Francis and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy

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Francis and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2021] AATA 644 (22 March 2021)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:          2014/3965

Re:Louise Francis

APPLICANT

AndInspector-General in Bankruptcy

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:The Hon. Matthew Groom, Senior Member

Date:22 March 2021

Place:Melbourne

The application for review is dismissed pursuant to section 42B(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

........................................................................

The Hon. Matthew Groom, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

BANKRUPTCY – annulment of bankruptcy – review by Tribunal of decision of Inspector-General in Bankruptcy of contribution assessment – all outstanding debts met – Trustees released – consideration of difference between annulment and discharge of bankruptcy – application dismissed under section 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – bankruptcy – annulment of bankruptcy – decision sought by the applicant no longer of any practical effect and serves no other legitimate purpose – application has become frivolous and vexatious – application dismissed under section 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

CASES

Currey and Australian Community Pharmacy Authority, Re [2007] AATA 1963

Farnan and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, Re [2007] AATA 1199
Marnotta Pty Ltd and Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing, Re (2004) 82 ALD 514
Stenhouse and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2012] AATA 57
Williams and Australian Electoral Commission, Re (1995) 38 ALD 366

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Hon. Matthew Groom, Senior Member

22 March 2021

Introduction

  1. This matter arises out of the administration of the applicant’s former bankrupt estate.

  2. The present issue before the Tribunal is consideration of an application to dismiss in accordance with sections 42B(1)(a) or (c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the “AAT Act”) brought by the respondent on the basis that, by reason of the applicant’s bankruptcy having come to an end, the application has become futile.

    Background

  3. The broader history to this matter is significant. It has involved extensive litigation over a number of years. The litigation has included a significant number of applications before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal seeking a review of various decisions relating to the applicant’s bankruptcy. The present application is one of those matters. The essential background facts are as follows:

    (a)On 25 July 2011, the applicant became bankrupt pursuant to a sequestration order. Mr Gess Rambaldi and Mr Andrew Yeo (the “Trustees”) were appointed trustees of the applicant’s bankrupt estate. The applicant subsequently sought to challenge the effect of the sequestration order through the Federal Court and the High Court but was unsuccessful. The debt that gave rise to the sequestration order had itself arisen out of earlier litigation in which the applicant had been involved.

    (b)The applicant lodged her Statement of Affairs with the Trustees on 15 April 2013.

    (c)On 28 April 2014, the Trustees issued the applicant with a notice of contribution assessment requiring her to make payments to her bankrupt estate under section 139P of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the “Bankruptcy…

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Details
Case
[2021] AATA 644
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal considered an application by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy to dismiss a review of a contribution assessment made against the applicant, Louise Ellen Francis. The applicant had sought review of a decision by the Inspector-General concerning contribution assessments made by her trustees. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the applicant's bankruptcy had concluded in a manner that rendered the ongoing review application futile.

The Tribunal was required to determine whether the applicant's application for review had become futile or served no legitimate purpose, thereby justifying its dismissal under section 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). This involved considering the status of the applicant's bankruptcy, the release of her trustees, and the practical effect of any decision the Tribunal might make in light of these developments.

The Tribunal reasoned that the applicant's bankruptcy had been annulled on 14 August 2020, pursuant to section 153A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), due to all debts and costs being paid in full. Furthermore, the Trustees had been released from their duties, meaning there was no longer a trustee in place to enforce any contribution assessment. Drawing on precedent, specifically *Re Farnan and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy*, the Tribunal concluded that, as the bankruptcy had concluded and the trustees released, any decision on the contribution assessment would have no practical utility. The Tribunal found the application to be futile, aligning with the meaning of "frivolous" in the context of section 42B, which signifies an application that is pointless because the Tribunal cannot assist the applicant in a meaningful way.

