Frajnd and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

Frajnd and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2018] AATA 1515 (12 June 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/6677
Re:Mark Frajnd
APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Member D K Grigg
Date:12 June 2018
Place:Brisbane

The decision under review is affirmed.
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Member D K Grigg
CATCHWORDS
FAMILY ASSISTANCE – family tax benefit – overpayment – whether administrative error – whether there are any special circumstances – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999
CASES
Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133
Groth v Secretary Department of Social Security [1995] FCA 1708
Riddell v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1993] FCA 261; (1993) 42 FCR 443
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales [1998] FCA 219; (1998) 82 FCR 154
Secretary of the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs v Jones [2012] 89 ATR 267; [2012] FCA 639
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Family Assistance Guide (2018)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Member D K Grigg
12 June 2018
INTRODUCTION & CLAIM HISTORY

At all relevant times Mr Frajnd was a recipient of family tax benefit (FTB) payments.
Pursuant to section 22 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (“Family Assistance Act”), entitlement to FTB is dependent upon a person having an FTB child. If an individual's percentage of care for a child during a care period is less than 35%, the child is taken not to be an FTB child: section 25 of the Family Assistance Act. Schedule 1 of the Family Assistance Act sets out how the rate of a parent’s FTB is determined. That rate will depend in part on the parent shared care percentage under section 59 of the Family Assistance Act.
On 27 January 2017, Mr Frajnd informed Centrelink that he had separated from his partner on 25 January 2017.[1] Mr Frajnd lodged further separation details on 7 February 2017 advising that he currently had 50% care of four children.[2]
[1] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T5, pages 36 – 41, Separation Details Form dated 27 January 2017.
[2] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T6, pages 42 – 47, Separation Details Form dated 7 February 2017.
Mr Frajnd’s former partner, Ms Jameney, lodged childcare arrangements details with Centrelink on 13 February 2017 stating that Mr Frajnd had moved out of the marital home on 25 January 2017 and that all of the children of the relationship were in her care.[3]
[3] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T7, pages 48 – 60, Details of Childcare Arrangements Form completed by Ms Jameney
dated 13 February 2017.
Mr Frajnd lodged a further childcare arrangements details form with Centrelink on 8 March 2017 which indicated that care arrangements had not yet been determined between himself and his ex-partner and that two of the children, his partner’s biological children, are independent of him and due to their age require no care from him.[4]
[4] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T8, pages 61 – 73, Details of Childcare Arrangements Form completed by Mr Frajnd
dated 8 March 2017.
On 12 April 2017, Mr Frajnd advised Centrelink that all the children were living with his ex-partner and that she was entitled to 100% FTB. Mr Frajnd advised Centrelink that Ms Jemeney had not been receiving any of the benefits because they had been redirected to a joint account since they separated.[5]
[5] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T9, page 74, Statement by Mr Frajnd dated 12 April 2017.
As a result of Mr Frajnd’s updated information Centrelink:
(a)adjusted the amount of FTB payable to Mr Franjd and Ms Jemeney;
(b)still paid Mr Franjd FTB on the basis that he had 100% care of one child;[6] and
(c)paid Ms Jemeney FTB backdated to 24 January 2017.[7]
[6] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T22, pages 219-221, Centrelink notice dated 24 April 2017.
[7] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T2, page 7, SSCSD’s Decision and Reasons for Decision dated 20 October 2017, para 6.
On 5 July 2017 Centrelink determined that because the children had not been in Mr Frajnd’s care or control since 25 January 2017 that he had been overpaid FTB amounts totalling $6895.07 for the period 24 January 2017 to 16 June 2017 and advised Mr Frajnd that Centrelink was required to recover this amount (“ FTB Debt ”).[8]
