nor inequitable, and therefore, there was no basis for the court to intervene under its supervisory jurisdiction.

The court dismissed Mr Freeman’s application for leave to appeal, finding the appeal to be incompetent. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the second respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused, and the appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the second respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Court pointed out to the parties that the judgment from which Mr Freeman purported to appeal was an interlocutory judgment, from which an appeal may not be brought unless the Court or a judge gives leave to appeal: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A); Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423. Thereupon Mr Freeman requested the Court to treat the Notice of Appeal as an application for leave to appeal, a course which was not opposed by counsel for the Trustees. The Court then embarked upon the hearing of an application by Mr Freeman for leave to appeal.Background The applications made by Mr Freeman to the primary judge are part of an extensive saga of litigation, which has its origins in a mediation between the Bank and Mr Freeman conducted before the late Mr R R Douglas QC (as he then was) in December 1997, at which Mr Freeman was represented by counsel and solicitors. As a result of the mediation, the Bank and Mr Freeman executed an agreement on 4 December 1997 (‘the mediation agreement’). The mediation agreement led to the establishment by the Bank of a bill facility of $1,020,000 in favour of Mr Freeman which was due for repayment on 6 April 1998. By the mediation agreement, Mr Freeman agreed to use his best endeavours to refinance the Bank’s debt or to sell the property ‘Glasford Vale’ by 4 March 1998. Settlement of any sale or refinancing was to be effected by 6 April 1998. The mediation agreement contained a provision (Cl 9.1) under which Mr Freeman released the Bank from claims which he had or might have had against the Bank in respect of a wide range of matters. Mr Freeman was unable to refinance the Bank’s debt, or sell ‘Glasford Vale’ by 4 March 1998. On 1 May 1998 the Bank commenced proceedings (No SC 4013 of 1998) in the Queensland Supreme Court for possession of ‘Glasford Vale’ (which had been mortgaged to the Bank), and for monies owing under the expired bill facility. The proceedings were heard before Ambrose J over a period of four days in September 2000, when Mr Freeman was represented by counsel. On 11 October 2000 Ambrose J gave judgment for the Bank for possession of ‘Glasford Vale’, and for the sum of $1,427,890.08 and indemnity costs. His Honour:-rejected Mr Freeman’s case that he was mentally incompetent when the mediation agreement was concluded;-found that the release was effective to release the Bank from all of the claims made by Mr Freeman in his counter claim; and-held that in any event Mr Freeman had no real prospect of success in establishing those claims. On 2 November 2001 Mr Freeman unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Ambrose J (No 9718 of 2000). On 14 March 2003 the High Court refused special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal. One of the matters relied upon in argument by counsel for Mr Freeman at the special leave application was an alleged failure on the part of the Bank to give proper discovery, a matter which had not been raised in the Court of Appeal. In any event, special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court because no arguable error had been demonstrated in the courts below.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 24 October 2003 one of the Trustees, Mr Joiner, filed an affidavit in the proceedings before the primary judge stating that:‘12. The Trustees abandoned the proceedings in S2339 of 2002 for the following reasons:(a)The Trustees did not consider it to be in the interests of creditors to prosecute the proceedings or assign them to the Applicant Mr Freeman was willing to provide consideration to the bankrupt estate for an assignment of the proceedings to him of $1.00;(b)No funding was available from the Commonwealth Government to conduct a detailed assessment of the proceedings;(c)The Trustees had strong reservations about the prospects of the proceedings being successful;(d)The Trustees were aware of the various risks associated with electing to prosecute or assign the proceedings, including exposing the Trustees to an adverse costs order, for which there were no funds in the estate to indemnify ourselves with. I considered that should the Trustees have elected to prosecute the proceedings, the Trustees would have become substituted as plaintiffs in the proceedings and thereby possibly become exposed to costs, if unsuccessful.13. The following factors were considered relevant to the Trustees decision to abandon the proceedings:(a)With respect to Mr Freeman’s allegations of new evidence that the Bank colluded with the Receivers and Managers in breaching a duty of care afforded to Mr Freeman by selling the properties and assets at undervalue, I referred to the reasons for judgment issued by the Full Federal Court on 26 August 2003 in the proceedings between Mr Freeman and the Bank (Q44 of 2002). In particular, I noted the Full Federal Court’s comments that it had considered the reasons for judgment issued by Justice Spender in earlier proceedings involving Mr Freeman and the Bank. At Paragraph 31, His Honours stated “His Honour (Justice Spender) said he was not to be taken as indicating any view as to the strength of the point but was not prepared to say it was inarguable given that the property was sold at a figure which was considerably less than the valuation which the bank’s valuer had placed on the property at a not irrelevant time”. Further, I considered the contents of Paragraphs 69, 70, 71, 72 and 73 of the Full Federal Court’s reasons for judgment.(b)I considered that various reasons for judgment issued by the Federal Court of Australia placed doubt on whether the alleged loss suffered by Mr Freeman could be sheeted to the Bank and that, if there are grounds to pursue the alleged claim of damages and loss, then the involvement of the Receivers and Managers, sold the properties and assets, ought to be investigated.14. Mr Freeman was requested to provide the Trustees with all relevant evidence to allow the Trustees to assess the Receivers and Managers’ involvement. However, no evidence has been forthcoming to date.’The decision of the primary judge The primary judge held:-that the issue is whether the decisions made by the Trustees effectively to abandon the two pieces of litigation are unjust or inequitable, such as to require the Court in the proper exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under s 178 of the Act to make orders of the kind for which Mr Freeman contends;-the history of the litigation suggests there are very real grounds for thinking that the prospects of success, particularly in the UCPR 668 proceedings, are ‘far from rosy’;-that he was not satisfied that the Trustees had reached a perverse or necessarily wrong conclusion about the prospects of the proposed litigation being successful;-the fact that the bankrupt estate is without funds, and that no funding is available from either creditors or the Commonwealth Government is a very real consideration; and-the Trustees’ decision not to prosecute proceedings relying on UCPR 668, nor to prosecute the proceedings in respect of the claim for damages against the Bank in respect of the sale at an alleged undervalue by Bank appointed receivers, had not been shown to be either unjust or inequitable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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