Franklin v Barry & Nilsson Lawyers (No 2)

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Franklin v Barry & Nilsson Lawyers (No 2) [2011] QDC 55

PARTIES:

EYLECE PATRICIA FRANKLIN
(Applicant)

AND

BARRY & NILSSON LAWYERS
(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

2607/09

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

21 April 2011

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22 March 2011

JUDGE:

Irwin DCJ

ORDER:

1.The respondent’s application to review the costs assessor’s decision and to set aside the certificate of the costs assessor filed 7 December 2010 is dismissed   

2.That within 14 days the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of thirty- seven thousand, one hundred and ninety-five dollars ($37,195.00).   

CATCHWORDS:

COSTS – ASSESSMENT – application to review costs assessor’s decision – where in 2003 the parties entered into a costs agreement for legal work directed to the Family Court – where in 2007 the proceedings were transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court – where the District Court held that the 2003 costs agreement was void with respect to new work done after transfer – where the Court subsequently ordered that eight bills be assessed by a costs assessor pursuant to s319(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 – whether the costs assessor erred in failing to properly consider the matters prescribed in s341(1) of the Act – whether the costs assessor erred in finding that the solicitors had failed to make disclosure pursuant to Chapter 3, Part 3.4, Division 3 of the Act – whether the costs assessor erred by applying the scale of costs under the Family Law Rules 2004 as a basis for determining a fair and reasonable value of legal services provided by the solicitors.

Family Laws Rules 2004, r 19.18, r 19.19, schs 3, 4 and 6 (cl 6.19)

Federal Magistrates Court Rules2001, r 21.09

Legal Profession Act 2007, s 308, s 310, s 311, s 315, s 316(4), s 319, s 335, s 341, s 342, s 732, s 734, s 736(2)

Queensland Law Society Act 1952, s 48, s 48F, s 48I

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 738, r 742, r 743H

Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621, applied

Bannerot v Waddington [2008] QDC 332, considered

Clarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 404, applied

D.G. Ogle Pty Ltd v Bowdens (1979) Qd R 507, considered

Franklin v Barry & Nilsson Lawyers, unreported, District Court of Queensland, Clare SC, DCJ, No. 2607 of 2009, 13 November 2009, considered.

Gallagher v R (1986) 160 CLR 392, applied

Gilbert v Kozicki [2007] QSC 268, considered

Herald v Worker Bee (Brisbane) Pty Ltd [2004] 2 Qd R 263, considered

Hill v Peel (1870) L.R.5.C.P 172, cited

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, applied

Langdale v Danby [1982] 3 All ER 129; [1982] 1 WLR 1123, applied

Re Bain Gasteen & Co’s Bill of Costs [1990] 1 Qd R 412, applied

Re Feez Ruthning’s Bill of Costs [1989] 1 Qd R…

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Details
Case
[2011] QDC 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Franklin v Barry & Nilsson Lawyers (No 2) is a case involving the assessment of costs incurred by the parties in proceedings transferred from the Family Court to the Federal Magistrates Court. The primary legal issues before the court were whether the costs assessor had erred in failing to properly consider prescribed matters, whether the assessor had wrongly found a failure to disclose, and whether the assessor had incorrectly applied the scale of costs under the Family Law Rules 2004. The case was heard in the District Court, which had previously held that the 2003 costs agreement was void regarding work done after the transfer of the proceedings.

The court examined whether the costs assessor had properly exercised their discretion, noting that the decision of the assessor lies upon the party challenging it to show that the decision was incorrect. The court relied on previous judgments that emphasised the wide discretion of a taxing officer and the limited circumstances in which a court would review such decisions. The District Court noted that the taxing officer's decisions on quantum were generally final and would only be reviewed if there was a clear error in principle or if the discretion was manifestly exercised wrongly.

After considering the arguments and the applicable legal principles, the District Court dismissed the respondent's application to review the costs assessor's decision. The court held that there were no grounds to set aside the certificate of the costs assessor. The court further ordered that the respondent pay the applicant the sum of thirty-seven thousand, one hundred and ninety-five dollars ($37,195.00) within 14 days. This decision underscored the court's reluctance to interfere with the costs assessor's discretion unless there was a clear error or a wrong principle was applied.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.The respondent’s application to review the costs assessor’s decision and to set aside the certificate of the costs assessor filed 7 December 2010 is dismissed

2.That within 14 days the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of thirty- seven thousand, one hundred and ninety-five dollars ($37,195.00).

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The decision of the costs assessor was given in the exercise of a discretionary judgment.[26] Therefore it lies upon the firm to satisfy the court that he failed to exercise that discretion properly. As observed by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v the Commonwealth:[27]“… the exercise of the jurisdiction to review a taxation of costs is subject to no narrower limitation than that which was stated by Bovill CJ and Brett J in Hill v Peel (1870) L.R.5.C.P:- “A very wide discretion must necessarily be left to the taxing officer, which must be exercised by him after careful consideration of each case; and where after properly considering the matter the master has arrived at a decision, it lies upon those who impeach his decision satisfy the court that he is wrong. Where a principle is involved the Court will always entertain the question, and if necessary give directions to the master; but where it is a question of whether the master has exercised his discretion properly, or it is only a question as to the amount to be allowed, the Court is generally unwilling to interfere with the judgment of its officer, whose peculiar province it is to investigate and to judge of such matters, unless there are very strong grounds to show that the officer is wrong in the judgment which he has formed. (emphasis added).”[26]D. G. Ogle v Bowdens (1979) Qd R 507 at 512 with reference to the costs assessor’s predecessor, the taxing officer.[27](1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627-628. In Re Bain Gasteen & Co’s Bill of Costs Thomas J said:[28]“The role of the taxing officer is therefore an extremely important one. The breadth of that discretion is emphasised in Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 C.L.R. 621, 627-628 which states the salutary rule that courts, generally speaking, regard a taxing officer’s decision on quantum as final, and will review the decision of a Taxing Master only if he proceeded on a wrong principle or if there has clearly been an error in the exercise of his discretion.” This is consistent with Kitto J also saying in Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth[29] that while the discretion of a taxing officer is generally speaking final, and it must be a very exceptional case in which a court will entertain an application to review the decision, there is no absolute proposition that a judge will never review a taxing officer’s decision on a question of quantum only. His Honour adopted the summary of the law by Jordan CJ (with whom the other members of the court agreed) in Schweppes Ltd v Archer:[30] “In appeals as to costs, the principles to be applied are these. The Court will always review a decision of a Taxing Officer where it is contended that he has proceeded upon a wrong principle, for the purpose of determining the principle which should be applied; and an error in principle may occur both in determining whether an item should be allowed and in determining how much should be allowed. Where no principle is involved and the question is, whether the Taxing Officer has correctly exercised a discretion which he possesses and is purporting to exercise, the Court is reluctant to interfere. It has undoubted jurisdiction to review the Taxing Officer’s decision even where an exercise of discretion only is involved, and will do so freely on a proper case, using its own knowledge of the circumstances: Western Australian Bank v Royal Insurance Co.; Clark, Tait & Co. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, but it will in general interfere only where the discretion appears not to have been exercised at all, or to have been exercised in a manner which is manifestly wrong; and where the question is one of amount only, will do so only in an extreme case”.[29](1953) 94 CLR 621 at 628.[30](1934) 34 S.R. (NSW) 178 at 183, 184; 51WN 71 at 73.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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