[8] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T 10 – T12, pages 76 – 81, Debt explanation and calculation documents and Centrelink
notice re account payable dated 5 July 2017.
Mr Frajnd sought a review of Centrelink’s decision to raise the FTB Debt by an Authorised Review Officer (“ARO”).[9] The appeal to the ARO was unsuccessful. The ARO found that the FTB Debt had been raised correctly and that no “special circumstances” existed to waive the debts.[10]
[9] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T 13, page 82, Centrelink letter dated 11 July 2017.
[10] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T 14, pages 83 – 90, Decision of Authorised Review Officer and notes dated 28 July
2017.
Mr Frajnd then lodged an application for review with the Social Services and Child Support Division (“SSCSD”) of this Tribunal.[11] The SSCSD rejected Mr Frajnd’s claim and affirmed the ARO’s decision on 20 October 2017.[12]
[11] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T 15, pages 91-92, Letter from AAT to Centrelink dated 3 August 2017.
[12] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T2, pages 5- 11, SSCSD’s Decision and Reasons for Decision dated 20 October 2017.
Mr Frajnd has sought a review of the SSCSD’s decision by this Tribunal.[13]
[13] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T1, pages 1 – 4, Application for Review dated 10 November 2017.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The issues for determination are whether:
(a)Mr Frajnd has been overpaid FTB payments;
(b)the FTB Debt is recoverable; and, if yes
(c)the FTB Debt should be written off; or
(d)the FTB Debt should be waived due to administrative error; or
(e)“special circumstances” exist such that the FTB Debt should be waived.
WAS MR FRAJND OVERPAID FTB PAYMENTS?
Once Centrelink became aware that the children of the relationship were no longer in Mr Frajnd’s care, the FTB payments to Mr Frajnd were cancelled and Centrelink raised the FTB Debt.
Section 71 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (“Administration Act”) provides that overpaid FTB debts due to the Commonwealth.
In written submissions provided in advance of the hearing, Mr Frajnd argued that the calculation and raising of the FTB debt was incorrect on the grounds that he had been a shared carer of the children during the FTB debt period.[14] However, at the hearing, Mr Frajnd told the Tribunal that he no longer wished to pursue that line of argument and does not dispute the calculations of the amount of the FTB Debt.
[14] Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 10, Points and Issues and Evidence and Arguments of Mr Frajnd dated 11 April
2018.
Therefore Mr Frajnd owes the FTB Debt to the Commonwealth.
IS THE FTB DEBT RECOVERABLE?
Even if a debt is owed, the Secretary may write off, or waive, a debt in certain circumstances (see sections 95, 97 and 101 of the Administration Act).
Should the FTB Debt be written off?
The Secretary may write off a debt in certain circumstances set out in section 95 of the Administration Act. Those sections provide that a debt may be written off, relevantly, where:
(a)the debt is irrecoverable at law; or
(b)the debtor has no capacity to repay the debt; or
(c)it is not cost effective for the Commonwealth to take action to
recover the debt.
Is the debt irrecoverable at law? (section 95(3))
A debt is taken to be irrecoverable at law if, and only if there is no proof of the debt capable of sustaining legal proceedings for its recovery: section 95(3) of the Administration Act.
None of the circumstances set out in section 95(3) of the Administration Act exist in this case and therefore the debt is not irrecoverable at law.
Does Mr Frajnd have the capacity to repay the debt? (section 95(4))
If a debt is recoverable by means of deductions from social security payments, income tax refunds or family assistance payments, the debtor is taken to have a capacity to repay the debt unless recovery by those means would result in the debtor being in severe financial hardship.
Mr Frajnd contends he is suffering from “severe financial hardship”. The Secretary submits that Mr Frajnd is not suffering from severe financial hardship.[15]
[15] Exhibit 2, Secretary’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 4 May 2018, para 59.
Other Tribunal decisions have determined that “severe financial hardship” needs to involve severe or extreme financial suffering and that a person’s entire financial position would need to be materially less than the current rate of their pension.[16]
[16] Re Lumsden and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1986] AATA 228; Stubbs and Secretary, Department