Consequently, the Tribunal ordered that the application for review be dismissed pursuant to section 42B(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Tribunal noted that this decision was made without reflecting adversely on the applicant, acknowledging her intelligence and genuine concerns, and expressing empathy for her personal circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The present issue before the Tribunal is consideration of an application to dismiss in accordance with sections 42B(1)(a) or (c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the “AAT Act”) brought by the respondent on the basis that, by reason of the applicant’s bankruptcy having come to an end, the application has become futile.Background The broader history to this matter is significant. It has involved extensive litigation over a number of years. The litigation has included a significant number of applications before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal seeking a review of various decisions relating to the applicant’s bankruptcy. The present application is one of those matters. The essential background facts are as follows:(a)On 25 July 2011, the applicant became bankrupt pursuant to a sequestration order. Mr Gess Rambaldi and Mr Andrew Yeo (the “Trustees”) were appointed trustees of the applicant’s bankrupt estate. The applicant subsequently sought to challenge the effect of the sequestration order through the Federal Court and the High Court but was unsuccessful. The debt that gave rise to the sequestration order had itself arisen out of earlier litigation in which the applicant had been involved. (b)The applicant lodged her Statement of Affairs with the Trustees on 15 April 2013.(c)On 28 April 2014, the Trustees issued the applicant with a notice of contribution assessment requiring her to make payments to her bankrupt estate under section 139P of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the “Bankruptcy Act”). Pursuant to the notice the applicant was required to pay the following amounts to her bankrupt estate:(i)$35,775.71 in respect of the contribution assessment period from 25 July 2011 to 24 July 2012 (“CAP 1”);(ii)$78,189.23 in respect of the contribution assessment period from 25 July 2012 to 24 July 2013 (“CAP 2”); and(iii)$36,220.71 in respect of the contribution assessment period from 25 July 2013 to 24 July 2014 (“CAP 3”).(d)On 29 April 2014, the applicant requested the respondent review the Trustees’ decision under section 139ZA of the Act. On 30 June 2014, a delegate of the respondent wrote to the applicant advising that they had decided to set aside the Trustees’ assessment and to make fresh assessments under section 139ZD of the Bankruptcy Act. The fresh assessments were as follows:(i)$29,882.60 in respect of CAP 1;(ii)$70,784.43 in respect of CAP 2; and(iii)$18,468.30 in respect of CAP 3.(e)On 28 July 2014, the applicant sought review of the respondent’s decision before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal pursuant to section 139ZF of the Bankruptcy Act. (f)Separate to the sequence of events relating to the contribution assessments, both the applicant and the Trustees were involved in a series of other legal proceedings relating to the applicant’s bankruptcy. On 8 January 2013, the applicant commenced proceedings in the Federal Court seeking an annulment of her bankrupt estate. That application was dismissed. During the course of 2013 various attempts were made by the Trustees to secure a sale of a property of the applicant. There was a sequence of further legal proceedings relating to that sale.(g)On 16 November 2015, the applicant’s mother passed away and the applicant became a beneficiary of her will. Probate was granted in respect of the will and the applicant’s brother was appointed as executor. Again, there were a number of legal proceedings commenced in relation to the deceased estate. The deceased estate included various properties and other assets. (h)During the course of 2017 and following, the applicant engaged in various other legal proceedings seeking to challenge the Trustees’ remuneration.(i)On 16 June 2017, the Trustees received $850,000 from the deceased estate. Following this the Trustees wrote to the applicant notifying the applicant of an estimate of the funds required to pay all outstanding debts and annul the bankruptcy. The Trustees subsequently engaged in negotiation with the applicant’s brother, as executor of the deceased estate, for this purpose. A further dispute arose in respect of the sale of one of the properties. The Trustees subsequently applied to the Federal Circuit Court for directions. On 1 October 2018, His Honour Judge McNab made orders that the Trustees were acting reasonably in giving consent for the sale of one of the properties. (j)The property the subject of those orders was subsequently sold and an amount from that sale was paid to the Trustees for the purpose of meeting all outstanding debts and costs in the applicant’s bankruptcy. The applicant’s bankruptcy was then annulled.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal does not intend to in any way reflect adversely on the applicant herself. In all of her dealings with the Tribunal the applicant has presented as an intelligent person with genuine concerns. The Tribunal has real empathy for the difficult personal circumstances the applicant has had to navigate. The difficulty for the Tribunal is that as matters now stand it can no longer see a legitimate purpose in proceeding with the application. As now Deputy President McCabe noted in Stenhouse and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2012] AATA 57 at [4]:The expression “frivolous or vexatious” is often misunderstood. In one sense, the words are unfortunate: an applicant might suppose the Tribunal is not taking his or her complaint seriously if it is described as being “frivolous”. That word has a particular meaning when it is used in the Act. It means the application is futile or pointless, most obviously because the Tribunal is not able to assist the applicant in a meaningful way.Decision The application for review is dismissed pursuant to section 42B(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Re Farnan and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2007] AATA 1199 Deputy President Jarvis considered the application of section 42B(1)(a) specifically in the context of a bankruptcy matter. In that case the discharge of the applicant’s bankruptcy had been delayed because the trustee had lodged a notice of objection to the discharge. The Inspector-General subsequently made a decision to affirm the action of the trustee. The applicant applied to the AAT for a review of the Inspector-General’s decision. The trustee subsequently withdrew the notice of objection with the effect that the applicant’s bankruptcy was discharged. Despite this the applicant sought to continue with the application for review of the Inspector-General’s decision because he wished to demonstrate that the decision had been wrongly taken. The respondent, which was the Inspector-General, sought dismissal under section 42B(1) of the AAT Act on the basis that the application had become frivolous or vexatious, claiming that no purpose would be served in continuing with the review. The Tribunal dismissed the application on the basis that as the applicant had since become discharged from the bankruptcy there would no longer be any utility in reviewing the decision of the Inspector-General. The Tribunal concluded:Mr Farnan has already been discharged from bankruptcy by virtue of s 149A(3)(b), because the trustee has previously withdrawn his objection. Any decision by this tribunal would accordingly be of no practical utility, thus also enlivening the discretion conferred on the tribunal by s42B(1) of the AAT Act to dismiss the application for review.Consideration The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant’s bankruptcy has been annulled and is now at an end. The annulment has been effected pursuant to section 153A of the Bankruptcy Act as a consequence of all debts and costs having been paid in full. This is confirmed by the National Personal Insolvency Index extract dated 22 August 2020 included in the Tribunal materials. The extract describes the applicant’s bankruptcy as having been annulled pursuant to section 153A of the Bankruptcy Act as a consequence of “PAYMENT IN FULL”. The extract states that the applicant is no longer a bankrupt “under this administration” and states that the date of the annulment is 14 August 2020. In addition, the Tribunal is also satisfied that the Trustees’ office has come to an end and therefore there is no Trustee in place to enforce a contribution assessment either now or at any time the future. This is consistent with the orders of Judge McNab of 3 June 2020 where he ordered that upon payment of ‘all the bankrupt’s debts’ (as defined in s 153A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’), including trustees remuneration and expenses and interest on interest bearing debts, the trustees are released from the trusteeship of the bankrupt estate of Louise Ellen Francis pursuant to section 183 of the Act upon the giving of the certificate save that the release shall not prevent the review of the remuneration of the trustees.