FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Francuziak v Honourable Michael Keenan MP, Minister for Justice
[2015] FCA 464
Citation: Francuziak v Honourable Michael Keenan MP, Minister for Justice [2015] FCA 464 Parties: PAWEL FRANCUZIAK v THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL KEENAN MP, MINISTER FOR JUSTICE File number: WAD 92 of 2014 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 15 May 2015 Catchwords: EXTRADITION – review of decision to surrender under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) – whether Minister applied the wrong test under s 22(3)(b) of the Act – whether overcrowding, delays in consideration for parole, violence and other risks to personal safety, and inadequate medical facilities and illness and disease amount to torture for the purposes of s 22(3)(b) of the Act
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether the Minister’s decision to surrender under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) was unreasonable – whether extradition would be totally incompatible with humanitarian considerations because of exceptional circumstances for the purposes of Art 3(4) of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – whether assurances from Poland should have been sought and obtained
Legislation: Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Art 3
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 11, 18(2), 22(2), 22(3)(b), 23
Extradition (Poland) Regulations 1999 (Cth) reg 4
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), 39B(1A)Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
de Bruyn v Minister for Justice & Customs (2004) 143 FCR 162
de Bruyn v Ellison [2004] FCA 880
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 308 ALR 280
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
O’Connor v Adamas (2013) 210 FCR 364Date of hearing: 28 October 2014 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 73 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr AG Elliott Solicitor for the Applicant: NR Barber Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr EM Heenan Solicitor for the Respondent: Ashurst Australia
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 92 of 2014
BETWEEN: PAWEL FRANCUZIAK
ApplicantAND: THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL KEENAN MP,
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE
Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 MAY 2015
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The Applicant do pay the costs of the Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 92 of 2014
BETWEEN: PAWEL FRANCUZIAK
ApplicantAND: THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL KEENAN MP,
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE
Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE:
15 MAY 2015
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mr Pawel Francuziak is challenging the Minister’s decision to surrender him for extradition to the Republic of Poland. By amended application, he seeks review of the Minister’s…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 464
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the Minister’s decision to surrender was unreasonable and if the assurances from Poland should have been sought and obtained. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Minister applied the wrong test in evaluating the risk of torture. The key legal question was whether the Minister's decision lacked an evident and intelligible justification. The court examined the meaning of "torture" as defined in the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and considered whether the Minister's decision aligned with the statutory requirements.
The court found that the Minister's decision was not so unreasonable as to lack an evident and intelligible justification. The court relied on the earlier decision in de Bruyn v Ellison, where it was held that the Act targets institutionalised torture by government authorities, not occasional and unpredictable violence in prisons. The court noted that the Minister did not address the wrong question and that a proper consideration of the evidence would not inevitably lead to a different conclusion. The court concluded that there was no relevant error demonstrated in the Minister's decision.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss Mr Francuziak’s application and to require him to pay the costs of the Minister, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the statutory framework and the specific criteria outlined in the Extradition Act when considering extradition matters.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The Applicant do pay the costs of the Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Francuziak argues that the fact that such conduct occurs and is apparently condoned by public officials is sufficient to constitute torture, even if not specifically carried out by them. If the conduct is inflicted by or with the involvement of a public official, it is argued that is sufficient to satisfy the definition of torture for the purpose of the determination which was to be made by the Minister in respect of Mr Francuziak. Consideration of the ‘wrong test’ ground and argument Section 22(3)(b) of the Act provides that a person may only be surrendered if:the Attorney-General does not have substantial grounds for believing that, if the person were surrendered to the extradition country, the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture; ... The thrust of the argument for Mr Francuziak is that the Minister erroneously considered whether conditions in the prisons in Poland were the result of deliberate Polish government policy designed to punish and harm inmates or him personally, rather than the correct test, which was whether or not there is a real chance of Mr Francuziak being mistreated, either by, or with the condonation of, government officials. Of course Mr Francuziak’s argument proceeds on the content of the Departmental Advice. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it may be inferred that the Departmental Advice is evidence of the matters the Minister took into account in making his or her decision (as distinct from necessarily constituting his or her personal reasons): see, as one of many examples, O’Connor v Adamas (2013) 210 FCR 364 per Barker J (at [248]-[250]). The difficulty for Mr Francuziak in relation to this issue lies in the meaning of ‘torture’ as discussed in de Bruyn, both at first instance and on appeal. Although the term ‘torture’ is undefined in the Act, its meaning was considered by Dowsett J at first instance in de Bruyn v Ellison. His Honour discussed the dictionary definition of torture, the definition in CAT and in the Crimes Torture Act 1988 (Cth) and made the following observations (at [15]-[16]) concerning circumstances said to apply to possible imprisonment in South Africa:15Mr de Bruyn’s case is that in the South African prison system, violence is often used by prisoners against fellow prisoners for coercive purposes and that this is sometimes connived at by prison officials. There is also a suggestion that from to time, prison officials encourage prisoners to offer violence to other prisoners for the purpose of reinforcing their own authority. Whilst such conduct might fall within the definitions to which I have referred, it seems most unlikely that it was the intention of the Parliament that the Attorney-General be satisfied that no such event will occur before making a decision as to extradition. Violence in prisons is not unknown; nor is corruption of prison officials. It is to be expected that violence will occur in that context and that it will sometimes be motivated by a desire to intimidate or coerce. Paragraph 22(3)(b) of the Act is directed at institutionalised torture by government authorities, not at occasional and unpredictable violence occurring in prisons, even with the connivance of corrupt prison officers.16In any event, the mere fact that incidents of that kind have previously occurred in the South African prison system does not mean that it is likely that Mr de Bruyn will suffer in that way. He has suggested that he might be subject to special attention because he is of Afrikaans extraction, well-educated, has left South Africa and because of his age. These are mere assertions which do not seem to be supported by any evidence. In any event, it cannot be said that the Minister addressed the wrong question or failed to address the issue. Nor can it be said that a proper consideration of the evidence must inevitably have led to his not being satisfied that Mr de Bruyn would not be subjected to torture. No relevant error has been demonstrated. (emphasis added)