of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 729; L and Department of Social Security [1995] AATA 159;
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Birgden [2003] AATA 67.
The Family Assistance Guide, which is used by Centrelink as a guide to the interpretation application of the Family Assistance Act, sets out in section 1.1.S.45 that:
The issue of severe financial hardship should be decided on an individual basis, taking into account the individual's circumstances. These would include:
·         the make up of the family group (e.g. single parent, number of children etc.),
·         current family income and expenses,
·         minimum amount of expected debt repayment under Centrelink guidelines,
·         standard reduction amounts for any outstanding FTB advances,
·         available funds, and
·         exceptional expenses (e.g. funeral or pharmaceutical costs).
There must be clear evidence that severe financial hardship would result (after reasonable expenses are deducted from income) if recovery of a debt were pursued, or if the standard FTB advance reduction rate continued to apply. Reasonable expenditure includes, but is not limited to: rent, groceries, electricity, minimum loan repayments, school fees, medical costs etc.
…
For the purpose of considering a waiver or a write-off, or reducing or suspending recovery of an FTB advance a person would be subject to severe financial hardship if their net fortnightly income (after reasonable expenses are deducted from gross income) over the debt repayment period (for both debts and advance recovery) would be less than the minimum fortnightly amount the person would be allowed to repay under the flexible repayment arrangements for FA debts.
The Tribunal is not bound to apply the Guide but it may, and it should apply it in exercising its discretion unless it is unlawful or “tends to produce an unjust decision”.[17]
[17] Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, at 645.
Mr Frajnd has been repaying the FTB Debt by way of fortnightly deductions of $15.00.[18]
[18] Exhibit 2, Secretary’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 4 May 2018, para 57, Annexure B, pages
8 and 10.
Mr Frajnd supplied a Statement of Financial Circumstances in October 2017 which indicated that his fortnightly income (a Centrelink disability support payment) was $960 per fortnight and his fortnightly expenses totalled $1782.47.[19] The Secretary notes that Mr Frajnd currently receives Centrelink payments totalling $1,042.40 gross per fortnight.[20]
[19] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T 16, pages 93 – 97, statement of financial circumstances dated 4 October 2017.
[20] Exhibit 2, Secretary’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 4 May 2018, para 57, Annexure B, pages
8 and 10.
Mr Frajnd wrote on the Statement of Financial Circumstances that it was a struggle for him to meet all of his commitments, he was in massive debt and was unable to pay his commitments. Mr Frajnd says that he and his ex-partner have a severely disabled child requiring constant care, who is expensive to support and this has resulted in the debt which he is carrying.
It is noted that Mr Frajnd’s claimed expenses are almost double that of the fortnightly income. The Secretary contends that a significant part of the expenses identified by Mr Frajnd relate to debts incurred by Mr Frajnd as opposed to his basic living expenses. The Secretary calculated that Mr Frajnd’s basic living expenses were only $814.61 per fortnight which is over $200 less than his current fortnightly Centrelink benefits.[21]
[21] Exhibit 2, Secretary’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 4 May 2018, paras 55 – 56, Annexure B.
At the hearing, Mr Frajnd confirmed that while he had debts he was not paying them. The Secretary made the point that the debt owed to the Australian taxpayer should be prioritised.
Mr Frajnd was given leave after the hearing to provide further details and corroborating documentation regarding the debts claimed in order that consideration could be given to whether or not they constituted reasonable expenditure. Mr Frajnd provided the following:
(a)two electricity bills issued on 19 January 2017 and 27 March 2017 showing an outstanding balance of $1437.55;
(b)a text message from an unknown sender indicating that he has an outstanding account - however, it is unknown who sent the text message, unclear what amount is owing and for what purpose the debt was incurred;
(c)Brisbane Adventist College statements and a default judgement entered in the Magistrates Court against Mr Frajnd and Ms Jameney dated 18 July 2016 indicating that they owe $104,571.71 in outstanding school fees for three of their children. The claim had originally been filed by Brisbane Adventist College on 19 November 2014;
(d)an advice letter from Caxton legal service regarding how Mr Franjd could approach Brisbane Adventist College to discuss payment plans or a non-enforcement order on compassionate grounds; and
(e)a settlement offer from citi debt recovery regarding an outstanding balance of $21,502.05 dated 15 April 2016. It is unknown to what this debt relates.
The information provided demonstrates that the debts upon which Mr Frajnd seeks to rely in support of his claim that he is suffering severe financial hardship are primarily concerning the outstanding school fees. No information has been provided, despite the Tribunal’s suggestion at the hearing, regarding what payment plan if any has been entered into with any of the entities to whom he owes money. Further, Mr Frajnd has decided, again despite the Tribunal’s suggestion, not to provide copies of any bank statements since April 2017 in order to demonstrate his current financial position. Mr Frajnd says that his disabled child costs a lot of money in care and yet despite a request by the Tribunal no information of any kind has been provided. Private school fees are a discretionary expense and are not what would constitute a reasonable expense particularly given that they were incurred at a time that Mr Frajnd told the Tribunal he had been significantly unwell and had been unable for health reasons to work. Mr Frajnd has not worked since he enrolled his children in school and yet he continued to enroll them. As a result of making this financially irresponsible decision, a significant debt is now owed by Mr Frajnd and his ex-partner. Whilst the Tribunal acknowledges that the debt exists there is simply no evidence that Mr Frajnd is paying back that debt or if he has entered into some arrangement as was recommended to him by Caxton Legal Service for a non-enforcement order or a more generous time within which to pay the debt.
Further, no evidence has been provided by Ms Jameney to support Mr Frajnd’s evidence that he gives everything he can to her to support the expenses required to assist their child. The other debt information provided is one to two years old. No current information has been provided.
Based on the Guide, Mr Frajnd would not be found to be suffering from severe financial hardship. In the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that Mr Frajnd has not demonstrated that he is suffering from severe financial hardship.
Is it cost-effective for the Commonwealth to recover the debt? (section 95(2)(d))
There is no indication from the Secretary that it is not cost-effective for it to recover the debt.
Conclusion – Write-Off
There is no basis for the FTB Debt to be written off under section 95 of the Administration Act.
Should the FTB Debt be Waived due To Administrative Error? (Section 97, the Administration Act)
Section 97 of the Administration Act provides relevantly:
Waiver of debt arising from error
(1) The Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion (the administrative error proportion ) of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if subsection (2) or (3) applies to that proportion of the debt.
(2) The Secretary must waive the administrative error proportion of a debt if:
(a) the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to the administrative error proportion of the debt; and
(b) the person would suffer severe financial hardship if it were not waived.
It can be seen from section 97(2) that even if the debt, or a portion of the debt, was attributable solely to administrative error, unless the person would suffer from severe financial hardship if it were not waived, section 97(1) does not apply.
As the Tribunal has found that Mr Frajnd would not suffer from severe financial hardship in the event that the FTB Debt was not waived, section 97(1) does not apply.
ARE THERE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAKE IT DESIRABLE FOR THE FTB DEBT TO BE WAIVED? (SECTION 101, THE ADMINISTRATION ACT)
The Secretary may also waive a debt owed, under section 101 of the Administration Act, if satisfied:
(a)the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i)making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii)failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the family assistance law; and
(b)
there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it

desirable to waive; and
(c)it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.
There are a few elements to be satisfied before a debt may be waived under section 101 of the Administration Act. First, the debt must not have arisen from the debtor; that is, Mr Frajnd must not have knowingly made a false statement or a false representation or knowingly failed or omitted to comply with a provision of the Social Security Act or the Administration Act. Second, there must be special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive the debt. Third, it must be more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.
What does “special circumstances” mean?
The Family Assistance Act does not define what constitutes “special circumstances”.
There has been considerable judicial consideration of the phrase in the context of other social security legislation, for example:
·“Special” denotes something different from the usual or ordinary: Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1995] FCA 1708; (1995) 40 ALD 541, at 545 per Kiefel J (as she then was).
·French J (as he then was) said in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 82 FCR 154, at 162:
The concept of special circumstances is broad. A constellation of factors, including financial circumstances, may fall within it. The express exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance is an indicator that it would otherwise be included. This gives some measure of the range of circumstances which will qualify as special. But as a matter of grammar and ordinary logic, the exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance does not mandate its inclusion in the range of matters constituting such circumstances for the purpose of enlivening the Secretary's discretion… It is inappropriate to constrain that flexibility by imposing a narrow or artificial construction upon the words. It may be that there will be few cases in which the Secretary will be satisfied that there are special circumstances in the absence of financial hardship. It may be that there are few cases in which having found special circumstances to exist, the Secretary would exercise the discretion to waive in the absence of financial hardship. But to anticipate the limits of the categories of possible cases by imposing on the language of the section a fetter upon its application which is not mandated by its words, is to erode its useful purpose.
·The Full Federal Court in Riddell v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1993) 42 FCR 443 held, at 450:
Each particular case must be considered on its merits. It is the essential nature of the provision to create a broad discretion to meet the great variety of circumstances which must occur, raising considerations of individual hardship, need, fairness, reasonableness, and whatever else may move an administrator, keeping in mind the scope and purposes of the Act, to make a decision one way or the other.
·Jacobson J in Secretary of the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs v Jones [2012] 89 ATR 267; [2012] FCA 639 explained the effect of the authorities as follows [emphasis added]:
[51] ...the phrase “special circumstances”, although lacking in precision, is sufficiently understood as including events or things that render the operation of the statue in a particular case as unfair, unintended or unjust. What is required is something that takes the case out of the ordinary, and unfairness or unintended consequences may show that this exists. Moreover, the circumstances of the case are not confined to matters that are external to the operation of the statutory scheme: see Smith per von Doussa J at 60, 61–62; Groth per Kiefel J at 545, Kertland v Secretary, Dept of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64 per Merkel J at 71, 73; Kirkbright v Secretary, Dept of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281 per Mansfield J at [22], [26]–[27] and [31]–[32]; see also Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR 1 per Heerey J at [17].

The AAT has also considered the phrase and followed the interpretation in Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1, at [12] (i.e. that the circumstances must be unusual, uncommon or exceptional).[22]
[22]See Hunnibell and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2004] AATA 992, at [19]; Papps and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] AATA 660, at [37].
In summary, the circumstances relied upon to be “special” must be unusual, different, uncommon or exceptional.[23]
[23]The core requirement for “special reasons” is that there be something “unusual or different”: French J in Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 106; (1999) 90 FCR 531, at [18]; Barker J in Kazmierczak v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1084,
Do special circumstances exist?
The Secretary submits that there is no evidence that special circumstances exist and that therefore the discretion to waive the debt cannot be invoked.[24]
[24] Exhibit 2, Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 12 July 2017, para104.
Section 101 of the Administration Act specifically provides that financial hardship alone will not constitute a special circumstance.
Mr Frajnd contends that he had mental health issues which give rise to a finding of “special circumstance”. In support of this he tendered a report from Ms Jeannette Brennan, Clinical Psychologist, dated 15 May 2018.[25] Ms Brennan reports that Mr Frajnd was referred to her on 6 June 2016 for anger, depression, anxiety and relationship stress. Ms Brennan writes that Mr Frajnd was severely stressed about his family situation and his children and that Mr Frajnd told her “he was unable to make a clear break because of the family especially the severely disabled child [and] this including his symptoms severely affected his decision making, including the Centrelink process”.
[25] Exhibit 6, Report of Ms Brennan dated 15 May 2018.
The Full Federal Court pointed out in Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133 that whether circumstances are special depends on how the error (or debt) came about; that is, what gave rise to the overpayment. Hill J, with Kiefel and Hely JJ concurring, provided that “Whether those circumstances were or were not special will obviously be a matter for the decision maker when the factual circumstances have been ascertained”.[26]
[26] Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133, at [67]. See also [2003] FCAFC 133, at [79]
What gave rise to the FTB Debt was in part Mr Frajnd’s uncertainty, understandably, at the early stages of separation about the extent to which he would be sharing care of the children with his ex-partner. Once it had been confirmed and verified by Centrelink that the children were and had been at all relevant times in the 100% care of Ms Jemeney, it was clear that Mr Frajnd had been overpaid.
Mr Frajnd told the Tribunal that when he informed Centrelink that his wife had 100% care of the children, he probably should have told Centrelink that to begin with. However, at that time, that is at the time of initial separation, his wife could not make a claim for FTB for residency reasons. This indicates that Mr Frajnd knew full well that he was not entitled to the FTB and that he sought to circumvent the law by claiming when his ex-partner could not.
Mr Frajnd points to the fact that when he advised Centrelink that Ms Jemeney had 100% care he identified that he had been transferring the FTB payments he had received to Ms Jemeney anyway so that Centrelink would not double pay. The Tribunal accepts that Ms Jemeney was upfront, at this point, and that the evidence verifies he was transferring those payments to Ms Jemeney.[27] However, the Tribunal still does not consider this to be a special circumstance. Nor does it indicate that Mr Frajnd was not capable of making decisions at the time the debt arose. He knew exactly what he was doing. He told the Tribunal that as far as he was concerned his family was entitled to the FTB so it did not matter who received it. Again, this was not Mr Frajnd’s decision to make. Mr Frajnd accepted that his family had been double paid their FTB entitlement but said his family would have suffered if he had not taken the payments and he had to act in a way so that his family would survive. Mr Frajnd says he tried to contact Centrelink when he continued to receive FTB but there is no record of that. The Tribunal does not accept that Mr Frajnd tried to notify Centrelink of the mistake, particularly because it does not fit with the rest of his evidence that he felt he was doing the right thing by his family. He sought to argue that the onus was on Centrelink. However, that is incorrect and also completely ignores the fact that the obligations set out in the notices he received from Centrelink are clear that it is the recipient that “must notify” the Department of a change in circumstances. For example, Centrelink sent letters to Mr Frajnd on 8 February 2017, 6 March 2017, 23 March 2017, 6 April 2017 and 24 April 2017 setting out his obligations to notify the Department if there was any relevant change in his circumstances.[28] There is no evidence that Mr Frajnd’s mental health was a circumstance that gave rise to the FTB Debt
[27] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T9, page 74, Statement of Mr Frajnd dated 12 April 2017; T17, page 108, Bank
statement.
[28] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T22, pages 174-221, Centrelink notices dated 8 February 2017, 27 February 2017, 6
March 2017, 23 March 2017, 6 April 2017, 24 April 2017.
.
The Tribunal finds that “special circumstances” do not exist. There is no basis for the FTB Debt to be waived under section 1237AAD of the Act.
DECISION
The decision under review is affirmed.

I certify that the preceding 54 (fifty – four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Member D K Grigg

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Associate
Dated: 12 June 2018

Date of hearing: 16 May 2018

Date final submissions received: 31 May 2018

Applicant: In person

Advocate for the Respondent: Mr Rick McQuinlan

Solicitors for the Respondent: Department of Human Services

at [37].

[2018] AATA 1515

12 June 2018

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Administrative Law

Statutory Interpretation

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Appeal

Remedies

Date of hearing:	16 May 2018
Date final submissions received:	31 May 2018
Applicant:	In person
Advocate for the Respondent:	Mr Rick McQuinlan
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Department of Human Services